This work proposes a multidimensional framework, based on a Latent Class model, to identify various types of corruption and their importance. A dataset of Eastern European and Central Asian countries is used to identify four groups of corrupt activities, which go beyond the usual classification of corruption into administrative and political. Estimates are validated by means of a direct administrative corruption index derived from the same dataset and comparison of corruption perception rankings published by Transparency International. The potential of the proposed approach is illustrated with an application to the relationship between firms' competitiveness and the latent classes of corruption identified.
{"title":"Modelling Corruption Perceptions Through Latent Class Models: Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asian Countries","authors":"L. Pieroni, G. d’Agostino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2587584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2587584","url":null,"abstract":"This work proposes a multidimensional framework, based on a Latent Class model, to identify various types of corruption and their importance. A dataset of Eastern European and Central Asian countries is used to identify four groups of corrupt activities, which go beyond the usual classification of corruption into administrative and political. Estimates are validated by means of a direct administrative corruption index derived from the same dataset and comparison of corruption perception rankings published by Transparency International. The potential of the proposed approach is illustrated with an application to the relationship between firms' competitiveness and the latent classes of corruption identified.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"377 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115907159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theft rates from subsidized food programs vary greatly and strongly influence program efficiency. Unfortunately, the determinants of these variations remain understudied because the agencies that run these programs seldom publicize the allocations of subsidized food to local markets. We develop a theoretical model of pilferage which predicts that: (i) pilferage from opaque programs is likely to rise more than proportionately with per capita food allocations; (ii) pilferage of inferior goods may be lower in poorer communities; (iii) pilferage rates need not rise as price subsidies are increased; and (iv) pilferage may rise as the relative quality of subsidized food is reduced. A comprehensive literature review and new estimates of pilferage across regions of the Philippines validates these predictions. Our finding, that around 48% of the subsidized rice went missing, is robust to new tests for sampling and recall error. Our policy discussion encourages geographic over administrative targeting, greater transparency in food allocations, and the use of realistic quotas.
{"title":"Pilferage from Opaque Food Subsidy Programs: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Aashish Mehta, S. Jha","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1658481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1658481","url":null,"abstract":"Theft rates from subsidized food programs vary greatly and strongly influence program efficiency. Unfortunately, the determinants of these variations remain understudied because the agencies that run these programs seldom publicize the allocations of subsidized food to local markets. We develop a theoretical model of pilferage which predicts that: (i) pilferage from opaque programs is likely to rise more than proportionately with per capita food allocations; (ii) pilferage of inferior goods may be lower in poorer communities; (iii) pilferage rates need not rise as price subsidies are increased; and (iv) pilferage may rise as the relative quality of subsidized food is reduced. A comprehensive literature review and new estimates of pilferage across regions of the Philippines validates these predictions. Our finding, that around 48% of the subsidized rice went missing, is robust to new tests for sampling and recall error. Our policy discussion encourages geographic over administrative targeting, greater transparency in food allocations, and the use of realistic quotas.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"10 10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129535567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Researchers and business leaders have long decried short-termism: the excessive focus of executives of publicly traded companies — along with fund managers and other investors — on short-term results. The central concern is that short-termism discourages long-term investments, threatening the performance of both individual firms and the U.S. economy.I argue in this paper that short-termism also invites institutional corruption. Institutional corruption in the present context refers to institutionally supported behavior that, while not necessarily unlawful, erodes public trust and undermines a company’s legitimate processes, core values, and capacity to achieve espoused goals. Institutional corruption in business typically entails gaming society’s laws and regulations, tolerating conflicts of interest, and persistently violating accepted norms of fairness, among other things.Section 1 introduces the twin problems of short-termism and institutional corruption and shows how the latter has led to a diminution of public trust in many of our leading firms and industries. Section 2 presents an illuminating example — just one of many possibilities — of short-termism and institutional corruption, namely the gaming of Securities and Exchange Commission rules by Citigroup’s mortgage-banking desk in 2007. Section 3, building on the Citigroup example, identifies the principal types of gaming and demonstrates just how pervasive gaming of society’s rules has become in recent decades. Section 4 explains how short-termism invites gaming and other forms of institutional corruption, and draws attention to seven significant sources of short-termism including: shifting beliefs about the purposes and responsibilities of the modern corporation; the concomitant rise of a new financial culture; misapplied performance metrics; perverse incentives; our vulnerability to hard-wired behavioral biases; the decreasing tenure of institutional leaders; and the bounded knowledge of corporate directors, which prevents effective board oversight. Section 5 addresses what is to be done about short-termism and the institutional corruption it invites. Recommendations and suggested reforms relate to the improvement of board oversight; the adoption of compensation principles and practices that can help mitigate the destructive effects of inappropriate metrics, perverse incentives, and hard-wired preferences for immediate satisfactions; the termination of quarterly earnings guidance; and the elimination of the built-in, short-term bias embedded in our current capital gains tax regime.
{"title":"Short-Termism at Its Worst: How Short-Termism Invites Corruption… and What to Do About It","authors":"Malcolm S. Salter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2247545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2247545","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers and business leaders have long decried short-termism: the excessive focus of executives of publicly traded companies — along with fund managers and other investors — on short-term results. The central concern is that short-termism discourages long-term investments, threatening the performance of both individual firms and the U.S. economy.I argue in this paper that short-termism also invites institutional corruption. Institutional corruption in the present context refers to institutionally supported behavior that, while not necessarily unlawful, erodes public trust and undermines a company’s legitimate processes, core values, and capacity to achieve espoused goals. Institutional corruption in business typically entails gaming society’s laws and regulations, tolerating conflicts of interest, and persistently violating accepted norms of fairness, among other things.Section 1 introduces the twin problems of short-termism and institutional corruption and shows how the latter has led to a diminution of public trust in many of our leading firms and industries. Section 2 presents an illuminating example — just one of many possibilities — of short-termism and institutional corruption, namely the gaming of Securities and Exchange Commission rules by Citigroup’s mortgage-banking desk in 2007. Section 3, building on the Citigroup example, identifies the principal types of gaming and demonstrates just how pervasive gaming of society’s rules has become in recent decades. Section 4 explains how short-termism invites gaming and other forms of institutional corruption, and draws attention to seven significant sources of short-termism including: shifting beliefs about the purposes and responsibilities of the modern corporation; the concomitant rise of a new financial culture; misapplied performance metrics; perverse incentives; our vulnerability to hard-wired behavioral biases; the decreasing tenure of institutional leaders; and the bounded knowledge of corporate directors, which prevents effective board oversight. Section 5 addresses what is to be done about short-termism and the institutional corruption it invites. Recommendations and suggested reforms relate to the improvement of board oversight; the adoption of compensation principles and practices that can help mitigate the destructive effects of inappropriate metrics, perverse incentives, and hard-wired preferences for immediate satisfactions; the termination of quarterly earnings guidance; and the elimination of the built-in, short-term bias embedded in our current capital gains tax regime.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130825517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If development projects are to be effective, a minimum requirement is that the funding reaches its intended destination. Yet the history of international development is replete with examples of this not happening. I argue that there will be fewer problems with corruption or other diversions of funding—which I jointly label capture—in more precisely targeted projects. More well-defined targeting results in superior accountability relationships because there is greater clarity of responsibility, clearer information about outcomes, and improved identifiability of stakeholders. I use an original cross-country, cross-project data set on the incidence of capture in World Bank-funded investment projects to test the theory. The data show a negative relationship between targeting and capture, and I demonstrate that this relationship is robust to a variety of specifications. In addition, I find that there is a higher baseline likelihood of project capture in countries perceived as more corrupt according to commonly used survey-based measures from Transparency International and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, cross-validating those measures and my own.
{"title":"Targeting, Accountability and Capture in Development Projects","authors":"Matthew S. Winters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1643381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1643381","url":null,"abstract":"If development projects are to be effective, a minimum requirement is that the funding reaches its intended destination. Yet the history of international development is replete with examples of this not happening. I argue that there will be fewer problems with corruption or other diversions of funding—which I jointly label capture—in more precisely targeted projects. More well-defined targeting results in superior accountability relationships because there is greater clarity of responsibility, clearer information about outcomes, and improved identifiability of stakeholders. I use an original cross-country, cross-project data set on the incidence of capture in World Bank-funded investment projects to test the theory. The data show a negative relationship between targeting and capture, and I demonstrate that this relationship is robust to a variety of specifications. In addition, I find that there is a higher baseline likelihood of project capture in countries perceived as more corrupt according to commonly used survey-based measures from Transparency International and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, cross-validating those measures and my own.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115237762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-12DOI: 10.5129/001041512798837996
Anoop Sadanandan
Decentralization advances patronage politics in distinct ways. First, in decentralized states both central and local politicians distribute patronage to enhance their political support. Second, local elections reveal information to central leaders about the geographic distribution of electorally salient voters. Central leaders can use this information to target particularistic benefits to these voters. Third, elected local politicians have individual strategies to distribute patronage, in spite of or in addition to the clientelistic strategies of the political parties they represent. Evidence from India indicates that decentralization has contributed to more extensive distribution of patronage in decentralized states. Data from Indian states and villages illustrate the incentives at the state and local levels that shape the distribution of patronage.
{"title":"Patronage and Decentralization: The Politics of Poverty in India","authors":"Anoop Sadanandan","doi":"10.5129/001041512798837996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041512798837996","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralization advances patronage politics in distinct ways. First, in decentralized states both central and local politicians distribute patronage to enhance their political support. Second, local elections reveal information to central leaders about the geographic distribution of electorally salient voters. Central leaders can use this information to target particularistic benefits to these voters. Third, elected local politicians have individual strategies to distribute patronage, in spite of or in addition to the clientelistic strategies of the political parties they represent. Evidence from India indicates that decentralization has contributed to more extensive distribution of patronage in decentralized states. Data from Indian states and villages illustrate the incentives at the state and local levels that shape the distribution of patronage.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131020497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the scale and composition of illicit financial flows from the 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Illicit financial flows involve the cross-border transfer of the proceeds of corruption, trade in contraband goods, criminal activities and tax evasion. In recent years, considerable interest has arisen over the extent to which such flows may have a detrimental impact on development and governance in both developed and developing countries alike.This issue has been recognized by the UN as important for development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Illicit capital flight, where it occurs, is a major hindrance to the mobilization of domestic resources for development. In many cases, it significantly reduces the volume of resources available for investment in the MDGs and productive capacities. Through theUnited Nations, the international community has committed to strengthen national and multilateral efforts to address it. As the deadline for achievement of the MDGs draws closer, it is vital understand more about the nature of this problem and to explore possible policy solutions, especially for those countries furthest off-track towards the MDGs.The study’s indicative results find that illicit financial flows from the LDCs have increased from US $9.7 billion in 1990 to US $26.3 billion in 2008 implying an inflation-adjusted rate of increase of 6.2 percent per annum. Conservative (lower-bound) estimates indicate that illicit flows have increased from US $7.9 billion in 1990 to US $20.2 billion in 2008. The top ten exporters of illicit capital account for 63 percent of total outflows from the LDCs while the top 20 account for nearly 83 percent. Trade mispricing accounts for the bulk (65-70 percent) of illicit outflows from the LDCs, and the propensity for mispricing has increased along with increasing external trade. Empirical research on illicit flows indicates that there are three types of factors driving illicit flows — macroeconomic, structural, and governance-related.The ratio of illicit outflows to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averages about 4.8 percent but there is wide variation among LDCs. Of the top 10 countries with the highest illicit flows to GDP ratio, four are small island countries, two are landlocked, and four are neither. In some LDCs, losses through illicit capital flows outpace monies received in official development assistance (ODA).
{"title":"Illicit Financial Flows from the Least Developed Countries: 1990-2008","authors":"D. Kar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2335018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2335018","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the scale and composition of illicit financial flows from the 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Illicit financial flows involve the cross-border transfer of the proceeds of corruption, trade in contraband goods, criminal activities and tax evasion. In recent years, considerable interest has arisen over the extent to which such flows may have a detrimental impact on development and governance in both developed and developing countries alike.This issue has been recognized by the UN as important for development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Illicit capital flight, where it occurs, is a major hindrance to the mobilization of domestic resources for development. In many cases, it significantly reduces the volume of resources available for investment in the MDGs and productive capacities. Through theUnited Nations, the international community has committed to strengthen national and multilateral efforts to address it. As the deadline for achievement of the MDGs draws closer, it is vital understand more about the nature of this problem and to explore possible policy solutions, especially for those countries furthest off-track towards the MDGs.The study’s indicative results find that illicit financial flows from the LDCs have increased from US $9.7 billion in 1990 to US $26.3 billion in 2008 implying an inflation-adjusted rate of increase of 6.2 percent per annum. Conservative (lower-bound) estimates indicate that illicit flows have increased from US $7.9 billion in 1990 to US $20.2 billion in 2008. The top ten exporters of illicit capital account for 63 percent of total outflows from the LDCs while the top 20 account for nearly 83 percent. Trade mispricing accounts for the bulk (65-70 percent) of illicit outflows from the LDCs, and the propensity for mispricing has increased along with increasing external trade. Empirical research on illicit flows indicates that there are three types of factors driving illicit flows — macroeconomic, structural, and governance-related.The ratio of illicit outflows to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averages about 4.8 percent but there is wide variation among LDCs. Of the top 10 countries with the highest illicit flows to GDP ratio, four are small island countries, two are landlocked, and four are neither. In some LDCs, losses through illicit capital flows outpace monies received in official development assistance (ODA).","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"73 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131848028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Catherine Refait-Alexandre, Etienne Farvaque, L. Weill
This study examines the relationship between bank transparency and efficiency. Using a unique data set for Russian banks, we find that transparency is important and that, among the dimensions of transparency, the transparency in board and management structure and process represents the most significant determinant. These results are controlled for size effects, the structure of liabilities, the structure of assets, and nonperforming loans. This highlights the role of transparency in improving efficiency, particularly in transition economies.
{"title":"Are Transparent Banks More Efficient? Evidence from Russia","authors":"Catherine Refait-Alexandre, Etienne Farvaque, L. Weill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1792605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1792605","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between bank transparency and efficiency. Using a unique data set for Russian banks, we find that transparency is important and that, among the dimensions of transparency, the transparency in board and management structure and process represents the most significant determinant. These results are controlled for size effects, the structure of liabilities, the structure of assets, and nonperforming loans. This highlights the role of transparency in improving efficiency, particularly in transition economies.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129056422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper describes how the gaming of society’s rules by corporations contributes to the problem of institutional corruption in the world of business. “Gaming” in its various forms involves the use of technically legal means to subvert the intent of society’s rules in order to gain advantage over rivals, maximize reported earnings, maintain high credit ratings, preserve access to capital on favorable terms, and reap personal rewards - just mention several possible motives. It is one of the most corrosive forms of institutional corruption in business. “Institutional corruption” refers to company-sanctioned behavior and relationships that may be lawful but either harm the public interest or weaken the capacity of the institution to achieve its primary purposes. The most salient consequence of institutional corruption is diminished public trust in the governance of the institution. In this paper, I describe the twin phenomena of gaming and institutional corruption - and how the former contributes to the latter, often with the support of professional advisors at law and auditing firms. I illustrate these phenomena with examples from Enron, which (apart from outright fraud) pursued one of the greatest gaming strategies of all time. I also point to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act as an excellent source of clinical data pertaining to gaming in a more contemporary setting. I then discuss how gaming and other trust-destroying behavior have been encouraged by the short-term decision-making horizons of both corporate executives and managers of large investment funds, how those time horizons are largely driven by ways in which the performance of operating executives and investment fund managers is measured and rewarded, and how the directors of these entities become complicit in the gaming of society’s rules and the spreading of institutional corruption. I end by suggesting possible remedies for curbing the ill effects of continued gaming of society’s rules and restoring much needed public trust in the offending institutions.
{"title":"Lawful But Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector","authors":"Malcolm S. Salter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1726004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1726004","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes how the gaming of society’s rules by corporations contributes to the problem of institutional corruption in the world of business. “Gaming” in its various forms involves the use of technically legal means to subvert the intent of society’s rules in order to gain advantage over rivals, maximize reported earnings, maintain high credit ratings, preserve access to capital on favorable terms, and reap personal rewards - just mention several possible motives. It is one of the most corrosive forms of institutional corruption in business. “Institutional corruption” refers to company-sanctioned behavior and relationships that may be lawful but either harm the public interest or weaken the capacity of the institution to achieve its primary purposes. The most salient consequence of institutional corruption is diminished public trust in the governance of the institution. In this paper, I describe the twin phenomena of gaming and institutional corruption - and how the former contributes to the latter, often with the support of professional advisors at law and auditing firms. I illustrate these phenomena with examples from Enron, which (apart from outright fraud) pursued one of the greatest gaming strategies of all time. I also point to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act as an excellent source of clinical data pertaining to gaming in a more contemporary setting. I then discuss how gaming and other trust-destroying behavior have been encouraged by the short-term decision-making horizons of both corporate executives and managers of large investment funds, how those time horizons are largely driven by ways in which the performance of operating executives and investment fund managers is measured and rewarded, and how the directors of these entities become complicit in the gaming of society’s rules and the spreading of institutional corruption. I end by suggesting possible remedies for curbing the ill effects of continued gaming of society’s rules and restoring much needed public trust in the offending institutions.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116004163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accounting fraud and many other forms of fraud and corruption are occurring around the globe. Alternative strategies that are based on sound research-based findings from different situations are needed if there is to be a systematic reduction in the occurrence of these forms of fraud. This research note introduces a topical research issue in the area of fraud risk factors and auditing standards in relation to different forms of fraud, and models of fraudulent behaviour, and identifies a more scientific approach that can be used to empirically examine these issues. It also calls for the future replication of this empirical research in another environment to extend the relevance of the developed model to a broader context. This research note outlines the background to this research issue, research problems and hypotheses, justification for the research, definitions, a proposed scientifically based research methodology and recommendations.
{"title":"Fraud Risk Factors and Auditing Standards: A Call for the Replication of Empirical Research in an Islamic Environment","authors":"Tumpal Wagner Sitorus, Don R Scott","doi":"10.12785/aja/130104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12785/aja/130104","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting fraud and many other forms of fraud and corruption are occurring around the globe. Alternative strategies that are based on sound research-based findings from different situations are needed if there is to be a systematic reduction in the occurrence of these forms of fraud. This research note introduces a topical research issue in the area of fraud risk factors and auditing standards in relation to different forms of fraud, and models of fraudulent behaviour, and identifies a more scientific approach that can be used to empirically examine these issues. It also calls for the future replication of this empirical research in another environment to extend the relevance of the developed model to a broader context. This research note outlines the background to this research issue, research problems and hypotheses, justification for the research, definitions, a proposed scientifically based research methodology and recommendations.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121856393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corruption in higher education is a newly emerging topic in the field of education research. Some aspects of corruption in education have been addressed in the resent works by Eckstein (2003), Hallak and Poisson (2002, 2007), Heyneman (2004, 2007, 2008), Noah & Eckstein (2001), Osipian (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), Segal (2004), and Washburn (2005). However, the rigorous systematic research is lacking. This paper considers corruption in higher education in the media, following publications in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation. It addresses the differences in forms of corruption across the nations pointing to how exactly they differ and why. Major findings point to the following: some forms of corruption are region-specific while others are universal; types of corruption are connected to the characteristics of the national systems; the general trend in the media attention reflects growing concern about corruption in academia; in the US more attention is now paid to fraud, plagiarism and cheating, while in Russia to bribery in admissions. The findings help to determine which aspects of corruption in higher education should be given more consideration in the future research and which ones might be prioritized, as well as how the national systems of higher education can be improved.
{"title":"Corruption in Higher Education: US, Russia, UK","authors":"Ararat L. Osipian","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1540714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1540714","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption in higher education is a newly emerging topic in the field of education research. Some aspects of corruption in education have been addressed in the resent works by Eckstein (2003), Hallak and Poisson (2002, 2007), Heyneman (2004, 2007, 2008), Noah & Eckstein (2001), Osipian (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), Segal (2004), and Washburn (2005). However, the rigorous systematic research is lacking. This paper considers corruption in higher education in the media, following publications in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation. It addresses the differences in forms of corruption across the nations pointing to how exactly they differ and why. Major findings point to the following: some forms of corruption are region-specific while others are universal; types of corruption are connected to the characteristics of the national systems; the general trend in the media attention reflects growing concern about corruption in academia; in the US more attention is now paid to fraud, plagiarism and cheating, while in Russia to bribery in admissions. The findings help to determine which aspects of corruption in higher education should be given more consideration in the future research and which ones might be prioritized, as well as how the national systems of higher education can be improved.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129738851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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