Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26993
T. Lyons
{"title":"Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific Realism—and the Socratic Alternative.","authors":"T. Lyons","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26993","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"146-150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42538754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26352
H. Sankey
This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.
{"title":"A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26352","url":null,"abstract":"This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"65-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48523037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998
Kerry McKenzie
Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.
{"title":"Being realistic: the challenge of theory change for a metaphysics of scientific realism","authors":"Kerry McKenzie","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26998","url":null,"abstract":"Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"136-142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45882654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1.27048
A. Fine
{"title":"Motives for Research","authors":"A. Fine","doi":"10.4245/sponge.v9i1.27048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.27048","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"42-45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43059257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1.28056
P. Vickers
My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-a-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may raise the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ question mark. But the concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!
{"title":"Quo Vadis Selective Scientific Realism","authors":"P. Vickers","doi":"10.4245/sponge.v9i1.28056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.28056","url":null,"abstract":"My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-a-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may raise the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ question mark. But the concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"118-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48791434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27046
Mario Alai
Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones (Doppelt (2007, 2011, 2013, 2014). Elsewhere I criticized his new brand of realism. Here instead I argue that (a) Doppelt has not shown that Deployment Realism cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, (b) explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and (c) Doppelt is right that truth is not a sufficient explanans, but for different reasons, and this does not refute Deployment Realism, but helps to detail it better. In a more explicit formulation, the realist IBE concludes not only to the truth of theories, but also to the reliability of scientists and scientific method, the order and simplicity of nature, and the approximate truth of background theories.
{"title":"How Deployment Realism withstands Doppelt's Criticisms","authors":"Mario Alai","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27046","url":null,"abstract":"Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones (Doppelt (2007, 2011, 2013, 2014). \u0000 Elsewhere I criticized his new brand of realism. Here instead I argue that (a) Doppelt has not shown that Deployment Realism cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, (b) explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and (c) Doppelt is right that truth is not a sufficient explanans, but for different reasons, and this does not refute Deployment Realism, but helps to detail it better. In a more explicit formulation, the realist IBE concludes not only to the truth of theories, but also to the reliability of scientists and scientific method, the order and simplicity of nature, and the approximate truth of background theories.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"122-135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46369046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27204
Jennifer Fraser
{"title":"Rebecca Lemov. Database of Dreams: The Lost Quest to Catalog Humanity. 354pp. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.","authors":"Jennifer Fraser","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.27204","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"183-185"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45200385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26990
P. Teller
Ronald Giere (2006) has argued that at its best science gives us knowledge only from different “perspectives,” but that this knowledge still counts as scientific realism. Others have noted that his “perspectival realism” is in tension with scientific realism as traditionally understood: How can different, even conflicting, perspectives give us what there is really? This essay outlines a program (some published, much forthcoming) that makes good on Giere’s idea with a fresh understanding of “realism” that eases this tension.
Ronald Giere（2006）认为，在最好的情况下，科学只能从不同的“角度”给我们知识，但这些知识仍然被视为科学现实主义。其他人注意到，他的“透视现实主义”与传统意义上的科学现实主义是矛盾的：不同的、甚至相互冲突的视角怎么能给我们真正的东西？这篇文章概述了一个项目（一些已经发表，很多即将发表），该项目以对“现实主义”的新理解来实现吉尔的想法，缓解了这种紧张局势。
{"title":"Referential and Perspectival Realism","authors":"P. Teller","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.26990","url":null,"abstract":"Ronald Giere (2006) has argued that at its best science gives us knowledge only from different “perspectives,” but that this knowledge still counts as scientific realism. Others have noted that his “perspectival realism” is in tension with scientific realism as traditionally understood: How can different, even conflicting, perspectives give us what there is really? This essay outlines a program (some published, much forthcoming) that makes good on Giere’s idea with a fresh understanding of “realism” that eases this tension.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"151-164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47171479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28059
S. Psillos
In his intervention to the ‘bankruptcy of science debate’, which raged in Paris in the turn of the twentieth century, Leo Tolstoy was one of the first to use the past record of science as a weapon against current science. It is not inductive. It does not conclude that all current scientific theories will be abandoned; nor that most of them will be abandoned; not even that it is more likely than not that all or most of them will be abandoned. Its conclusion is modest: some of presently accepted theories will have the fate of those past theories that once dominated the scene but subsequently were abandoned.
{"title":"Tolstoy’s argument: realism and the history of science","authors":"S. Psillos","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28059","url":null,"abstract":"In his intervention to the ‘bankruptcy of science debate’, which raged in Paris in the turn of the twentieth century, Leo Tolstoy was one of the first to use the past record of science as a weapon against current science. It is not inductive. It does not conclude that all current scientific theories will be abandoned; nor that most of them will be abandoned; not even that it is more likely than not that all or most of them will be abandoned. Its conclusion is modest: some of presently accepted theories will have the fate of those past theories that once dominated the scene but subsequently were abandoned.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"68-77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41473532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28062
R. Hendry
{"title":"Scientific Realism and the History of Chemistry","authors":"R. Hendry","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V9I1.28062","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"108-117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46490464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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