According to Dworkin, “truth” is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with the analysis of the underlying values we attach to these concepts. Dworkin understands the true as a matter of interpretation, which—and this is often misunderstood—is capable of producing a correct conception of the truth. The truth is thereby directly related to justice. Dworkin even ties his theory of interpretation to an objective truth that can only produce conclusive reasons for a specific advocacy of a particular position in an argument after responsible and intensive debate—in the sense of his two-stage theory. In fact, it turns out that Dworkin’s search for and conception of an objective truth describes a (historical) process. We interpret what our ancestors have already interpreted and continue to understand (in a modified way). This reflexive responsibility is ours to bear; according to Dworkin, it is our responsibility to always stand up for truth through good arguments.
{"title":"Ronald Dworkin: Seeking Truth and Justice through Responsibility","authors":"Samra Ibric","doi":"10.3390/laws12030041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030041","url":null,"abstract":"According to Dworkin, “truth” is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with the analysis of the underlying values we attach to these concepts. Dworkin understands the true as a matter of interpretation, which—and this is often misunderstood—is capable of producing a correct conception of the truth. The truth is thereby directly related to justice. Dworkin even ties his theory of interpretation to an objective truth that can only produce conclusive reasons for a specific advocacy of a particular position in an argument after responsible and intensive debate—in the sense of his two-stage theory. In fact, it turns out that Dworkin’s search for and conception of an objective truth describes a (historical) process. We interpret what our ancestors have already interpreted and continue to understand (in a modified way). This reflexive responsibility is ours to bear; according to Dworkin, it is our responsibility to always stand up for truth through good arguments.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46614040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When I received a request from MDPI in 2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, to guest-edit a new online journal of philosophy of law and legal theory, including the history of their disciplines, it was immediately clear to me that this offer could be a great opportunity for all of us working in the field of philosophy of law or legal theory to develop an organ to exchange knowledge through this, as well as further crises [...]
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue «Justice Based on Truth»","authors":"Marcel Senn","doi":"10.3390/laws12030043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030043","url":null,"abstract":"When I received a request from MDPI in 2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, to guest-edit a new online journal of philosophy of law and legal theory, including the history of their disciplines, it was immediately clear to me that this offer could be a great opportunity for all of us working in the field of philosophy of law or legal theory to develop an organ to exchange knowledge through this, as well as further crises [...]","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45942611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Spinoza’s philosophy argues for the freedom of individuals as singular beings in the state. This freedom is not perfect yet immanent. Freedom—according to the Ethics—is a consequence of true knowledge and virtue, which must be able to develop and can only be realised gradually. The state and the laws establish the framework that makes this freedom possible. Freedom and true knowledge are basic concepts of the metaphysical system. Justice, however, appears as a legal and political concept in Spinoza’s thought, which the philosopher did not discuss in depth. Nevertheless, the concept of justice has a specific significance in the philosophical context in which it occurs in the TTP—especially in the wisdom of King Solomon—and in the Ethics. Justice, on the one hand, strengthens harmony, security, and freedom. On the other hand, the freedom to philosophise forms a condition for justice to develop according to reason. The knowledge that justice has a importance in Spinoza’s thought is consistent with the complexity of his philosophy and makes its understanding more complete.
{"title":"Truth and Justice in Spinoza’s Theological–Political Treatise and the Ethics","authors":"Andreas Kistler","doi":"10.3390/laws12030039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030039","url":null,"abstract":"Spinoza’s philosophy argues for the freedom of individuals as singular beings in the state. This freedom is not perfect yet immanent. Freedom—according to the Ethics—is a consequence of true knowledge and virtue, which must be able to develop and can only be realised gradually. The state and the laws establish the framework that makes this freedom possible. Freedom and true knowledge are basic concepts of the metaphysical system. Justice, however, appears as a legal and political concept in Spinoza’s thought, which the philosopher did not discuss in depth. Nevertheless, the concept of justice has a specific significance in the philosophical context in which it occurs in the TTP—especially in the wisdom of King Solomon—and in the Ethics. Justice, on the one hand, strengthens harmony, security, and freedom. On the other hand, the freedom to philosophise forms a condition for justice to develop according to reason. The knowledge that justice has a importance in Spinoza’s thought is consistent with the complexity of his philosophy and makes its understanding more complete.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42056113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reconstructs some of the core elements of Dworkin’s epistemology of ethics. To understand why, for Dworkin, questions of legal philosophy lead to moral epistemology, the main points of Dworkin’s last restatement of his theoretical account of law are outlined. Against this background, the paper critically assesses the merits of Dworkin’s criticism of current prominent forms of skepticism and what it teaches us about the epistemology of legal thought.
{"title":"Truth, Ethics and Legal Thought—Some Lessons from Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and Its Critique","authors":"Matthias Mahlmann","doi":"10.3390/laws12030042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030042","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reconstructs some of the core elements of Dworkin’s epistemology of ethics. To understand why, for Dworkin, questions of legal philosophy lead to moral epistemology, the main points of Dworkin’s last restatement of his theoretical account of law are outlined. Against this background, the paper critically assesses the merits of Dworkin’s criticism of current prominent forms of skepticism and what it teaches us about the epistemology of legal thought.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48458761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this essay is to outline the significance of Leibniz’s philosophy of law for the present. The essay traces the main features of Leibniz’s theory and points out what further developments of his approach are pending today. Finally, it shows how similar Leibniz’s basic convictions are to those of Ronald Dworkin.
{"title":"Justice and Truth: A Leibnizian Perspective on Modern Jurisprudence","authors":"Matthias Armgardt","doi":"10.3390/laws12030038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030038","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this essay is to outline the significance of Leibniz’s philosophy of law for the present. The essay traces the main features of Leibniz’s theory and points out what further developments of his approach are pending today. Finally, it shows how similar Leibniz’s basic convictions are to those of Ronald Dworkin.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42560479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the publication of Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, the strategies of Surveillance Capitalists and appropriate responses to them have become common points of discussion across several fields. However, there is relatively little literature addressing challenges that Surveillance Capitalism raises for the foundations of law. This article outlines Surveillance Capitalism and then compares the views of Thomas Aquinas and Ronald Dworkin in four areas: truth and reality, reality and law, interpretation and social custom, and virtue and law; finally, it closes by asking whether the law alone can provide a sufficient response to Surveillance Capitalism. The overarching argument of the article is that, while Aquinas’s view of the foundations of law accounts for and responds to the challenges of Surveillance Capitalism more effectively than Dworkin’s, law alone cannot provide a sufficient response to this emerging phenomenon.
{"title":"Thomas Aquinas, Ronald Dworkin, and the Fourth Revolution: The Foundations of Law in the Age of Surveillance Capitalism","authors":"K. Smith","doi":"10.3390/laws12030040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030040","url":null,"abstract":"Since the publication of Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, the strategies of Surveillance Capitalists and appropriate responses to them have become common points of discussion across several fields. However, there is relatively little literature addressing challenges that Surveillance Capitalism raises for the foundations of law. This article outlines Surveillance Capitalism and then compares the views of Thomas Aquinas and Ronald Dworkin in four areas: truth and reality, reality and law, interpretation and social custom, and virtue and law; finally, it closes by asking whether the law alone can provide a sufficient response to Surveillance Capitalism. The overarching argument of the article is that, while Aquinas’s view of the foundations of law accounts for and responds to the challenges of Surveillance Capitalism more effectively than Dworkin’s, law alone cannot provide a sufficient response to this emerging phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48002841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dworkin’s and other analytic/positivist philosophers’ theoretical approach to law leads inexorably to politicization, totalitarianism, less justice, less trust in government, and less truth. A more practical approach is Fuller’s, which is based on experience of human behavior and an analysis of what has worked in the past. That is also the approach traditionally used in the common law system. This article uses a comparative study of the two Western traditions, their history, and their most prominent legal philosophers to explicate how and why Dworkin’s and Fuller’s approaches are consistent and inconsistent with those traditions, followed by a comparative analysis of the results obtained by prominent international NGOs. Dworkin’s approach, which grows out of analytic philosophy, is unworkable because like all scientistic theories, it treats human beings mechanistically, de-emphasizing personal responsibility, ignoring the need for individual incentive, and it assumes an all-encompassing, all-powerful government of experts to make legal decisions for a collectivity. Under Fuller’s common law approach, the proper role of law is to manage conflict, as it cannot be prevented and cannot always be resolved, thus building the public’s trust in government as unbiased and apolitical as possible. This concept of the rule of law places law above government, minimizes politicization, incentivizes personal responsibility, individual incentive, and entrepreneurship, and is the only true common good among men.
{"title":"Fuller, Dworkin, Scientism, and Liberty: The Dichotomy between Continental and Common Law Traditions and Their Consequences","authors":"Nadia E. Nedzel","doi":"10.3390/laws12030037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030037","url":null,"abstract":"Dworkin’s and other analytic/positivist philosophers’ theoretical approach to law leads inexorably to politicization, totalitarianism, less justice, less trust in government, and less truth. A more practical approach is Fuller’s, which is based on experience of human behavior and an analysis of what has worked in the past. That is also the approach traditionally used in the common law system. This article uses a comparative study of the two Western traditions, their history, and their most prominent legal philosophers to explicate how and why Dworkin’s and Fuller’s approaches are consistent and inconsistent with those traditions, followed by a comparative analysis of the results obtained by prominent international NGOs. Dworkin’s approach, which grows out of analytic philosophy, is unworkable because like all scientistic theories, it treats human beings mechanistically, de-emphasizing personal responsibility, ignoring the need for individual incentive, and it assumes an all-encompassing, all-powerful government of experts to make legal decisions for a collectivity. Under Fuller’s common law approach, the proper role of law is to manage conflict, as it cannot be prevented and cannot always be resolved, thus building the public’s trust in government as unbiased and apolitical as possible. This concept of the rule of law places law above government, minimizes politicization, incentivizes personal responsibility, individual incentive, and entrepreneurship, and is the only true common good among men.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49501950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The determination of truth in the aftermath of war aiming at establishing justice and peace is a key element of a transitional justice (TJ) process. The theory of justice of Roland Dworkin deals with an approach in which the interpretation of values such as equality, liberty or truth are paramount. Dworkin’s theory of justice is applied to constitutional states and lays out how democratic values are negotiated. The goal of a TJ process is to lead a state towards democracy after a war or internal armed conflict. TJ processes as well as Dworkin’s theory of justice are to be understood as dynamic, which implies that they are subject to constant change and thus to be considered in their respective social, cultural, political, and economic contexts. This paper explores the relationship between truth and justice in the framework of a TJ trial and Roland Dworkin’s theory of justice. The TJ process in Colombia serves as a case study because that was where I conducted field research in TJ in 2019.
{"title":"Transitional Justice Process and the Justice Theory of Roland Dworkin","authors":"Helen Gyr","doi":"10.3390/laws12030035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030035","url":null,"abstract":"The determination of truth in the aftermath of war aiming at establishing justice and peace is a key element of a transitional justice (TJ) process. The theory of justice of Roland Dworkin deals with an approach in which the interpretation of values such as equality, liberty or truth are paramount. Dworkin’s theory of justice is applied to constitutional states and lays out how democratic values are negotiated. The goal of a TJ process is to lead a state towards democracy after a war or internal armed conflict. TJ processes as well as Dworkin’s theory of justice are to be understood as dynamic, which implies that they are subject to constant change and thus to be considered in their respective social, cultural, political, and economic contexts. This paper explores the relationship between truth and justice in the framework of a TJ trial and Roland Dworkin’s theory of justice. The TJ process in Colombia serves as a case study because that was where I conducted field research in TJ in 2019.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49452390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Border pushbacks, including at the European Union’s external borders and by countries such as Australia, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States, are common—and in fact have become a new normal. These border policing or other operations aim to prevent people from reaching, entering, or remaining in a territory. Screening for protection needs is summary or non-existent. Pushbacks violate the international prohibitions of collective expulsion and refoulement, and pushbacks of children are inconsistent with the best interests principle and other children’s rights standards. Excessive force, other ill-treatment, family separation, and other rights violations may also accompany pushback operations. Despite formidable obstacles such as weak oversight mechanisms, undue judicial deference to the executive, and official ambivalence, domestic court rulings and other initiatives show some promise in securing compliance with international standards and affording a measure of accountability.
{"title":"The Persistent, Pernicious Use of Pushbacks against Children and Adults in Search of Safety","authors":"M. Bochenek","doi":"10.3390/laws12030034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030034","url":null,"abstract":"Border pushbacks, including at the European Union’s external borders and by countries such as Australia, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States, are common—and in fact have become a new normal. These border policing or other operations aim to prevent people from reaching, entering, or remaining in a territory. Screening for protection needs is summary or non-existent. Pushbacks violate the international prohibitions of collective expulsion and refoulement, and pushbacks of children are inconsistent with the best interests principle and other children’s rights standards. Excessive force, other ill-treatment, family separation, and other rights violations may also accompany pushback operations. Despite formidable obstacles such as weak oversight mechanisms, undue judicial deference to the executive, and official ambivalence, domestic court rulings and other initiatives show some promise in securing compliance with international standards and affording a measure of accountability.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46143245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In August of 2022, the United States Department of Treasury sanctioned the virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash, an open-source and fully decentralised piece of software running on the Ethereum blockchain, subsequently leading to the arrest of one of its developers in The Netherlands. Not only was this the first time the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) extended its authority to sanction a foreign ‘person’ to software, but the decentralised nature of the software and global usage highlight the challenge of establishing jurisdiction over decentralised software and its global user base. The government claims jurisdiction over citizens, residents, and any assets that pass through the country’s territory. As a global financial center with most large tech companies, this often facilitates the establishment of jurisdiction over global conduct that passes through US servers. However, decentralised programs on blockchains with nodes located around the world challenge this traditional approach as either nearly all countries can claim jurisdiction over users, subjecting users to criminal laws in countries with which they have no true interaction, or they limit jurisdiction, thereby risking abuse by bad actors. This article takes a comparative approach to examine the challenges to establishing criminal jurisdiction on cryptocurrency-related crimes.
{"title":"When Criminals Abuse the Blockchain: Establishing Personal Jurisdiction in a Decentralised Environment","authors":"C. Watters","doi":"10.3390/laws12020033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12020033","url":null,"abstract":"In August of 2022, the United States Department of Treasury sanctioned the virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash, an open-source and fully decentralised piece of software running on the Ethereum blockchain, subsequently leading to the arrest of one of its developers in The Netherlands. Not only was this the first time the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) extended its authority to sanction a foreign ‘person’ to software, but the decentralised nature of the software and global usage highlight the challenge of establishing jurisdiction over decentralised software and its global user base. The government claims jurisdiction over citizens, residents, and any assets that pass through the country’s territory. As a global financial center with most large tech companies, this often facilitates the establishment of jurisdiction over global conduct that passes through US servers. However, decentralised programs on blockchains with nodes located around the world challenge this traditional approach as either nearly all countries can claim jurisdiction over users, subjecting users to criminal laws in countries with which they have no true interaction, or they limit jurisdiction, thereby risking abuse by bad actors. This article takes a comparative approach to examine the challenges to establishing criminal jurisdiction on cryptocurrency-related crimes.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44631247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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