Pub Date : 2019-06-07DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_11
J. Schlundt, Moon Y. F. Tay, Chengcheng Hu, Chen Liwei
{"title":"Food Security: Microbiological and Chemical Risks","authors":"J. Schlundt, Moon Y. F. Tay, Chengcheng Hu, Chen Liwei","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"228 1","pages":"231 - 274"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72880889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-07DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_16
J. Stikeleather, A. Masys
{"title":"Global Health Security Innovation","authors":"J. Stikeleather, A. Masys","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"10 1","pages":"387 - 425"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88312180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-07DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_13
A. French
{"title":"Simulation and Modeling Applications in Global Health Security","authors":"A. French","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23491-1_13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"64 1","pages":"307 - 340"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84287084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/23779497.2019.1663128
P. Hough
ABSTRACT Environmental security is generally held to be a contemporary or even futuristic concern. However, as with many facets of security thought, this overlooks how the unparalleled technological, economic and social changes of the 19th Century forged much of the international political landscape we now inhabit. The tendency for ecological political enquiry to focus on the rise of ecocentric policy serves to obscure how many aspects of national and human security relating to environmental change were apparent in the 19th century. Human insecurity in the face of pollution and resource depletion was a part of the emergence of ecological science in response to the industrialisation of Europe and North America. In addition, this was the era when European imperialism reached its apex and European nationalisms fully emerged; both of which contributed to the national securitization of the environment around much of the world in contrasting ways as the desire to both conquer and preserve nature became more evident. Environmental questions of national, human and ecological security are not peculiar to the present age and were very much apparent in 19th Century global politics.
{"title":"Back to the future: environmental security in nineteenth century global politics","authors":"P. Hough","doi":"10.1080/23779497.2019.1663128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23779497.2019.1663128","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Environmental security is generally held to be a contemporary or even futuristic concern. However, as with many facets of security thought, this overlooks how the unparalleled technological, economic and social changes of the 19th Century forged much of the international political landscape we now inhabit. The tendency for ecological political enquiry to focus on the rise of ecocentric policy serves to obscure how many aspects of national and human security relating to environmental change were apparent in the 19th century. Human insecurity in the face of pollution and resource depletion was a part of the emergence of ecological science in response to the industrialisation of Europe and North America. In addition, this was the era when European imperialism reached its apex and European nationalisms fully emerged; both of which contributed to the national securitization of the environment around much of the world in contrasting ways as the desire to both conquer and preserve nature became more evident. Environmental questions of national, human and ecological security are not peculiar to the present age and were very much apparent in 19th Century global politics.","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"7 1","pages":"1 - 13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87431101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/23779497.2019.1699848
K. Chmielińska, D. Hubé, T. Bausinger, M. Simon, G. Rivière, P. Fauser, H. Sanderson
ABSTRACT The battlefield of Verdun has seen some of the heaviest shelling in the history of mankind. This site as well as clean-up facilities in Germany may constitute contamination hot-spots and point-sources with leaking to groundwater. This study collected existing toxicological and ecotoxicological data on mustard gas degradation products, together with physical – chemical properties of listed compounds. It also provides quantities of these products measured in the groundwater of France, Germany and the pore water of the Baltic Sea. We indicate a deficiency of information on the toxicity of 1-oxa-4,5-dithiepane and 1,2,5 – trithiepane. In the groundwater of the German city of Munster 1-oxa-4,5-dithiepane was measured up to 250 µg/L, thus exceeding safe levels. Ecotoxicological studies classify this compound as toxic to aquatic organisms. 1,2,5-trithiepane is not a persistent compound. It was measured, however, in the groundwater at 1 µg/L level. This suggests that it could be formed from an active source of mustard gas. Considering the lack of toxicological data and the uncertainty about the amount of munition deposits, we suggest that research into the toxicity and exposure of, 1-oxa-4,5-dithiepane and 1,2,5 – trithiepane is needed for sites of concern.
{"title":"Environmental contamination with persistent cyclic mustard gas impurities and transformation products","authors":"K. Chmielińska, D. Hubé, T. Bausinger, M. Simon, G. Rivière, P. Fauser, H. Sanderson","doi":"10.1080/23779497.2019.1699848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23779497.2019.1699848","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The battlefield of Verdun has seen some of the heaviest shelling in the history of mankind. This site as well as clean-up facilities in Germany may constitute contamination hot-spots and point-sources with leaking to groundwater. This study collected existing toxicological and ecotoxicological data on mustard gas degradation products, together with physical – chemical properties of listed compounds. It also provides quantities of these products measured in the groundwater of France, Germany and the pore water of the Baltic Sea. We indicate a deficiency of information on the toxicity of 1-oxa-4,5-dithiepane and 1,2,5 – trithiepane. In the groundwater of the German city of Munster 1-oxa-4,5-dithiepane was measured up to 250 µg/L, thus exceeding safe levels. Ecotoxicological studies classify this compound as toxic to aquatic organisms. 1,2,5-trithiepane is not a persistent compound. It was measured, however, in the groundwater at 1 µg/L level. This suggests that it could be formed from an active source of mustard gas. Considering the lack of toxicological data and the uncertainty about the amount of munition deposits, we suggest that research into the toxicity and exposure of, 1-oxa-4,5-dithiepane and 1,2,5 – trithiepane is needed for sites of concern.","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"14 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89378179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/23779497.2018.1556112
H. Carter, Louis Gauntlett, G. Rubin, D. Russell, Mélissa Généreux, L. Lemyre, P. Blain, M. Byers, R. Amlȏt
ABSTRACT The likelihood of major incidents and disasters has increased in recent years, due to climate change, urbanisation, and acts of terrorism. Effective management of such incidents is crucial to ensure that members of the public are able and willing to take appropriate protective actions. The workshop described in this paper brought together researchers, practitioners and policy makers with expertise in emergency planning, preparedness and response to generate recommendations for major incident management. Workshop participants agreed that understanding the psychosocial aspects of major incidents is crucial to effective incident response, and a number of key themes were raised during workshop discussions. Based on these themes, four key recommendations can be made for informing planning and preparedness for major incidents.
{"title":"Psychosocial and behavioural aspects of early incident response: outcomes from an international workshop","authors":"H. Carter, Louis Gauntlett, G. Rubin, D. Russell, Mélissa Généreux, L. Lemyre, P. Blain, M. Byers, R. Amlȏt","doi":"10.1080/23779497.2018.1556112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23779497.2018.1556112","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The likelihood of major incidents and disasters has increased in recent years, due to climate change, urbanisation, and acts of terrorism. Effective management of such incidents is crucial to ensure that members of the public are able and willing to take appropriate protective actions. The workshop described in this paper brought together researchers, practitioners and policy makers with expertise in emergency planning, preparedness and response to generate recommendations for major incident management. Workshop participants agreed that understanding the psychosocial aspects of major incidents is crucial to effective incident response, and a number of key themes were raised during workshop discussions. Based on these themes, four key recommendations can be made for informing planning and preparedness for major incidents.","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"55 1","pages":"28 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81413396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/23779497.2018.1480403
A. Parsons, P. Matero, Martin Adams, Kenneth B Yeh
ABSTRACT Mobile and field transportable laboratories have long been used by military and defence, intergovernmental inspections, health, and environmental monitoring agencies. Among the purposes of deploying such laboratories are early warning, forward reconnaissance, on-site investigation, verification, and response. With the advent of technology that has enabled the use of diagnostic equipment in the field and extended transportation capabilities to rapidly deliver these assets and services, mobile and field units have served to further extend networks of existing, fixed laboratories. Case histories of example mobile and field transportable laboratories are compared and discussed including those used by the United States military, Finnish Defence Forces, United Nations, and several mobile and transportable diagnostics laboratories used in response to the 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa. Given the often-remote locations to which these laboratories are deployed, they must incorporate a high degree of self-sufficiency, particularly with regard to utilities, and integral biosafety and biosecurity measures. Experienced scientists performing similar technical tasks in fixed laboratories can be employed to support and refine the mobile and field laboratory operations. Mobile and field transportable laboratories are usually national-level assets that require ongoing funding for maintenance, equipping, resupply, and training of personnel in order to maintain a readiness posture for their intended missions. We also examine the cost estimates and sustainment challenges of operating and maintaining these laboratories to provide recommendations and lessons learnt for their practical use and deployment.
{"title":"Examining the utility and readiness of mobile and field transportable laboratories for biodefence and global health security-related purposes","authors":"A. Parsons, P. Matero, Martin Adams, Kenneth B Yeh","doi":"10.1080/23779497.2018.1480403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23779497.2018.1480403","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mobile and field transportable laboratories have long been used by military and defence, intergovernmental inspections, health, and environmental monitoring agencies. Among the purposes of deploying such laboratories are early warning, forward reconnaissance, on-site investigation, verification, and response. With the advent of technology that has enabled the use of diagnostic equipment in the field and extended transportation capabilities to rapidly deliver these assets and services, mobile and field units have served to further extend networks of existing, fixed laboratories. Case histories of example mobile and field transportable laboratories are compared and discussed including those used by the United States military, Finnish Defence Forces, United Nations, and several mobile and transportable diagnostics laboratories used in response to the 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa. Given the often-remote locations to which these laboratories are deployed, they must incorporate a high degree of self-sufficiency, particularly with regard to utilities, and integral biosafety and biosecurity measures. Experienced scientists performing similar technical tasks in fixed laboratories can be employed to support and refine the mobile and field laboratory operations. Mobile and field transportable laboratories are usually national-level assets that require ongoing funding for maintenance, equipping, resupply, and training of personnel in order to maintain a readiness posture for their intended missions. We also examine the cost estimates and sustainment challenges of operating and maintaining these laboratories to provide recommendations and lessons learnt for their practical use and deployment.","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"90 1","pages":"1 - 13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81532676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/23779497.2018.1509675
Stephanie E. Meulenbelt
ABSTRACT The food supply chain may be intentionally compromised. Potential devastating effects of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents are particularly emphasised and the ease with which such an attack may take place is described in numerous sources. Yet, using the food chain’s carrying capacity to spread a CBRN contamination across a wide geographic area is (extremely) complicated. Although episodes of intentional food contaminations can be serious, they rarely result in mass fatalities. Economic damage may quickly arise, but is often a result of (too) rigorous countermeasures. Past incidents demonstrate that a sole suspicion or even rumour of food being contaminated can already have severe consequences. This paper provides insight into the threat of intentional CBRN contamination of the food chain. It describes various parameters, including the type of agents capable of yielding damage, possible points of introduction and potential consequences of deliberate CBRN contamination of the food chain, in an effort to facilitate future risk assessment.
{"title":"Assessing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats to the food supply chain","authors":"Stephanie E. Meulenbelt","doi":"10.1080/23779497.2018.1509675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23779497.2018.1509675","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The food supply chain may be intentionally compromised. Potential devastating effects of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents are particularly emphasised and the ease with which such an attack may take place is described in numerous sources. Yet, using the food chain’s carrying capacity to spread a CBRN contamination across a wide geographic area is (extremely) complicated. Although episodes of intentional food contaminations can be serious, they rarely result in mass fatalities. Economic damage may quickly arise, but is often a result of (too) rigorous countermeasures. Past incidents demonstrate that a sole suspicion or even rumour of food being contaminated can already have severe consequences. This paper provides insight into the threat of intentional CBRN contamination of the food chain. It describes various parameters, including the type of agents capable of yielding damage, possible points of introduction and potential consequences of deliberate CBRN contamination of the food chain, in an effort to facilitate future risk assessment.","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"40 1","pages":"14 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76785989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.1080/23779497.2017.1279022
Kenneth B Yeh, Martin Adams, E. Marshall, Debanjana Dasgupta, A. Zhunushov, A. Richards, J. Hay
Abstract Organisations in under-resourced areas that achieve long-term research sustainability by successfully competing for research funding will not only build their reputation for conducting quality science but also develop their human resources in a manner that reduces the risk of becoming a future security threat. Major challenges to these organisations include identifying and prioritising funding opportunities, securing and administering external grant awards and publishing both the outcomes of research and relevant surveillance data. Lack of a standardised evaluation technique to assess institutional research capabilities poses challenges for identifying and targeting specific, repeatable processes that lead to organisational improvements. Short- and long-term goals, which are challenged by research quality, funding and human resources, need to be established in order to achieve complex missions such as reducing global health security threats. Once baseline capabilities are established, a consistent evaluation technique provides an objective view to complement other steps that enhance capabilities. The capability maturity model, which is often used in business and technology sectors for establishing life cycle and planning sustainment, is a technique that enhances performance by defining three levels of capability (initial, managed and optimised). An organisation can assess its current state of capability (‘as is’) and develop an actionable strategy for its next progression (‘to be’). In addition, application of a CMM aids creation of a strategy for realising a more repeatable and optimised process. Research programmes frequently rely on basic metrics such as the number of peer-reviewed publications and grant funding awards to measure their quality. Our analysis suggests an approach that includes references and tools, especially those that are risk-based, which can be used to establish initial best practices, define metrics, measure outputs and rates of success in a stepwise manner. In addition, we provide a pilot example from a survey of research institutes in under-resourced areas.
{"title":"Applying a Capability Maturity Model (CMM) to evaluate global health security-related research programmes in under-resourced areas","authors":"Kenneth B Yeh, Martin Adams, E. Marshall, Debanjana Dasgupta, A. Zhunushov, A. Richards, J. Hay","doi":"10.1080/23779497.2017.1279022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23779497.2017.1279022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Organisations in under-resourced areas that achieve long-term research sustainability by successfully competing for research funding will not only build their reputation for conducting quality science but also develop their human resources in a manner that reduces the risk of becoming a future security threat. Major challenges to these organisations include identifying and prioritising funding opportunities, securing and administering external grant awards and publishing both the outcomes of research and relevant surveillance data. Lack of a standardised evaluation technique to assess institutional research capabilities poses challenges for identifying and targeting specific, repeatable processes that lead to organisational improvements. Short- and long-term goals, which are challenged by research quality, funding and human resources, need to be established in order to achieve complex missions such as reducing global health security threats. Once baseline capabilities are established, a consistent evaluation technique provides an objective view to complement other steps that enhance capabilities. The capability maturity model, which is often used in business and technology sectors for establishing life cycle and planning sustainment, is a technique that enhances performance by defining three levels of capability (initial, managed and optimised). An organisation can assess its current state of capability (‘as is’) and develop an actionable strategy for its next progression (‘to be’). In addition, application of a CMM aids creation of a strategy for realising a more repeatable and optimised process. Research programmes frequently rely on basic metrics such as the number of peer-reviewed publications and grant funding awards to measure their quality. Our analysis suggests an approach that includes references and tools, especially those that are risk-based, which can be used to establish initial best practices, define metrics, measure outputs and rates of success in a stepwise manner. In addition, we provide a pilot example from a survey of research institutes in under-resourced areas.","PeriodicalId":32212,"journal":{"name":"Global Security Health Science and Policy","volume":"57 1","pages":"1 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85220824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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