Pub Date : 1978-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600002533
S. C. Brown, G. Vesey, Richard Peters, J. Spiers
{"title":"PHS volume 12 Cover and Front matter","authors":"S. C. Brown, G. Vesey, Richard Peters, J. Spiers","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600002533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600002533","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127695162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1978-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600002570
C. Battersby
In a celebrated passage in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume tells us that those readers who prefer Bunyan's writings to Addison's are merely ‘pretended critics’ whose judgment is ‘absurd and ridiculous’; this is ‘no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean’ (GG, iii, p. 269). Hume shows a decisiveness and vehemence in his judgment against Bunyan that has greater significance than that of being a mere reflection of his aesthetic principles. Hume does, after all, wish to make ‘durable admiration’ the foundation of his standard of taste, and both the number of eighteenth-century reprints of The Pilgrim's Progress and Johnson's comment that this work has as ‘the best evidence of its merit, the general and continued approbation of mankind’ testify to the lasting popularity of Bunyan's work (GG, iii, p. 27i). Hume's critical judgment on Bunyan is not merely a consequence of a mechanical application of his standard of taste, but is rather a reflection of what I will term Hume's ‘epistemology of ease’.
在《品味标准》的一段著名段落中，休谟告诉我们，那些喜欢班扬作品而不喜欢艾迪生作品的读者只是“假装的批评家”，他们的判断是“荒谬可笑的”;这“就像他把一座鼹鼠丘建得和特纳里夫一样高，或者把一个池塘建得和海洋一样宽一样”(GG, iii, p. 269)。休谟在对班扬的批判中表现出一种果断和激烈，这比仅仅反映他的美学原则具有更大的意义。毕竟，休谟确实希望将“持久的钦佩”作为他品味标准的基础，18世纪《天路历程》的再版数量和约翰逊的评论都证明了班扬的作品是“其优点的最佳证据，是人类普遍和持续的认可”(GG, iii, p. 27i)。休谟对班扬的批判判断不仅仅是机械地应用他的品味标准的结果，而是我称之为休谟的“安逸认识论”的反映。
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Pub Date : 1978-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600002569
G. Rogers
The relationship between John Locke and Isaac Newton, his co-founder of, in the apt phrase of one recent writer, ‘the Moderate Enlightenment’ of the eighteenth century, has many dimensions. There is their friendship, which began only after each had written his major work, and which had its stormy interlude. There is the difficult question of their mutual impact. In what ways did each draw intellectually on the other? That there was some debt of each to the other is almost certain, but its exact extent is problematic. Questions may be asked over a whole range of intellectual issues, but not always answered. Thus their theology, which was in many respects close, and which forms the bulk of their surviving correspondence, may yet reveal mutual influence. There is the question of their political views, where both were firmly Whig. But it is upon their philosophy, and certain aspects of their philosophy in particular, that this paper will concentrate. My main theme is the nature of their empiricism, and my main contention is that between them they produced a powerful and comprehensive philosophy.
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Pub Date : 1977-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000480
S. Hampshire
The prescription that lays down how one ought to reason in moral matters is normally supported by a more general account of reasoning, which suggests limits upon what can be counted as reasoning of any kind, whether practical or theoretical. If, for example, one accepts, or presupposes, a Cartesian theory of reasoning, the normal case of reasoning is apt to be represented as conscious and explicit inference from one more or less clear idea to another in a set of distinguishable steps. The distinguishable steps are the feature that I wish to stress now. Given this Cartesian account, the normal case of rational deliberation before decision will also be represented as more or less explicit inference from one idea, or proposition, to another in successive, distinct steps.
{"title":"On Having a Reason","authors":"S. Hampshire","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000480","url":null,"abstract":"The prescription that lays down how one ought to reason in moral matters is normally supported by a more general account of reasoning, which suggests limits upon what can be counted as reasoning of any kind, whether practical or theoretical. If, for example, one accepts, or presupposes, a Cartesian theory of reasoning, the normal case of reasoning is apt to be represented as conscious and explicit inference from one more or less clear idea to another in a set of distinguishable steps. The distinguishable steps are the feature that I wish to stress now. Given this Cartesian account, the normal case of rational deliberation before decision will also be represented as more or less explicit inference from one idea, or proposition, to another in successive, distinct steps.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1977-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123107684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1977-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000479
Conjugal Faithfulness, P. M. Hutchings
‘Faithfulness’ is defined in The Oxford English Dictionary of 1901 in a way that leaves out what one might take as a central paradigm. The OED entry reads, in part Faithfulness … the quality of being faithful. A. Fidelity, loyalty (to a superior or friend) … B. Strict adherence to one's pledged word; honesty, sincerity. … The feudal system, the army, and the rest of such things are provided for in (A) ‘loyalty to a superior …’, and so are friends – after superiors. In (B), commercial interests are satisfactorily covered: ‘strict adherence to one's pledged word, honesty. …’ It is a nice piece of social history: from William the Conqueror to the latter phases of the Industrial Revolution, in two definitions. But a very odd piece of social history, in that conjugal faithfulness, the most existential one that there is, does not rate a mention.
1901年的《牛津英语词典》(Oxford English Dictionary)中对“信实”(Faithfulness)的定义省略了人们可能认为是核心范式的内容。《牛津英语词典》的部分词条是这样解释的:忠诚，忠诚的品质。忠诚，忠诚(对上级或朋友);诚实,真诚。封建制度、军队和其他诸如此类的东西在(A)“对上级的忠诚”中有规定，在上级之后的朋友也是如此。在(B)中，商业利益得到了令人满意的涵盖:“严格遵守承诺，诚实。”这是一部很好的社会史:从征服者威廉到工业革命的后期，有两种定义。但是社会历史上有一段很奇怪的事，那就是夫妻的忠诚，最存在的忠诚，却没有被提及。
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Pub Date : 1977-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s008044360000042x
{"title":"PHS volume 11 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s008044360000042x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s008044360000042x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1977-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121523706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1977-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s0080443600000418
G. Vesey, ENewson B Mayo, MWarnock PAiHutchingsSHampshire, S. K. Zaw, M. B. RFHolland, JNFindlayJ Glover, J. Spiers, E. Newson
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Pub Date : 1977-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000492
S. K. Zaw
Should the insane and the mentally ill be held morally responsible for their actions? To answer ‘No’ to this question is to classify the mentally abnormal as not fully human: and indeed legal tradition has generally oscillated between assimilating the insane to brutes and assimilating them to children below the age of discretion, neither of these two categories being accountable in law for what they do. In what respect relevant to moral responsibility were the insane held to resemble brutes and children? In the case of brutes, the answer seems to have been that the doings of the insane appeared to lack whatever it is that marks out human actions as distinctively human. What the insane did could not be thought of as issuing from deliberation, or as capable of having issued from deliberation, but seemed rather to be the result of the unbridled operation of nature — if a diseased nature. The natural comparison with insane killings seemed to be, for example, the killing of birds by cats. This distinction between animal doings and human actions does not depend on Cartesian views about the workings of animals; the operation of nature need not be thought of as mechanical. The thought is simply that where there is no room for deliberation there is no room for moral appraisal. Children, on the other hand, though capable of distinctively human action — i.e. of deliberating about what they do — were held not to be capable of the relevant kind of deliberation: for they were held ‘not to know the difference between right and wrong’.
{"title":"‘Irresistible Impulse’ and Moral Responsibility","authors":"S. K. Zaw","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000492","url":null,"abstract":"Should the insane and the mentally ill be held morally responsible for their actions? To answer ‘No’ to this question is to classify the mentally abnormal as not fully human: and indeed legal tradition has generally oscillated between assimilating the insane to brutes and assimilating them to children below the age of discretion, neither of these two categories being accountable in law for what they do. In what respect relevant to moral responsibility were the insane held to resemble brutes and children? In the case of brutes, the answer seems to have been that the doings of the insane appeared to lack whatever it is that marks out human actions as distinctively human. What the insane did could not be thought of as issuing from deliberation, or as capable of having issued from deliberation, but seemed rather to be the result of the unbridled operation of nature — if a diseased nature. The natural comparison with insane killings seemed to be, for example, the killing of birds by cats. This distinction between animal doings and human actions does not depend on Cartesian views about the workings of animals; the operation of nature need not be thought of as mechanical. The thought is simply that where there is no room for deliberation there is no room for moral appraisal. Children, on the other hand, though capable of distinctively human action — i.e. of deliberating about what they do — were held not to be capable of the relevant kind of deliberation: for they were held ‘not to know the difference between right and wrong’.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1977-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129316308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1977-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000443
E. Newson
Out of my normal context, and separated from my usual reference groups, perhaps I need first of all to explain the background from which I speak. As a developmental psychologist whose main research interests are to do with child rearing in the various social environments in which it takes place, I have been particularly concerned with the long-term dialogues (verbal and non-verbal) that go on between parents and children, in the course of which they commonly come to certain understandings about their mutual tolerances and intolerances, and learn to live together with some regard to these limits. I stress the intersubjective nature of these understandings because I take it as axiomatic that children bring up their parents in the course of parents bringing up their children, even though parents are more powerful in physical terms and marginally more powerful in psychological terms. Secondly, as a child psychologist working clinically with parents and handicapped or problem children, I am also interested in another kind of dialogue: that which takes place between parents and professionals with the child as focus. I am concerned to find ways of making this dialogue as effective as possible, in particular by recognising the differences that inform parental and professional approaches to our common focus, and then using these differences to enable a complementary partnership that builds upon the advantages of each.
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Pub Date : 1977-03-01DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000467
M. Warnock
My topic may seem a bizarre mixture of epistemology and value theory; and perhaps it is best to acknowledge this oddity at once. I should also, perhaps, confess that such a mixture has always seemed something to aspire to. Any philosopher who has made it seem that feeling strongly about something, valuing it highly, is an inevitable consequence of the nature of human understanding, that from the facts of knowledge or perception one can derive the inescapable facts of emotion or desire, any such philosopher has always deeply appealed to me. I am therefore a confessed perpetrator of the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed I go further, and say that I love the fallacy. So Spinoza, Hume (however much people say that he first discovered naturalism to be fallacious) and Sartre all seem to me to be real philosophers, on the grounds that for them this connexion between knowing and wanting seemed inevitable. My aim is to illustrate this kind of connexion by suggesting that the human imagination is such that we ought to value it and respect it more highly than anything else; and that therefore, if it can be educated and improved, it is to this education that we should give priority, if we are concerned with education at all. It may seem on the face of it absurd to say that we ought to value any particular human faculty or capacity. It may be thought that this is not the kind of object or evaluation with which at any rate philosophers should be concerned. But the fact is, of course, that we do value very highly indeed all kinds of capacities that we have, such as sight, and hearing and understanding. And being unashamedly naturalistic, I have no hesitation in saying not only that we do value them, but that we ought to; they are, in every sense, valuable.
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