User reporting is an essential component of content moderation on many online platforms -- in particular, on end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging platforms where platform operators cannot proactively inspect message contents. However, users' privacy concerns when considering reporting may impede the effectiveness of this strategy in regulating online harassment. In this paper, we conduct interviews with 16 users of E2EE platforms to understand users' mental models of how reporting works and their resultant privacy concerns and considerations surrounding reporting. We find that users expect platforms to store rich longitudinal reporting datasets, recognizing both their promise for better abuse mitigation and the privacy risk that platforms may exploit or fail to protect them. We also find that users have preconceptions about the respective capabilities and risks of moderators at the platform versus community level -- for instance, users trust platform moderators more to not abuse their power but think community moderators have more time to attend to reports. These considerations, along with perceived effectiveness of reporting and how to provide sufficient evidence while maintaining privacy, shape how users decide whether, to whom, and how much to report. We conclude with design implications for a more privacy-preserving reporting system on E2EE messaging platforms.
{"title":"\"Is Reporting Worth the Sacrifice of Revealing What I Have Sent?\": Privacy Considerations When Reporting on End-to-End Encrypted Platforms","authors":"Leijie Wang, Ruotong Wang, S. Williams-Ceci, Sanketh Menda, Amy X. Zhang","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2306.10478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.10478","url":null,"abstract":"User reporting is an essential component of content moderation on many online platforms -- in particular, on end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging platforms where platform operators cannot proactively inspect message contents. However, users' privacy concerns when considering reporting may impede the effectiveness of this strategy in regulating online harassment. In this paper, we conduct interviews with 16 users of E2EE platforms to understand users' mental models of how reporting works and their resultant privacy concerns and considerations surrounding reporting. We find that users expect platforms to store rich longitudinal reporting datasets, recognizing both their promise for better abuse mitigation and the privacy risk that platforms may exploit or fail to protect them. We also find that users have preconceptions about the respective capabilities and risks of moderators at the platform versus community level -- for instance, users trust platform moderators more to not abuse their power but think community moderators have more time to attend to reports. These considerations, along with perceived effectiveness of reporting and how to provide sufficient evidence while maintaining privacy, shape how users decide whether, to whom, and how much to report. We conclude with design implications for a more privacy-preserving reporting system on E2EE messaging platforms.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132786065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-09DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2306.06261
Zhixuan Zhou, Tanusree Sharma, Luke Emano, Sauvik Das, Yang Wang
Crypto wallets are a key touch-point for cryptocurrency use. People use crypto wallets to make transactions, manage crypto assets, and interact with decentralized apps (dApps). However, as is often the case with emergent technologies, little attention has been paid to understanding and improving accessibility barriers in crypto wallet software. We present a series of user studies that explored how both blind and sighted individuals use MetaMask, one of the most popular non-custodial crypto wallets. We uncovered inter-related accessibility, learnability, and security issues with MetaMask. We also report on an iterative redesign of MetaMask to make it more accessible for blind users. This process involved multiple evaluations with 44 novice crypto wallet users, including 20 sighted users, 23 blind users, and one user with low vision. Our study results show notable improvements for accessibility after two rounds of design iterations. Based on the results, we discuss design implications for creating more accessible and secure crypto wallets for blind users.
{"title":"Iterative Design of An Accessible Crypto Wallet for Blind Users","authors":"Zhixuan Zhou, Tanusree Sharma, Luke Emano, Sauvik Das, Yang Wang","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2306.06261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.06261","url":null,"abstract":"Crypto wallets are a key touch-point for cryptocurrency use. People use crypto wallets to make transactions, manage crypto assets, and interact with decentralized apps (dApps). However, as is often the case with emergent technologies, little attention has been paid to understanding and improving accessibility barriers in crypto wallet software. We present a series of user studies that explored how both blind and sighted individuals use MetaMask, one of the most popular non-custodial crypto wallets. We uncovered inter-related accessibility, learnability, and security issues with MetaMask. We also report on an iterative redesign of MetaMask to make it more accessible for blind users. This process involved multiple evaluations with 44 novice crypto wallet users, including 20 sighted users, 23 blind users, and one user with low vision. Our study results show notable improvements for accessibility after two rounds of design iterations. Based on the results, we discuss design implications for creating more accessible and secure crypto wallets for blind users.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129323299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-15DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2302.07788
Filipo Sharevski, Benjamin Kessell
In this study, we interviewed 22 prominent hacktivists to learn their take on the increased proliferation of misinformation on social media. We found that none of them welcomes the nefarious appropriation of trolling and memes for the purpose of political (counter)argumentation and dissemination of propaganda. True to the original hacker ethos, misinformation is seen as a threat to the democratic vision of the Internet, and as such, it must be confronted on the face with tried hacktivists' methods like deplatforming the"misinformers"and doxing or leaking data about their funding and recruitment. The majority of the hacktivists also recommended interventions for raising misinformation literacy in addition to targeted hacking campaigns. We discuss the implications of these findings relative to the emergent recasting of hacktivism in defense of a constructive and factual social media discourse.
{"title":"Fight Fire with Fire: Hacktivists' Take on Social Media Misinformation","authors":"Filipo Sharevski, Benjamin Kessell","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2302.07788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.07788","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we interviewed 22 prominent hacktivists to learn their take on the increased proliferation of misinformation on social media. We found that none of them welcomes the nefarious appropriation of trolling and memes for the purpose of political (counter)argumentation and dissemination of propaganda. True to the original hacker ethos, misinformation is seen as a threat to the democratic vision of the Internet, and as such, it must be confronted on the face with tried hacktivists' methods like deplatforming the\"misinformers\"and doxing or leaking data about their funding and recruitment. The majority of the hacktivists also recommended interventions for raising misinformation literacy in addition to targeted hacking campaigns. We discuss the implications of these findings relative to the emergent recasting of hacktivism in defense of a constructive and factual social media discourse.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117329889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-07-22DOI: 10.1017/9781316831960.021
F. Schaub, Rebecca Balebako, Adam L. Durity, L. Cranor
Notifying users about a system's data practices is supposed to enable users to make informed privacy decisions. Yet, current notice and choice mechanisms, such as privacy policies, are often ineffective because they are neither usable nor useful, and are therefore ignored by users. Constrained interfaces on mobile devices, wearables, and smart home devices connected in an Internet of Things exacerbate the issue. Much research has studied usability issues of privacy notices and many proposals for more usable privacy notices exist. Yet, there is little guidance for designers and developers on the design aspects that can impact the effectiveness of privacy notices. In this paper, we make multiple contributions to remedy this issue. We survey the existing literature on privacy notices and identify challenges, requirements, and best practices for privacy notice design. Further, we map out the design space for privacy notices by identifying relevant dimensions. This provides a taxonomy and consistent terminology of notice approaches to foster understanding and reasoning about notice options available in the context of specific systems. Our systemization of knowledge and the developed design space can help designers, developers, and researchers identify notice and choice requirements and develop a comprehensive notice concept for their system that addresses the needs of different audiences and considers the system's limitations and opportunities for providing notice.
{"title":"A Design Space for Effective Privacy Notices","authors":"F. Schaub, Rebecca Balebako, Adam L. Durity, L. Cranor","doi":"10.1017/9781316831960.021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316831960.021","url":null,"abstract":"Notifying users about a system's data practices is supposed to enable users to make informed privacy decisions. Yet, current notice and choice mechanisms, such as privacy policies, are often ineffective because they are neither usable nor useful, and are therefore ignored by users. Constrained interfaces on mobile devices, wearables, and smart home devices connected in an Internet of Things exacerbate the issue. Much research has studied usability issues of privacy notices and many proposals for more usable privacy notices exist. Yet, there is little guidance for designers and developers on the design aspects that can impact the effectiveness of privacy notices. In this paper, we make multiple contributions to remedy this issue. We survey the existing literature on privacy notices and identify challenges, requirements, and best practices for privacy notice design. Further, we map out the design space for privacy notices by identifying relevant dimensions. This provides a taxonomy and consistent terminology of notice approaches to foster understanding and reasoning about notice options available in the context of specific systems. Our systemization of knowledge and the developed design space can help designers, developers, and researchers identify notice and choice requirements and develop a comprehensive notice concept for their system that addresses the needs of different audiences and considers the system's limitations and opportunities for providing notice.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115979819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Huh, Hyoungshick Kim, R. Bobba, Masooda N. Bashir, K. Beznosov
To ensure that users do not choose weak personal identification numbers (PINs), many banks give out systemgenerated random PINs. 4-digit is the most commonly used PIN length, but 6-digit system-generated PINs are also becoming popular. The increased security we get from using system-generated PINs, however, comes at the cost of memorability. And while banks are increasingly adopting systemgenerated PINs, the impact on memorability of such PINs has not been studied. We conducted a large-scale online user study with 9,114 participants to investigate the impact of increased PIN length on the memorability of PINs, and whether number chunking 1 techniques (breaking a single number into multiple smaller numbers) can be applied to improve memorability for larger PIN lengths. As one would expect, our study shows that system-generated 4-digit PINs outperform 6-, 7-, and 8-digit PINs in long-term memorability. Interestingly, however, we find that there is no statistically significant difference in memorability between 6-, 7-, and 8-digit PINs, indicating that 7-, and 8-digit PINs should also be considered when looking to increase PIN length to 6-digits from currently common length of 4-digits for improved security. By grouping all 6-, 7-, and 8-digit chunked PINs together, and comparing them against a group of all non-chunked PINs, we find that chunking, overall, improves memorability of system-generated PINs. To our surprise, however, none of the individual chunking policies (e.g., 0000-00-00) showed statistically significant improvement over their peer non� Part of this work was done while Dr. Huh and Dr. Bobba were at the University of Illinois. 1 Note that our notion of chunking differs from the traditional notion in that we do not chunk numbers into semantically meaningful pieces.
{"title":"On the Memorability of System-generated PINs: Can Chunking Help?","authors":"J. Huh, Hyoungshick Kim, R. Bobba, Masooda N. Bashir, K. Beznosov","doi":"10.5072/ZENODO.309748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5072/ZENODO.309748","url":null,"abstract":"To ensure that users do not choose weak personal identification numbers (PINs), many banks give out systemgenerated random PINs. 4-digit is the most commonly used PIN length, but 6-digit system-generated PINs are also becoming popular. The increased security we get from using system-generated PINs, however, comes at the cost of memorability. And while banks are increasingly adopting systemgenerated PINs, the impact on memorability of such PINs has not been studied. We conducted a large-scale online user study with 9,114 participants to investigate the impact of increased PIN length on the memorability of PINs, and whether number chunking 1 techniques (breaking a single number into multiple smaller numbers) can be applied to improve memorability for larger PIN lengths. As one would expect, our study shows that system-generated 4-digit PINs outperform 6-, 7-, and 8-digit PINs in long-term memorability. Interestingly, however, we find that there is no statistically significant difference in memorability between 6-, 7-, and 8-digit PINs, indicating that 7-, and 8-digit PINs should also be considered when looking to increase PIN length to 6-digits from currently common length of 4-digits for improved security. By grouping all 6-, 7-, and 8-digit chunked PINs together, and comparing them against a group of all non-chunked PINs, we find that chunking, overall, improves memorability of system-generated PINs. To our surprise, however, none of the individual chunking policies (e.g., 0000-00-00) showed statistically significant improvement over their peer non� Part of this work was done while Dr. Huh and Dr. Bobba were at the University of Illinois. 1 Note that our notion of chunking differs from the traditional notion in that we do not chunk numbers into semantically meaningful pieces.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121012290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Online social networks provide access to the user's information for long periods of time after the information's initial publication. In this paper, we investigate the relation between information aging and its sharing preferences on Facebook. Our findings are based on a survey of 193 Facebook users, in which we asked users to specify their sharing preferences and intentions towards posts that were published in different periods of time (from the time of the survey and up to 24 months prior to the time of the survey.) Our results show that willingness to share significantly drops with the time passed since publishing the post. The occurrence of life changes, such as graduating from college or moving to a new town, is correlated with a further decrease in the willingness to share. We discuss our findings by relating it to information aging theories and privacy theories. Finally, we use our results to reflect on privacy mechanisms for long-term usage of online social networks, such as expiry date for content and historical information reviewing processes.
{"title":"Retrospective privacy: managing longitudinal privacy in online social networks","authors":"Oshrat Ayalon, Eran Toch","doi":"10.1145/2501604.2501608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2501604.2501608","url":null,"abstract":"Online social networks provide access to the user's information for long periods of time after the information's initial publication. In this paper, we investigate the relation between information aging and its sharing preferences on Facebook. Our findings are based on a survey of 193 Facebook users, in which we asked users to specify their sharing preferences and intentions towards posts that were published in different periods of time (from the time of the survey and up to 24 months prior to the time of the survey.) Our results show that willingness to share significantly drops with the time passed since publishing the post. The occurrence of life changes, such as graduating from college or moving to a new town, is correlated with a further decrease in the willingness to share. We discuss our findings by relating it to information aging theories and privacy theories. Finally, we use our results to reflect on privacy mechanisms for long-term usage of online social networks, such as expiry date for content and historical information reviewing processes.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116823052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ecological validity of password studies is a complex topic and difficult to quantify. Most researchers who conduct password user studies try to address the issue in their study design. However, the methods researchers use to try to improve ecological validity vary and some methods even contradict each other. One reason for this is that the very nature of the problem of ecological validity of password studies is hard to study, due to the lack of ground truth. In this paper, we present a study on the ecological validity of password studies designed specifically to shed light on this issue. We were able to compare the behavior of 645 study participants with their real world password choices. We conducted both online and laboratory studies, under priming and non-priming conditions, to be able to evaluate the effects of these different forms of password studies. While our study is able to investigate only one specific password environment used by a limited population and thus cannot answer all questions about ecological validity, it does represent a first important step in judging the impact of ecological validity on password studies.
{"title":"On the ecological validity of a password study","authors":"S. Fahl, M. Harbach, Y. Acar, Matthew Smith","doi":"10.1145/2501604.2501617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2501604.2501617","url":null,"abstract":"The ecological validity of password studies is a complex topic and difficult to quantify. Most researchers who conduct password user studies try to address the issue in their study design. However, the methods researchers use to try to improve ecological validity vary and some methods even contradict each other. One reason for this is that the very nature of the problem of ecological validity of password studies is hard to study, due to the lack of ground truth. In this paper, we present a study on the ecological validity of password studies designed specifically to shed light on this issue. We were able to compare the behavior of 645 study participants with their real world password choices. We conducted both online and laboratory studies, under priming and non-priming conditions, to be able to evaluate the effects of these different forms of password studies. While our study is able to investigate only one specific password environment used by a limited population and thus cannot answer all questions about ecological validity, it does represent a first important step in judging the impact of ecological validity on password studies.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132680855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Graphical passwords are an alternative form of authentication that use images for login, and leverage the picture superiority effect for good usability and memorability. Categories of graphical passwords have been distinguished on the basis of different kinds of memory retrieval (recall, cued-recall, and recognition). Psychological research suggests that leveraging recognition memory should be best, but this remains an open question in the password literature. This paper examines how different kinds of memory retrieval affect the memorability and usability of random assigned graphical passwords. A series of five studies of graphical and text passwords showed that participants were able to better remember recognition-based graphical passwords, but their usability was limited by slow login times. A graphical password scheme that leveraged recognition and recall memory was most successful at combining memorability and usability.
{"title":"Memory retrieval and graphical passwords","authors":"E. Stobert, R. Biddle","doi":"10.1145/2501604.2501619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2501604.2501619","url":null,"abstract":"Graphical passwords are an alternative form of authentication that use images for login, and leverage the picture superiority effect for good usability and memorability. Categories of graphical passwords have been distinguished on the basis of different kinds of memory retrieval (recall, cued-recall, and recognition). Psychological research suggests that leveraging recognition memory should be best, but this remains an open question in the password literature. This paper examines how different kinds of memory retrieval affect the memorability and usability of random assigned graphical passwords. A series of five studies of graphical and text passwords showed that participants were able to better remember recognition-based graphical passwords, but their usability was limited by slow login times. A graphical password scheme that leveraged recognition and recall memory was most successful at combining memorability and usability.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130093408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Idris Adjerid, A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, G. Loewenstein
In an effort to address persistent consumer privacy concerns, policy makers and the data industry seem to have found common grounds in proposals that aim at making online privacy more "transparent." Such self-regulatory approaches rely on, among other things, providing more and better information to users of Internet services about how their data is used. However, we illustrate in a series of experiments that even simple privacy notices do not consistently impact disclosure behavior, and may in fact be used to nudge individuals to disclose variable amounts of personal information. In a first experiment, we demonstrate that the impact of privacy notices on disclosure is sensitive to relative judgments, even when the objective risks of disclosure actually stay constant. In a second experiment, we show that the impact of privacy notices on disclosure can be muted by introducing simple misdirections that do not alter the objective risk of disclosure. These findings cast doubts on the likelihood of initiatives predicated around notices and transparency to address, by themselves, online privacy concerns.
{"title":"Sleights of privacy: framing, disclosures, and the limits of transparency","authors":"Idris Adjerid, A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, G. Loewenstein","doi":"10.1145/2501604.2501613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2501604.2501613","url":null,"abstract":"In an effort to address persistent consumer privacy concerns, policy makers and the data industry seem to have found common grounds in proposals that aim at making online privacy more \"transparent.\" Such self-regulatory approaches rely on, among other things, providing more and better information to users of Internet services about how their data is used. However, we illustrate in a series of experiments that even simple privacy notices do not consistently impact disclosure behavior, and may in fact be used to nudge individuals to disclose variable amounts of personal information. In a first experiment, we demonstrate that the impact of privacy notices on disclosure is sensitive to relative judgments, even when the objective risks of disclosure actually stay constant. In a second experiment, we show that the impact of privacy notices on disclosure can be muted by introducing simple misdirections that do not alter the objective risk of disclosure. These findings cast doubts on the likelihood of initiatives predicated around notices and transparency to address, by themselves, online privacy concerns.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129015619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Agarwal, Nisheeth Shrivastava, S. Jaiswal, S. Panjwani
Recent studies have highlighted user concerns with respect to third-party tracking and online behavioral advertising (OBA) and the need for better consumer choice mechanisms to address these phenomena. We re-investigate the question of perceptions of third-party tracking while situating it in the larger context of how online ads, in general, are perceived by users. Via in-depth interviews with 53 Web users in India, we find that although concerns for third-party tracking and OBA remain noticeable amongst this population, other aspects of online advertising---like the possibility of being shown ads with embarrassing and suggestive content---are voiced as greater concerns than the concern of being tracked. Current-day blocking tools are insufficient to redress the situation: users demand selective filtering of ad content (as opposed to blocking out all ads) and are not satisfied with mechanisms that only control tracking and OBA. We conclude with design recommendations for enduser tools to control online ad consumption keeping in mind the concerns brought forth by our study.
{"title":"Do not embarrass: re-examining user concerns for online tracking and advertising","authors":"L. Agarwal, Nisheeth Shrivastava, S. Jaiswal, S. Panjwani","doi":"10.1145/2501604.2501612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2501604.2501612","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies have highlighted user concerns with respect to third-party tracking and online behavioral advertising (OBA) and the need for better consumer choice mechanisms to address these phenomena. We re-investigate the question of perceptions of third-party tracking while situating it in the larger context of how online ads, in general, are perceived by users. Via in-depth interviews with 53 Web users in India, we find that although concerns for third-party tracking and OBA remain noticeable amongst this population, other aspects of online advertising---like the possibility of being shown ads with embarrassing and suggestive content---are voiced as greater concerns than the concern of being tracked. Current-day blocking tools are insufficient to redress the situation: users demand selective filtering of ad content (as opposed to blocking out all ads) and are not satisfied with mechanisms that only control tracking and OBA. We conclude with design recommendations for enduser tools to control online ad consumption keeping in mind the concerns brought forth by our study.","PeriodicalId":273244,"journal":{"name":"Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security","volume":"331 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132618592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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