In his David R. Tillinghast Lecture given at NYU in 1998, H. David Rosenbloom presented the tax world with a critical view as to the existence of an “international tax regime”. Has the world changed since? On the one hand there is a strong move towards international tax coordination, including multilateral agreements and the creation of new institutions handling international tax policies like the G20 or the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. On the other hand, there is growing uncertainty and much explicit disagreement about the substantive fundamentals driving international tax policy and an increasingly bitter clash of revenue claims raised by governments. While countries were able to rally around the concept of “value creation” and the “single tax principle” in order to put tax havens in their place, they struggle to find common ground regarding the principles governing the overall allocation of taxing rights at the global level so far.
在1998年纽约大学的David R. Tillinghast讲座中，H. David Rosenbloom对“国际税收制度”的存在提出了一种批判性的观点。从那以后，世界发生了变化吗?一方面，国际税收协调有了强有力的进展，包括多边协议和建立处理国际税收政策的新机构，如20国集团或BEPS包容性框架。另一方面，对于推动国际税收政策的实质性基本因素，不确定性日益增加，分歧也越来越明显，各国政府提出的税收主张之间的冲突也越来越激烈。虽然各国能够围绕“价值创造”和“单一税收原则”的概念团结起来，以便将避税天堂置于其位置，但迄今为止，它们很难在全球范围内就管理税收权总体分配的原则找到共同点。
{"title":"Is there Finally an International Tax System?","authors":"W. Schoen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3922687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3922687","url":null,"abstract":"In his David R. Tillinghast Lecture given at NYU in 1998, H. David Rosenbloom presented the tax world with a critical view as to the existence of an “international tax regime”. Has the world changed since? On the one hand there is a strong move towards international tax coordination, including multilateral agreements and the creation of new institutions handling international tax policies like the G20 or the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. On the other hand, there is growing uncertainty and much explicit disagreement about the substantive fundamentals driving international tax policy and an increasingly bitter clash of revenue claims raised by governments. While countries were able to rally around the concept of “value creation” and the “single tax principle” in order to put tax havens in their place, they struggle to find common ground regarding the principles governing the overall allocation of taxing rights at the global level so far.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129781046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jana Cahlíková, Lubomír Cingl, K. Chadimová, Miroslav Zajíček
We provide evidence on both innovative as well as known behavioral strategies aimed at improving tax compliance, using a unified environment of two large correspondence experiments (N=82,599 and N=51,142) with potential TV-fees evaders in the Czech Republic. We (i) simplify the original letter and add a QR code for easier registration; use two innovative text strategies aimed at (ii) the elicitation of preference for fee designation, and (iii) the explanation of fee purpose. We also employ strategies known in the literature but providing mixed results: highlighting (iv) legal consequences of non-compliance, (v) value of services for the fee, and (vi) social norms. Apart from the text treatments, we modify the envelopes by placing there (vii) a picture of a cartoon character (supported by a sticker inside), or (viii) a red inscription “Important”, with the aim to stimulate recipients' reciprocity and attention. Our results show that the text simplification and highlighting legal consequences substantially improve effectiveness of the letter, which we self-replicate on a new sample two years later, while the remaining treatments do not improve over the baseline. The QR code brings only a modest improvement.
{"title":"Carrots, Sticks, or Simplicity? Field Evidence on What Makes People Pay TV Fees","authors":"Jana Cahlíková, Lubomír Cingl, K. Chadimová, Miroslav Zajíček","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3891641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891641","url":null,"abstract":"We provide evidence on both innovative as well as known behavioral strategies aimed at improving tax compliance, using a unified environment of two large correspondence experiments (N=82,599 and N=51,142) with potential TV-fees evaders in the Czech Republic. We (i) simplify the original letter and add a QR code for easier registration; use two innovative text strategies aimed at (ii) the elicitation of preference for fee designation, and (iii) the explanation of fee purpose. We also employ strategies known in the literature but providing mixed results: highlighting (iv) legal consequences of non-compliance, (v) value of services for the fee, and (vi) social norms. Apart from the text treatments, we modify the envelopes by placing there (vii) a picture of a cartoon character (supported by a sticker inside), or (viii) a red inscription “Important”, with the aim to stimulate recipients' reciprocity and attention. Our results show that the text simplification and highlighting legal consequences substantially improve effectiveness of the letter, which we self-replicate on a new sample two years later, while the remaining treatments do not improve over the baseline. The QR code brings only a modest improvement.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132689275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Julie Chytilová, G. Roland, Tomáš Želinský
Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.
{"title":"Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating","authors":"Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Julie Chytilová, G. Roland, Tomáš Želinský","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3891611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891611","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131045499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A central issue that is discussed in climate policy is the fear of owners of stocks of fossil hydrocarbon deposits that high CO2 taxes and bans on the combustion use of hydrocarbons will turn their stocks into stranded assets. They might react by extracting and selling their reserves today: a rush to burn results. We show how the stranded-asset problem could be avoided or strongly moderated. We analyze a simple intertemporal equilibrium with a given stock of fossil hydrocarbons. The key variable for a climate-neutral solution to the rush-to-burn problem is to maintain existing and generate new markets for climate-neutral products from fossil hydrocarbons in the future. We give examples of such products. In this framework subsidies for such products (or for their innovation) also reduce the rush-to-burn problem. In contrast, the creation of substitutes for fossil hydrocarbon-based climate-neutral products, or subsidies for such products reduce the market for products made from fossil hydrocarbons. This aggravates the stranded-assets problem and thus has a climate-damaging effect.
{"title":"Effective Climate Policy Needs Non-Combustion Uses for Hydrocarbons","authors":"Kai A. Konrad, K. Lommerud","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3871017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3871017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A central issue that is discussed in climate policy is the fear of owners of stocks of fossil hydrocarbon deposits that high CO2 taxes and bans on the combustion use of hydrocarbons will turn their stocks into stranded assets. They might react by extracting and selling their reserves today: a rush to burn results. We show how the stranded-asset problem could be avoided or strongly moderated. We analyze a simple intertemporal equilibrium with a given stock of fossil hydrocarbons. The key variable for a climate-neutral solution to the rush-to-burn problem is to maintain existing and generate new markets for climate-neutral products from fossil hydrocarbons in the future. We give examples of such products. In this framework subsidies for such products (or for their innovation) also reduce the rush-to-burn problem. In contrast, the creation of substitutes for fossil hydrocarbon-based climate-neutral products, or subsidies for such products reduce the market for products made from fossil hydrocarbons. This aggravates the stranded-assets problem and thus has a climate-damaging effect.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132287994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper looks at a concept in international taxation that has gained prominence and declined more quickly than any other, namely the idea that the international allocation of taxing rights should be shifted back to "where the value is created". It focuses on the question of what we can learn from this rapid rise and fall.
{"title":"Value Creation, the Benefit Principle and Efficiency-Related Allocation of Taxing Rights","authors":"W. Schoen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3849322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3849322","url":null,"abstract":"The paper looks at a concept in international taxation that has gained prominence and declined more quickly than any other, namely the idea that the international allocation of taxing rights should be shifted back to \"where the value is created\". It focuses on the question of what we can learn from this rapid rise and fall.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123802227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a field experiment among adolescents in India to study how interventions to increase one pro-environment activity (namely, recycling single-use plastic carry bags), spill over to other pro-environment activities. I show using lab and field experiments combined with survey data that (i) providing information on the need to recycle does not change recycling behaviour, whereas (ii) providing incentives along with the information leads to higher recycling. There is a positive spillover from the incentive treatment to other pro-environment activities. This positive spillover is observed among subjects who respond to the incentives and increase recycling. Notably, the positive spillover is also observed among those in this treatment who do not respond to the incentives and do not change recycling behaviour. This provides evidence for complementarities among pro-environment behaviours and suggests that interventions may have unaccounted positive effects on non-target environment behaviours.
{"title":"Are Pro-environment Behaviours Substitutes or Complements? Evidence from the Field","authors":"Raisa Sherif","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3799970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3799970","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a field experiment among adolescents in India to study how interventions to increase one pro-environment activity (namely, recycling single-use plastic carry bags), spill over to other pro-environment activities. I show using lab and field experiments combined with survey data that (i) providing information on the need to recycle does not change recycling behaviour, whereas (ii) providing incentives along with the information leads to higher recycling. There is a positive spillover from the incentive treatment to other pro-environment activities. This positive spillover is observed among subjects who respond to the incentives and increase recycling. Notably, the positive spillover is also observed among those in this treatment who do not respond to the incentives and do not change recycling behaviour. This provides evidence for complementarities among pro-environment behaviours and suggests that interventions may have unaccounted positive effects on non-target environment behaviours.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125833103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not offer membership in equilibrium. If the prize is mostly public or the elasticity of marginal effort cost high, they offer exclusive membership. Membership commitment, membership fees, and the introduction of a third group all lead to the emergence of equilibria with endogenous non-exclusive membership. A contest designer interested in maximising effort would like to prohibit non-exclusive membership and allow exclusive membership only if groups are more effective than singletons.
{"title":"Exclusivity of Groups in Contests","authors":"Jonas Send","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3752731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752731","url":null,"abstract":"I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not offer membership in equilibrium. If the prize is mostly public or the elasticity of marginal effort cost high, they offer exclusive membership. Membership commitment, membership fees, and the introduction of a third group all lead to the emergence of equilibria with endogenous non-exclusive membership. A contest designer interested in maximising effort would like to prohibit non-exclusive membership and allow exclusive membership only if groups are more effective than singletons.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132908573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gianmarco Daniele, A. Martinangeli, Francesco Passarelli, Willem Sas, Lisa Windsteiger
The causal nexus between socio-economic insecurity and anti-immigration sentiments remains unclear despite correlational evidence. We exploit the disruption brought about by the Covid-19 outbreak to randomly provide survey respondents with information about the consequences of the epidemic. We find that pessimistic information about both the economic and health consequences causally reinforces the desire to restrict access to health care to native residents. Further, the prospect of dire economic consequences brings about a general adversity to immigration as well as political radicalisation. Both effects are less pronounced in areas with larger immigrant populations. Our theoretical model pins down two possible mechanisms explaining these results: a zero-sum game to split scarce public resources between residents and immigrants on the one hand and, on the other, fear of contagion. These also shape the tradeoff between prioritizing residents and extending vaccination programmes to immigrants to lower contagion risk.
{"title":"The Causal Impact of Economic and Health Insecurity on Anti-Immigration Sentiment","authors":"Gianmarco Daniele, A. Martinangeli, Francesco Passarelli, Willem Sas, Lisa Windsteiger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3750161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3750161","url":null,"abstract":"The causal nexus between socio-economic insecurity and anti-immigration sentiments remains unclear despite correlational evidence. We exploit the disruption brought about by the Covid-19 outbreak to randomly provide survey respondents with information about the consequences of the epidemic. We find that pessimistic information about both the economic and health consequences causally reinforces the desire to restrict access to health care to native residents. Further, the prospect of dire economic consequences brings about a general adversity to immigration as well as political radicalisation. Both effects are less pronounced in areas with larger immigrant populations. Our theoretical model pins down two possible mechanisms explaining these results: a zero-sum game to split scarce public resources between residents and immigrants on the one hand and, on the other, fear of contagion. These also shape the tradeoff between prioritizing residents and extending vaccination programmes to immigrants to lower contagion risk.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115230565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the world of satin bowerbirds, the male-birds engage in a contest among themselves to win their mates: they spend considerable time and effort in decorating their own bowers, and then attempt to destroy the decorations of their rivals’ bowers. The female-birds, in turn, select their mates on the basis of the attractiveness of the best surviving bowers. We study a game-theoretic model of such a mating contest, where two male-birds of distinct strengths engage in competitive signaling with value-less signals followed by signal sabotage (in an environment where a female-bird infers a male-bird’s strength by observing the quality of his surviving bower). We prove that sabotage possibilities can improve the outcomes for both male-birds – since anticipated threat of sabotage depresses each male-bird’s incentive to engage in costly signaling, while harming the outcome for the female-bird – as sabotage introduces noise in the female-bird’s selection process.
{"title":"Bowerbirds’ Mate-Selection Contests","authors":"Bharat Goel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3394772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394772","url":null,"abstract":"In the world of satin bowerbirds, the male-birds engage in a contest among themselves to win their mates: they spend considerable time and effort in decorating their own bowers, and then attempt to destroy the decorations of their rivals’ bowers. The female-birds, in turn, select their mates on the basis of the attractiveness of the best surviving bowers. We study a game-theoretic model of such a mating contest, where two male-birds of distinct strengths engage in competitive signaling with value-less signals followed by signal sabotage (in an environment where a female-bird infers a male-bird’s strength by observing the quality of his surviving bower). We prove that sabotage possibilities can improve the outcomes for both male-birds – since anticipated threat of sabotage depresses each male-bird’s incentive to engage in costly signaling, while harming the outcome for the female-bird – as sabotage introduces noise in the female-bird’s selection process.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129865107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Preferences over social ranks have emerged as potential drivers of weaker than expected support for redistributive interventions among those closest to the bottom of the income distribution. We compare preferences for alterations of the income distribution affecting the decision maker's social rank, but not their income, and compare them with similar alterations leaving both rank and income unchanged. We find support for both a discontinuously greater disutility from occupying the last as opposed to higher ranks, thus affecting only those closest to the bottom of the distribution, and for a general dislike of rank reversals affecting most ranks. We moreover contribute to the replication literature by uncovering and correcting a potential reason for the failed replication of previous results. We discuss implications for policy design in both public finance and management science.
{"title":"Last Word Not Yet Spoken: Last Place and Rank Reversal Aversion","authors":"A. Martinangeli, Lisa Windsteiger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3325784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3325784","url":null,"abstract":"Preferences over social ranks have emerged as potential drivers of weaker than expected support for redistributive interventions among those closest to the bottom of the income distribution. We compare preferences for alterations of the income distribution affecting the decision maker's social rank, but not their income, and compare them with similar alterations leaving both rank and income unchanged. We find support for both a discontinuously greater disutility from occupying the last as opposed to higher ranks, thus affecting only those closest to the bottom of the distribution, and for a general dislike of rank reversals affecting most ranks. We moreover contribute to the replication literature by uncovering and correcting a potential reason for the failed replication of previous results. We discuss implications for policy design in both public finance and management science.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121649039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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