Beyond the untold health challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic brought significant economic disruption; inducing one of the worst global recessions since World War II. However, while studies have explored the socio-economic and health implications of the pandemic; including governments’ social protection responses through relief packages, extant literature has glossed over the Nigerian COVID-19 economic recovery strategy. Anchoring on the Rentier State Theory and Qual-dominant approach, this study examines the nature and trajectory of the Nigeria economic recovery strategy in the shock of COVID-19 recession. It found that despite the vulnerability of an oil-dependent economy as was exposed by the COVID-19 lockdowns, the Nigerian economic recovery and sustainability Plan 2020 to 2025 still rely on oil rents. Thus, the study concludes that without the development and expansion of domestic manufacturing through science and technology, the Nigerian economy is unlikely to survive future economic shocks. Therefore, the study recommends that to ensure sustainable economic growth and development, the domestic and home-grown industries should be expanded and sustained to drive the Nigerian economy.
{"title":"The State and COVID-19 Economic Recovery Strategy in Nigeria","authors":"A. Ajah, Edith Uwajumogu C.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3895418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895418","url":null,"abstract":"Beyond the untold health challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic brought significant economic disruption; inducing one of the worst global recessions since World War II. However, while studies have explored the socio-economic and health implications of the pandemic; including governments’ social protection responses through relief packages, extant literature has glossed over the Nigerian COVID-19 economic recovery strategy. Anchoring on the Rentier State Theory and Qual-dominant approach, this study examines the nature and trajectory of the Nigeria economic recovery strategy in the shock of COVID-19 recession. It found that despite the vulnerability of an oil-dependent economy as was exposed by the COVID-19 lockdowns, the Nigerian economic recovery and sustainability Plan 2020 to 2025 still rely on oil rents. Thus, the study concludes that without the development and expansion of domestic manufacturing through science and technology, the Nigerian economy is unlikely to survive future economic shocks. Therefore, the study recommends that to ensure sustainable economic growth and development, the domestic and home-grown industries should be expanded and sustained to drive the Nigerian economy.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115465809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study analyses the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Indian Stock Exchange in the initial months. Inclusive investigation suggests that the fears of coronavirus effect on the global economy have rocked markets worldwide, with stock prices plunging. The Indian stocks were eventually „back in the red‟ despite various stimulus packages announced by the Fed and RBI. It further describes why COVID-19 is not the only reason for the recent stock market crash and suggests that falling stock markets might not be the only reason for a possible global recession as the real challenge this time is the interaction of supply shock with a substantial fall in spending by consumers and businesses, i.e., demand shock which will produce a deeper and a more lasting recession.
{"title":"COVID-19’s Impact on Indian Financial Market","authors":"Phat Huynh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3920180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920180","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyses the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Indian Stock Exchange in the initial months. Inclusive investigation suggests that the fears of coronavirus effect on the global economy have rocked markets worldwide, with stock prices plunging. The Indian stocks were eventually „back in the red‟ despite various stimulus packages announced by the Fed and RBI. It further describes why COVID-19 is not the only reason for the recent stock market crash and suggests that falling stock markets might not be the only reason for a possible global recession as the real challenge this time is the interaction of supply shock with a substantial fall in spending by consumers and businesses, i.e., demand shock which will produce a deeper and a more lasting recession.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130521854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The slain SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus) negatively impacted business, industries, jobs, the economy, the stock market around the globe. The worst-hit were the travel & tourism and hospitality industries. This study examines the influence of travel ban and other restrictions during the pandemic on Airlines in the USA. The effect is evident in the stock market, the number of flights operating, and the timeline/updates from CDC affecting the industry as a whole. The market Model Event study methodology was used to a sample of 3 NYSE listed Airliners for a sample period of 64 days (start date-Feb 24th; end date-May 22nd, 2020). An event window of 64 days was observed with 22 days prior to the event and 42 days post-March 25th, 2020. Event t_1 was marked as the day when US stocks snapped back from the three-year lows ending it green as the lawmakers announced the fiscal package to combat the economic impact of COVID-19. With Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJI) gained 2,113.01 points or 11.4%, to close at 20,704.91 and the S&P 500 rose 209.93 points or 9.4% to close at 2,447.33. While the Nasdaq Composite Index closed at 7,417.86, adding 557.19 points or 8.1%.[2]. Even though we observed significantly negative Average Abnormal Returns much before and after that period, where the investors were unsure of the outcome of by the administration and had low confidence level on the economic trajectory. The AAR diagnosed during and around that period was also found positive due to the news of the Rescue Package Expectation of $2 trillion stimulus bill.
{"title":"Airlines Stock Market Response to Stimulus Bill Expectation On March 25th, 2020 An Event Study","authors":"Robin Garewal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3760118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3760118","url":null,"abstract":"The slain SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus) negatively impacted business, industries, jobs, the economy, the stock market around the globe. The worst-hit were the travel & tourism and hospitality industries. This study examines the influence of travel ban and other restrictions during the pandemic on Airlines in the USA. The effect is evident in the stock market, the number of flights operating, and the timeline/updates from CDC affecting the industry as a whole. The market Model Event study methodology was used to a sample of 3 NYSE listed Airliners for a sample period of 64 days (start date-Feb 24th; end date-May 22nd, 2020). An event window of 64 days was observed with 22 days prior to the event and 42 days post-March 25th, 2020. Event t_1 was marked as the day when US stocks snapped back from the three-year lows ending it green as the lawmakers announced the fiscal package to combat the economic impact of COVID-19. With Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJI) gained 2,113.01 points or 11.4%, to close at 20,704.91 and the S&P 500 rose 209.93 points or 9.4% to close at 2,447.33. While the Nasdaq Composite Index closed at 7,417.86, adding 557.19 points or 8.1%.[2]. Even though we observed significantly negative Average Abnormal Returns much before and after that period, where the investors were unsure of the outcome of by the administration and had low confidence level on the economic trajectory. The AAR diagnosed during and around that period was also found positive due to the news of the Rescue Package Expectation of $2 trillion stimulus bill.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132475293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has dual institutional roles: a steward of international financial stability and a global banker safeguarding the resources of its sovereign shareholders. But, how does the IMF behave when its balance sheet becomes exposed to higher-than-usual credit risk, creating a financial catch-22? We expect the IMF varies its lending behavior, based on the nature of sovereign credit crises. When there is high contagion risk, the IMF aims to preserve global financial stability as a lender of last resort by extending large loans, notwithstanding its balance sheet strains. The IMF employs policy conditionality to hedge its lending risk, but prioritizes alleviating global market turmoil over program compliance. When market contagion is contained, however, the IMF is more likely to act as a traditional banker, suspending programs for non-compliance. Ironically, given its tendency to forgive non-compliance as a lender of last resort, our theoretical framework suggests that the Fund intensifies its moral hazard problem.
We test our theoretical priors by conducting a comparative case study analysis of IMF decision-making over time for two of its largest borrowers: Argentina and Greece. Leveraging volumes of hundred-paged minutes from IMF executive board meeting archives and extensive field research interviews, we illustrate the lending stances of IMF directors evolve in response to changes in global contagion risk. By examining the IMF’s own institutional agency under high financial risk, this study offers new insights for the study of international political economy and international organizations.
{"title":"The IMF's Financial Catch-22: Global Banker or Lender of Last Resort?","authors":"S. Kaplan, Sujeong Shim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3500162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3500162","url":null,"abstract":"The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has dual institutional roles: a steward of international financial stability and a global banker safeguarding the resources of its sovereign shareholders. But, how does the IMF behave when its balance sheet becomes exposed to higher-than-usual credit risk, creating a financial catch-22? We expect the IMF varies its lending behavior, based on the nature of sovereign credit crises. When there is high contagion risk, the IMF aims to preserve global financial stability as a lender of last resort by extending large loans, notwithstanding its balance sheet strains. The IMF employs policy conditionality to hedge its lending risk, but prioritizes alleviating global market turmoil over program compliance. When market contagion is contained, however, the IMF is more likely to act as a traditional banker, suspending programs for non-compliance. Ironically, given its tendency to forgive non-compliance as a lender of last resort, our theoretical framework suggests that the Fund intensifies its moral hazard problem. <br> <br>We test our theoretical priors by conducting a comparative case study analysis of IMF decision-making over time for two of its largest borrowers: Argentina and Greece. Leveraging volumes of hundred-paged minutes from IMF executive board meeting archives and extensive field research interviews, we illustrate the lending stances of IMF directors evolve in response to changes in global contagion risk. By examining the IMF’s own institutional agency under high financial risk, this study offers new insights for the study of international political economy and international organizations.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116585172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Santiago Barraza, Martín A. Rossi, Timothy J. Yeager
We study the short-term causal effect of the Paycheck Protection Program on unemployment. Using the 2019 density of Small Business Administration member bank offices in a county as an instrument for PPP loans originated in that county during April 2020, we find statistically and economically significant effects from the program on unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of this relief policy and the financial system infrastructure in preserving jobs during the COVID-19 crisis.
{"title":"The Short-Term Effect of the Paycheck Protection Program on Unemployment","authors":"Santiago Barraza, Martín A. Rossi, Timothy J. Yeager","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3667431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667431","url":null,"abstract":"We study the short-term causal effect of the Paycheck Protection Program on unemployment. Using the 2019 density of Small Business Administration member bank offices in a county as an instrument for PPP loans originated in that county during April 2020, we find statistically and economically significant effects from the program on unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of this relief policy and the financial system infrastructure in preserving jobs during the COVID-19 crisis.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126671561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article is a review of the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), an initiative under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act. The program was meant as a lifeline for small businesses by offering forgivable loans. However, recent reports have indicated that billions went to large public companies. In the article I examine the pitfalls of the program such as its ambiguous guidelines.
{"title":"Borrowers Beware: PPP Loans May Provide a Lifeline or Liability","authors":"S. Block","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3605986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3605986","url":null,"abstract":"The article is a review of the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), an initiative under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act. The program was meant as a lifeline for small businesses by offering forgivable loans. However, recent reports have indicated that billions went to large public companies. In the article I examine the pitfalls of the program such as its ambiguous guidelines.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131853858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Baker, R. Farrokhnia, Steffen Meyer, Michaela Pagel, Constantine Yannelis, Suwen Ge, Spyros Kypraios, Rebecca Liu
The 2020 CARES Act directed large cash payments to households. We analyze households’ spending responses using data from a Fintech non-profit, exploring heterogeneity by income, recent income declines, and liquidity as well as linked survey responses about economic expectations. Households respond rapidly to payments, with spending increasing by about $0.14 per dollar during the first week and plateauing around $0.25-$0.30 over 3 months. In contrast to previous stimulus programs, we see little response of durables spending. Households with lower incomes, greater income declines, and less liquidity display stronger responses whereas households that expect employment losses and benefit cuts display weaker responses.
{"title":"Income, Liquidity, and the Consumption Response to the 2020 Economic Stimulus Payments","authors":"S. Baker, R. Farrokhnia, Steffen Meyer, Michaela Pagel, Constantine Yannelis, Suwen Ge, Spyros Kypraios, Rebecca Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3587894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3587894","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The 2020 CARES Act directed large cash payments to households. We analyze households’ spending responses using data from a Fintech non-profit, exploring heterogeneity by income, recent income declines, and liquidity as well as linked survey responses about economic expectations. Households respond rapidly to payments, with spending increasing by about $0.14 per dollar during the first week and plateauing around $0.25-$0.30 over 3 months. In contrast to previous stimulus programs, we see little response of durables spending. Households with lower incomes, greater income declines, and less liquidity display stronger responses whereas households that expect employment losses and benefit cuts display weaker responses.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128142146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The dollar’s dominance as the world’s reserve currency was inaugurated at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference where the agreement was signed by the 44 wartime allies, but the dollar’s hegemony was solidified in 1971 when US President Nixon cut the dollar’s link to gold. True, the fixed exchange rate regime reminiscence of the Bretton Woods is no longer with us; and also true that the two watchdog institutions created in 1944 are still around permitting and encouraging but almost compelling world inflation. We are now faced with a dilemma that begs for a solution; the Bretton Woods system and its successor the dollar regime after 1971 created a system of economic slavery in which all countries are serving to keep the United States of America happy. The inevitable birth of Bitcoin is the upshot of this dilemma and the most recent devaluation of the Turkish lira is an unescapable consequence that unmistakably demonstrated exactly what happens when the U.S. demands are not satisfied. The U.S. dollar continues to rule both international trade and foreign exchange markets; today, circa 90% of daily forex trading volume is dollar denominated plus half of the world’s 185 currencies are in a tight trading range to the dollar. Since the late 1990s, the United States’ growing abuse of sanction power via the dollar tool has reemerged the interest in search for a viable alternative to the U.S. dollar.
{"title":"Turkish Lira – A Fiat Currency that Resembles the Volatility of Cryptocurrencies: The Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility on Turkish Economy","authors":"John Taskinsoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3335545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3335545","url":null,"abstract":"The dollar’s dominance as the world’s reserve currency was inaugurated at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference where the agreement was signed by the 44 wartime allies, but the dollar’s hegemony was solidified in 1971 when US President Nixon cut the dollar’s link to gold. True, the fixed exchange rate regime reminiscence of the Bretton Woods is no longer with us; and also true that the two watchdog institutions created in 1944 are still around permitting and encouraging but almost compelling world inflation. We are now faced with a dilemma that begs for a solution; the Bretton Woods system and its successor the dollar regime after 1971 created a system of economic slavery in which all countries are serving to keep the United States of America happy. The inevitable birth of Bitcoin is the upshot of this dilemma and the most recent devaluation of the Turkish lira is an unescapable consequence that unmistakably demonstrated exactly what happens when the U.S. demands are not satisfied. The U.S. dollar continues to rule both international trade and foreign exchange markets; today, circa 90% of daily forex trading volume is dollar denominated plus half of the world’s 185 currencies are in a tight trading range to the dollar. Since the late 1990s, the United States’ growing abuse of sanction power via the dollar tool has reemerged the interest in search for a viable alternative to the U.S. dollar.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130130776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Managing the euro crisis has been a process of institutional transformation for the EU. The European Semester has emerged as a powerful tool for economic policy coordination between the Member States. Beyond the new enforcement tools that the Semester affords the Commission and Council in case of non-compliance with country-specific recommendations, the management of the crisis has given the Commission experience in structural reforms. The Commission now regularly uses this experience in formulating its yearly country-specific recommendations to Member States. Far from a stalwart of untethered neoliberalism, the Commission has been fashioning itself as the manager with a human face, the institution that understands both the structural reform requirements for a global economy, and the special need for strong social institutions that could shield European citizens from the worst of the shocks provoked by globalized markets. Hence the name, “Structural Reforms 2.0,” per the Juncker Commission. In this chapter, I review the Commission’s emerging structural reform “know-how,” as represented in its latest reflection papers and European Semester documents. The European Commission seems to have drawn from its experience in managing loan conditionality for debtor countries like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, in order to come up with the set of structural reforms that it considers necessary for any country to thrive within the context of the euro. At the same time, it has taken on board the critiques of structural reforms that point to the potentially negative short-term effects of structural adjustment. Thus, the Commission seems to have fully embraced the idea of the EU as a soft alternative to unfettered globalization and has taken it upon itself to monitor certain aspects of the welfare state in Member States. The Commission’s recommendations, however, while presented in the mode of technocratic expertise, entail deeply political choices in almost every imaginable regulatory field. Despite constant assurances that there is no “one-size fits all” model for structural reforms, what is shaping up through the European Semester is effectively a list of desirable reforms—a set menu of options—which the Commission now openly characterizes as “EU best practices.” If applied, they would provoke deep restructurings and adjustments of national political economies with winners and losers to boot. These demands for deep restructurings are couched in a language of technical adjustment and fine-tuning that does not do justice to the qualitative reform required of the Member States nor to the substantive trade-offs between market efficiency and social fairness that only a democratic process can legitimize. Contrary to some observers, I conclude that the inclusion of social policy goals into the European Semester can be an indication of both the success of socially minded actors in influencing the content of macroeconomic governance, and of the success of market-minded
{"title":"Post-Crisis Economic and Social Policy: Some Thoughts on Structural Reforms 2.0.","authors":"Philomila Tsoukala","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3273562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3273562","url":null,"abstract":"Managing the euro crisis has been a process of institutional transformation for the EU. The European Semester has emerged as a powerful tool for economic policy coordination between the Member States. Beyond the new enforcement tools that the Semester affords the Commission and Council in case of non-compliance with country-specific recommendations, the management of the crisis has given the Commission experience in structural reforms. The Commission now regularly uses this experience in formulating its yearly country-specific recommendations to Member States. Far from a stalwart of untethered neoliberalism, the Commission has been fashioning itself as the manager with a human face, the institution that understands both the structural reform requirements for a global economy, and the special need for strong social institutions that could shield European citizens from the worst of the shocks provoked by globalized markets. Hence the name, “Structural Reforms 2.0,” per the Juncker Commission. In this chapter, I review the Commission’s emerging structural reform “know-how,” as represented in its latest reflection papers and European Semester documents. The European Commission seems to have drawn from its experience in managing loan conditionality for debtor countries like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, in order to come up with the set of structural reforms that it considers necessary for any country to thrive within the context of the euro. At the same time, it has taken on board the critiques of structural reforms that point to the potentially negative short-term effects of structural adjustment. Thus, the Commission seems to have fully embraced the idea of the EU as a soft alternative to unfettered globalization and has taken it upon itself to monitor certain aspects of the welfare state in Member States. The Commission’s recommendations, however, while presented in the mode of technocratic expertise, entail deeply political choices in almost every imaginable regulatory field. Despite constant assurances that there is no “one-size fits all” model for structural reforms, what is shaping up through the European Semester is effectively a list of desirable reforms—a set menu of options—which the Commission now openly characterizes as “EU best practices.” If applied, they would provoke deep restructurings and adjustments of national political economies with winners and losers to boot. These demands for deep restructurings are couched in a language of technical adjustment and fine-tuning that does not do justice to the qualitative reform required of the Member States nor to the substantive trade-offs between market efficiency and social fairness that only a democratic process can legitimize. Contrary to some observers, I conclude that the inclusion of social policy goals into the European Semester can be an indication of both the success of socially minded actors in influencing the content of macroeconomic governance, and of the success of market-minded","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131206300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This commentary offers an analysis of the Florescu ruling, rendered by the ECJ in June 2017. Among others, it offers insights on the legal status of the MoU bailed-out countries enter into, the reviewability of these instruments, and the applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to financial assistance in the EU.
{"title":"Bailouts, the Legal Status of Memoranda of Understanding, and the Scope of Application of the EU Charter: Florescu","authors":"Menelaos Markakis, P. Dermine","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163823","url":null,"abstract":"This commentary offers an analysis of the Florescu ruling, rendered by the ECJ in June 2017. Among others, it offers insights on the legal status of the MoU bailed-out countries enter into, the reviewability of these instruments, and the applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to financial assistance in the EU.","PeriodicalId":286175,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Responses to Financial Crises (Development) (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127494685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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