We study initial coin offerings (ICOs) to understand how an unregulated market overcomes information frictions and conflicts of interest. Listing platforms both independently assess an offering and crowdsource information from "expert" reviewers. These experts provide more balanced textual reviews as they gain experience and receive positive feedback from the community, consistent with a reputation effect. We find that proceeds are higher when reviews are more positive even after controlling for both the reviewer's and platform's numerical rating. Finally, experts with greater potential conflicts of interest are more positive than other reviewers, but investors identify these conflicts and discount their reviews.
{"title":"The Role of 'Expert Reviewers' in Private Capital Markets","authors":"Reena Aggarwal, K. Hanley, Xiaofei Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3715643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3715643","url":null,"abstract":"We study initial coin offerings (ICOs) to understand how an unregulated market overcomes information frictions and conflicts of interest. Listing platforms both independently assess an offering and crowdsource information from \"expert\" reviewers. These experts provide more balanced textual reviews as they gain experience and receive positive feedback from the community, consistent with a reputation effect. We find that proceeds are higher when reviews are more positive even after controlling for both the reviewer's and platform's numerical rating. Finally, experts with greater potential conflicts of interest are more positive than other reviewers, but investors identify these conflicts and discount their reviews.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126780407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine whether national culture, in particular, its individualism/collectivism dimension, affects sell-side financial analysts’ forecasting behavior. We find that analysts from individualistic cultures are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than analysts from collectivistic cultures. These results are related to individualistic (collectivistic) analysts’ inclination to over-weight (under-weight) their private information in forming forecasts. The culture’s effect is not permanent: Although slowly, it does decay over time. For market consequences, short-window market reactions are stronger to bold reports by collectivistic analysts than to those by individualistic analysts. For longer-term effects, we find that higher individualism of the covering analysts is associated with lower stock price synchronicity, indicating proportionately more firm-specific information impounded in the stock price. In net, however, we find that individualistic and collectivistic analysts appear to be equally effective in mitigating firms’ information asymmetry.
{"title":"National Culture and Analysts’ Forecasting Behavior","authors":"Ying Cao, Rubin Hao, Yong George Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3713715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3713715","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether national culture, in particular, its individualism/collectivism dimension, affects sell-side financial analysts’ forecasting behavior. We find that analysts from individualistic cultures are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than analysts from collectivistic cultures. These results are related to individualistic (collectivistic) analysts’ inclination to over-weight (under-weight) their private information in forming forecasts. The culture’s effect is not permanent: Although slowly, it does decay over time. For market consequences, short-window market reactions are stronger to bold reports by collectivistic analysts than to those by individualistic analysts. For longer-term effects, we find that higher individualism of the covering analysts is associated with lower stock price synchronicity, indicating proportionately more firm-specific information impounded in the stock price. In net, however, we find that individualistic and collectivistic analysts appear to be equally effective in mitigating firms’ information asymmetry.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127332501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a rationale for overachievement in non-professional activities in the labor market. The intrinsically motivated worker uses his achievement in the non-professional activity as a signaling device to protect his image. When the worker's career concern is weak, he exerts no extra effort on his non-professional activity. When the worker's career concern is strong, however, his effort level for the non-professional activity can go beyond the bliss point. With a very strong career concern, an “obsessive behavior” can arise in equilibrium, as the intrinsically motivated worker may choose to sacrifice the professional activity for the non-professional activity in an earlier stage of his career.
{"title":"Overachieving and Obsessive Behavior as Signaling Devices under Career Concern","authors":"A. Rodivilov, Dongsoo Shin, Xiaojian Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3711917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3711917","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a rationale for overachievement in non-professional activities in the labor market. The intrinsically motivated worker uses his achievement in the non-professional activity as a signaling device to protect his image. When the worker's career concern is weak, he exerts no extra effort on his non-professional activity. When the worker's career concern is strong, however, his effort level for the non-professional activity can go beyond the bliss point. With a very strong career concern, an “obsessive behavior” can arise in equilibrium, as the intrinsically motivated worker may choose to sacrifice the professional activity for the non-professional activity in an earlier stage of his career.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134494886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies order submission strategies by institutional investors when trading on private information. By merging institutional daily transactions with original/confidential 13F filings, I separate informed trades from uninformed ones. Informed large orders tend to be split across more brokers and over more days. While same brokers tend to work uninformed large orders over multiple days, the brokers who facilitated early parts of broken-up informed orders rarely receive the remaining parts of the same orders on later days. Institutional investors also provide camouflage for their informed orders by mixing an informed order with other uninformed orders simultaneously sent to the same broker. As a result, a higher degree of shuffling a portfolio of orders is associated with a larger share of informed trading volume. The splitting and shuffling strategies designed to conceal informed trades from brokers and other market participants tend to lower institutional trading costs, especially on informed orders.
{"title":"Splitting and Shuffling: Institutional Trading Motives and Order Submissions Across Brokers","authors":"Munhee Han, Sanghyun (Hugh) Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3429452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3429452","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies order submission strategies by institutional investors when trading on private information. By merging institutional daily transactions with original/confidential 13F filings, I separate informed trades from uninformed ones. Informed large orders tend to be split across more brokers and over more days. While same brokers tend to work uninformed large orders over multiple days, the brokers who facilitated early parts of broken-up informed orders rarely receive the remaining parts of the same orders on later days. Institutional investors also provide camouflage for their informed orders by mixing an informed order with other uninformed orders simultaneously sent to the same broker. As a result, a higher degree of shuffling a portfolio of orders is associated with a larger share of informed trading volume. The splitting and shuffling strategies designed to conceal informed trades from brokers and other market participants tend to lower institutional trading costs, especially on informed orders.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130727003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates how a privately-informed seller could signal her type by gathering information about the buyer's match value. We study two alternative ways to obtain information. In the first one, labeled information acquisition, the seller can acquire exogenous signals by facing a fixed acquisition cost. In the second one, on top of the fixed cost, the seller faces an additional designing cost based on mutual information to endogenously reduce uncertainty on the match value (information design). At first glance, bearing such cost may seem not convenient for the seller. However, we show that when the designing cost is relatively high, the parameter region in which separation can occur is larger under information design. When this cost is low, the separation cannot emerge under information design. The non-monotone relationship between the designing cost and separating outcomes shows that a seller's ability to provide match information is not necessarily associated with more precise quality information.
{"title":"Does Costly Persuasion Signal Quality?","authors":"Elias Carroni, L. Ferrari, G. Pignataro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3689695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3689695","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates how a privately-informed seller could signal her type by gathering information about the buyer's match value. We study two alternative ways to obtain information. In the first one, labeled information acquisition, the seller can acquire exogenous signals by facing a fixed acquisition cost. In the second one, on top of the fixed cost, the seller faces an additional designing cost based on mutual information to endogenously reduce uncertainty on the match value (information design). At first glance, bearing such cost may seem not convenient for the seller. However, we show that when the designing cost is relatively high, the parameter region in which separation can occur is larger under information design. When this cost is low, the separation cannot emerge under information design. The non-monotone relationship between the designing cost and separating outcomes shows that a seller's ability to provide match information is not necessarily associated with more precise quality information.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129282497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies screening competition under flexible information acquisition and its interaction with price competition. Multiple homogeneous buyers play a game where they simultaneously design independent exams with pre-specified information limit on a binary-type seller. Once observing own exam's outcome, a buyer may choose to bid for the object. This paper shows that under general assumptions on information cost, binary-signal symmetric equilibrium exists and must be supported by mixed strategies. Moreover, equilibrium is inefficient and on average buyers over-reject the seller. Price regulation may help restore efficiency.
{"title":"Screening Competition under Flexible Information Acquisition","authors":"Yiran Fan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3690020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3690020","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies screening competition under flexible information acquisition and its interaction with price competition. Multiple homogeneous buyers play a game where they simultaneously design independent exams with pre-specified information limit on a binary-type seller. Once observing own exam's outcome, a buyer may choose to bid for the object. This paper shows that under general assumptions on information cost, binary-signal symmetric equilibrium exists and must be supported by mixed strategies. Moreover, equilibrium is inefficient and on average buyers over-reject the seller. Price regulation may help restore efficiency.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130326638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study social learning in networks with information acquisition and choice. Bayesian agents act in sequence, observe the choices of their connections, and acquire information via sequential search. Complete learning occurs if search costs are not bounded away from zero and the network is sufficiently connected and has identifiable information paths. If search costs are bounded away from zero, complete learning is possible in many stochastic networks, including almost-complete networks, but even a weaker notion of long-run learning fails in many other networks. When agents observe random numbers of immediate predecessors, the rate of convergence, the probability of wrong herds, and long-run efficiency properties are the same as in the complete network. The density of indirect connections affects convergence rates. Network transparency has short-run implications for welfare and efficiency. Simply letting agents observe the shares of earlier choices reduces inefficiency and welfare losses.
{"title":"Collective Search in Networks","authors":"Niccolò Lomys","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3197244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3197244","url":null,"abstract":"I study social learning in networks with information acquisition and choice. Bayesian agents act in sequence, observe the choices of their connections, and acquire information via sequential search. Complete learning occurs if search costs are not bounded away from zero and the network is sufficiently connected and has identifiable information paths. If search costs are bounded away from zero, complete learning is possible in many stochastic networks, including almost-complete networks, but even a weaker notion of long-run learning fails in many other networks. When agents observe random numbers of immediate predecessors, the rate of convergence, the probability of wrong herds, and long-run efficiency properties are the same as in the complete network. The density of indirect connections affects convergence rates. Network transparency has short-run implications for welfare and efficiency. Simply letting agents observe the shares of earlier choices reduces inefficiency and welfare losses.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121771837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates rationalizable implementation in social environments where agents can provide hard evidence on the private information they possess. Specifically, we study necessary and sufficient conditions for virtual implementation using a notion of Rationalizability that captures forward-induction thinking. Our results non-trivially strengthen those from previous contributions to Rationalizable Implementation with dynamic mechanisms. In particular, we prove that, under a mild economic condition, dynamic mechanisms that rely on evidence can strategically distinguish all agents' information types endowed with different type-dependent messages. Thus, in a large class of social environments, if agents' evidence technologies are responsive, i.e., different types are endowed with different evidence, preference interdependence no longer plays a role in determining which class of Social Choice Functions can be rationalizably virtually implemented.
{"title":"Strongly Rationalizable Virtual Implementation in Social Environments With Evidence","authors":"Carlo Cusumano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3680728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3680728","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates rationalizable implementation in social environments where agents can provide hard evidence on the private information they possess. Specifically, we study necessary and sufficient conditions for virtual implementation using a notion of Rationalizability that captures forward-induction thinking. Our results non-trivially strengthen those from previous contributions to Rationalizable Implementation with dynamic mechanisms. In particular, we prove that, under a mild economic condition, dynamic mechanisms that rely on evidence can strategically distinguish all agents' information types endowed with different type-dependent messages. Thus, in a large class of social environments, if agents' evidence technologies are responsive, i.e., different types are endowed with different evidence, preference interdependence no longer plays a role in determining which class of Social Choice Functions can be rationalizably virtually implemented.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114836580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the optimal auction due to Myerson (1981) in response, we characterize both the buyer-optimal information structure, which maximizes the buyers' surplus, and the sellerworst information structure, which minimizes the seller's revenue. We translate both information design problems into finite-dimensional, constrained optimization problems in which one can explicitly solve for the optimal information structures. In contrast to the case with one buyer (Roesler and Szentes, 2017 and Du, 2018), we show that with two or more buyers, the symmetric buyer-optimal information structure is different from the symmetric seller-worst information structure. The good is always sold under the seller-worst information structure but not under the buyer-optimal information structure. Nevertheless, as the number of buyers goes to infinity, both symmetric information structures converge to no disclosure. We also show that in an ex ante symmetric setting, an asymmetric information structure is never seller-worst but can generate a strictly higher surplus for the buyers than the symmetric buyer-optimal information structure.
{"title":"Information Design in Optimal Auctions","authors":"Yi-Chun Chen, Xiangqian Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3673680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3673680","url":null,"abstract":"We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the optimal auction due to Myerson (1981) in response, we characterize both the buyer-optimal information structure, which maximizes the buyers' surplus, and the sellerworst information structure, which minimizes the seller's revenue. We translate both information design problems into finite-dimensional, constrained optimization problems in which one can explicitly solve for the optimal information structures. In contrast to the case with one buyer (Roesler and Szentes, 2017 and Du, 2018), we show that with two or more buyers, the symmetric buyer-optimal information structure is different from the symmetric seller-worst information structure. The good is always sold under the seller-worst information structure but not under the buyer-optimal information structure. Nevertheless, as the number of buyers goes to infinity, both symmetric information structures converge to no disclosure. We also show that in an ex ante symmetric setting, an asymmetric information structure is never seller-worst but can generate a strictly higher surplus for the buyers than the symmetric buyer-optimal information structure.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"943 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133481656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An objective of the Dodd-Frank Act was to improve the detection of financial fraud, including insider trading, through the creation of the whistle-blower bounty program at the SEC. This program provides for substantial financial rewards and strong anti-retaliation provisions to protect whistle-blowers. I test the effectiveness of the whistle-blower program in reducing informed trading by corporate insiders. I isolate the effect of the program from that of other concurrent reforms by identifying insiders of firms that are more sensitive to whistle-blowing allegations. For a sample of firms that lobbied against the whistle-blower provisions of the Act, I find that the profitability of insider purchases significantly reduces post Dodd-Frank relative to that of other insiders. The reduction in abnormal profits is economically meaningful, in the range of 0.05% to 0.10% daily return. I find similar results for insiders of firms with weak internal whistle-blower programs who are likely to be more sensitive to the new regulation, and for insiders of firms perceived by market participants as benefiting from the additional oversight provided by the program. I analyze whether the whistle-blower program was effective in reducing informed insider sales by examining pre-earnings announcement and pre-M&A settings when insider transactions are more likely to be information-driven. I find that, post Dodd-Frank, insiders are less likely to sell before events that are perceived negatively by investors. The legal literature suggests that insider trading behavior is more difficult to expose and prove than corporate-level fraud. In contrast with the beliefs of the program critics, I find that whistle-blowers are effective deterrents of insider trading, suggesting that they are a valuable resource for unravelling this hard-to-detect illegal activity.
{"title":"The Deterrent Effect of Whistleblowing on Insider Trading","authors":"Jacob Raleigh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3672026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672026","url":null,"abstract":"An objective of the Dodd-Frank Act was to improve the detection of financial fraud, including insider trading, through the creation of the whistle-blower bounty program at the SEC. This program provides for substantial financial rewards and strong anti-retaliation provisions to protect whistle-blowers. I test the effectiveness of the whistle-blower program in reducing informed trading by corporate insiders. I isolate the effect of the program from that of other concurrent reforms by identifying insiders of firms that are more sensitive to whistle-blowing allegations. For a sample of firms that lobbied against the whistle-blower provisions of the Act, I find that the profitability of insider purchases significantly reduces post Dodd-Frank relative to that of other insiders. The reduction in abnormal profits is economically meaningful, in the range of 0.05% to 0.10% daily return. I find similar results for insiders of firms with weak internal whistle-blower programs who are likely to be more sensitive to the new regulation, and for insiders of firms perceived by market participants as benefiting from the additional oversight provided by the program. I analyze whether the whistle-blower program was effective in reducing informed insider sales by examining pre-earnings announcement and pre-M&A settings when insider transactions are more likely to be information-driven. I find that, post Dodd-Frank, insiders are less likely to sell before events that are perceived negatively by investors. The legal literature suggests that insider trading behavior is more difficult to expose and prove than corporate-level fraud. In contrast with the beliefs of the program critics, I find that whistle-blowers are effective deterrents of insider trading, suggesting that they are a valuable resource for unravelling this hard-to-detect illegal activity.","PeriodicalId":232169,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information (Topic)","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134440751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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