Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27045
N. Cartwright
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
{"title":"Theoretical practices that work: those that mimic Nature’s own","authors":"N. Cartwright","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27045","url":null,"abstract":"The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48289097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27002
Hasok Chang
In this innovative book, Hasok Chang constructs a philosophy of science for 'realistic people' interested in understanding and promoting the actual practices of inquiry in science and other knowledge-focused areas of life. Inspired by pragmatist philosophy, he reconceives the very notions of reality and truth on the basis of his concept of the 'operational coherence' of epistemic activities, and offers new pragmatist conceptions of truth and reality as operational ideals achievable in actual scientific practice. Rejecting the version of scientific realism that is concerned with claiming that our theories correspond to an ultimate reality, he proposes instead an 'activist realism': a commitment to do all that we can actually do to improve our knowledge of realities. His book will appeal to scholars and students in philosophy, science and the history of science, and all who are concerned about the place of science and empirical truth in society.
{"title":"Realism for Realistic People","authors":"Hasok Chang","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27002","url":null,"abstract":"In this innovative book, Hasok Chang constructs a philosophy of science for 'realistic people' interested in understanding and promoting the actual practices of inquiry in science and other knowledge-focused areas of life. Inspired by pragmatist philosophy, he reconceives the very notions of reality and truth on the basis of his concept of the 'operational coherence' of epistemic activities, and offers new pragmatist conceptions of truth and reality as operational ideals achievable in actual scientific practice. Rejecting the version of scientific realism that is concerned with claiming that our theories correspond to an ultimate reality, he proposes instead an 'activist realism': a commitment to do all that we can actually do to improve our knowledge of realities. His book will appeal to scholars and students in philosophy, science and the history of science, and all who are concerned about the place of science and empirical truth in society.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44520677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26979
Joseph Rouse
This paper recapitulates my four primary lines of argument that what is wrong with scientific realism is not realist answers to questions to which various anti-realists give different answers, but instead assumptions shared by realists and anti-realists in framing the question. Each strategy incorporates its predecessors as a consequence. A first, minimalist challenge, taken over from Arthur Fine and Michael Williams, rejects the assumption that the sciences have a general aim or goal. A second consideration is that realists and antirealists undertake a mistaken, substantive commitment to a separation between mind and world, which allows them to frame the issue in terms of how epistemic “access” to the world is mediated. A third strategy for dissolving the realism question challenges its underlying commitment to the independence of meaning and truth, a strategy pursued in different ways by Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, John Haugeland, and myself. The fourth and most encompassing strategy shows that realists and antirealists are thereby committed to an objectionably antinaturalist conception of scientific understanding, in conflict with what the sciences themselves have to say about our own conceptual capacities.
{"title":"Beyond Realism and Antirealism ---At Last?","authors":"Joseph Rouse","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26979","url":null,"abstract":"This paper recapitulates my four primary lines of argument that what is wrong with scientific realism is not realist answers to questions to which various anti-realists give different answers, but instead assumptions shared by realists and anti-realists in framing the question. Each strategy incorporates its predecessors as a consequence. A first, minimalist challenge, taken over from Arthur Fine and Michael Williams, rejects the assumption that the sciences have a general aim or goal. A second consideration is that realists and antirealists undertake a mistaken, substantive commitment to a separation between mind and world, which allows them to frame the issue in terms of how epistemic “access” to the world is mediated. A third strategy for dissolving the realism question challenges its underlying commitment to the independence of meaning and truth, a strategy pursued in different ways by Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, John Haugeland, and myself. The fourth and most encompassing strategy shows that realists and antirealists are thereby committed to an objectionably antinaturalist conception of scientific understanding, in conflict with what the sciences themselves have to say about our own conceptual capacities.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41248294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1.29357
Andrew Oakes
{"title":"Douglas A. Vakoch and Matthew F. Dowd. The Drake Equation: Estimating the Prevalence of Extraterrestrial Life through the Ages","authors":"Andrew Oakes","doi":"10.4245/sponge.v9i1.29357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.29357","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42194228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26986
K. B. Wray
It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that (i) realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and (ii) anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.
{"title":"The Relevance of Evidence from the History of Science in the Contemporary Realism/Anti-realism Debate","authors":"K. B. Wray","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26986","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that (i) realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and (ii) anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42481093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27760
Jamie Shaw
There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. More specifically, many have argued that plausible formulations of realism and anti-realism do not differ substantially in any way (Fine 1986; Stein 1989; Blackburn 2002). In this paper, I argue against this trend by demonstrating how a hypothetical resolution of the debate, through deeper engagement with the historical record, has important implications for our criterion of theory pursuit and science policy. I do this by revisiting Arthur Fine’s ‘small handful’ argument for realism and show how the debate centers on whether continuity (either ontological or structural) should be an indicator for the future fruitfulness of a theory. I then demonstrate how these debates work in practice by considering the case of the Human Brain Project. I close by considering some potential practical considerations of formulating meta-inductions. By doing this, I contribute three insights to the current debate: 1) demonstrate how the realism/anti-realism debate is a substantive debate, 2) connect debates about realism/anti-realism to debates about theory choice and pursuit, and 3) show the practical significance of meta-inductions.
{"title":"Why the Realism Debate Matters for Science Policy: The Case of the Human Brain Project","authors":"Jamie Shaw","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27760","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. More specifically, many have argued that plausible formulations of realism and anti-realism do not differ substantially in any way (Fine 1986; Stein 1989; Blackburn 2002). In this paper, I argue against this trend by demonstrating how a hypothetical resolution of the debate, through deeper engagement with the historical record, has important implications for our criterion of theory pursuit and science policy. I do this by revisiting Arthur Fine’s ‘small handful’ argument for realism and show how the debate centers on whether continuity (either ontological or structural) should be an indicator for the future fruitfulness of a theory. I then demonstrate how these debates work in practice by considering the case of the Human Brain Project. I close by considering some potential practical considerations of formulating meta-inductions. By doing this, I contribute three insights to the current debate: 1) demonstrate how the realism/anti-realism debate is a substantive debate, 2) connect debates about realism/anti-realism to debates about theory choice and pursuit, and 3) show the practical significance of meta-inductions.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48072717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27042
H. M. Collins
Ple a s e no t e: Ch a n g e s m a d e a s a r e s ul t of p u blishing p roc e s s e s s uc h a s copy-e di ting, for m a t ting a n d p a g e n u m b e r s m ay no t b e r eflec t e d in t his ve r sion. For t h e d efini tive ve r sion of t his p u blica tion, ple a s e r ef e r to t h e p u blish e d sou rc e. You a r e a dvise d to cons ul t t h e p u blish e r’s ve r sion if you wish to ci t e t his p a p er.
Ple a s e no t e：Ch a n g e s m a d e a s a r e s ult of p publishing p proc s s uc h a s copy-e di ting，for m a t ting a n d p a g e n u m b e r s m a t e eflex t e d in t sion。为了确定该版本，请参阅发布该版本的参考资料。如果您希望发布该版本，您可以建议您发布该版本。
{"title":"Gravitational Waves and Scientific Realism","authors":"H. M. Collins","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27042","url":null,"abstract":"Ple a s e no t e: Ch a n g e s m a d e a s a r e s ul t of p u blishing p roc e s s e s s uc h a s copy-e di ting, for m a t ting a n d p a g e n u m b e r s m ay no t b e r eflec t e d in t his ve r sion. For t h e d efini tive ve r sion of t his p u blica tion, ple a s e r ef e r to t h e p u blish e d sou rc e. You a r e a dvise d to cons ul t t h e p u blish e r’s ve r sion if you wish to ci t e t his p a p er.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45334453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27095
T. Arabatzis
I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious
{"title":"Engaging philosophically with the history of science: two challenges for scientific realism","authors":"T. Arabatzis","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27095","url":null,"abstract":"I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47795647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28057
P. Kyle Stanford
Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.
{"title":"A Fond Farewell to \"Approximate Truth\"?","authors":"P. Kyle Stanford","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28057","url":null,"abstract":"Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44711375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998
Kerry McKenzie
Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.
{"title":"Being realistic: the challenge of theory change for a metaphysics of scientific realism","authors":"Kerry McKenzie","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998","url":null,"abstract":"Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45882654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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