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Hume's Fragment on Evil 休谟的《恶论片段
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-08 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2022.0003
Daryl Ooi
Abstract:Since its relatively recent publication (1995), Hume's Fragment on Evil has received little sustained analysis. References to the Fragment tend to be scarce, and at best, only parts of the Fragment are cited at any time. This essay presents an interpretation of the Fragment that considers the text in its entirety, emphasizing its overall argumentative features and structure. This essay begins by providing an introduction to the background of the Fragment, arguing that Hume was likely responding, in part, to Butler's Analogy. It then examines the aims and methodology of the Fragment. In this, it considers Hume's naturalistic and experimental epistemology, and his mitigated skepticism. The Fragment is presented as a discussion about our ability to know the moral attributes of God. The rest of the essay discusses the three strategies Hume employs to answer this question. Further, it considers Hume's own distinction between a philosophical response to the question (its foundation in reason) and a psychological one (its origin in human nature). Throughout the essay, I provide an evaluation of Hume's key arguments and point out several connections the Fragment has with other texts in Hume's corpus. I conclude by suggesting that these connections indicate that the Fragment represent Hume's own views.
摘要:自1995年出版以来,休谟的《恶论片段》几乎没有得到持续的分析。对Fragment的引用很少,在任何时候最多只能引用Fragment的一部分。本文提出了一种从整体上考虑文本的解读,强调其整体的论证特征和结构。本文首先介绍了《片段》的背景,认为休谟可能是对巴特勒的《类比》的部分回应。然后,它检查的目的和方法的片段。在这方面,它考虑了休谟的自然主义和实验认识论,以及他的缓和的怀疑主义。《残篇》是关于我们认识上帝道德属性的能力的讨论。本文的其余部分讨论了休谟用来回答这个问题的三种策略。此外,它还考虑了休谟自己对这个问题的哲学回应(其理性基础)和心理学回应(其人性起源)的区别。在整篇文章中,我对休谟的主要论点进行了评价,并指出了《碎片》与休谟语料库中其他文本的联系。我的结论是,这些联系表明《片段》代表了休谟自己的观点。
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引用次数: 0
Skepticism in Hume's Dialogues 休谟对话录中的怀疑论
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-08 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2022.0002
Hsueh Qu
Abstract:In this paper, I examine the epistemological positions of Philo and Cleanthes in the Dialogues. I find that Philo's attitude towards skepticism mirrors that of the first Enquiry, most notably in its endorsement of mitigated skepticism, and its treatment of religious reasoning as distinctly discontinuous with science and philosophy. Meanwhile, Cleanthes's epistemological framework corresponds to that of the Treatise, most notably in its adoption of something like the Title Principle, and its treatment of some forms of religious reasoning as broadly continuous with science and philosophy. It is not merely that the epistemological systems of the Treatise and Enquiry are echoed in Cleanthes's and Philo's positions respectively; these frameworks seem to clarify, provide a substantive basis for, and render more complete their somewhat piecemeal statements on this topic in the Dialogues. Thus, Philo's and Cleanthes's dispute is not limited to the theological, but extends to the epistemological.
摘要:本文考察了菲洛和克利斯在《对话》中的认识论立场。我发现菲洛对怀疑主义的态度反映了第一部《问询》的态度,最显著的是它支持减轻怀疑主义,并将宗教推理视为与科学和哲学明显不连续。与此同时,Cleanthes的认识论框架与《论》的认识论架构相对应,最显著的是它采用了类似标题原则的东西,并将某些形式的宗教推理处理为与科学和哲学广泛连续。这不仅是因为《论》和《探究》的认识论体系分别在Cleanthes和Philo的立场上得到了呼应;这些框架似乎澄清了对话中关于这一主题的零散陈述,为其提供了实质性基础,并使其更加完整。因此,菲洛和克利斯的争论不仅限于神学,而且延伸到了认识论。
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引用次数: 2
Hume's Deep Anti-Contractarianism 休谟的深层反契约主义
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-08 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2022.0006
Sebastian Bender
Abstract:Hume is an avowed critic of contractarianism. He opposes the idea that a legitimate government is based on an "original contract" or on the consent of those who are governed. Most scholars assume, though, that his criticisms apply only to a limited range of contractarian theories, namely to theories according to which actual contractors reach an actual agreement. Theories on which the agreement in question is understood in hypothetical or counterfactual terms, however, are oftentimes seen as being compatible with Hume's views. Against such interpretations, this paper shows that Hume rejects all contractarian theories, including hypothetical ones. It argues, first, that Hume employs a so far unacknowledged empiricist debunking strategy against contractarianism; if successful, this strategy undermines all variants of contractarianism. Second, it shows that the Humean conception of the state of nature (a topic that has received virtually no scholarly attention) is incompatible with hypothetical contractarianism. Finally, it argues that Hume rejects contractarianism in part because he anticipates a line of criticism which nowadays is often leveled against so-called ideal theory. On Hume's view, the agreements reached by highly idealized contractors are of little relevance to the non-ideal individuals in the actual world.
摘要:休谟是一位公认的反传统主义批评家。他反对合法政府建立在“原始合同”或被统治者同意的基础上的观点。然而,大多数学者认为,他的批评只适用于有限范围的契约理论,即实际承包商达成实际协议的理论。然而,用假设或反事实的术语来理解所讨论的协议的理论通常被视为与休谟的观点相一致。与这些解释相反,本文表明休谟拒绝接受所有的契约主义理论,包括假设的理论。它认为,首先,休谟采用了一种迄今为止尚未被承认的经验主义的反契约主义的揭穿策略;如果成功的话,这一策略会破坏所有反传统主义的变体。其次,它表明了休谟的自然状态概念(一个几乎没有受到学术关注的话题)与假设的矛盾主义是不相容的。最后,它认为,休谟拒绝契约主义,部分原因是他预见到了一条批评路线,而如今这种批评路线往往是针对所谓的理想理论的。在休谟看来,高度理想化的契约者所达成的协议与现实世界中的非理想个体几乎没有关联。
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引用次数: 0
Editors' Introduction 编辑简介
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-08 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2022.0001
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Mark G. Spencer
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引用次数: 0
Secret Sentiments: Hume on Pride, Decency, and Virtue 《隐秘的情感:休谟论骄傲、正派与美德》
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-08 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2022.0007
Enrico Galvagni
Abstract:In this paper, I reconstruct Hume's account of decency, the virtue associated with a limited display of pride, and show how it presents a significant challenge to standard virtue ethical interpretations of Hume. In section I, I explore his ambivalent conception of pride as both virtuous (because useful and agreeable to oneself) and vicious (when excessive and disagreeable to others). In section II, I show how the virtue of decency provides a practical solution to these two clashing aspects of pride. In doing so, I demonstrate that decency is a merely behavioural virtue that requires no virtuous motive and consists of nothing more than "a fair outside." I argue that this account of decency represents a serious and underexplored challenge to standard interpretations of Hume as a virtue ethicist committed to the idea that actions derive their moral value from underlying motives. In section III, I reply to some objections.
摘要:本文重构了休谟关于体面的描述,这是一种与有限的骄傲表现相关的美德,并展示了它如何对休谟的标准美德伦理解释提出了重大挑战。在第一部分中,我探讨了他的矛盾概念,即骄傲既是美德的(因为对自己有用和愉快),也是邪恶的(当过度和不愉快时)。在第二节中,我展示了体面的美德如何为骄傲的这两个冲突方面提供了一个实用的解决方案。在这样做的过程中,我证明了体面仅仅是一种行为美德,不需要高尚的动机,只包括“公平的外部”。我认为,这种关于体面的描述,对休谟作为一个美德伦理学家的标准解释提出了一个严肃的、未被充分探讨的挑战,休谟致力于从潜在动机中获得行为的道德价值。在第三节中,我对一些反对意见作出答复。
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引用次数: 0
Hume on Calm Passions, Moral Sentiments, and the "Common Point of View" 论休谟的冷静激情、道德情操与“共同点”
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-08 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2022.0005
James Chamberlain
Abstract:I argue for a thorough reinterpretation of Hume's "common point of view" thesis, at least within his moral Enquiry. Hume is typically understood to argue that we correct for sympathetically produced variations in our moral sentiments, by undertaking an imaginative exercise. I argue that Hume cannot consistently claim this, because he argues that we automatically experience the same degree of the same moral sentiment towards all tokens of any one type of character trait. I then argue that, in his Enquiry at least, Hume only believes that we correct for variations in our non-moral sentiments. When he claims that we sometimes choose a "common point of view," he just means that we sometimes choose to verbally express our calm, moral sentiments, and no other passions, when we publicly evaluate people's characters.
摘要:我主张对休谟的“共同观点”论题进行彻底的重新诠释,至少在他的《道德探究》中是这样。休谟通常认为,我们通过进行想象练习来纠正我们道德情感中同情产生的变化。我认为休谟不能始终如一地宣称这一点,因为他认为,我们对任何一种性格特征的所有标志,都会自动地体验到同样程度的道德情感。我认为,至少在他的《探究》中,休谟只相信我们纠正了我们非道德情感的变化。当他说我们有时会选择一个“共同的观点”时,他的意思是,当我们公开评价别人的性格时,我们有时会选择口头表达我们的冷静、道德的情感,而不是其他的激情。
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引用次数: 0
A Philosopher's Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism by Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind (review) 《哲学家的经济学家:休谟与资本主义的兴起》作者:玛格丽特·沙巴斯、卡尔·温纳林德
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-08 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2022.0009
Erik W. Matson
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引用次数: 0
Hume's Account of the Scope of Justice 休谟关于正义范围的论述
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-05-07 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2020.0003
Ian Cruise
Abstract:Hume's account of the scope of justice, many think, is implausibly narrow, applying almost exclusively to respect for property rights. Such a view would indeed be highly objectionable because it would leave out of the scope of justice altogether requirements to keep our promises, obey the law, and refrain from threats and violence (among many others). I argue that Hume's theory of justice, properly understood, avoids this objection. And seeing how is instructive because once we understand his account correctly, we can appreciate its resources for offering attractive explanations of why a number of diverse phenomena fall within the scope of justice. Overcoming this challenge is a major stepping stone on the way to seeing Hume's theory of justice as a genuine competitor with the other dominant theories of justice in the philosophical literature.
摘要:许多人认为,休谟关于正义范围的论述过于狭隘,几乎只适用于对财产权的尊重。这种观点确实是非常令人反感的,因为它将把遵守承诺、遵守法律、不受威胁和暴力(以及其他许多要求)等要求完全排除在正义的范围之外。我认为休谟的正义理论,如果得到正确的理解,就避免了这种异议。理解他的解释是有启发意义的,因为一旦我们正确理解了他的解释,我们就能欣赏到其中的资源,因为它提供了吸引人的解释,解释了为什么许多不同的现象都属于正义的范围。克服这一挑战是将休谟的正义理论视为哲学文献中其他主导正义理论的真正竞争者的重要垫脚石。
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引用次数: 1
Hume's Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl (review) 休谟的怀疑主义:皮洛尼主义与学院派作者:彼得·s·福尔(书评)
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-05-07 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2020.0007
C. Goldhaber
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引用次数: 0
Philo's Second Circumstance: Malebranche and the General Laws Theodicy in Hume's Dialogues 斐洛的第二种情况:休谟对话录中的马勒布兰奇与一般法则神正论
4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-05-07 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2020.0005
Todd Ryan
Abstract:In Part XI of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Philo enumerates "four circumstances" which he claims are the principal sources of pain and suffering in human life. In this paper, I focus on Philo's second circumstance in which he develops a critique of what I call the 'general laws theodicy.' This theodicy, according to which natural evils arise as a result of God's government of the universe by simple and general laws of nature, is most closely associated with Nicolas Malebranche. However, I argue that Philo's criticisms badly misfire against Malebranche's version of the theodicy. I then show how the general laws theodicy was radically reinterpreted by a succession of British philosophers—among them Berkeley, Hutcheson and Butler—and that it is against this reconceived version of the theodicy that Philo's objections are aimed.
摘要:在《自然宗教对话录》第十一篇中,菲洛列举了“四种情况”,他认为这是人类生活中痛苦和苦难的主要来源。在本文中,我将重点关注斐洛的第二种情况,在这种情况下,他对我所说的“一般规律神正论”进行了批判。这种神正论认为,自然的邪恶是上帝通过简单而普遍的自然法则管理宇宙的结果,这种神正论与尼古拉斯·马勒布兰奇(Nicolas Malebranche)的关系最为密切。然而,我认为斐洛的批评与马勒布兰奇的神正论大相径庭。然后,我展示了一般规律的神正论是如何被一系列英国哲学家——其中包括伯克利、哈奇森和巴特勒——从根本上重新诠释的,而斐洛的反对正是针对这种重新定义的神正论。
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引用次数: 1
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Hume Studies
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