{"title":"O controle de concentrações em plataformas digitais: uma análise crítica dos limites e potencialidades do art. 88, §7º da lei nº 12.529/2011","authors":"B. Renzetti, C. Saito","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i2.1075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i2.1075","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"22 27","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139166314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"PROCESSO DE RESPONSABILIZAÇÃO DE PESSOAS JURÍDICAS: A ACUMULAÇÃO DAS PENALIDADES PREVISTAS NA LEI DO SISTEMA BRASILEIRO DE DEFESA DA CONCORRÊNCIA E NA LEI ANTICORRUPÇÃO NA HIPÓTESE DE FRAUDE EM LICITAÇÃO E CONTRATOS PÚBLICOS","authors":"","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"276 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124451229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vivian Anne Fraga, Nascimento Arruda, M. Barbosa, Castro Zenkner, Fundação Getúlio, Rio de Janeiro., Rj, Brasil Marco, Volpini Micheli, Dr. Luis Henrique, Bertolino Braido, Vargas Fgv, Direito Concorrencial
Context: Like other jurisdictions and international bodies, Brazilian competition law characterizes bid-rigging cartels as the most serious type of anticompetitive conduct. Supported by the complex and multifaceted applicable legal framework, the competent national authority – the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade) – has been proactively and diligently exercising initiatives for a holistic accountability of cartelists. Integrated with the legal system of multiple persecution of such agents, Cade has provoked individuals, organizations, and other governmental bodies, encouraging them, within the limits of their own respective competences and attributions, to seek sanctions of a civil, criminal nature and in the other administrative fronts. Objective: The text aims – through a dense empirical analysis – at confirming the occurrence of this important institutional movement of the authority in promoting a holistic legal accountability of offenders. This institutional movement herewith referred to as “Accountability 360°” is fully integrated into a legal and legislative framework that provides for multiple punitive responses to the cartel: administratively, criminally, and reparative (by means of civil liability). Method: Quantitative and qualitative analysis of cartel cases in public tenders decided by CADE’s Tribunal in the last five years. Based on CADE’s Electronic Information System (SEI) search tool, the percentage of cases in which the authority effectively promoted the 360° Accountability was checked and, in a complementary way, the merits of the decisions were analyzed. Conclusions: The results place Cade in a protagonist role of a holistic enforcement in the fight against bid-rigging cartels. In this role, the authority sanctions cartelists under the scope of the antitrust law and makes use of the multifaceted applicable legal system that provides for sanctions of various orders, such as criminal, administrative, and civil.
{"title":"RESPONSABILIZAÇÃO 360°: DESDOBRAMENTOS DE UM MOVIMENTO RESPONSIVO DISSUASÓRIO ESTIMULADO PELA AUTORIDADE DE DEFESA DA CONCORRÊNCIA","authors":"Vivian Anne Fraga, Nascimento Arruda, M. Barbosa, Castro Zenkner, Fundação Getúlio, Rio de Janeiro., Rj, Brasil Marco, Volpini Micheli, Dr. Luis Henrique, Bertolino Braido, Vargas Fgv, Direito Concorrencial","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1035","url":null,"abstract":"Context: Like other jurisdictions and international bodies, Brazilian competition law characterizes bid-rigging cartels as the most serious type of anticompetitive conduct. Supported by the complex and multifaceted applicable legal framework, the competent national authority – the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade) – has been proactively and diligently exercising initiatives for a holistic accountability of cartelists. Integrated with the legal system of multiple persecution of such agents, Cade has provoked individuals, organizations, and other governmental bodies, encouraging them, within the limits of their own respective competences and attributions, to seek sanctions of a civil, criminal nature and in the other administrative fronts. Objective: The text aims – through a dense empirical analysis – at confirming the occurrence of this important institutional movement of the authority in promoting a holistic legal accountability of offenders. This institutional movement herewith referred to as “Accountability 360°” is fully integrated into a legal and legislative framework that provides for multiple punitive responses to the cartel: administratively, criminally, and reparative (by means of civil liability). Method: Quantitative and qualitative analysis of cartel cases in public tenders decided by CADE’s Tribunal in the last five years. Based on CADE’s Electronic Information System (SEI) search tool, the percentage of cases in which the authority effectively promoted the 360° Accountability was checked and, in a complementary way, the merits of the decisions were analyzed. Conclusions: The results place Cade in a protagonist role of a holistic enforcement in the fight against bid-rigging cartels. In this role, the authority sanctions cartelists under the scope of the antitrust law and makes use of the multifaceted applicable legal system that provides for sanctions of various orders, such as criminal, administrative, and civil.","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133031207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CONSÓRCIO ENTRE CONCORRENTES E AS RECENTES ORIENTAÇÕES DA COMISSÃO EUROPEIA CONSTANTES DO HORIZONTAL GUIDELINES DE 2023","authors":"","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114425705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"UMA ANÁLISE DA (IN)COMPATIBILIDADE ENTRE O EXERCÍCIO DO LEVERAGE REGULATÓRIO E A ATUAÇÃO DO CADE NA DEFESA DA CONCORRÊNCIA NO BRASIL","authors":"","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127558057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Natasha Siqueira, Mendes de Nóvoa, Dr. Luis Henrique, Bertolino Braido, Fundação Getúlio, Vargas Fgv
Context: The article aims to analyze how to improve antitrust enforcement through compliance in fulfillment of Cease and Desist Agreements (TCC for its acronym in Portuguese), in the context of Brazilian law. Objective: Demonstrate how antitrust compliance can be used as an effective tool in Brazilian regulatory cooperation, especially to increase the enforcement antitrust. Method: Deductive and bibliographic method and jurisprudential analysis. Conclusions: Compliance programs are positives as an instrument of regulatory cooperation in antitrust law, especially as an enforcement for antitrust law.
{"title":"ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUSTE POR MEIO DA APLICAÇÃO DO COMPLIANCE CONCORRENCIAL EM TERMOS DE COMPROMISSO DE CESSAÇÃO (TCCs)","authors":"Natasha Siqueira, Mendes de Nóvoa, Dr. Luis Henrique, Bertolino Braido, Fundação Getúlio, Vargas Fgv","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.986","url":null,"abstract":"Context: The article aims to analyze how to improve antitrust enforcement through compliance in fulfillment of Cease and Desist Agreements (TCC for its acronym in Portuguese), in the context of Brazilian law. Objective: Demonstrate how antitrust compliance can be used as an effective tool in Brazilian regulatory cooperation, especially to increase the enforcement antitrust. Method: Deductive and bibliographic method and jurisprudential analysis. Conclusions: Compliance programs are positives as an instrument of regulatory cooperation in antitrust law, especially as an enforcement for antitrust law.","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127387169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ASPECTOS REGULATÓRIOS E SEUS EFEITOS NO SETOR DE ÁGUA E ESGOTO DO BRASIL","authors":"","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115726528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"TERMO DE COMPROMISSO DE CESSAÇÃO DE CONDUTA E ACORDO DE NÃO PERSECUÇÃO PENAL: UMA INTERSECÇÃO VANTAJOSA EM CASOS DE CARTEL","authors":"","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.985","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132094317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rosângela Aparecida, Soares Fernandes, L. Bispo, J. Júnior, Dr. Luis Henrique, Bertolino Braido, Fundação Getúlio, Vargas Fgv
Contextualization: Empirical studies, which aim to detect economic signs of a cartel, have been gaining relevance in the international and national literature. However, there is a gap in the literature of works with applications of this nature, which include the resale of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). This segment has characteristics that enable the formation of a cartel and, in recent years, has been the target of complaints and investigations regarding this conduct before competition regulatory bodies. Objective: That said, the objective of the article was to detect economic signs of cartel in the resale of LPG, in Nova Andradina and Dourados, Mato Grosso do Sul, from May 2004 to August 2020. The hypothesis was tested that, during the cartel period, the average price of LPG has increased and its variance has decreased. Methodology: The coefficient of price variation and their respective average values were calculated for the complete period, cartel and post-cartel. Next, the models A utoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH), Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) and Threshold GARCH, are estimated, all, with the introduction of the dummy cartel variable, as proposed by Bolotova, Connor e Miller (2008). Results: The prices variation coefficients revealed that they were more aligned during the cartel period. The estimated volatility models, in general, allowed us to accept the hypothesis that, during the cartel, there was an increase in the average price of LPG in both municipalities. No decrease in variance in the price of LPG was detected for the city of Dourados-MS. The asymmetry coefficients showed that the series, from both analyzed cities, have impacts of asymmetric shocks on the variance. Conclusion: It is concluded that there are economic signs of cartel in the resale of LPG in the analyzed municipalities.
情境化:实证研究旨在发现卡特尔的经济迹象，在国际和国内文献中越来越重要。然而，在这种性质的应用中，包括液化石油气(LPG)的转售，文献中存在空白。这部分具有形成卡特尔的特点，近年来一直是竞争监管机构对这种行为的投诉和调查的目标。目的:也就是说，本文的目的是在2004年5月至2020年8月期间，在南马托格罗索州的新安德拉迪纳和杜拉多斯发现液化石油气转售中的卡特尔经济迹象。对假设进行了检验，发现在卡特尔时期，液化石油气的平均价格上升，其方差减小。方法:计算整个时期、卡特尔和卡特尔后的价格变动系数及其平均值。接下来，通过引入Bolotova、Connor e Miller(2008)提出的虚拟cartel变量，对模型A -回归条件异方差(ARCH)、广义自回归条件异方差(GARCH)和阈值GARCH进行估计。结果:价格变动系数显示，在卡特尔时期，价格变动系数更为一致。一般来说，估计的波动模型使我们能够接受这样的假设，即在卡特尔期间，两个城市的液化石油气平均价格都有所上涨。在杜拉多斯- ms市，液化石油气价格的差异没有减少。不对称系数表明，来自两个分析城市的序列对方差有不对称冲击的影响。结论:分析城市液化石油气转售存在卡特尔经济迹象。
{"title":"INDÍCIOS ECONÔMICOS DE CARTEL NA REVENDA DE GLP: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “LAISSEZ-FAIRE”","authors":"Rosângela Aparecida, Soares Fernandes, L. Bispo, J. Júnior, Dr. Luis Henrique, Bertolino Braido, Fundação Getúlio, Vargas Fgv","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.1022","url":null,"abstract":"Contextualization: Empirical studies, which aim to detect economic signs of a cartel, have been gaining relevance in the international and national literature. However, there is a gap in the literature of works with applications of this nature, which include the resale of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). This segment has characteristics that enable the formation of a cartel and, in recent years, has been the target of complaints and investigations regarding this conduct before competition regulatory bodies. Objective: That said, the objective of the article was to detect economic signs of cartel in the resale of LPG, in Nova Andradina and Dourados, Mato Grosso do Sul, from May 2004 to August 2020. The hypothesis was tested that, during the cartel period, the average price of LPG has increased and its variance has decreased. Methodology: The coefficient of price variation and their respective average values were calculated for the complete period, cartel and post-cartel. Next, the models A utoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH), Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) and Threshold GARCH, are estimated, all, with the introduction of the dummy cartel variable, as proposed by Bolotova, Connor e Miller (2008). Results: The prices variation coefficients revealed that they were more aligned during the cartel period. The estimated volatility models, in general, allowed us to accept the hypothesis that, during the cartel, there was an increase in the average price of LPG in both municipalities. No decrease in variance in the price of LPG was detected for the city of Dourados-MS. The asymmetry coefficients showed that the series, from both analyzed cities, have impacts of asymmetric shocks on the variance. Conclusion: It is concluded that there are economic signs of cartel in the resale of LPG in the analyzed municipalities.","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116379905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ATOS DE CONCENTRAÇÃO NÃO CONHECIDOS PELO CADE: A NECESSIDADE DE APRIMORAMENTO DOS CRITÉRIOS DE NOTIFICAÇÃO VISANDO MITIGAR A INSEGURANÇA JURÍDICA","authors":"","doi":"10.52896/rdc.v11i1.991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v11i1.991","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":260841,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Defesa da Concorrência","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131394951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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