We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor’s reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator’s disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor’s reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools. (JEL D82, D83, G21, G28, G38, M42)
{"title":"Monitor Reputation and Transparency","authors":"I. Marinovic, M. Szydlowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3703870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703870","url":null,"abstract":"We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor’s reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator’s disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor’s reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools. (JEL D82, D83, G21, G28, G38, M42)","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86901469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alan P. Kwan, Chen Lin, Vesa Pursiainen, Mingzhu Tai
Banks’ information technology (IT) capabilities affect their ability to serve customers during the COVID-19 pandemic, which generates an unexpected and unprecedented shock that shifts banking services from in-person to digital. Amid mobility restrictions, banks with better IT experience larger reductions in physical branch visits and larger increases in website traffic, implying a larger shift to digital banking. Stronger IT banks are able to originate more Paycheck Protection Program loans to small business borrowers, especially in areas with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, higher internet use, and higher bank competition. Those banks also attract more deposit flows and receive better mobile customer reviews during the pandemic.
{"title":"Stress Testing Banks' Digital Capabilities: Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Alan P. Kwan, Chen Lin, Vesa Pursiainen, Mingzhu Tai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3694288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3694288","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Banks’ information technology (IT) capabilities affect their ability to serve customers during the COVID-19 pandemic, which generates an unexpected and unprecedented shock that shifts banking services from in-person to digital. Amid mobility restrictions, banks with better IT experience larger reductions in physical branch visits and larger increases in website traffic, implying a larger shift to digital banking. Stronger IT banks are able to originate more Paycheck Protection Program loans to small business borrowers, especially in areas with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, higher internet use, and higher bank competition. Those banks also attract more deposit flows and receive better mobile customer reviews during the pandemic.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81001816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of informal institutional environment on bank capital decisions worldwide as well as within the United States at the state level. Specifically, we focus on individualism and based on a sample of 7,034 banks in 68 countries, we establish three major findings: First, individualism is negatively and significantly associated with bank regulatory capital, an association which is independent of the influence of formal institutional environment per se. Second, effective legal enforcement magnifies the negative effect of individualism on bank regulatory capital. Finally, focusing on a single country, the United States, we also find that banks in individualistic states hold less regulatory capital than banks in collectivist states and the effect of individualism is magnified with effective legal enforcement at the state level. Our findings suggest that individualism serves as a constraint on regulators, as any given regulatory guidelines or formal institutional factors will operate very differently depending on the informal institutional environment.
{"title":"Individualism, Formal Institutional Environment and Bank Capital Decisions","authors":"Mohammad Bitar, Amine Tarazi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3709448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709448","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of informal institutional environment on bank capital decisions worldwide as well as within the United States at the state level. Specifically, we focus on individualism and based on a sample of 7,034 banks in 68 countries, we establish three major findings: First, individualism is negatively and significantly associated with bank regulatory capital, an association which is independent of the influence of formal institutional environment per se. Second, effective legal enforcement magnifies the negative effect of individualism on bank regulatory capital. Finally, focusing on a single country, the United States, we also find that banks in individualistic states hold less regulatory capital than banks in collectivist states and the effect of individualism is magnified with effective legal enforcement at the state level. Our findings suggest that individualism serves as a constraint on regulators, as any given regulatory guidelines or formal institutional factors will operate very differently depending on the informal institutional environment.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81403981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper documents implications of Germany’s draft regulation on electronic securities for RegTech and SupTech. Regulation of electronic securities or a dematerialized system should not only serve the development of the private sector, FinTech and RegTech for regulatory compliance but also serve the public sector, namely support RegTech for regulators and SupTech for financial supervisors. Electronic securities have the potential to increase operational efficiency and accuracy both in compliance and supervision, namely, corporate governance, audit, and surveillance by deploying RegTech and SupTech systems. Digital transformation in the financial sector should include considerations in line with the digital finance requirements, such as closing the technology gap between the private and public sectors and managing asymmetric technology risks. Germany’s draft regulation is a strong signal for digital transformation in Germany; however, it does not foresee a fully dematerialized system, a prerequisite for well-designed RegTech and SupTech systems.
{"title":"Implications of Germany’s Draft Electronic Securities Regulation for RegTech and SupTech","authors":"Stefan Zeranski, Ibrahim E. Sancak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3692401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692401","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents implications of Germany’s draft regulation on electronic securities for RegTech and SupTech. Regulation of electronic securities or a dematerialized system should not only serve the development of the private sector, FinTech and RegTech for regulatory compliance but also serve the public sector, namely support RegTech for regulators and SupTech for financial supervisors. Electronic securities have the potential to increase operational efficiency and accuracy both in compliance and supervision, namely, corporate governance, audit, and surveillance by deploying RegTech and SupTech systems. Digital transformation in the financial sector should include considerations in line with the digital finance requirements, such as closing the technology gap between the private and public sectors and managing asymmetric technology risks. Germany’s draft regulation is a strong signal for digital transformation in Germany; however, it does not foresee a fully dematerialized system, a prerequisite for well-designed RegTech and SupTech systems.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90725499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Spanish abstract: El presente capitulo trata del asesoramiento financiero automatizado, conocido como «Robo-Advice». Se analiza su origen y desarrollo como una de las actividades de las finanzas tecnologicas (Fintech) de mayor proyeccion. Tras acercarnos a su naturaleza juridica y su distincion de otras figuras, se aborda su regimen legal, en particular desde la Union Europea, para concluir con algunas propuestas de politica legislativa. English abstract: This chapter is about automated financial advice, known as Robo-Advice. Its origin and development are analyzed as Fintech activity of greater projection. After approaching its legal nature and its distinction from other figures, its legal regime is addressed, particularly from the European Union, to conclude with some legislative policy proposals.
{"title":"Asesoramiento Financiero Automatizado (Robo-Advice), Nuevo Animal Financiero (Automated Financial Advice (Robo-Advice), New Financial Animal)","authors":"F. Zunzunegui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3692271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692271","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish abstract: El presente capitulo trata del asesoramiento financiero automatizado, conocido como «Robo-Advice». Se analiza su origen y desarrollo como una de las actividades de las finanzas tecnologicas (Fintech) de mayor proyeccion. Tras acercarnos a su naturaleza juridica y su distincion de otras figuras, se aborda su regimen legal, en particular desde la Union Europea, para concluir con algunas propuestas de politica legislativa. \u0000 \u0000English abstract: This chapter is about automated financial advice, known as Robo-Advice. Its origin and development are analyzed as Fintech activity of greater projection. After approaching its legal nature and its distinction from other figures, its legal regime is addressed, particularly from the European Union, to conclude with some legislative policy proposals.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"15 9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86659253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mutual funds are captives of the investment management firms, also known as fund sponsors, that bring them into existence and provide for their day-to-day operations. Because fund sponsors exercise complete control over the operations of their funds, the possibility arises that a fund sponsor will use its position of control to obtain advisory fees that are greater than those that would have been established by arm’s length bargaining. A fundamental responsibility of independent mutual fund directors, which serve as watchdogs over the interests of mutual fund shareholders, is to ensure that advisory fees are reasonable in light of, among other factors, economies of scale and profitability realized by a fund sponsor. Yet, despite oversight by independent directors, this paper shows that many mutual fund sponsors have been able to maintain high advisory fees, and have realized increasing levels of economies of scale and profitability, as industry assets increased more than 600% between 1995 and 2018. The nub of the issue is that the methodologies used to calculate profitability have largely evaded meaningful scrutiny by fund boards, which are typically advised that there is no “right answer” when it comes to a methodology. Yet, sponsors are keenly aware that litigation risk arising from excessive profitability could force advisory fee decreases on large and highly profitable funds, and therefore are incentivized to use inappropriate cost allocation methods to understate profit margin. Vigilant fund directors should recognize this potential conflict and rectify the situation, but this has not happened. This paper explores profit margins, scale economies, cost allocation methodology and case law in depth. It identifies two large fund complexes with unambiguously inappropriate cost allocation methodologies and presents circumstantial evidence of widespread use of such practices in the industry.
{"title":"Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: Sponsors Game the System as Watchdogs Slumber","authors":"Stewart L. Brown, S. Pomerantz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3687680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3687680","url":null,"abstract":"Mutual funds are captives of the investment management firms, also known as fund sponsors, that bring them into existence and provide for their day-to-day operations. Because fund sponsors exercise complete control over the operations of their funds, the possibility arises that a fund sponsor will use its position of control to obtain advisory fees that are greater than those that would have been established by arm’s length bargaining. A fundamental responsibility of independent mutual fund directors, which serve as watchdogs over the interests of mutual fund shareholders, is to ensure that advisory fees are reasonable in light of, among other factors, economies of scale and profitability realized by a fund sponsor. Yet, despite oversight by independent directors, this paper shows that many mutual fund sponsors have been able to maintain high advisory fees, and have realized increasing levels of economies of scale and profitability, as industry assets increased more than 600% between 1995 and 2018. The nub of the issue is that the methodologies used to calculate profitability have largely evaded meaningful scrutiny by fund boards, which are typically advised that there is no “right answer” when it comes to a methodology. Yet, sponsors are keenly aware that litigation risk arising from excessive profitability could force advisory fee decreases on large and highly profitable funds, and therefore are incentivized to use inappropriate cost allocation methods to understate profit margin. Vigilant fund directors should recognize this potential conflict and rectify the situation, but this has not happened. This paper explores profit margins, scale economies, cost allocation methodology and case law in depth. It identifies two large fund complexes with unambiguously inappropriate cost allocation methodologies and presents circumstantial evidence of widespread use of such practices in the industry.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78080825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Insurance ideas inform legal thought: from tort law, to health law, to theories of distributive justice. Within legal thought, insurance is often conceived as an ideal type in which insurers distribute determinable risks through contracts that fix the parties’ obligations in advance. This ideal type has normative appeal, among other reasons because it explains how tort law might achieve in practice the objectives of tort theory. Significantly for tort theory, this ideal type supports a restrictive vision of liability-based regulation, on the grounds that uncertainty poses an existential threat to insurance markets. Prior work has criticized this restrictive vision on normative grounds. This article criticizes that vision on empirical grounds. The article describes an emerging secondary insurance market – the insurance runoff market – that transfers liabilities under insurance policies issued many years in the past. Having started with old asbestos and hazardous waste liabilities, the market now extends to other liabilities that have not worked out well for the companies that insured them, including workers compensation, savings-linked life insurance, pension and annuity guarantees, and long term care insurance. Runoff specialists reprice these legacy insurance liabilities with hindsight, consolidate them, and take calculated risks that encourage capital to enter the runoff market. That market transforms the uncertainties of the past into today’s tradeable risks, bringing into the open a dynamic that pervades insurance markets: namely, the promises that are made in all insurance policies get bundled and reconceptualized into sets of liabilities that are valued and revalued, further combined and redefined over time. Through the lens of the runoff market we can see many ways that insurance organizations manage uncertainty, revealing the resilience in insurance markets and the flexibility and innovation that produce that resilience. The runoff market counsels us to give much less weight to arguments that expanding liability will undermine insurance markets. Insurance already involves so much uncertainty, and insurers have so many ways to manage it, that the most likely result will always be that they will continue to muddle through.
{"title":"Uncertainty > Risk: Lessons for Legal Thought from the Insurance Runoff Market","authors":"T. Baker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3532449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3532449","url":null,"abstract":"Insurance ideas inform legal thought: from tort law, to health law, to theories of distributive justice. Within legal thought, insurance is often conceived as an ideal type in which insurers distribute determinable risks through contracts that fix the parties’ obligations in advance. This ideal type has normative appeal, among other reasons because it explains how tort law might achieve in practice the objectives of tort theory. Significantly for tort theory, this ideal type supports a restrictive vision of liability-based regulation, on the grounds that uncertainty poses an existential threat to insurance markets. \u0000 \u0000Prior work has criticized this restrictive vision on normative grounds. This article criticizes that vision on empirical grounds. The article describes an emerging secondary insurance market – the insurance runoff market – that transfers liabilities under insurance policies issued many years in the past. Having started with old asbestos and hazardous waste liabilities, the market now extends to other liabilities that have not worked out well for the companies that insured them, including workers compensation, savings-linked life insurance, pension and annuity guarantees, and long term care insurance. \u0000 \u0000Runoff specialists reprice these legacy insurance liabilities with hindsight, consolidate them, and take calculated risks that encourage capital to enter the runoff market. That market transforms the uncertainties of the past into today’s tradeable risks, bringing into the open a dynamic that pervades insurance markets: namely, the promises that are made in all insurance policies get bundled and reconceptualized into sets of liabilities that are valued and revalued, further combined and redefined over time. \u0000 \u0000Through the lens of the runoff market we can see many ways that insurance organizations manage uncertainty, revealing the resilience in insurance markets and the flexibility and innovation that produce that resilience. The runoff market counsels us to give much less weight to arguments that expanding liability will undermine insurance markets. Insurance already involves so much uncertainty, and insurers have so many ways to manage it, that the most likely result will always be that they will continue to muddle through.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87340048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existe una amplia literatura empirica sobre la efectividad de la intervencion cambiaria (FXI). Sin embargo, dados los diferentes objetivos y la heterogeneidad de los paises con respecto a las condiciones del mercado, es de esperarse que a la fecha no haya un consenso. Este trabajo es el mas grande jamas realizado en la literatura de FXI, con un total de 279 efectos reportados, provenientes de 74 estudios empiricos. Cubre estimaciones realizadas en 19 paises y durante 5 decadas. En general, nuestro meta-analisis encuentra una depreciacion promedio de la moneda local del 1,0% y una reduccion de la volatilidad de la tasa de cambio del 0,6%, en respuesta a una compra neta de mil millones de dolares. Sin embargo, los resultados son mas pequenos bajo efectos fijos y aleatorios. Al considerar diferentes factores economicos, encontramos que los efectos se magnifican para los casos consistentes con el trilema de la politica monetaria (mayor efecto si la apertura financiera y la independencia monetaria son bajas). Los efectos tambien son mayores en paises emergentes, cuando las crisis cambiarias y bancarias son menores, cuando aumenta el tamano de la intervencion y cuando las intervenciones son anunciadas.
{"title":"The Effectiveness of FX Interventions: A Meta-Analysis","authors":"Lucía Arango-Lozano, Lukas Menkhoff, Daniela Rodríguez-Novoa, Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3688821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3688821","url":null,"abstract":"Existe una amplia literatura empirica sobre la efectividad de la intervencion cambiaria (FXI). Sin embargo, dados los diferentes objetivos y la heterogeneidad de los paises con respecto a las condiciones del mercado, es de esperarse que a la fecha no haya un consenso. Este trabajo es el mas grande jamas realizado en la literatura de FXI, con un total de 279 efectos reportados, provenientes de 74 estudios empiricos. Cubre estimaciones realizadas en 19 paises y durante 5 decadas. En general, nuestro meta-analisis encuentra una depreciacion promedio de la moneda local del 1,0% y una reduccion de la volatilidad de la tasa de cambio del 0,6%, en respuesta a una compra neta de mil millones de dolares. Sin embargo, los resultados son mas pequenos bajo efectos fijos y aleatorios. Al considerar diferentes factores economicos, encontramos que los efectos se magnifican para los casos consistentes con el trilema de la politica monetaria (mayor efecto si la apertura financiera y la independencia monetaria son bajas). Los efectos tambien son mayores en paises emergentes, cuando las crisis cambiarias y bancarias son menores, cuando aumenta el tamano de la intervencion y cuando las intervenciones son anunciadas.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81469490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We identify growth in riskless principal trades (“RPTs”) using TRACE corporate bond market trade data. An RPT is a brokered trade arranged by a dealer for which the dealer obtains compensation by marking up the price instead of charging a commission. Over the last 15 years, RPTs increased from 19% to 37% of all customer trades, while non-zero markups declined 43% on average, with most changes occurring recently. The growth in electronic trading systems undoubtedly explain these trends, but most traders cannot access these systems directly. Small changes to the bond market structure could further decrease investor transaction costs.
{"title":"Riskless Principal Trades in Corporate Bond Markets","authors":"L. Harris, Anindya Mehta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3681652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3681652","url":null,"abstract":"We identify growth in riskless principal trades (“RPTs”) using TRACE corporate bond market trade data. An RPT is a brokered trade arranged by a dealer for which the dealer obtains compensation by marking up the price instead of charging a commission. Over the last 15 years, RPTs increased from 19% to 37% of all customer trades, while non-zero markups declined 43% on average, with most changes occurring recently. The growth in electronic trading systems undoubtedly explain these trends, but most traders cannot access these systems directly. Small changes to the bond market structure could further decrease investor transaction costs.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80788048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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