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The Role of Agents in Fraudulent Activities: Evidence from the Housing Market in China 中介在欺诈行为中的作用:来自中国房地产市场的证据
Pub Date : 2019-12-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3507754
Sumit Agarwal, Weida Kuang, Long Wang, Zoe Yang
This paper examines the role that agents play in fraudulent activities in the housing market in China. Using a representative sample of housing transactions in Beijing from 2014 to 2017, we investigate the existence and magnitudes of the so-called Yin-Yang contracts, and explore whether and how agents affect tax evasion. First, we find that agents can learn the monitoring distance of local tax authorities through their cumulative experiences and strategically report prices as close as possible to the internal guideline prices set by local authorities. At the same time, agents' involvement in tax evasion is significantly affected by the tax evasion behaviors of their peers. Second, we show that agents’ work experiences contribute to creating more severe Yin-Yang contracts in the presence of loosening financial constraints, and vice versa. Our results suggest that agents' expertise becomes more important for buyers who face a trade-off between reporting higher to borrow more from the bank and reporting lower to evade taxes.
本文考察了中介在中国房地产市场欺诈活动中的作用。本文以2014年至2017年北京住房交易的代表性样本为样本,考察了所谓的阴阳合同的存在和规模,并探讨了代理人是否以及如何影响逃税。首先,我们发现代理商可以通过累积经验了解地税机关的监控距离,并策略性地报告价格,尽可能接近地方机关设定的内部指导价。同时,代理人参与偷税行为也受到其同伴偷税行为的显著影响。其次,我们表明,在金融约束放松的情况下,代理人的工作经历有助于创造更严格的阴阳合同,反之亦然。我们的研究结果表明,对于那些面临权衡的买家来说,经纪人的专业知识变得更加重要,他们要么高报以从银行借更多的钱,要么低报以逃避税收。
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引用次数: 2
Private News and Monetary Policy - Forward Guidance As Bayesian Persuasion 私人新闻与货币政策——作为贝叶斯说服的前瞻指引
Pub Date : 2019-12-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3507183
Ippei Fujiwara, Yuichiro Waki
When the central bank has information that can help the private sector predict the future better, should it communicate such information to the public? In a simple New Keynesian model, such Delphic forward guidance unambiguously reduces ex ante welfare by increasing the variability of inflation and the output gap. In other words, it cannot persuade private agents to change their actions in favor of the central bank. In more elaborate DSGE models, the welfare effect may be either positive or negative, depending on the type of shock as well as distortions and frictions. These results suggest that improving welfare by Delphic forward guidance may be particularly difficult under model uncertainty.
当央行掌握了可以帮助私营部门更好地预测未来的信息时,它是否应该将这些信息告知公众?在一个简单的新凯恩斯主义模型中,这种德尔菲式前瞻指导通过增加通胀的可变性和产出缺口,毫无疑问地降低了事前福利。换句话说,它无法说服私人代理人改变他们的行为,以支持央行。在更复杂的DSGE模型中,福利效应可能是积极的,也可能是消极的,这取决于冲击的类型以及扭曲和摩擦。这些结果表明,在模型不确定的情况下,通过德尔菲前瞻指导来提高福利可能特别困难。
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引用次数: 2
Acquiring Innovation Under Information Frictions 信息摩擦下的创新获取
Pub Date : 2019-10-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3475698
M. Celik, X. Tian, Wenyu Wang
An active M&A market incentivizes many firms to specialize in innovation with the anticipation of being acquired in the future. Acquiring innovation, however, is subject to information frictions, because acquirers often find it challenging to assess the value and impact of innovative targets. Using data on US public firms, we document that (i) there is a robust inverted-U relationship between firm innovation and takeover exposure, (ii) equity usage increases with target innovation, and (iii) deal completion rate drops as targets become more innovative. Motivated by these findings, we develop and estimate a model of acquiring innovation under information frictions. We find that acquirers' due diligence reveals only 33% of private information possessed by targets, and eliminating the remaining information friction can increase firms' expected gains from the M&A market by 38%. This efficiency gain is achieved through a higher probability of mergers and a larger value creation in completed transactions. We also find that a more efficient M&A market encourages more firm innovation, resulting in a higher average firm growth rate.
一个活跃的并购市场激励许多公司专注于创新,并预期未来会被收购。然而,获取创新受制于信息摩擦,因为收购方经常发现评估创新目标的价值和影响具有挑战性。利用美国上市公司的数据,我们证明(i)公司创新与收购风险之间存在强大的倒u型关系,(ii)股权使用随着目标创新而增加,以及(iii)交易完成率随着目标变得更具创新性而下降。在这些发现的激励下,我们开发并估计了信息摩擦下获取创新的模型。我们发现,收购方的尽职调查仅揭示了被收购方拥有的33%的私人信息,消除剩余的信息摩擦可以使企业从并购市场获得的预期收益增加38%。这种效率的提高是通过更高的合并概率和在完成的交易中创造更大的价值来实现的。并购市场效率越高,企业创新能力越强,企业平均增长率越高。
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引用次数: 8
Going Public or Staying Private: The Cost of Mandated Transparency 上市还是不上市:强制性透明度的代价
Pub Date : 2019-10-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3465919
Yifeng Guo, Joshua Mitts
Public markets are transparent institutions, where disclosure is mandatory and order flow observable. We show that transparency can lead to insufficient information acquisition and inefficient investment. Our model links a firm's preference for public markets to the quality of disclosure metrics. When short-term signals diverge from the long-run value of a project, entrepreneurs prefer opaque private markets where investors can bargain over the costs of acquiring information. Imperfect communication is a mechanism by which mandatory disclosure may destroy value, leading firms to remain private.
公开市场是透明的机构,信息披露是强制性的,秩序流动是可观察的。我们表明,透明度可能导致信息获取不足和投资效率低下。我们的模型将公司对公开市场的偏好与披露指标的质量联系起来。当短期信号偏离项目的长期价值时,企业家更喜欢不透明的私人市场,在那里投资者可以就获取信息的成本进行讨价还价。不完善的沟通是一种强制披露可能破坏价值的机制,导致公司保持私有。
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引用次数: 2
Undisclosed Debt Sustainability 未披露债务可持续性
Laura Alfaro, Fabio Kanczuk
Over the past decade, non–Paris Club creditors, notably China, have become an important source of financing for low- and middle-income countries. In contrast with typical sovereign debt, these lending arrangements are not public, and other creditors have no information about their magnitude. We transform the traditional sovereign debt and default model to quantitatively study incomplete information arrangements and find they greatly reduce traditional/Paris Club creditors’ debt sustainability. Disclosure of nontraditional debt would imply significant welfare gains for the recipient countries but would reduce its sustainability. We discuss the implications of nontraditional lending on standard assumptions of sovereign debt models in particular defaulting costs.
在过去十年中,非巴黎俱乐部债权国,特别是中国,已成为中低收入国家的重要融资来源。与典型的主权债务不同,这些贷款安排不公开,其他债权人对其规模一无所知。我们将传统的主权债务和违约模型转化为定量研究不完全信息安排,发现它们大大降低了传统/巴黎俱乐部债权人的债务可持续性。披露非传统债务将意味着受援国的重大福利收益,但会降低其可持续性。我们讨论了非传统贷款对主权债务模型标准假设的影响,特别是违约成本。
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引用次数: 7
Feedback on Ideas 想法反馈
Pub Date : 2019-09-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3422097
Zeinab Aboutalebi, Ayush Pant
Employees are often assigned tasks comprising two distinct phases: in the first phase, ideas are generated; in the second phase, the best idea is implemented. Furthermore, it is common for supervisors to give feedback to their employees during this process. This paper studies the supervisor’s problem. Supervisors face the following tradeoff: while honest feedback encourages employees to discard bad ideas, it can also be demotivating. We obtain three main results. First, the supervisor only gives honest feedback to agents who believe in their ability to succeed. Second, receiving honest feedback leads such high self-opinion agents to exert more effort. Third, overconfidence is potentially welfare improving.
员工通常被分配的任务包括两个不同的阶段:第一阶段,产生想法;在第二阶段,最好的想法被执行。此外,在这个过程中,主管给员工反馈是很常见的。本文研究了监事问题。主管们面临着以下权衡:虽然诚实的反馈会鼓励员工放弃糟糕的想法,但它也可能会让员工失去动力。我们得到三个主要结果。首先,主管只给那些相信自己有能力成功的代理人诚实的反馈。其次,获得诚实的反馈会使这些高自我评价的代理人付出更多的努力。第三,过度自信可能会改善福利。
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引用次数: 0
Dynamic Pricing with External Information and Inventory Constraint 考虑外部信息和库存约束的动态定价
Pub Date : 2019-09-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3458662
Xiaocheng Li, Zeyu Zheng
A merchant dynamically sets prices in each time period when selling a product over a finite time horizon with a given initial inventory. The merchant utilizes new external information that is observed at the beginning of each time period, whereas the demand function—how the external information and the price jointly impact that single-period demand distribution—is unknown. The merchant’s decision, setting price dynamically, serves dual roles to learn the unknown demand function and to balance inventory with an ultimate objective to maximize the expected cumulative revenue. The main objective of this work is to characterize and provide a full spectrum of relations between the order of optimal expected cumulative revenue achieved in three decision-making regimes: the merchant’s online decision-making regime, a clairvoyant regime with complete knowledge about the demand function, and a deterministic regime in which all the uncertainties are relaxed to the expectations. In the analyses, we derive an unconstrained representation of the optimality gap for generic constrained online learning problems, which renders tractable lower and upper bounds for the expected revenue achieved by dynamic pricing algorithms between different regimes. This analytical framework also inspires the design of two dual-based dynamic pricing algorithms for the clairvoyant and online regimes. This paper was accepted by Hamid Nazerzadeh, data science. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4963 .
在给定初始库存的有限时间范围内销售产品时,商家在每个时间段动态设置价格。商家利用在每个时间段开始时观察到的新的外部信息,而需求函数——外部信息和价格如何共同影响单期需求分布——是未知的。商家动态定价的决策具有学习未知需求函数和平衡库存的双重作用,最终目标是期望累计收益最大化。这项工作的主要目标是描述并提供在三种决策机制中实现的最优预期累积收入顺序之间的关系的全部范围:商人的在线决策机制,对需求函数有完全了解的洞察力机制,以及所有不确定性都放松到预期的确定性机制。在分析中,我们推导了一般约束在线学习问题的最优性差距的无约束表示,该表示为不同制度之间动态定价算法实现的期望收益提供了可处理的下界和上界。这个分析框架也启发了两种基于双重的动态定价算法的设计,用于透视和在线制度。本文被数据科学的Hamid Nazerzadeh接受。补充材料:在线附录和数据可在https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4963上获得。
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引用次数: 7
Information Hierarchies 信息层次结构
Pub Date : 2019-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3448870
Benjamin Brooks, A. Frankel, Emir Kamenica
If experiment A is Blackwell more informative than experiment B, it is always possible that A and B are induced by signals A′ and B′ such that A′ is a refinement of B′, that is, A′ entails observing B′ plus some additional information. We first show that this result does not extend beyond pairs of experiments: There exist collections of experiments that cannot be induced by a collection of signals so that whenever two experiments are Blackwell ordered, the associated signals are refinement ordered. In other words, sometimes it is impossible for more informed agents to know everything that less informed agents know. More broadly, define an information hierarchy to be a partially ordered set that ranks experiments in terms of informativeness. Is it the case that for any choice of experiments indexed on the hierarchy such that higher experiments are Blackwell more informative, there are signals that induce these experiments with higher signals being refinements of lower signals? We show that the answer is affirmative if and only if the undirected graph of the information hierarchy is a forest.
如果实验A比实验B具有更多的布莱克威尔信息,则A和B总是可能受到信号A '和B '的诱导,使得A '是B '的细化,即A '需要观察B '加上一些额外的信息。我们首先表明,这一结果并不超出实验对:存在不能由信号集合诱导的实验集合,因此每当两个实验是布莱克威尔有序的,相关的信号是细化有序的。换句话说,有时候消息灵通的代理不可能知道消息灵通的代理所知道的一切。更广泛地说,将信息层次定义为根据信息量对实验进行排序的部分有序集合。是否存在这样的情况,对于任何在层次上索引的实验的选择,比如更高的实验是布莱克威尔更有信息的,有一些信号诱导这些实验,更高的信号是低信号的细化?我们证明了当且仅当信息层次的无向图是森林时,答案是肯定的。
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引用次数: 1
Herding with Costs to Observation 放牧与观察成本
Pub Date : 2019-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3433717
Stephen M. Nei
When agents are presented with information from others, they might ignore their own information and follow the “wisdom of the crowds”. As first noted by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992), this can harm overall learning in a society. In this paper, I consider the strategic decisions of agents in gathering this public information when there is a constant marginal cost to observing other agents. Costs have an ambiguous effect on the likelihood that society herds on the correct action. In some cases, there is an intermediate range of costs that are high enough that some agents will choose not to imitate others but low enough that later agents will then aggregate this additional information.
当代理从别人那里获得信息时,他们可能会忽略自己的信息,而跟随“群体智慧”。正如Bikhchandani等人(1992)和Banerjee(1992)首先指出的那样,这可能会损害社会的整体学习。在本文中,我考虑了当观察其他代理人的边际成本为恒定时,代理人收集公共信息的策略决策。成本对社会采取正确行动的可能性有模糊的影响。在某些情况下,存在一个中间范围的成本,这个成本足够高,以至于一些代理会选择不模仿其他代理,但又足够低,以至于后来的代理会汇总这些额外的信息。
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引用次数: 1
Transparency and Collateral: The Design of CCPs' Loss Allocation Rules 透明度与担保:ccp损失分担规则的设计
Pub Date : 2019-08-02 DOI: 10.17016/feds.2019.058
Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, Francesco Carli
This paper adopts a mechanism design approach to study optimal clearing arrangements for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by two types of agents: a borrower and lender. The borrower is subject to limited commitment and holds private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. The lender can acquire information at a cost about the commitment of the borrower, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. When truthful revelation by the borrower is not incentive compatible, the mechanism designer optimally trades off the value of information about the lack of commitment of the borrower with the cost of incentivizing the lender to acquire such information. Central clearing of these financial contracts through a central counterparty (CCP) allows lenders to mutualize their counterparty risks, but this insurance may weaken incentives to acquire and reveal informatio n about such risks. If information acquisition is incentive compatible, then lenders choose central clearing. If it is not, they may prefer bilateral clearing to prevent strategic default by borrowers and to economize on costly collateral. Central clearing is analyzed under different institutional features observed in financial markets, which place different restrictions on the contract space in the mechanism design problem. The interaction between the costly information acquisition and the limited commitment friction differs significantly in each clearing arrangement and in each set of restrictions. This results in novel lessons about the desirability of central versus bilateral clearing depending on traders' characteristics and the institutional features defining the operation of the CCP.
本文采用机制设计方法研究双边金融合同的最优清算安排,其中交易对手风险评估对效率至关重要。经济中充斥着两种类型的代理人:借款人和贷款人。借款人须承担有限的承诺,并对这种缺乏承诺的严重程度持有私人信息。贷款人可以以一定的成本获取借款人的承诺信息,从而影响对交易对手风险的评估。当借款人的真实披露与激励不相容时,机制设计者最优地权衡了关于借款人缺乏承诺的信息的价值与激励贷款人获取这些信息的成本。通过中央对手方(CCP)对这些金融合约进行中央清算,允许贷款人共同承担其对手方风险,但这种保险可能会削弱获取和披露此类风险信息的动机。如果信息获取是激励相容的,那么出借人选择中央清算。如果不是,他们可能更倾向于双边清算,以防止借款人的战略违约,并节省昂贵的抵押品。在机制设计问题中,分析了金融市场不同的制度特征对合约空间的不同限制。在每一种清算安排和每一组限制条件下,昂贵的信息获取与有限的承诺摩擦之间的相互作用存在显著差异。这就产生了关于中央清算与双边清算的可取性的新教训,这取决于交易者的特征和定义CCP运作的制度特征。
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引用次数: 2
期刊
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)
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