{"title":"Provocative Speech in French Law: A Closer Look at Charlie Hebdo","authors":"Asma T. Uddin","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125001833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defending Israelis or Suppressing Palestinian Self-Determination? An Analysis of Operation Protective Edge Using the Two-Factor Test","authors":"Wajiha Rais","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133266256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Complementary or Competing Freedoms: Government Officials, Religious Freedom, and LGBTQ Rights","authors":"Frank S. Ravitch","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121949852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the early twenty-first century, some—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—believe that Islam requires Muslims to engage in holy war or Jih d. This article concludes that this early twenty-first century notion that Muslims are obligated to wage holy war is based on a failure to appreciate that Jih d was never a universally agreed upon concept in Islam nor was there ever a universal obligation to participate in Jih d. In order to support the assertion that Muslims are not obligated to engage in holy war, this article looks to canonical texts from the anaf School of Islamic Law from the ninth through the fourteenth century CE. These texts are called Fatw collections because they compile legal opinions on a wide variety of matters. The first observation that the article presents is that some of these canonical Fatw collections do not even address the question of Jih d while other Fatw collections treat Jih d in at least three different ways. Thus the article demonstrates that the earliest Muslim legal scholars of the anaf School did not share a uniform understanding of what constitutes holy war nor did they agree on who is obligated to become a holy warrior. Indeed, the article concludes that early legal scholars especially disagreed on the obligation to engage in Jih d and on who qualifies to call for Jih d. Hence it is false to claim that Muslims are obligated now (or have ever been obligated) to engage in Jih d. * Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology, Vanderbilt University. ** Doctoral Candidate, Emory University. The authors would like to acknowledge Professor Devin Stewart for his valuable insights and comments on this article. 377fiu_11-1 S heet N o. 5 S de B 048/2016 1011:02 37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 5 Side B 04/28/2016 10:11:02
{"title":"Are Muslims Obligated to Engage in Holy War","authors":"Beverly I. Moran, Rahimjon Abdugafurov","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"In the early twenty-first century, some—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—believe that Islam requires Muslims to engage in holy war or Jih d. This article concludes that this early twenty-first century notion that Muslims are obligated to wage holy war is based on a failure to appreciate that Jih d was never a universally agreed upon concept in Islam nor was there ever a universal obligation to participate in Jih d. In order to support the assertion that Muslims are not obligated to engage in holy war, this article looks to canonical texts from the anaf School of Islamic Law from the ninth through the fourteenth century CE. These texts are called Fatw collections because they compile legal opinions on a wide variety of matters. The first observation that the article presents is that some of these canonical Fatw collections do not even address the question of Jih d while other Fatw collections treat Jih d in at least three different ways. Thus the article demonstrates that the earliest Muslim legal scholars of the anaf School did not share a uniform understanding of what constitutes holy war nor did they agree on who is obligated to become a holy warrior. Indeed, the article concludes that early legal scholars especially disagreed on the obligation to engage in Jih d and on who qualifies to call for Jih d. Hence it is false to claim that Muslims are obligated now (or have ever been obligated) to engage in Jih d. * Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology, Vanderbilt University. ** Doctoral Candidate, Emory University. The authors would like to acknowledge Professor Devin Stewart for his valuable insights and comments on this article. 377fiu_11-1 S heet N o. 5 S de B 048/2016 1011:02 37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 5 Side B 04/28/2016 10:11:02","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117086044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Good but Not Great: Autonomous Vehicles and the Law in Florida","authors":"Jeffery Mackowski","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114849328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bob Jonesing: Same-Sex Marriage and the Hankering to Strip Religious Institutions of Their Tax-Exempt Status","authors":"Timothy J. Tracey","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130209335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Women and the Free Exercise Clause: Some Thoughts About a (Religious) Feminist Reading","authors":"Marie A. Failinger","doi":"10.25148/lawrev.11.1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.11.1.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125995596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public reason, as developed by John Rawls, is the idea that the “moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority.” This Essay explores the role that the idea of public reason plays in the opinions of Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court's 2015 landmark decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage (SSM). Most notably: Roberts accuses Kennedy of violating public reason by grounding the right to SSM on a sectarian creed, namely, the comprehensive liberalism espoused by John Stuart Mill. Kennedy implicitly reproves citizens who support SSM bans on religious grounds, perhaps gesturing towards a civic duty or etiquette to refrain from supporting laws based solely on one’s creed. Roberts in turn criticizes Kennedy for unfairly applying the demands of public reason to ordinary citizens. In these ways, Roberts and Kennedy act less like exemplars of public reason, the role that Rawls envisions for a supreme court, and more like whistleblowers of others’ violations and misapplications of the idea.
约翰·罗尔斯发展的公共理性是这样一种理念，即“规范我们共同生活的道德或政治规则，在某种意义上，对所有这些规则声称对其具有权威的人来说，是合理的或可接受的。”本文探讨了公共理性理念在大法官约翰·罗伯茨(John Roberts)和大法官安东尼·肯尼迪(Anthony Kennedy)在奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案(Obergefell v. Hodges)中所扮演的角色。奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案是最高法院2015年做出的具有里程碑意义的裁决，承认了同性婚姻的宪法权利。最值得注意的是:罗伯茨指责肯尼迪违反公共理性，将SSM的权利建立在宗派信条之上，即约翰·斯图尔特·密尔所支持的全面自由主义。肯尼迪含蓄地谴责那些基于宗教理由支持SSM禁令的公民，也许是在暗示一种公民责任或礼仪，即不支持完全基于个人信仰的法律。罗伯茨反过来批评肯尼迪不公平地将公共理性的要求应用于普通公民。在这些方面，罗伯茨和肯尼迪的行为不像罗尔斯设想的最高法院中公共理性的典范，而更像是其他人违反和误用这一理念的举报人。
{"title":"The Role of Public Reason in Obergefell v. Hodges","authors":"R. A. Katz","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.13","url":null,"abstract":"Public reason, as developed by John Rawls, is the idea that the “moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority.” This Essay explores the role that the idea of public reason plays in the opinions of Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court's 2015 landmark decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage (SSM). Most notably: Roberts accuses Kennedy of violating public reason by grounding the right to SSM on a sectarian creed, namely, the comprehensive liberalism espoused by John Stuart Mill. Kennedy implicitly reproves citizens who support SSM bans on religious grounds, perhaps gesturing towards a civic duty or etiquette to refrain from supporting laws based solely on one’s creed. Roberts in turn criticizes Kennedy for unfairly applying the demands of public reason to ordinary citizens. In these ways, Roberts and Kennedy act less like exemplars of public reason, the role that Rawls envisions for a supreme court, and more like whistleblowers of others’ violations and misapplications of the idea.","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115917615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Your Fatwa Does Not Apply Here”: International Law and the Opponents of “Holy Wars”","authors":"Karima E. Bennoune","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116315252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper is an empirical study of the way drag queens protect their intellectual property without reverting to formal intellectual property law. It identifies that substituting for the law is a double-layered social norm system devised by the queens in which the creators (the queens) as well as the users of the domain influence its norms and enforcement. The paper outlines the incentives that queens have for creating drag; the unique social structure and the distinctive subject matter of the domain; and the special relationships that the queens have with their audience. It holds, that this structure allows for the creation of a well tailored and functioning social norms system. The paper delineates the reasons why intellectual property law cannot accommodate for the queen's creations; and it presents the norm system the queens developed in order to prevent appropriation. The paper outlines the advantages of the social norms system – a structured, better tailored and flexible ordering regime; as well as possible disadvantages such as lack of IP policy and concerns regarding powerful guilds blocking creativity. The paper also addresses the idea of a creative domain that wishes to challenge law, rather than become a part of it. The paper concludes that the drag domain holds important lessons for the general intellectual property discourse.
{"title":"Don't Be a Drag, Just Be a Queen – How Drag Queens Protect Their Intellectual Property Without Law","authors":"Eden Sarid","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2511477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2511477","url":null,"abstract":"The paper is an empirical study of the way drag queens protect their intellectual property without reverting to formal intellectual property law. It identifies that substituting for the law is a double-layered social norm system devised by the queens in which the creators (the queens) as well as the users of the domain influence its norms and enforcement. The paper outlines the incentives that queens have for creating drag; the unique social structure and the distinctive subject matter of the domain; and the special relationships that the queens have with their audience. It holds, that this structure allows for the creation of a well tailored and functioning social norms system. The paper delineates the reasons why intellectual property law cannot accommodate for the queen's creations; and it presents the norm system the queens developed in order to prevent appropriation. The paper outlines the advantages of the social norms system – a structured, better tailored and flexible ordering regime; as well as possible disadvantages such as lack of IP policy and concerns regarding powerful guilds blocking creativity. The paper also addresses the idea of a creative domain that wishes to challenge law, rather than become a part of it. The paper concludes that the drag domain holds important lessons for the general intellectual property discourse.","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122337807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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