This study empirically analyzes the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings policy and the impact of cash holdings on firm performance using 97 multinational data. We find that there is a nonlinear cubic function relationship between the political corruption and corporate cash holdings with a negative coefficient of cubic term of political corruption. Specifically, in developed countries with low levels of political corruption, there is a U-shape relationship between political corruption and cash holdings; however, in frontier and emerging countries, there is an Inverted-U-shape relationship. These results show that two hypothesis ‘Expropriation Shielding hypothesis’ and ‘Preoccupancy hypothesis’ on previous literature are not conflicting, but can be explained differently according to the level of development of countries and the level of political corruption. In addition, we find that the effects of political corruption on firm performance when firms use cash are different in developed and developing countries. From these results, we suggest that political corruption is an important variable in corporate financial policy and firm performance.
{"title":"Political Corruption and Corporate Cash Holdings","authors":"Dongwook Seo, S. Han","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3021653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3021653","url":null,"abstract":"This study empirically analyzes the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings policy and the impact of cash holdings on firm performance using 97 multinational data. We find that there is a nonlinear cubic function relationship between the political corruption and corporate cash holdings with a negative coefficient of cubic term of political corruption. Specifically, in developed countries with low levels of political corruption, there is a U-shape relationship between political corruption and cash holdings; however, in frontier and emerging countries, there is an Inverted-U-shape relationship. These results show that two hypothesis ‘Expropriation Shielding hypothesis’ and ‘Preoccupancy hypothesis’ on previous literature are not conflicting, but can be explained differently according to the level of development of countries and the level of political corruption. In addition, we find that the effects of political corruption on firm performance when firms use cash are different in developed and developing countries. From these results, we suggest that political corruption is an important variable in corporate financial policy and firm performance.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117161346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the international anti-corruption framework and the peer review monitoring process. Peer review is described as the “systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state … comply with established standards and principles.” However, despite its growing importance as a regulatory process, peer review has not been comprehensively analysed, resulting in a “literature famine” on its nature and operations. Indeed, to date, there has been very limited academic discussion on peer review. As a result, one aim of this article is to contribute to a stronger understanding of its process. While our focus is on peer review in the anti-corruption context, where possible, universal characteristics of the process are discussed. The second objective of this article is to consider the merits of the peer review process in incentivising states to take action against corruption. Peer review is the mechanism for evaluation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) under its Anti-bribery Convention and the African Union’s (AU) good governance objectives under good governance objectives under the Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Whilst acknowledging the criticisms of peer review, this article argues that peer review has been successful in particular contexts in increasing state compliance with these international instruments. In particular, peer review has contributed to the acceptance of anti-corruption norms and focused on the need for all countries to regulate corruption at the national level.
{"title":"Peer Review and the Global Anti-Corruption Conventions: Context, Theory and Practice","authors":"E. Bao, Kath Hall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025230","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the international anti-corruption framework and the peer review monitoring process. Peer review is described as the “systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state … comply with established standards and principles.” However, despite its growing importance as a regulatory process, peer review has not been comprehensively analysed, resulting in a “literature famine” on its nature and operations. Indeed, to date, there has been very limited academic discussion on peer review. As a result, one aim of this article is to contribute to a stronger understanding of its process. While our focus is on peer review in the anti-corruption context, where possible, universal characteristics of the process are discussed. The second objective of this article is to consider the merits of the peer review process in incentivising states to take action against corruption. Peer review is the mechanism for evaluation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) under its Anti-bribery Convention and the African Union’s (AU) good governance objectives under good governance objectives under the Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Whilst acknowledging the criticisms of peer review, this article argues that peer review has been successful in particular contexts in increasing state compliance with these international instruments. In particular, peer review has contributed to the acceptance of anti-corruption norms and focused on the need for all countries to regulate corruption at the national level.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133518687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kelly M. McMann, Brigitte Seim, Jan Teorell, Staffan I. Lindberg
We are grateful to Lucas Flowers, Mark Patteson, and Andrew Slivka for their research assistance. This research project was supported by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg, Grant 2013.0166, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; European Research Council, Grant 724191, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; and internal grants from the Vice-Chancellor’s office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. We performed simulations and other computational tasks using resources provided by the Notre Dame Center for Research Computing (CRC) through the High Performance Computing section and the Swedish National Infrastructure for Computing (SNIC) at the National Supercomputer Centre, SNIC 2016/1-382 and 2017/1-68. We specifically acknowledge the assistance of In-Saeng Suh at CRC and Johan Raber at SNIC in facilitating our use of their respective systems.
我们非常感谢Lucas Flowers、Mark Patteson和Andrew Slivka对我们研究的帮助。本研究项目由Riksbankens Jubileumsfond资助，Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg，瑞典哥德堡大学V-Dem研究所;瑞典哥德堡大学V-Dem研究所，克努特和爱丽丝·瓦伦堡基金会向瓦伦堡学院研究员斯塔凡·i·林德伯格资助2013.0166;欧洲研究理事会资助724191，主持:Staffan I. Lindberg，瑞典哥德堡大学V-Dem研究所;以及哥德堡大学副校长办公室、社会科学学院院长和政治学系的内部拨款。我们利用圣母大学研究计算中心(CRC)通过高性能计算部门和瑞典国家计算基础设施(SNIC)在国家超级计算机中心(SNIC 2016/1-382和2017/1-68)提供的资源进行了模拟和其他计算任务。我们特别感谢CRC的in - saeng Suh和SNIC的Johan Raber为我们使用他们各自的系统提供的帮助。
{"title":"Democracy and Corruption: A Global Time-Series Analysis with V-Dem Data","authors":"Kelly M. McMann, Brigitte Seim, Jan Teorell, Staffan I. Lindberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2941979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2941979","url":null,"abstract":"We are grateful to Lucas Flowers, Mark Patteson, and Andrew Slivka for their research assistance. This research project was supported by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg, Grant 2013.0166, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; European Research Council, Grant 724191, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; and internal grants from the Vice-Chancellor’s office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. We performed simulations and other computational tasks using resources provided by the Notre Dame Center for Research Computing (CRC) through the High Performance Computing section and the Swedish National Infrastructure for Computing (SNIC) at the National Supercomputer Centre, SNIC 2016/1-382 and 2017/1-68. We specifically acknowledge the assistance of In-Saeng Suh at CRC and Johan Raber at SNIC in facilitating our use of their respective systems.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130248138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a policy experiment in India, we examine the impact of a third party audit on tax compliance. Employing the generalized difference-in-difference methodology, we find that growth in tax payment is 58 percentage points higher under a regime with no third party audit. The fact that the differential growth in tax is negatively associated with differential growth in discretionary expenses and also absence of any real growth of treated firms, suggestively indicate collusion and corruption. Our results hold up-to a battery of placebo tests, absorption of time varying and time invariant unobservable factors and, display heterogeneity based on expected lines.
{"title":"Impact of Third Party Audits on Compliance and Corruption: Evidence Using a Policy Experiment","authors":"Prasanna Tantri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2904811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2904811","url":null,"abstract":"Using a policy experiment in India, we examine the impact of a third party audit on tax compliance. Employing the generalized difference-in-difference methodology, we find that growth in tax payment is 58 percentage points higher under a regime with no third party audit. The fact that the differential growth in tax is negatively associated with differential growth in discretionary expenses and also absence of any real growth of treated firms, suggestively indicate collusion and corruption. Our results hold up-to a battery of placebo tests, absorption of time varying and time invariant unobservable factors and, display heterogeneity based on expected lines.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"411 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123561832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper applies property rights theory to explain changes in foreign affiliates’ ownership. Post-entry ownership change is driven by both firm-level characteristics and by the differences in the institutional environments in host countries. We distinguish between financial market development and the level of corruption as two different institutional dimensions, such that changes along these dimensions impact upon ownership change in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that changes in ownership are affected by the foreign affiliate’s relatedness with its parent’s sector, as well as by the affiliate’s maturity. We use firm level data across 125 host countries to test our hypotheses.
{"title":"Ownership Control of Foreign Affiliates: A Property Rights Theory Perspective","authors":"N. Driffield, T. Mickiewicz, Yama Temouri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2862968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2862968","url":null,"abstract":"This paper applies property rights theory to explain changes in foreign affiliates’ ownership. Post-entry ownership change is driven by both firm-level characteristics and by the differences in the institutional environments in host countries. We distinguish between financial market development and the level of corruption as two different institutional dimensions, such that changes along these dimensions impact upon ownership change in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that changes in ownership are affected by the foreign affiliate’s relatedness with its parent’s sector, as well as by the affiliate’s maturity. We use firm level data across 125 host countries to test our hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126815318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I provide a model that connects the bribe amount with the fines imposed on both bribe-taker and bribe-payer. I show that the proposal of Basu (2011) to not punish bribe-payers to induce whistleblowing does not have to help lower bribes. Higher fines on bribe-takers will make them ask for larger bribes, whereas lowering fines for bribe-paying on bribe-payers might increase their willingness to pay the bribe. An increase in transparency, if achieved, effectively increases both fines simultaneously.
{"title":"On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes","authors":"Sergey V Popov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2783262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783262","url":null,"abstract":"I provide a model that connects the bribe amount with the fines imposed on both bribe-taker and bribe-payer. I show that the proposal of Basu (2011) to not punish bribe-payers to induce whistleblowing does not have to help lower bribes. Higher fines on bribe-takers will make them ask for larger bribes, whereas lowering fines for bribe-paying on bribe-payers might increase their willingness to pay the bribe. An increase in transparency, if achieved, effectively increases both fines simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"438 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116018144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The law enforcement shortcomings in corruption cases are substantial and call for a greater scope of enforcement tools and efficient procedures. Main concerns in reform should include basic criminal law principles, consequences for markets, access to the information necessary for reactions, and value for money in enforcement operations. In this article, we suggest European governments can strengthen the preventive effects of criminal law vis-à-vis corporations by clarifying how various forms of negligence will lead to reactions, request self-assessments of estimated/accepted business risk, apply predictable principles for duty-based sanctions (with strict residual liability), and develop principled rules for negotiated settlements. In addition, for criminal law reactions to incentivize firms to self-police and self-report, we argue that debarment from public contracting and other severe consequences of a criminal-law reaction should be placed under the control of one law enforcement entity. Eventually, due to strict conditions on the use of criminal law reactions, it is also necessary to let civil law reactions better complement the enforcement strategies of criminal justice systems.
{"title":"Bribes, Crimes and Law Enforcement","authors":"Erling Hjelmeng, Tina Søreide","doi":"10.54648/eulr2017003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2017003","url":null,"abstract":"The law enforcement shortcomings in corruption cases are substantial and call for a greater scope of enforcement tools and efficient procedures. Main concerns in reform should include basic criminal law principles, consequences for markets, access to the information necessary for reactions, and value for money in enforcement operations. In this article, we suggest European governments can strengthen the preventive effects of criminal law vis-à-vis corporations by clarifying how various forms of negligence will lead to reactions, request self-assessments of estimated/accepted business risk, apply predictable principles for duty-based sanctions (with strict residual liability), and develop principled rules for negotiated settlements. In addition, for criminal law reactions to incentivize firms to self-police and self-report, we argue that debarment from public contracting and other severe consequences of a criminal-law reaction should be placed under the control of one law enforcement entity. Eventually, due to strict conditions on the use of criminal law reactions, it is also necessary to let civil law reactions better complement the enforcement strategies of criminal justice systems.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126651105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a macro panel of 31 European countries, this paper explores the hypothesis that cross-country differences in the exposition to the risk of poverty or social exclusion (as defined by the Europe 2020 anti-poverty strategy) are strongly affected by countries’ political, institutional and legal characteristics and particularly by the level of perceived corruption in the public and political sectors. As expected, the results show that economic growth, income distribution, public expenditure and investment, as well as education but not technical development, have strong effects on poverty reduction. This notwithstanding, results indicate that corruption and poor institutional quality significantly interact with economic co-factors and threaten the positive effects of growth on poverty. Altogether, the results signal the need for reassessment of the Euro 2020 strategy, which mainly relies on economic instruments alone.
{"title":"Corruption, Fatigued Democracy and Bad Governance: Are They Co-Determinants of Poverty Risk and Social Exclusion in Europe? A Cross-Country Macro-Level Comparison","authors":"B. Bosco","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2720828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2720828","url":null,"abstract":"Using a macro panel of 31 European countries, this paper explores the hypothesis that cross-country differences in the exposition to the risk of poverty or social exclusion (as defined by the Europe 2020 anti-poverty strategy) are strongly affected by countries’ political, institutional and legal characteristics and particularly by the level of perceived corruption in the public and political sectors. As expected, the results show that economic growth, income distribution, public expenditure and investment, as well as education but not technical development, have strong effects on poverty reduction. This notwithstanding, results indicate that corruption and poor institutional quality significantly interact with economic co-factors and threaten the positive effects of growth on poverty. Altogether, the results signal the need for reassessment of the Euro 2020 strategy, which mainly relies on economic instruments alone.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130390746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-11-11DOI: 10.1108/S1569-376720160000017010
W. Selmier
Abstract Purpose Much of the criticism directed toward banking in China revolves around self-dealing in relationships between bankers and their clients. Corruption, nepotism, high levels of non-performing loans, and the inefficiency of government-directed lending have all been laid at the door of embedded guanxi networks. While valid to an extent, this criticism ignores two important, related points: guanxi networks bring disciplining mechanisms as well as the potential for corruption, and those mechanisms may improve banking governance. Methodology/approach Employing theory from relationship banking, information economics, and the business ethics of guanxi, I examine how monitoring by netizens will lead to greater disclosure. Findings Relationship banking in a Chinese context – with the influence of guanxi in banking – further increases reputational costs when self-dealing is uncovered. Costs of bad banking behavior are increasing just as benefits from staying rich increase. Increased disclosure affects chances of staying rich as disclosure increases the chance that a corrupt relationship will lead to loss of wealth and reputation. Research limitations/implications This paper presents a theoretical construct informed by selected examples. An empirical analysis of netizen monitoring leading to improved banking governance would provide additional support for the theoretical construct. Practical implications Bankers, financiers, and government officials must be aware of monitoring by netizens, which forces more ethical financial contracting. Social implications Rather than weakening financial system governance, guanxi may begin to strengthen the disciplinary measures inherent in relationship banking as information disclosure increases and private sector monitoring grows. Originality/value This paper provides an extension to private monitoring theory in financial contracting which may be applied to netizen monitoring in other regions and countries.
{"title":"Netizens and Private Monitoring in Chinese Banking","authors":"W. Selmier","doi":"10.1108/S1569-376720160000017010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-376720160000017010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000Purpose \u0000Much of the criticism directed toward banking in China revolves around self-dealing in relationships between bankers and their clients. Corruption, nepotism, high levels of non-performing loans, and the inefficiency of government-directed lending have all been laid at the door of embedded guanxi networks. While valid to an extent, this criticism ignores two important, related points: guanxi networks bring disciplining mechanisms as well as the potential for corruption, and those mechanisms may improve banking governance. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Methodology/approach \u0000Employing theory from relationship banking, information economics, and the business ethics of guanxi, I examine how monitoring by netizens will lead to greater disclosure. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Findings \u0000Relationship banking in a Chinese context – with the influence of guanxi in banking – further increases reputational costs when self-dealing is uncovered. Costs of bad banking behavior are increasing just as benefits from staying rich increase. Increased disclosure affects chances of staying rich as disclosure increases the chance that a corrupt relationship will lead to loss of wealth and reputation. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Research limitations/implications \u0000This paper presents a theoretical construct informed by selected examples. An empirical analysis of netizen monitoring leading to improved banking governance would provide additional support for the theoretical construct. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Practical implications \u0000Bankers, financiers, and government officials must be aware of monitoring by netizens, which forces more ethical financial contracting. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Social implications \u0000Rather than weakening financial system governance, guanxi may begin to strengthen the disciplinary measures inherent in relationship banking as information disclosure increases and private sector monitoring grows. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Originality/value \u0000This paper provides an extension to private monitoring theory in financial contracting which may be applied to netizen monitoring in other regions and countries.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125544584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International sports will have to strengthen their efforts to exclude persons with morals in conflict with their sports. IOC and FIFA should mirror their top ambitions in athletic and financial areas by similarly leading ambitions to serve human mankind more generally. To encounter critiques that the organizing of major sporting events are „elitist actions“ IOC and FIFA should declare ex-ante referenda as a precondition for bidding. In order to reduce the funds available for corruption, the role of public finance in major sporting events should be overthought. At least broadcasters under public law public should be excluded from the bidding for TV. FIFA and other sporting federations should make public their payments to member federations etc and the underlying decision criteria.
{"title":"Ensuring Good Governance and Preventing Corruption in the Planning of Major Sporting Events – Open Issues","authors":"W. Maennig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2973288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973288","url":null,"abstract":"International sports will have to strengthen their efforts to exclude persons with morals in conflict with their sports. IOC and FIFA should mirror their top ambitions in athletic and financial areas by similarly leading ambitions to serve human mankind more generally. To encounter critiques that the organizing of major sporting events are „elitist actions“ IOC and FIFA should declare ex-ante referenda as a precondition for bidding. In order to reduce the funds available for corruption, the role of public finance in major sporting events should be overthought. At least broadcasters under public law public should be excluded from the bidding for TV. FIFA and other sporting federations should make public their payments to member federations etc and the underlying decision criteria.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116582684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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