This paper proposes a tractable competing mechanism game where each seller simultaneously posts a trading contract that specifies a menu of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) direct mechanisms conditional on an array of messages sent by buyers, and each seller subsequently chooses a DIC direct mechanism from his menu. The complete set of a seller's profits that are supportable in a (symmetric) equilibrium is the interval between the minmax value of his profit with respect to DIC direct mechanisms and his profit in the joint profit maximization. The set of a seller's equilibrium profits is robust to the possibility of a seller's deviation to any arbitrary mechanism in the standard environment with linear utilities and independent private type. Further, with no limited liability or with no capacity constraints, the set of a seller's equilibrium profits coincides with the set of his feasible (i.e., individually rational and incentive compatible) profits. Given a number of buyers, the number of sellers can be endogenized and is equal to the largest number at which a seller's profit in the joint profit maximization is non-negative: As the number of buyers increases, competition is neutralized because only the monopoly terms of trade prevails in the market, whereas the range of a seller's equilibrium profits shrinks to his reservation profit.
{"title":"Neutralized Competition","authors":"Seungjin Han","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3178182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3178182","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a tractable competing mechanism game where each seller simultaneously posts a trading contract that specifies a menu of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) direct mechanisms conditional on an array of messages sent by buyers, and each seller subsequently chooses a DIC direct mechanism from his menu. The complete set of a seller's profits that are supportable in a (symmetric) equilibrium is the interval between the minmax value of his profit with respect to DIC direct mechanisms and his profit in the joint profit maximization. The set of a seller's equilibrium profits is robust to the possibility of a seller's deviation to any arbitrary mechanism in the standard environment with linear utilities and independent private type. Further, with no limited liability or with no capacity constraints, the set of a seller's equilibrium profits coincides with the set of his feasible (i.e., individually rational and incentive compatible) profits. Given a number of buyers, the number of sellers can be endogenized and is equal to the largest number at which a seller's profit in the joint profit maximization is non-negative: As the number of buyers increases, competition is neutralized because only the monopoly terms of trade prevails in the market, whereas the range of a seller's equilibrium profits shrinks to his reservation profit.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114403134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a principal-agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the screening mechanism and, concurrently, the process by which the agent learns his type. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type, there is one of two possible outcomes: the type is allocated the efficient quantity or is left with zero rents ex post.
{"title":"Optimal Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraint","authors":"T. Heumann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3050014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050014","url":null,"abstract":"We study a principal-agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the screening mechanism and, concurrently, the process by which the agent learns his type. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type, there is one of two possible outcomes: the type is allocated the efficient quantity or is left with zero rents ex post.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126954323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper studies rehypothecation, a practice in which financial institutions re-pledge collateral pledged to them by their clients. Rehypothecation enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy, but it also incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when counterparties fail. We examine the possibility of a conflict between the intermediary and its borrower on rehypothecation arrangements. The direction of this conflict depends on haircuts of the contract between them: if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation. This offers an empirical prediction of a link between the size of haircut in collateralized financial contracts, borrower information, and the likelihood of rehypothecation.
{"title":"Collateral, Rehypothecation, and Efficiency","authors":"Hyejin Park, C. Kahn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2992797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2992797","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies rehypothecation, a practice in which financial institutions re-pledge collateral pledged to them by their clients. Rehypothecation enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy, but it also incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when counterparties fail. We examine the possibility of a conflict between the intermediary and its borrower on rehypothecation arrangements. The direction of this conflict depends on haircuts of the contract between them: if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation. This offers an empirical prediction of a link between the size of haircut in collateralized financial contracts, borrower information, and the likelihood of rehypothecation.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130360540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine size management by European private firms for which disclosure requirements increase at size thresholds. Our estimates suggest at least 8% of firms near thresholds that impose income statement disclosure manage size downward, and the average firm that manages size sacrifices more than 6% of its assets. We find that multiple determinants of proprietary costs predict this behavior, and that size management to avoid mandatory audits, which are similarly imposed at size thresholds, is of comparable magnitude. Our results triangulate the economic significance of proprietary costs in a setting largely without confounding capital market, agency, or compliance costs.
{"title":"Size Management by European Private Firms to Minimize Proprietary Costs of Disclosure","authors":"Darren Bernard, D. Burgstahler, Devrimi Kaya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2484161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2484161","url":null,"abstract":"We examine size management by European private firms for which disclosure requirements increase at size thresholds. Our estimates suggest at least 8% of firms near thresholds that impose income statement disclosure manage size downward, and the average firm that manages size sacrifices more than 6% of its assets. We find that multiple determinants of proprietary costs predict this behavior, and that size management to avoid mandatory audits, which are similarly imposed at size thresholds, is of comparable magnitude. Our results triangulate the economic significance of proprietary costs in a setting largely without confounding capital market, agency, or compliance costs.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126959449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Businesses, policy makers, and scholars are calling for property rights in data. They currently focus particularly on the vast amounts of data generated by connected cars, industrial machines, artificial intelligence, toys and other devices on the Internet of Things (IoT). This data is personal to numerous parties who are associated with a connected device, for example, the driver of a connected car, its owner and passengers, as well as other traffic participants. Manufacturers, dealers, independent providers of auto parts and services, insurance companies, law enforcement agencies and many others are also interested in this data. Various parties are actively staking their claims to data on the Internet of Things, as they are mining data, the fuel of the digital economy. Stakeholders in digital markets often frame claims, negotiations and controversies regarding data access as one of ownership. Businesses regularly assert and demand that they own data. Individual data subjects also assume that they own data about themselves. Policy makers and scholars focus on how to redistribute ownership rights to data. Yet, upon closer review, it is very questionable whether data is—or should be—subject to any property rights. This article unambiguously answers the question in the negative, both with respect to existing law and future lawmaking, in the United States as in the European Union, jurisdictions with notably divergent attitudes to privacy, property and individual freedoms. Data as such, i.e., the content of information - exists conceptually separate from works of authorship and data bases (which can be subject to intellectual property rights), physical embodiments of information (data on a computer chip, which can be subject to personal property rights; warning symbol painted on a road, which can be subject to real property rights) and physical objects or intangible items to which information relates (e.g., a dangerous malfunctioning vehicle to which the warnings on road markings or a computer chip relate). Lawmakers have granted property rights to different persons regarding works of authorship, data bases, chattels, land and other items for the purpose of incentivizing investments and improvements in such items, a purpose that does not exist with respect to data as such. Individual persons, businesses, governments and the public at large have different interests in data and access restrictions. These interests are protected by an intricate net of existing laws that deliberately refrain from granting property laws in data. Existing property laws intentionally exclude data from subject matter definitions. Existing data-related laws and property laws balance interests in data and access restrictions based on public policy considerations that would be impaired by a creation of property rights in data. New property rights in data are not suited to promote better privacy or more innovation or technological advances, but would more likely suffocate free s
{"title":"No One Owns Data","authors":"L. Determann","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3123957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3123957","url":null,"abstract":"Businesses, policy makers, and scholars are calling for property rights in data. They currently focus particularly on the vast amounts of data generated by connected cars, industrial machines, artificial intelligence, toys and other devices on the Internet of Things (IoT). This data is personal to numerous parties who are associated with a connected device, for example, the driver of a connected car, its owner and passengers, as well as other traffic participants. Manufacturers, dealers, independent providers of auto parts and services, insurance companies, law enforcement agencies and many others are also interested in this data. Various parties are actively staking their claims to data on the Internet of Things, as they are mining data, the fuel of the digital economy. Stakeholders in digital markets often frame claims, negotiations and controversies regarding data access as one of ownership. Businesses regularly assert and demand that they own data. Individual data subjects also assume that they own data about themselves. Policy makers and scholars focus on how to redistribute ownership rights to data. Yet, upon closer review, it is very questionable whether data is—or should be—subject to any property rights. This article unambiguously answers the question in the negative, both with respect to existing law and future lawmaking, in the United States as in the European Union, jurisdictions with notably divergent attitudes to privacy, property and individual freedoms. Data as such, i.e., the content of information - exists conceptually separate from works of authorship and data bases (which can be subject to intellectual property rights), physical embodiments of information (data on a computer chip, which can be subject to personal property rights; warning symbol painted on a road, which can be subject to real property rights) and physical objects or intangible items to which information relates (e.g., a dangerous malfunctioning vehicle to which the warnings on road markings or a computer chip relate). Lawmakers have granted property rights to different persons regarding works of authorship, data bases, chattels, land and other items for the purpose of incentivizing investments and improvements in such items, a purpose that does not exist with respect to data as such. Individual persons, businesses, governments and the public at large have different interests in data and access restrictions. These interests are protected by an intricate net of existing laws that deliberately refrain from granting property laws in data. Existing property laws intentionally exclude data from subject matter definitions. Existing data-related laws and property laws balance interests in data and access restrictions based on public policy considerations that would be impaired by a creation of property rights in data. New property rights in data are not suited to promote better privacy or more innovation or technological advances, but would more likely suffocate free s","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132356546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alexander Michaelides, Andreas Milidonis, George P. Nishiotis
Using daily abnormal currency returns for the universe of countries with flexible exchange rates, we show local currency depreciations ahead of unscheduled, public sovereign debt downgrade announcements. Consistent with the private information hypothesis, the effect is stronger in lower institutional quality countries and holds after we control for concurrent public information and for publicly available rumors about the forthcoming downgrades. Our results persist when abnormal currency returns are adjusted for global carry and dollar risk factors, world equity and bond returns, as well as local stock market returns. Finally, the currency depreciations are permanent, providing evidence for a link between fundamentals and currency markets.
{"title":"Private Information in Currency Markets","authors":"Alexander Michaelides, Andreas Milidonis, George P. Nishiotis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2720172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2720172","url":null,"abstract":"Using daily abnormal currency returns for the universe of countries with flexible exchange rates, we show local currency depreciations ahead of unscheduled, public sovereign debt downgrade announcements. Consistent with the private information hypothesis, the effect is stronger in lower institutional quality countries and holds after we control for concurrent public information and for publicly available rumors about the forthcoming downgrades. Our results persist when abnormal currency returns are adjusted for global carry and dollar risk factors, world equity and bond returns, as well as local stock market returns. Finally, the currency depreciations are permanent, providing evidence for a link between fundamentals and currency markets.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126998963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Agents learn about a changing state using private signals and their neighbors’ past estimates of the state. We present a model in which Bayesian agents in equilibrium use neighbors’ estimates simply by taking weighted sums with time-invariant weights. The dynamics thus parallel those of the tractable DeGroot model of learning in networks, but arise as an equilibrium outcome rather than a behavioral assumption. We examine whether information aggregation is nearly optimal as neighborhoods grow large. A key condition for this is signal diversity: each individual’s neighbors have private signals that not only contain independent information, but also have sufficiently different distributions. Without signal diversity—e.g., if private signals are i.i.d.—learning is suboptimal in all networks and highly inefficient in some. Turning to social influence, we find it is much more sensitive to one’s signal quality than to one’s number of neighbors, in contrast to standard models with exogenous updating rules.
{"title":"Learning from Neighbors About a Changing State","authors":"Krishna Dasaratha, B. Golub, Nir Hak","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdac077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac077","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Agents learn about a changing state using private signals and their neighbors’ past estimates of the state. We present a model in which Bayesian agents in equilibrium use neighbors’ estimates simply by taking weighted sums with time-invariant weights. The dynamics thus parallel those of the tractable DeGroot model of learning in networks, but arise as an equilibrium outcome rather than a behavioral assumption. We examine whether information aggregation is nearly optimal as neighborhoods grow large. A key condition for this is signal diversity: each individual’s neighbors have private signals that not only contain independent information, but also have sufficiently different distributions. Without signal diversity—e.g., if private signals are i.i.d.—learning is suboptimal in all networks and highly inefficient in some. Turning to social influence, we find it is much more sensitive to one’s signal quality than to one’s number of neighbors, in contrast to standard models with exogenous updating rules.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128739516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the nature of contracts that optimally reward innovations in a risky environment, when the innovator is privately informed about the quality of her innovation and must engage an agent to develop it. We model the innovator as a principal who has private but imperfect information about the quality of her project: the project might be worth exploring or not, but even a project of high quality may fail. We characterize the best equilibrium for the high type principal, which is either a separating equilibrium or a pooling one. Due to the interaction between the signaling incentives of the principal and dynamic moral hazard of the agent, the best equilibrium induces inefficiently early termination of the high quality project. The high type principal is forced to share the surplus -- with the agent in the separating equilibrium, or the low type principal in the pooling equilibrium. A mediator, who offers a menu of contracts and keeps the agent uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full information surplus.
{"title":"Contracts that Reward Innovation: Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal","authors":"Yiman Sun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3071451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3071451","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the nature of contracts that optimally reward innovations in a risky environment, when the innovator is privately informed about the quality of her innovation and must engage an agent to develop it. We model the innovator as a principal who has private but imperfect information about the quality of her project: the project might be worth exploring or not, but even a project of high quality may fail. We characterize the best equilibrium for the high type principal, which is either a separating equilibrium or a pooling one. Due to the interaction between the signaling incentives of the principal and dynamic moral hazard of the agent, the best equilibrium induces inefficiently early termination of the high quality project. The high type principal is forced to share the surplus -- with the agent in the separating equilibrium, or the low type principal in the pooling equilibrium. A mediator, who offers a menu of contracts and keeps the agent uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full information surplus.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122066155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study a continuous time principal-agent model in which an unknown parameter and the agent's hidden effort affect the distribution of observable outcomes. The principal and the agent learn about the parameter by observing past outcomes. The agent's current effort has an implicit long-term effect through the belief dynamics and a deviation in effort creates a persistent disparity between the principal's and the agent's beliefs. This disparity affects the rate of learning as well as how the two evaluate the expected distribution of future outcomes which in turn affects their evaluation of future payoffs. Placing minimal restrictions on how effort and the parameter interact, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatible contracts. In addition to the agent's promised utility, the covariance between the on-path posterior beliefs and the agent's total payoff serves as a second state variable capturing the marginal long-run effects of effort.
{"title":"Dynamic Contracting with Moral Hazard Under Incomplete Information","authors":"Teddy Mekonnen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3283476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3283476","url":null,"abstract":"I study a continuous time principal-agent model in which an unknown parameter and the agent's hidden effort affect the distribution of observable outcomes. The principal and the agent learn about the parameter by observing past outcomes. The agent's current effort has an implicit long-term effect through the belief dynamics and a deviation in effort creates a persistent disparity between the principal's and the agent's beliefs. This disparity affects the rate of learning as well as how the two evaluate the expected distribution of future outcomes which in turn affects their evaluation of future payoffs. Placing minimal restrictions on how effort and the parameter interact, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatible contracts. In addition to the agent's promised utility, the covariance between the on-path posterior beliefs and the agent's total payoff serves as a second state variable capturing the marginal long-run effects of effort.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123119652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider a cheap talk setting with two senders and a continuum of receivers with heterogenous preferences. Receivers listen to just one sender, but can choose which sender to listen to. We determine that: (i) full communication is possible for a large set of sender preferences; (ii) both senders attract listeners only if they are oppositional and not too polarized; and (iii) senders with preferences that are closer to the average receiver preference are listened to by a greater proportion of receivers. In extensions, we endogenize the senders’ preferences and investigate the effects of an entertainment benefit derived by receivers.
{"title":"Constrained Listening, Audience Alignment, and Expert Communication","authors":"Kevin C. Smith, M. Heinle, Paul E. Fischer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3068376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068376","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a cheap talk setting with two senders and a continuum of receivers with heterogenous preferences. Receivers listen to just one sender, but can choose which sender to listen to. We determine that: (i) full communication is possible for a large set of sender preferences; (ii) both senders attract listeners only if they are oppositional and not too polarized; and (iii) senders with preferences that are closer to the average receiver preference are listened to by a greater proportion of receivers. In extensions, we endogenize the senders’ preferences and investigate the effects of an entertainment benefit derived by receivers.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121078959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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