ABSTRACT There are instances where CEO turnover occurs, even if the company has not made any significant strategy changes, and the new CEO possesses similar abilities as the predecessor. This paper aims to provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon. One possible reason for this “aggressive” CEO turnover is the board’s desire to reduce the information rents earned by the privately informed CEO. Specifically, the incumbent CEO has a temptation to “sandbag” the board about profitability prospects to secure more generous incentive pay for future implementation, and a (seemingly aggressive) replacement policy helps discourage this kind of gaming. That is, instead of “information-based entrenchment” as suggested by the literature (Laux 2008; Inderst and Mueller 2010), this paper shows a countervailing effect that the CEO’s private information (combined with the later-stage moral hazard problem) may lead to her dismissal more often than the ex post efficient benchmark. JEL Classifications: D86; G34; M41.
在某些情况下，即使公司没有做出任何重大的战略改变，新任CEO也会出现离职，而且新任CEO的能力与前任相似。本文旨在为这种看似不合理的现象提供一个合理的解释。这种“激进”的CEO更替的一个可能原因是，董事会希望减少私下知情的CEO所赚取的信息租金。具体来说，现任首席执行官很容易就盈利前景向董事会“撒沙袋”，以便为未来的执行获得更慷慨的激励薪酬，而(看似激进的)替代政策有助于阻止这种博弈。也就是说，与文献所建议的“基于信息的堑壕”不同(Laux 2008;Inderst and Mueller 2010)，本文显示了一种抵消效应，即CEO的私人信息(结合后期道德风险问题)可能比事后效率基准更容易导致她被解雇。JEL分类:D86;G34;M41。
{"title":"Information, Incentives, and CEO Replacement","authors":"Xiaojing Meng","doi":"10.2308/tar-2019-0494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2019-0494","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There are instances where CEO turnover occurs, even if the company has not made any significant strategy changes, and the new CEO possesses similar abilities as the predecessor. This paper aims to provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon. One possible reason for this “aggressive” CEO turnover is the board’s desire to reduce the information rents earned by the privately informed CEO. Specifically, the incumbent CEO has a temptation to “sandbag” the board about profitability prospects to secure more generous incentive pay for future implementation, and a (seemingly aggressive) replacement policy helps discourage this kind of gaming. That is, instead of “information-based entrenchment” as suggested by the literature (Laux 2008; Inderst and Mueller 2010), this paper shows a countervailing effect that the CEO’s private information (combined with the later-stage moral hazard problem) may lead to her dismissal more often than the ex post efficient benchmark. JEL Classifications: D86; G34; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135662936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tyler J. Kleppe, Andrew T. Pierce, Zac Wiebe, Teri Lombardi Yohn
ABSTRACT Although daylight saving time (DST) is thought to provide economic benefits, extant research documents various adverse effects of DST adjustments. However, prior research provides little conclusive evidence about the effects of DST adjustments on capital market participants. We examine the effects of “spring forward” DST advances, which disrupt the human sleep cycle and economic activities, on investors’ processing of earnings news. We find a delayed price response to earnings news released during the first week following a DST advance. We also find that this effect is stronger among firms with investors who are more likely to be trading on earnings news and among firms with less sophisticated investors. Our findings contribute to research on the unintended consequences of DST adjustments and to the growing literature on intra-investor variation in disclosure processing costs. Our study may be of interest to legislators currently debating proposed legislation that would eliminate DST phasing. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; M41; M48.
{"title":"The Effects of Daylight Saving Time Adjustments on Investor Information Processing","authors":"Tyler J. Kleppe, Andrew T. Pierce, Zac Wiebe, Teri Lombardi Yohn","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0369","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although daylight saving time (DST) is thought to provide economic benefits, extant research documents various adverse effects of DST adjustments. However, prior research provides little conclusive evidence about the effects of DST adjustments on capital market participants. We examine the effects of “spring forward” DST advances, which disrupt the human sleep cycle and economic activities, on investors’ processing of earnings news. We find a delayed price response to earnings news released during the first week following a DST advance. We also find that this effect is stronger among firms with investors who are more likely to be trading on earnings news and among firms with less sophisticated investors. Our findings contribute to research on the unintended consequences of DST adjustments and to the growing literature on intra-investor variation in disclosure processing costs. Our study may be of interest to legislators currently debating proposed legislation that would eliminate DST phasing. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; M41; M48.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135963198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT We argue that contracting with the federal government involves significant proprietary information cost due to regulations requiring contractors to provide proprietary information, which may become available to outsiders via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We provide evidence by showing that firms become more willing to bid for government contracts after a recent Supreme Court ruling on FOIA (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media) that improved information protection for contractors and that this effect strengthens when the contracts entail higher proprietary information cost for contractors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K4; M4.
{"title":"Proprietary Information Cost of Contracting with the Government","authors":"Jiapeng He, Kevin Li, Ningzhong Li, Weining Zhang","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0351","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We argue that contracting with the federal government involves significant proprietary information cost due to regulations requiring contractors to provide proprietary information, which may become available to outsiders via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We provide evidence by showing that firms become more willing to bid for government contracts after a recent Supreme Court ruling on FOIA (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media) that improved information protection for contractors and that this effect strengthens when the contracts entail higher proprietary information cost for contractors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K4; M4.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135662076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT This study investigates the economic consequences of the IFRS 3 (2008) requirement for fair valuing earnouts. Using a hand-collected sample of earnout fair value estimates in acquisitions completed by Australian firms, we find that a significant portion of acquirers overstate initial earnout liabilities and strategically reverse them as operating gains to boost post-M&A earnings. These overstatements are more pronounced when acquirers face investment- and performance-related pressure but attenuated in the presence of high-quality auditors and debt-financed deals. Acquirers also obfuscate earnout-related disclosures, inhibiting investors’ assessment of earnout values. By doing so, managers extend their tenure. Further analysis reveals that IFRS 3 (2008) leads to a significant increase in both the frequency and magnitude of earnouts in public acquirers’ transactions. Overall, we highlight the accounting benefit of earnouts for acquirers under IFRS 3 (2008), with implications for investors, analysts, auditors, and standard setters. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G34; M41.
{"title":"Fair Value of Earnouts: Valuation Uncertainty or Managerial Opportunism?","authors":"Andrew Ferguson, Cecilia Wei Hu, Peter Lam","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0613","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study investigates the economic consequences of the IFRS 3 (2008) requirement for fair valuing earnouts. Using a hand-collected sample of earnout fair value estimates in acquisitions completed by Australian firms, we find that a significant portion of acquirers overstate initial earnout liabilities and strategically reverse them as operating gains to boost post-M&A earnings. These overstatements are more pronounced when acquirers face investment- and performance-related pressure but attenuated in the presence of high-quality auditors and debt-financed deals. Acquirers also obfuscate earnout-related disclosures, inhibiting investors’ assessment of earnout values. By doing so, managers extend their tenure. Further analysis reveals that IFRS 3 (2008) leads to a significant increase in both the frequency and magnitude of earnouts in public acquirers’ transactions. Overall, we highlight the accounting benefit of earnouts for acquirers under IFRS 3 (2008), with implications for investors, analysts, auditors, and standard setters. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G34; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136153331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT We experimentally investigate how subordinates’ budget reporting in hierarchical organizations is influenced by social distance between subordinates and their direct manager. Although prior research promotes reducing this social distance to improve cooperation and efficiency, we contend that reduced social distance can differentially influence budget reporting, conditional on the manager’s stake in the residual claim. As predicted, we find through two studies that the effect of reduced social distance changes from increasing subordinates’ honesty to decreasing subordinates’ honesty as the manager’s stake in the residual claim decreases. We also find that subordinates’ concern for the manager’s economic well-being and concern about the manager’s impression of their reporting behavior mediate these results. The implications of our findings for management accounting theory and practice are discussed. Data Availability: Please contact the authors. JEL Classifications: C91; D91; M41.
{"title":"The Behavioral Effects of Social Distance and Residual Claim Distribution on Budget Reporting in Hierarchical Organizations","authors":"Xi Kuang, Michael Majerczyk, Di Yang","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0270","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We experimentally investigate how subordinates’ budget reporting in hierarchical organizations is influenced by social distance between subordinates and their direct manager. Although prior research promotes reducing this social distance to improve cooperation and efficiency, we contend that reduced social distance can differentially influence budget reporting, conditional on the manager’s stake in the residual claim. As predicted, we find through two studies that the effect of reduced social distance changes from increasing subordinates’ honesty to decreasing subordinates’ honesty as the manager’s stake in the residual claim decreases. We also find that subordinates’ concern for the manager’s economic well-being and concern about the manager’s impression of their reporting behavior mediate these results. The implications of our findings for management accounting theory and practice are discussed. Data Availability: Please contact the authors. JEL Classifications: C91; D91; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nerissa C. Brown, Adrienna A. Huffman, Shira Cohen
ABSTRACT We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economically significant association between accounting complexity and managers’ propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings information. This relation is robust and incremental to common measures of business and linguistic complexity, and the transitory nature of firms’ economic activities. We also find that the quality and informativeness of adjusted earnings information increases with accounting complexity, consistent with motives to better inform investors when accounting disclosures are complex. Overall, our results suggest that managers use non-GAAP earnings disclosure to mitigate the adverse informational effects of accounting complexity. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; M43.
{"title":"Accounting Reporting Complexity and Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure","authors":"Nerissa C. Brown, Adrienna A. Huffman, Shira Cohen","doi":"10.2308/tar-2018-0760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2018-0760","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economically significant association between accounting complexity and managers’ propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings information. This relation is robust and incremental to common measures of business and linguistic complexity, and the transitory nature of firms’ economic activities. We also find that the quality and informativeness of adjusted earnings information increases with accounting complexity, consistent with motives to better inform investors when accounting disclosures are complex. Overall, our results suggest that managers use non-GAAP earnings disclosure to mitigate the adverse informational effects of accounting complexity. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; M43.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135471805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peter R. Demerjian, Edward L. Owens, Matias Sokolowski
ABSTRACT We provide evidence that lenders with lower regulatory capital issue loans with lower financial covenant strictness, consistent with such lenders viewing borrower covenant violations as costlier. This is because a borrower covenant violation may lead the lender to downgrade the loan, which triggers accounting that further reduces regulatory capital. Because of regulatory scrutiny, this is true even if the lender waives the violation. We find that this association is concentrated in performance covenants rather than capital covenants. We also find that lenders with relatively low capital issue loans with lower amounts and shorter maturities, consistent with such lenders replacing covenant protection with stricter loan terms on other dimensions. Finally, we find that this form of lender capital management extends to loan syndicate participant lenders, in that participants with relatively low capital adequacy take smaller loan shares when the lead arranger sets high covenant strictness. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; M40; M41.
{"title":"Lender Capital Management and Financial Covenant Strictness","authors":"Peter R. Demerjian, Edward L. Owens, Matias Sokolowski","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0346","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We provide evidence that lenders with lower regulatory capital issue loans with lower financial covenant strictness, consistent with such lenders viewing borrower covenant violations as costlier. This is because a borrower covenant violation may lead the lender to downgrade the loan, which triggers accounting that further reduces regulatory capital. Because of regulatory scrutiny, this is true even if the lender waives the violation. We find that this association is concentrated in performance covenants rather than capital covenants. We also find that lenders with relatively low capital issue loans with lower amounts and shorter maturities, consistent with such lenders replacing covenant protection with stricter loan terms on other dimensions. Finally, we find that this form of lender capital management extends to loan syndicate participant lenders, in that participants with relatively low capital adequacy take smaller loan shares when the lead arranger sets high covenant strictness. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; M40; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT We examine firm decisions to provide listings of sell-side analyst coverage on corporate investor relations (IR) websites. These listings are related to three major areas of financial research—voluntary disclosure, investor relations, and analysts. Our hand-collected data permit cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Firms are more likely to have such listings when analysts are more important information intermediaries and when firms are directly involved in managing their IR websites. For firms with listings, the probability of an analyst being included on the listing is increasing in firm awareness of and familiarity with the analyst, how active and favorable the analyst is, and the analyst’s reputation. Additional analysis indicates similar results across self-hosting versus third-party hosting IR websites, with a notable exception that self-hosting firms exhibit a stronger preference for analysts who issue more favorable research about the firm. Decisions to add or drop analysts from listings reinforce the main results. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G17; G24; M41.
{"title":"An Examination of the Listing of Analyst Coverage on Corporate Websites","authors":"Mark T. Bradshaw, Lian Fen Lee, Kyle Peterson","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0149","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We examine firm decisions to provide listings of sell-side analyst coverage on corporate investor relations (IR) websites. These listings are related to three major areas of financial research—voluntary disclosure, investor relations, and analysts. Our hand-collected data permit cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Firms are more likely to have such listings when analysts are more important information intermediaries and when firms are directly involved in managing their IR websites. For firms with listings, the probability of an analyst being included on the listing is increasing in firm awareness of and familiarity with the analyst, how active and favorable the analyst is, and the analyst’s reputation. Additional analysis indicates similar results across self-hosting versus third-party hosting IR websites, with a notable exception that self-hosting firms exhibit a stronger preference for analysts who issue more favorable research about the firm. Decisions to add or drop analysts from listings reinforce the main results. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G17; G24; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135586312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT Insurance pricing is subject to stricter regulation in some states than others. This cross-sectional variation, coupled with the occurrence of staggered deregulation in several states, enables a powerful test of the political cost hypothesis that managers manipulate accruals to mitigate adverse effects of rate regulation. We show that insurers understate their loss reserve accruals in more regulated regimes, a finding that contrasts with most prior studies documenting expense-increasing accruals in regulatory pricing settings like utilities. We theorize and find evidence that regulator-enabled cartel-like collective rate making leads to premiums being higher than the competitive level. Our results are consistent with accounting manipulation being used to justify deviating from these high rates and showcase a role for accounting in cartel enforcement. JEL Classifications: M41; G18; G22; G32.
{"title":"Insurance Rate Regulation, Management of the Loss Reserve and Pricing","authors":"Gans Narayanamoorthy, John Page, Bohan Song","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0637","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Insurance pricing is subject to stricter regulation in some states than others. This cross-sectional variation, coupled with the occurrence of staggered deregulation in several states, enables a powerful test of the political cost hypothesis that managers manipulate accruals to mitigate adverse effects of rate regulation. We show that insurers understate their loss reserve accruals in more regulated regimes, a finding that contrasts with most prior studies documenting expense-increasing accruals in regulatory pricing settings like utilities. We theorize and find evidence that regulator-enabled cartel-like collective rate making leads to premiums being higher than the competitive level. Our results are consistent with accounting manipulation being used to justify deviating from these high rates and showcase a role for accounting in cartel enforcement. JEL Classifications: M41; G18; G22; G32.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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