Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0089563
A lever (machined from a casting made of AISI type 410 stainless steel, then surface hardened by nitriding) that was a component of the main fuel-control linkage of an aircraft engine fractured in flight after a service life of less than 50 h. Investigation (radiographic inspection) supported the conclusions that the lever broke at a cold shut extending through approximately 95% of the cross section. The normally applied load constituted an overload of the remainder of the lever. Recommendations included adding magnetic-particle inspection to the inspection procedures for this cast lever.
{"title":"Fracture of a Cast Stainless Steel Lever Because of a Cold Shut","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0089563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0089563","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A lever (machined from a casting made of AISI type 410 stainless steel, then surface hardened by nitriding) that was a component of the main fuel-control linkage of an aircraft engine fractured in flight after a service life of less than 50 h. Investigation (radiographic inspection) supported the conclusions that the lever broke at a cold shut extending through approximately 95% of the cross section. The normally applied load constituted an overload of the remainder of the lever. Recommendations included adding magnetic-particle inspection to the inspection procedures for this cast lever.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133546846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001540
J. A. Scott
Ground maintenance personnel discovered hydraulic fluid leaking from two small cracks in a main landing gear cylinder made from AISI 4340 Cr-Mo-Ni alloy steel. Failure of the part had initiated on the ID of the cylinder. Numerous cracks were found under the chromium plate. A 6500x electron fractograph showed cracking was predominantly intergranular with hairline indications. Leaking had occurred only 43 h after overhaul of the part. Total service time on the part was 9488 h. It was concluded that cracking on the ID was caused by hydrogen embrittlement which occurred during or after overhaul. The specific source of hydrogen which produced failure was not ascertainable.
{"title":"Use of Electron Fractography to Diagnose Hairline Cracking in an AISI 4340 Main Landing Gear Cylinder","authors":"J. A. Scott","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001540","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Ground maintenance personnel discovered hydraulic fluid leaking from two small cracks in a main landing gear cylinder made from AISI 4340 Cr-Mo-Ni alloy steel. Failure of the part had initiated on the ID of the cylinder. Numerous cracks were found under the chromium plate. A 6500x electron fractograph showed cracking was predominantly intergranular with hairline indications. Leaking had occurred only 43 h after overhaul of the part. Total service time on the part was 9488 h. It was concluded that cracking on the ID was caused by hydrogen embrittlement which occurred during or after overhaul. The specific source of hydrogen which produced failure was not ascertainable.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"157 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116603731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047059
The governor on an aircraft engine failed and upon disassembly of the unit, it was discovered that the retainer for the flyweight pivot pins was broken. The channel-shaped retainer was made of 0.8 mm (0.030 in.) thick 1018 or 1020 steel. The part was plated with copper, which acted as a stop-off during carburizing of the offset, circular thrust-bearing surface surrounding the 16-mm (0.637-in.) diam hole. The bearing surface was case hardened to a depth of 0.05 to 0.1 mm (0.002 to 0.005 in.), then austempered to obtain a minimum hardness of 600 Knoop (1-kg, or 2.2-lb, load). Considerable vibration was created in the installation because of the design of the mechanical device used to transmit power to the governor. The pins were permitted to slide axially a small distance. Analysis (visual inspection, microscopic examination, and ductility measurements) supported the conclusion that failure of the retainer was the result of fatigue caused by vibration in the flyweight assembly. Impact of the pivot pins on the retainer also contributed to failure. Recommendations included redesign of the flyweight assembly, and replacement of the channel-shaped retainer with a spring-clip type of pin retainer.
{"title":"Fatigue Failure of a Steel Channel-Shaped Retainer Because of Vibration","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047059","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The governor on an aircraft engine failed and upon disassembly of the unit, it was discovered that the retainer for the flyweight pivot pins was broken. The channel-shaped retainer was made of 0.8 mm (0.030 in.) thick 1018 or 1020 steel. The part was plated with copper, which acted as a stop-off during carburizing of the offset, circular thrust-bearing surface surrounding the 16-mm (0.637-in.) diam hole. The bearing surface was case hardened to a depth of 0.05 to 0.1 mm (0.002 to 0.005 in.), then austempered to obtain a minimum hardness of 600 Knoop (1-kg, or 2.2-lb, load). Considerable vibration was created in the installation because of the design of the mechanical device used to transmit power to the governor. The pins were permitted to slide axially a small distance. Analysis (visual inspection, microscopic examination, and ductility measurements) supported the conclusion that failure of the retainer was the result of fatigue caused by vibration in the flyweight assembly. Impact of the pivot pins on the retainer also contributed to failure. Recommendations included redesign of the flyweight assembly, and replacement of the channel-shaped retainer with a spring-clip type of pin retainer.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"294 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132427112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047673
A series of resistance spot welds joining Z-shape and C-shape members of an aircraft drop-tank structure failed during ejection testing. The members were fabricated of alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T62. The back surface of the C-shape members showed severe electrode-indentation marks off to one side of the spot weld, suggesting improper electrode contact. Visual examination of the weld fractures showed that the weld nuggets varied considerably in size, some being very small and three exhibiting an HAZ but no weld. Of 28 welds, only nine had acceptable nugget diameters and fusion-zone widths. The weld deficiencies were traced to problems in forming and fit-up of the C-shape members and to difficulties in alignment and positioning of the weld tooling. The failure of the resistance spot welds was attributed to poor weld quality caused by unfavorable fit-up and lack of proper weld-tool positioning. The problem could be solved by better forming procedures to provide an accurate fit-up that would not interfere with electrode alignment.
{"title":"Failure of Resistance Spot Welds in an Aircraft Drop Tank Because of Poor Fit-Up","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047673","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A series of resistance spot welds joining Z-shape and C-shape members of an aircraft drop-tank structure failed during ejection testing. The members were fabricated of alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T62. The back surface of the C-shape members showed severe electrode-indentation marks off to one side of the spot weld, suggesting improper electrode contact. Visual examination of the weld fractures showed that the weld nuggets varied considerably in size, some being very small and three exhibiting an HAZ but no weld. Of 28 welds, only nine had acceptable nugget diameters and fusion-zone widths. The weld deficiencies were traced to problems in forming and fit-up of the C-shape members and to difficulties in alignment and positioning of the weld tooling. The failure of the resistance spot welds was attributed to poor weld quality caused by unfavorable fit-up and lack of proper weld-tool positioning. The problem could be solved by better forming procedures to provide an accurate fit-up that would not interfere with electrode alignment.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"329 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134128710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0048164
A flat spring for the main landing gear of a light aircraft failed after safe execution of a hard landing. The spring material was identified by chemical analysis to be 6150 steel. The fracture was found to have occurred near the end of the spring that was inserted through a support member about 25 mm thick and attached to the fuselage by a single bolt. Brinelling (plastic flow and indentation due to excessive localized contact pressure) was observed on the upper surface of the spring where the forward and rear edges of the spring contacted the support member. It was indicated by chevron marks that brittle fracture had started beneath the brinelled area at the forward edge of the upper surface of the spring. The origin of the brittle fracture was found to be a small fatigue crack that had been present for a considerable period of time before final fracture occurred. Fracture of the landing-gear spring was concluded to have been caused by a fatigue crack that resulted from excessive brinelling at the support point. Regular visual examinations to detect evidence of brinelling and wear at the support in aircraft with this configuration of landing-gear spring were recommended.
{"title":"Fracture of a Landing-Gear Flat Spring","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0048164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0048164","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A flat spring for the main landing gear of a light aircraft failed after safe execution of a hard landing. The spring material was identified by chemical analysis to be 6150 steel. The fracture was found to have occurred near the end of the spring that was inserted through a support member about 25 mm thick and attached to the fuselage by a single bolt. Brinelling (plastic flow and indentation due to excessive localized contact pressure) was observed on the upper surface of the spring where the forward and rear edges of the spring contacted the support member. It was indicated by chevron marks that brittle fracture had started beneath the brinelled area at the forward edge of the upper surface of the spring. The origin of the brittle fracture was found to be a small fatigue crack that had been present for a considerable period of time before final fracture occurred. Fracture of the landing-gear spring was concluded to have been caused by a fatigue crack that resulted from excessive brinelling at the support point. Regular visual examinations to detect evidence of brinelling and wear at the support in aircraft with this configuration of landing-gear spring were recommended.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134400140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047072
Postflight inspection of a gas-turbine aircraft engine that had experienced compressor stall revealed that the engine air-intake bullet assembly had dislodged and was seated against the engine-inlet guide vanes at the 3 o'clock position. The bullet assembly consisted of an outer aerodynamic shell and an inner stiffener shell, both of 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick aluminum alloy 6061-T6, and four attachment clips of 1 mm (0.040 in.) thick alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T42. Each clip was joined to the outer shell by 12 spot welds and was also joined to the stiffener. Analysis (visual inspection, dye-penetrant inspection, and 10x/150x micrographs of sections etched with Keller's reagent) supports the conclusion that the outer shell of the bullet assembly separated from the stiffener because the four attachment clips fractured through the shell-to-clip spot welds. Fracture occurred by fatigue that initiated at the notch created by the intersection of the faying surfaces of the clip and shell with the spot weld nuggets. The 6061 aluminum alloy shell and stiffener were in the annealed (O) temper rather than T6, as specified. Recommendations included heat treating the shell and stiffener to the T6 temper after forming.
{"title":"Fatigue Failure of an Aluminum Alloy Assembly at Spot Welds Because of Improper Heat Treatment","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047072","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Postflight inspection of a gas-turbine aircraft engine that had experienced compressor stall revealed that the engine air-intake bullet assembly had dislodged and was seated against the engine-inlet guide vanes at the 3 o'clock position. The bullet assembly consisted of an outer aerodynamic shell and an inner stiffener shell, both of 1.3 mm (0.050 in.) thick aluminum alloy 6061-T6, and four attachment clips of 1 mm (0.040 in.) thick alclad aluminum alloy 2024-T42. Each clip was joined to the outer shell by 12 spot welds and was also joined to the stiffener. Analysis (visual inspection, dye-penetrant inspection, and 10x/150x micrographs of sections etched with Keller's reagent) supports the conclusion that the outer shell of the bullet assembly separated from the stiffener because the four attachment clips fractured through the shell-to-clip spot welds. Fracture occurred by fatigue that initiated at the notch created by the intersection of the faying surfaces of the clip and shell with the spot weld nuggets. The 6061 aluminum alloy shell and stiffener were in the annealed (O) temper rather than T6, as specified. Recommendations included heat treating the shell and stiffener to the T6 temper after forming.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123951283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001491
M. Katcher
Two silica phenolic nozzle liners cracked during proof testing. The test consisted of pressuring the nozzles to 14.1 MPa (2050 psia) for 5 to 20 s. It was concluded that the failure was due to longitudinal cracking in the convergent exhaust-nozzle insulators, stemming from the use of silica phenolic tape produced from flawed materials that went undetected by the quality control tests, which at the time, assessed tape strength properties in the warp rather than the bias direction. Once the nozzle manufacturer and its suppliers identified the problem, they changed their quality control procedures and resumed production of nozzle liners with more tightly controlled fiber/fabric materials.
{"title":"Failure Analysis of Silica Phenolic Nozzle Liners","authors":"M. Katcher","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001491","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Two silica phenolic nozzle liners cracked during proof testing. The test consisted of pressuring the nozzles to 14.1 MPa (2050 psia) for 5 to 20 s. It was concluded that the failure was due to longitudinal cracking in the convergent exhaust-nozzle insulators, stemming from the use of silica phenolic tape produced from flawed materials that went undetected by the quality control tests, which at the time, assessed tape strength properties in the warp rather than the bias direction. Once the nozzle manufacturer and its suppliers identified the problem, they changed their quality control procedures and resumed production of nozzle liners with more tightly controlled fiber/fabric materials.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128077097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001558
D. Meyn, R. Bayles
A liquid hydrogen main fuel control valve for a rocket engine failed by fracture of the Ti-5Al-2.5Sn body during the last of a series of static engine test firings. Fractographic, metallurgical, and stress analyses determined that a combination of fatigue and unexpected aqueous stress-corrosion cracking initiated and propagated the crack which caused failure. The failure analysis approach and its results are described to illustrate how fractography and fracture mechanics, together with a knowledge of the crack initiation and propagation mechanisms of the valve material under various stress states and environments, helped investigators to trace the cause of failure.
{"title":"Analysis of Sub-Critical Cracking in a Ti-5Al-2.5Sn Liquid Hydrogen Control Valve","authors":"D. Meyn, R. Bayles","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001558","url":null,"abstract":"A liquid hydrogen main fuel control valve for a rocket engine failed by fracture of the Ti-5Al-2.5Sn body during the last of a series of static engine test firings. Fractographic, metallurgical, and stress analyses determined that a combination of fatigue and unexpected aqueous stress-corrosion cracking initiated and propagated the crack which caused failure. The failure analysis approach and its results are described to illustrate how fractography and fracture mechanics, together with a knowledge of the crack initiation and propagation mechanisms of the valve material under various stress states and environments, helped investigators to trace the cause of failure.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125177047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001018
C. Howard Craft
Initial investigation showed that a landing gear failure was the result of a hard landing with no evidence of contributory factors. The objective of reexamination was to determine whether there was any evidence of metallurgical failure. The landing gear was primarily an AISI type 6150 Cr-V steel flat spring attached at the top end to the fuselage and at the bottom end to the axle. Failure occurred at the clamping point near the top end of this spring. The failure showed evidence of severe brinelling at one corner in the clamping area. The fracture surfaces were clean, fresh, and indicative of a shock type of failure pattern. Closer examination, however, showed a fatigue crack at one corner. At this point, there was definite evidence of progression and oxidation. It was concluded that the corner in question was subjected to repeated brinelling resulting from normal landing loads, probably accentuated by looseness in the clamping device. The resulting residual tensile stress lowered the effective fatigue strength at that point against drag and side loads.
{"title":"Failure of a Main Landing Gear on a Light Airplane","authors":"C. Howard Craft","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Initial investigation showed that a landing gear failure was the result of a hard landing with no evidence of contributory factors. The objective of reexamination was to determine whether there was any evidence of metallurgical failure. The landing gear was primarily an AISI type 6150 Cr-V steel flat spring attached at the top end to the fuselage and at the bottom end to the axle. Failure occurred at the clamping point near the top end of this spring. The failure showed evidence of severe brinelling at one corner in the clamping area. The fracture surfaces were clean, fresh, and indicative of a shock type of failure pattern. Closer examination, however, showed a fatigue crack at one corner. At this point, there was definite evidence of progression and oxidation. It was concluded that the corner in question was subjected to repeated brinelling resulting from normal landing loads, probably accentuated by looseness in the clamping device. The resulting residual tensile stress lowered the effective fatigue strength at that point against drag and side loads.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124971126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001747
Jivan B. Shah
This report covers case histories of failures in fixed-wing light airplane and helicopter components. In a 2025-T6 or 2219 aluminum alloy propeller blade that failed near the tip, cracks started on the leading edge at surface damage in the critical area-the zone between 4 and 10 in. from the tip of the blade. Incorrect dressing and inadequate pre-flight inspection were the two main causes. Two other types of propeller blade fatigue failures resulted mainly from propeller straightening operations, usually performed after previous blade bending damage. To eliminate blade tip failures, all surface-damaged material should be removed and polished smooth before further flight. The blade should be correctly dressed. Also, the tachometer should be calibrated to ensure the engine/propeller combination is not operated in the critical speed range at normal cruising speeds.
{"title":"Damaged Propeller Blades","authors":"Jivan B. Shah","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001747","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This report covers case histories of failures in fixed-wing light airplane and helicopter components. In a 2025-T6 or 2219 aluminum alloy propeller blade that failed near the tip, cracks started on the leading edge at surface damage in the critical area-the zone between 4 and 10 in. from the tip of the blade. Incorrect dressing and inadequate pre-flight inspection were the two main causes. Two other types of propeller blade fatigue failures resulted mainly from propeller straightening operations, usually performed after previous blade bending damage. To eliminate blade tip failures, all surface-damaged material should be removed and polished smooth before further flight. The blade should be correctly dressed. Also, the tachometer should be calibrated to ensure the engine/propeller combination is not operated in the critical speed range at normal cruising speeds.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131808406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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