The political events of the late 1980s, as well as the results of the Round Table negotiations, needed their formal confirmation in the Constitution in order to secure their durability. During the political transformation in the years 1989–1991, there were seven amendments of the Constitution of 1952 adopted, out of which the first two were particularly important. The first amendment of April 1989 restored, among others, the office of the President as a head of state and the Senate, as well as established the National Council of the Judiciary as the body protecting independent courts and judges. The second amendment of December 1989 introduced the fundamental principles such as a democratic state ruled by law, social justice, political pluralism, freedom of economic activity and property protection. The current Constitution of 1997 has been amended only twice – in 2006 in regard to the extradition of a Polish citizen (art. 55 par. 3) and in 2009 in regard to passive electoral rights (art. 99 par. 3). As shown by the political experience after 2015, the procedure for adopting the amendment to the Constitution set out in art. 235 is extremely difficult, which has led to a situation in which it is bypassed and the content of constitutional provisions is changed by ordinary provisions.
{"title":"Constitutional reforms in Poland after 7 April 1989","authors":"Anna Rytel-Warzocha","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.006","url":null,"abstract":"The political events of the late 1980s, as well as the results of the Round Table negotiations, needed their formal confirmation in the Constitution in order to secure their durability. During the political transformation in the years 1989–1991, there were seven amendments of the Constitution of 1952 adopted, out of which the first two were particularly important. The first amendment of April 1989 restored, among others, the office of the President as a head of state and the Senate, as well as established the National Council of the Judiciary as the body protecting independent courts and judges. The second amendment of December 1989 introduced the fundamental principles such as a democratic state ruled by law, social justice, political pluralism, freedom of economic activity and property protection. The current Constitution of 1997 has been amended only twice – in 2006 in regard to the extradition of a Polish citizen (art. 55 par. 3) and in 2009 in regard to passive electoral rights (art. 99 par. 3). As shown by the political experience after 2015, the procedure for adopting the amendment to the Constitution set out in art. 235 is extremely difficult, which has led to a situation in which it is bypassed and the content of constitutional provisions is changed by ordinary provisions.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48198983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dzisiaj z wdzięcznością dedykujemy pamięci Doktora Stanisława Augusta Morawskiego kolejny tom kolokwium prawniczego polsko-włoskiego, odbytego w Mrągowie, pięknym mieście na Mazurach. Kolokwium, którego idea powstała przy Jego udziale i które, obok licznych Jego osiągnięć w Polsce i w Italii, stanowi kolejne dzieło przynoszące powszechny pożytek.
{"title":"Stanisław August Morawski w mojej pamięci","authors":"Z. Witkowski","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.002","url":null,"abstract":"Dzisiaj z wdzięcznością dedykujemy pamięci Doktora Stanisława Augusta Morawskiego kolejny tom kolokwium prawniczego polsko-włoskiego, odbytego w Mrągowie, pięknym mieście na Mazurach. Kolokwium, którego idea powstała przy Jego udziale i które, obok licznych Jego osiągnięć w Polsce i w Italii, stanowi kolejne dzieło przynoszące powszechny pożytek.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66714935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eternity clauses can be defined as constitutional provisions or constitutional principles that are immune from amendment. The eternity clauses should be understood as protecting the core of fundamental constitutional principles and therefore leaving space for evolutive interpretation of these principles. Therefore, these clauses function as barriers or “stop lines” to constitutional amendment. Legal scholars observe that eternity clauses can aspire to protect two types of values serving as foundations of the state’s constitutional identity. In the first group unmodifiable provisions protect such universal values as democracy, natural and inalienable human rights, or the principle of the rule of law. The principles in the second group, by contrast, protect specific values reflecting the special characteristic features of a given state’s constitutional identity. Those could include federalism, the role of religion in the state, or the principle of separation of the powers. The analysis of the constitutional regulations and the case-law of the Constitutional Courts should allow us to answer whether the eternity clauses are a realistic or merely an illusory way of protecting the state’s constitutional identity?
{"title":"Eternity clause – a realistic or merely an illusory way of protecting the state’s constitutional identity?","authors":"Maciej Serowaniec, Z. Witkowski","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.012","url":null,"abstract":"Eternity clauses can be defined as constitutional provisions or constitutional principles that are immune from amendment. The eternity clauses should be understood as protecting the core of fundamental constitutional principles and therefore leaving space for evolutive interpretation of these principles. Therefore, these clauses function as barriers or “stop lines” to constitutional amendment. Legal scholars observe that eternity clauses can aspire to protect two types of values serving as foundations of the state’s constitutional identity. In the first group unmodifiable provisions protect such universal values as democracy, natural and inalienable human rights, or the principle of the rule of law. The principles in the second group, by contrast, protect specific values reflecting the special characteristic features of a given state’s constitutional identity. Those could include federalism, the role of religion in the state, or the principle of separation of the powers. The analysis of the constitutional regulations and the case-law of the Constitutional Courts should allow us to answer whether the eternity clauses are a realistic or merely an illusory way of protecting the state’s constitutional identity?","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66715014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present paper focuses on the prospects for and the directions of possible amendments to the current Constitution of the Republic of Poland with particular focus on local government. The authors discuss the scope of the recommended amendments and look for an answer to the question of whether an amendment to the Polish Constitution is needed or, instead, a new Constitution should be adopted.
{"title":"Perspectives and directions of the desired changes to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland with particular focus on local government","authors":"Stanisław Bułajewski, Monika Giżyńska","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.015","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper focuses on the prospects for and the directions of possible amendments to the current Constitution of the Republic of Poland with particular focus on local government. The authors discuss the scope of the recommended amendments and look for an answer to the question of whether an amendment to the Polish Constitution is needed or, instead, a new Constitution should be adopted.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66715043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The subject of considerations in this study will be the issue of the consequences of introducing the provisions of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant into the legal order of the Republic of Poland, including the relationship of these provisions to the constitutional prohibition on the extradition of Polish citizens. In the opinion of the Criminal Law Codification Committee at the Minister of Justice, it follows that the implementation of framework decisions by a Member State is subject to the same rules and principles as the implementation of directives by a Member State. A Member State cannot justify the non-implementation of a directive by domestic law (including constitutional provisions). However, the issue of the effect of the framework decision is not directly related to the implementation (implementation) of that decision by a Member State, as it concerns the process of applying Community law by the courts of a Member State. The statement that the framework decision does not have direct effect is therefore irrelevant for the assessment of the compliance of the Polish provisions introducing the European arrest warrant with the provisions of the Polish Constitution. As a consequence, the issue of EAW implementation may be properly resolved by amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
{"title":"Harmonization of the national laws of EU Member States and the necessity to amend the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997","authors":"Dobrochna Ossowska-Salamonowicz, Bogna Przybyszewska-Szter","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.016","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of considerations in this study will be the issue of the consequences of introducing the provisions of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant into the legal order of the Republic of Poland, including the relationship of these provisions to the constitutional prohibition on the extradition of Polish citizens. In the opinion of the Criminal Law Codification Committee at the Minister of Justice, it follows that the implementation of framework decisions by a Member State is subject to the same rules and principles as the implementation of directives by a Member State. A Member State cannot justify the non-implementation of a directive by domestic law (including constitutional provisions). However, the issue of the effect of the framework decision is not directly related to the implementation (implementation) of that decision by a Member State, as it concerns the process of applying Community law by the courts of a Member State. The statement that the framework decision does not have direct effect is therefore irrelevant for the assessment of the compliance of the Polish provisions introducing the European arrest warrant with the provisions of the Polish Constitution. As a consequence, the issue of EAW implementation may be properly resolved by amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66715067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L’articolo esamina in primo luogo le tradizionali caratteristiche dello Statuto albertino quale Carta costituzionale ‘ottriata, perpetua ed irrevocabile’; in un secondo momento, esso evidenzia come, nonostante tale formale ‘fissità’ e l’assenza di una sua autonoma legittimazione istituzionale, lo Statuto albertino vivrà diverse fasi evolutive, proprio perché alla base del suo processo di adozione vi è quel patto politico esplicitamente stretto tra la Corona e tutto il movimento liberale. Proprio la ‘forma di governo’ e le sue evoluzioni – secondo l’Autore – rappresentano una possibile ‘lente’ per individuare alcune ‘stagioni della Carta statutaria: così nell’articolo si parla, all’inizio della fase statutaria, di una ‘stagione’ indubbiamente incentrata intorno alla logica di funzionamento propria del regime monarchico-costituzionale e nella quale prevale la volontà del Re. Una seconda ‘stagione’ della forma di governo è quella che evolve verso il modello parlamentare, nella quale però solo in parte si realizzò il consolidamento del Potere Legislativo quanto piuttosto il rafforzamento del Potere Esecutivo sotto il duplice versante dell’organizzazione e degli strumenti normativi adottati. In conclusione, l’articolo intende evidenziare come le ‘stagioni’ della Carta albertina non siano state lineari ma forse piuttosto individuabili attraverso una sorta di stop and go back, tra tentativi di distaccarsi dal testo formale e tendenze ad adottare prassi e interpretazioni più coerenti con le previsioni statutarie.
{"title":"Lo Statuto albertino e il ‘paradosso’ delle riforme: brevi cenni sulle evoluzioni di una Carta „ottriata, perpetua ed irrevocabile”","authors":"Piero Gambale","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.004","url":null,"abstract":"L’articolo esamina in primo luogo le tradizionali caratteristiche dello Statuto albertino quale Carta costituzionale ‘ottriata, perpetua ed irrevocabile’; in un secondo momento, esso evidenzia come, nonostante tale formale ‘fissità’ e l’assenza di una sua autonoma legittimazione istituzionale, lo Statuto albertino vivrà diverse fasi evolutive, proprio perché alla base del suo processo di adozione vi è quel patto politico esplicitamente stretto tra la Corona e tutto il movimento liberale. Proprio la ‘forma di governo’ e le sue evoluzioni – secondo l’Autore – rappresentano una possibile ‘lente’ per individuare alcune ‘stagioni della Carta statutaria: così nell’articolo si parla, all’inizio della fase statutaria, di una ‘stagione’ indubbiamente incentrata intorno alla logica di funzionamento propria del regime monarchico-costituzionale e nella quale prevale la volontà del Re. Una seconda ‘stagione’ della forma di governo è quella che evolve verso il modello parlamentare, nella quale però solo in parte si realizzò il consolidamento del Potere Legislativo quanto piuttosto il rafforzamento del Potere Esecutivo sotto il duplice versante dell’organizzazione e degli strumenti normativi adottati. In conclusione, l’articolo intende evidenziare come le ‘stagioni’ della Carta albertina non siano state lineari ma forse piuttosto individuabili attraverso una sorta di stop and go back, tra tentativi di distaccarsi dal testo formale e tendenze ad adottare prassi e interpretazioni più coerenti con le previsioni statutarie.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66714609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W styczniu 1919 r. odbyły się wybory do Sejmu Ustawodawczego, którego naczelnym zadaniem było przygotowanie i uchwalenie konstytucji. Konstytucja została ostatecznie uchwalona przez Sejm Ustawodawczy w dniu 17 marca 1921 r., stąd przeszła do historii jako Konstytucja marcowa. Duży wpływ na rozwiązania konstytucyjne wprowadzone do polskiej ustawy zasadniczej miały wzorce francuskiej konstytucji z roku 1875. Konstytucja wprowadzała system parlamentarno-gabinetowy. Nowelizacja konstytucji dokonana w sierpniu 1926 r. była odpowiedzią na krytykę dotychczasowego modelu konstytucyjnego i zmierzała do zwiększenia kompetencji władzy wykonawczej. Konstytucja marcowa została ostatecznie zastąpiona przez nową ustawę konstytucyjną z 23 kwietnia 1935 r. Nowa ustawa zasadnicza, zwana Konstytucją kwietniową, była wyrazem dążenia obozu rządowego do dalszego wzmocnienia władzy wykonawczej i centralizacji kluczowych kompetencji w urzędzie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie procedur zmian ustawy zasadniczej przyjętych w polskich konstytucjach okresu międzywojennego.
{"title":"Tryb zmiany konstytucji polskich z 1921 i 1935 r. – geneza, interpretacja, praktyka","authors":"A. Szmyt","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.003","url":null,"abstract":"W styczniu 1919 r. odbyły się wybory do Sejmu Ustawodawczego, którego naczelnym zadaniem było przygotowanie i uchwalenie konstytucji. Konstytucja została ostatecznie uchwalona przez Sejm Ustawodawczy w dniu 17 marca 1921 r., stąd przeszła do historii jako Konstytucja marcowa. Duży wpływ na rozwiązania konstytucyjne wprowadzone do polskiej ustawy zasadniczej miały wzorce francuskiej konstytucji z roku 1875. Konstytucja wprowadzała system parlamentarno-gabinetowy. Nowelizacja konstytucji dokonana w sierpniu 1926 r. była odpowiedzią na krytykę dotychczasowego modelu konstytucyjnego i zmierzała do zwiększenia kompetencji władzy wykonawczej. Konstytucja marcowa została ostatecznie zastąpiona przez nową ustawę konstytucyjną z 23 kwietnia 1935 r. Nowa ustawa zasadnicza, zwana Konstytucją kwietniową, była wyrazem dążenia obozu rządowego do dalszego wzmocnienia władzy wykonawczej i centralizacji kluczowych kompetencji w urzędzie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie procedur zmian ustawy zasadniczej przyjętych w polskich konstytucjach okresu międzywojennego.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66714540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lo Statuto del Regno di Sardegna, concesso nel 1848, non diceva nulla circa la procedura per la sua revisione. Pertanto, fu comunemente ritenuto che per modificare il testo originario fosse sufficiente la procedura legislativa ordinaria. Pur nondimeno, innovazioni del massimo rilievo ebbero piuttosto luogo senza alcun atto formale. In alcuni casi queste andavano ben oltre le previsioni dello Statuto, mentre in altri casi addirittura le contraddicevano, con riguardo a questioni essenziali. Il testo originario divenne così parte di un ordine costituzionale de facto alquanto incerto, cedevole e rimodellabile. Ciò ebbe molte conseguenze rimarchevoli e indesiderabili. Quando il fascismo prese il potere negli anni Venti dello scorso secolo, il sistema politico italiano subì uno shock profondo, che tuttavia fu ritenuto compatibile con la costituzione de facto, come plasmata e applicata in precedenza dagli attori politici rilevanti, anzitutto dalla monarchia. Poi i fascisti al governo puntarono a ulteriori alterazioni, devastanti per i principi liberali e le istituzioni rappresentative, ma fecero attenzione ad introdurle attraverso atti formalmente legislativi. Così facendo, dimostravano un’obbedienza esteriore allo Statuto. Se il fascismo fosse rimasto al potere per più tempo, secondo quelle che erano sue intenzioni dichiarate sarebbe forse riuscito a trasformare il sistema politico italiano in un totalitarismo. Al riguardo rilevano il modo in cui erano stati concepiti lo Statuto e la sua revisione nell’Italia prefascista, nonché il ruolo effettivamente svolto dalla monarchia durante il periodo fascista.
{"title":"La „flessibilità” dello Statuto albertino e il regime fascista","authors":"Antonio La Spina","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2021.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2021.005","url":null,"abstract":"Lo Statuto del Regno di Sardegna, concesso nel 1848, non diceva nulla circa la procedura per la sua revisione. Pertanto, fu comunemente ritenuto che per modificare il testo originario fosse sufficiente la procedura legislativa ordinaria. Pur nondimeno, innovazioni del massimo rilievo ebbero piuttosto luogo senza alcun atto formale. In alcuni casi queste andavano ben oltre le previsioni dello Statuto, mentre in altri casi addirittura le contraddicevano, con riguardo a questioni essenziali. Il testo originario divenne così parte di un ordine costituzionale de facto alquanto incerto, cedevole e rimodellabile. Ciò ebbe molte conseguenze rimarchevoli e indesiderabili. Quando il fascismo prese il potere negli anni Venti dello scorso secolo, il sistema politico italiano subì uno shock profondo, che tuttavia fu ritenuto compatibile con la costituzione de facto, come plasmata e applicata in precedenza dagli attori politici rilevanti, anzitutto dalla monarchia. Poi i fascisti al governo puntarono a ulteriori alterazioni, devastanti per i principi liberali e le istituzioni rappresentative, ma fecero attenzione ad introdurle attraverso atti formalmente legislativi. Così facendo, dimostravano un’obbedienza esteriore allo Statuto. Se il fascismo fosse rimasto al potere per più tempo, secondo quelle che erano sue intenzioni dichiarate sarebbe forse riuscito a trasformare il sistema politico italiano in un totalitarismo. Al riguardo rilevano il modo in cui erano stati concepiti lo Statuto e la sua revisione nell’Italia prefascista, nonché il ruolo effettivamente svolto dalla monarchia durante il periodo fascista.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66714686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Freedom of speech and freedom of conscience and religion are essential human rights which are protected, among others, by the ECHR. The number of the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions on wearing religious symbols (in a form of a Christian cross, a Muslim veil or a headscarf) at work remains small. Nevertheless, some interpretation guidelines can be identified in particular on how to ensure that an interference with Article 9 of the 1950 Convention has to be proportionate and “necessary in a democratic society”. Owing to a lack of European-wide consensus on states’ approach to religion, a state exercises a wide margin of appreciation. Nevertheless, a state always has to take into account rights of the others, in particular those who are dependent on (e.g. patience at hospital) employees or are prone to an impact of employees (e.g. pupils and students). Thus, dress codes confirming a secular nature and religious neutrality of a State not always violates Article 9 of the ECHR. Rules apply mainly to public bodies, but a state liability may also be found to private company’s cases. Details of each employment contract and of the employee’s conduct have to be always analysed. The dress code rules applied to man and women and irrespective to their religion, so the Court has not declared it to be discriminatory because of sex or religion of employees.
{"title":"Wearing religious symbols at work in the ECtHR’s judgments","authors":"P. Sadowski","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2020.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2020.007","url":null,"abstract":"Freedom of speech and freedom of conscience and religion are essential human rights which are protected, among others, by the ECHR. The number of the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions on wearing religious symbols (in a form of a Christian cross, a Muslim veil or a headscarf) at work remains small. Nevertheless, some interpretation guidelines can be identified in particular on how to ensure that an interference with Article 9 of the 1950 Convention has to be proportionate and “necessary in a democratic society”. Owing to a lack of European-wide consensus on states’ approach to religion, a state exercises a wide margin of appreciation. Nevertheless, a state always has to take into account rights of the others, in particular those who are dependent on (e.g. patience at hospital) employees or are prone to an impact of employees (e.g. pupils and students). Thus, dress codes confirming a secular nature and religious neutrality of a State not always violates Article 9 of the ECHR. Rules apply mainly to public bodies, but a state liability may also be found to private company’s cases. Details of each employment contract and of the employee’s conduct have to be always analysed. The dress code rules applied to man and women and irrespective to their religion, so the Court has not declared it to be discriminatory because of sex or religion of employees.","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47827163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A pandemic can provide a textbook example for the restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms. Romania has decided to derogate from the application of the European Convention on Human Rights during the state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The questions discussed in this paper are whether the derogation of Romania fulfils the criteria established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. If the answer is affirmative: does it have any effect on the inherent limitations on the freedom of expression as stated in art. 10 of ECHR?
{"title":"Romania: derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights – freedom of expression during public emergency","authors":"Mónika Márton","doi":"10.12775/tsp-w.2020.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/tsp-w.2020.003","url":null,"abstract":"A pandemic can provide a textbook example for the restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms. Romania has decided to derogate from the application of the European Convention on Human Rights during the state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The questions discussed in this paper are whether the derogation of Romania fulfils the criteria established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. If the answer is affirmative: does it have any effect on the inherent limitations on the freedom of expression as stated in art. 10 of ECHR?","PeriodicalId":32741,"journal":{"name":"Torunskie Studia PolskoWloskie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48544854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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