The tax treatment of carried interest has become a notorious bete noire for many politicians and some academicians and practitioners. Both 2016 presidential candidates denounced the current tax treatment and vowed to change it. President Obama described the current treatment as a “tax loophole” which should be closed. Others have also characterized the current tax treatment as an abusive loophole. It is the thesis of this article that those criticisms are unfounded. To the contrary, the current tax treatment accords with sound tax policy and is proper and appropriate. Given the broad approval that attended the attacks on carried interest, a reader might well be skeptical of our claim; but if you will bear with us, we are convinced that we can sustain it.
{"title":"The Fallacious Objections to the Tax Treatment of Carried Interest","authors":"Douglas A. Kahn, J. Kahn","doi":"10.5744/ftr.2017.1051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5744/ftr.2017.1051","url":null,"abstract":"The tax treatment of carried interest has become a notorious bete noire for many politicians and some academicians and practitioners. Both 2016 presidential candidates denounced the current tax treatment and vowed to change it. President Obama described the current treatment as a “tax loophole” which should be closed. Others have also characterized the current tax treatment as an abusive loophole. It is the thesis of this article that those criticisms are unfounded. To the contrary, the current tax treatment accords with sound tax policy and is proper and appropriate. Given the broad approval that attended the attacks on carried interest, a reader might well be skeptical of our claim; but if you will bear with us, we are convinced that we can sustain it.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115386597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our study analyzes the influence of public disclosure of group structures in Exhibit 21 on the tax aggressiveness of U.S. multinational firms. Several U.S. multinational enterprises have removed a substantial number of subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 since 2008. Our analysis suggests that firms that decided to substantially reduce the number of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in their Exhibit 21 avoid significantly more taxes compared to firms that did not change disclosure. Our results suggest that publicly disclosed country-by-country information could influence MNEs’ tax avoidance behavior.
{"title":"Public Disclosure of Foreign Subsidiaries and International Tax Avoidance","authors":"Tanja Herbert, Pia Olligs, Michael Overesch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2640552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2640552","url":null,"abstract":"Our study analyzes the influence of public disclosure of group structures in Exhibit 21 on the tax aggressiveness of U.S. multinational firms. Several U.S. multinational enterprises have removed a substantial number of subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 since 2008. Our analysis suggests that firms that decided to substantially reduce the number of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in their Exhibit 21 avoid significantly more taxes compared to firms that did not change disclosure. Our results suggest that publicly disclosed country-by-country information could influence MNEs’ tax avoidance behavior.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123544546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper demonstrates that, notwithstanding conventional statutory and discretionary remedies, practical injustice nevertheless prevails whenever the Commissioner of Taxation makes a revised private ruling.
{"title":"Practical Injustice in the Context of Private Tax Rulings","authors":"J. Azzi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3270092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3270092","url":null,"abstract":"This paper demonstrates that, notwithstanding conventional statutory and discretionary remedies, practical injustice nevertheless prevails whenever the Commissioner of Taxation makes a revised private ruling.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"473 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122180460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Poniatowski, M. Bonch-Osmolovskiy, Misha V. Belkindas
This analysis serves as the Final Report for the DG TAXUD Project 2015/CC/131, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States”, which is a follow up to the reports published in 2013, 2014, and 2015. In this report, we present estimates of the VAT Gap and the Policy Gap for the year 2014, as well as revised estimates for the years 2010-2013 due the transmission of Eurostat national accounts from the ESA95 to the ESA10. This update covers Croatia, which was not included in the previous updates. While it was hoped that the update would also cover Cyprus, it has not been possible due to incomplete national accounts data.The VAT Gap is a measure of VAT compliance and enforcement that provides an estimate of revenue loss due to fraud and evasion, tax avoidance, bankruptcies, financial insolvencies, as well as miscalculations. It is defined as the difference between the amount of VAT collected and the VAT Total Tax Liability (VTTL), which is expressed in the report in both absolute and relative terms. The VTTL is the theoretical tax liability according to tax law, and is estimated using a “top-down” approach. As the capacity and willingness to pay taxes is affected by economic cycles, the reviving 2014 economic situation in the European Union (EU) has, therefore, provided good conditions for narrowing the VAT Gap in EU Member States. The year 2014 saw numerous changes in tax enforcement and monitoring, such as anti-smuggling measures, electronic reporting functionalities, limits on cash transactions and the extension of lists of goods applicable to the reverse VAT charge mechanism. On the other hand, only three EU Member States implemented significant changes in their VAT regimes. Positive economic tailwinds, stable VAT regimes, and measures introduced against tax non-compliance led to a decrease in the relative size of the VAT Gap. In nominal terms, in 2014, the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States amounted to EUR 159.5 billion. The VTTL accounted for EUR 1,136.3 billion, whereas the revenue was EUR 976.9 billion. Expressed as a percent of VTTL, the VAT Gap reached 14.06 percent. As a result, the overall VAT Gap as a percent of the VTTL marked its first decrease since 2011. The EUR 2.5 billion decline of the VAT Gap in 2014 compared to 2013 was equivalent to the decrease of the ratio of the Gap and the VTTL by approximately 0.69 percentage point (in the EU-26).The smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (1.24 percent), Luxembourg (3.80 percent), and Finland (6.92 percent). The largest Gaps were registered in Romania (37.89 percent), Lithuania (36.84 percent), and Malta (35.32 percent). Overall, half of the EU-27 Member States recorded a Gap below 10.4 percent.
{"title":"Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2016 Final Report","authors":"G. Poniatowski, M. Bonch-Osmolovskiy, Misha V. Belkindas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2847658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2847658","url":null,"abstract":"This analysis serves as the Final Report for the DG TAXUD Project 2015/CC/131, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States”, which is a follow up to the reports published in 2013, 2014, and 2015. In this report, we present estimates of the VAT Gap and the Policy Gap for the year 2014, as well as revised estimates for the years 2010-2013 due the transmission of Eurostat national accounts from the ESA95 to the ESA10. This update covers Croatia, which was not included in the previous updates. While it was hoped that the update would also cover Cyprus, it has not been possible due to incomplete national accounts data.The VAT Gap is a measure of VAT compliance and enforcement that provides an estimate of revenue loss due to fraud and evasion, tax avoidance, bankruptcies, financial insolvencies, as well as miscalculations. It is defined as the difference between the amount of VAT collected and the VAT Total Tax Liability (VTTL), which is expressed in the report in both absolute and relative terms. The VTTL is the theoretical tax liability according to tax law, and is estimated using a “top-down” approach. As the capacity and willingness to pay taxes is affected by economic cycles, the reviving 2014 economic situation in the European Union (EU) has, therefore, provided good conditions for narrowing the VAT Gap in EU Member States. The year 2014 saw numerous changes in tax enforcement and monitoring, such as anti-smuggling measures, electronic reporting functionalities, limits on cash transactions and the extension of lists of goods applicable to the reverse VAT charge mechanism. On the other hand, only three EU Member States implemented significant changes in their VAT regimes. Positive economic tailwinds, stable VAT regimes, and measures introduced against tax non-compliance led to a decrease in the relative size of the VAT Gap. In nominal terms, in 2014, the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States amounted to EUR 159.5 billion. The VTTL accounted for EUR 1,136.3 billion, whereas the revenue was EUR 976.9 billion. Expressed as a percent of VTTL, the VAT Gap reached 14.06 percent. As a result, the overall VAT Gap as a percent of the VTTL marked its first decrease since 2011. The EUR 2.5 billion decline of the VAT Gap in 2014 compared to 2013 was equivalent to the decrease of the ratio of the Gap and the VTTL by approximately 0.69 percentage point (in the EU-26).The smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (1.24 percent), Luxembourg (3.80 percent), and Finland (6.92 percent). The largest Gaps were registered in Romania (37.89 percent), Lithuania (36.84 percent), and Malta (35.32 percent). Overall, half of the EU-27 Member States recorded a Gap below 10.4 percent.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128583148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What happens if you combine 20 years worth of lists of expatriates? You find inconsistencies.
如果你把20年的外籍人士名单结合起来,会发生什么?你会发现矛盾。
{"title":"The Escape Hatch (Expatriation): Curiosities in the Data","authors":"E. Fraser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2835897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835897","url":null,"abstract":"What happens if you combine 20 years worth of lists of expatriates? You find inconsistencies.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126713004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anne L. Alstott, R. Avi-Yonah, Lily L. Batchelder, Joshua D. Blank, Noel B. Cunningham, Victor Fleischer, Ari D. Glogower, David Kamin, Mitchell A. Kane, Sally Katzen, Edward D. Kleinbard, Michael S. Knoll, Rebecca M. Kysar, Zachary D. Liscow, Daniel N. Shaviro, John P. Steines, David A. Super, Clint Wallace, G. Yin
Amici file this brief to provide the Ninth Circuit with relevant background information on the basics of transfer pricing and cost-sharing agreements, and to advance four key points. First, the 2003 cost-sharing regulation at issue in this case is substantively reasonable under the commensurate-with-income standard. Although we agree with the government that this standard can be harmonized with the standard that generally governs Treasury’s rulemaking authority under section 482 (known as the arm’s-length standard), the focus of our brief is the commensurate-with-income authority. Properly understood, that authority provides a sufficient independent basis for the regulation. Indeed, the legislative history practically mandates that stock-based compensation be accounted for in cost-sharing agreements.Second, by requiring that Treasury rely exclusively on its commensurate-with-income authority in order to avail itself of that authority, the Tax Court misunderstood a basic principle of administrative law. To be sure, a court “must judge the propriety of [an agency’s action] solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.” S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). But a court must “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). And here, the cost-sharing regulation may be reasonably understood as an exercise of Treasury’s commensurate-with-income authority, and both the notice of proposed rulemaking and the preamble to the final cost-sharing regulation cited this authority.Third, even if this Court finds that Treasury’s explanation of the cost-sharing regulation is inadequate, the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that any error affected the procedure used or the substance of the decision reached. But it cannot carry this burden, because Treasury considered the comments submitted and responded accordingly. And Treasury reached a substantively reasonable conclusion that addresses the concerns that led Congress to create the commensurate-with-income standard in the first place. Therefore, at a minimum, this Court should remand the regulation to Treasury without vacating it, so that Treasury has an opportunity to clarify its explanation.Finally, invalidating the regulation would have significant policy consequences, resulting in billions of dollars of lost tax revenue due to this regulation alone. It would upset the past decade of cost-sharing agreements and adversely impact tax administration in a manner that reaches far beyond the regulation at issue here, at significant cost to the public fisc.
Amici提交了这份摘要,向第九巡回法院提供了有关转让定价和成本分担协议基础知识的相关背景信息,并提出了四个关键点。首先,本案中争议的2003年成本分摊规定在与收入相称的标准下实质上是合理的。尽管我们同意政府的观点,认为这一标准可以与财政部根据第482条制定的规则制定权力的一般标准(称为“一臂之距标准”)相协调,但我们简报的重点是与收入相称的权力。正确理解,该权力为监管提供了充分的独立基础。事实上,立法历史实际上要求在成本分担协议中考虑基于股票的薪酬。其次,通过要求财政部完全依赖其与收入相称的权力来利用这一权力,税务法院误解了行政法的一个基本原则。可以肯定的是,法院“必须仅根据该机构援引的理由来判断(该机构行为)是否恰当”。sec诉Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,196(1947)。但法院必须“支持一个不太理想的明确的决定,如果机构的路径可以合理地辨别出来。”机动车辆Mfrs美国法院起诉州立农场公司案。汽车。Ins。法院,463 U.S. 29, 43(1983)。在这里,成本分摊法规可以合理地理解为财政部与收入相称的权力的行使,拟议规则制定的通知和最终成本分摊法规的序言都引用了这一权力。第三,即使本院认定财政部对成本分摊规则的解释不充分,纳税人也有责任证明任何错误都影响了所使用的程序或所达成的决定的实质。但它不能承担这个负担,因为财政部考虑了提交的意见并做出了相应的回应。财政部得出了一个相当合理的结论,解决了导致国会首先制定与收入相称标准的担忧。因此,本法院至少应将该规定退回财政部而不予以撤销,以便财政部有机会澄清其解释。最后,使该规定无效将产生重大的政策后果,仅这一规定就会导致数十亿美元的税收损失。它将颠覆过去十年的成本分摊协议,并对税收管理产生不利影响,其影响远远超出了这里所讨论的监管范围,对公共财政造成重大损失。
{"title":"Ninth Circuit Amicus Brief of 19 Tax Law and Administrative Law Professors, Altera v. Commissioner, Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497","authors":"Anne L. Alstott, R. Avi-Yonah, Lily L. Batchelder, Joshua D. Blank, Noel B. Cunningham, Victor Fleischer, Ari D. Glogower, David Kamin, Mitchell A. Kane, Sally Katzen, Edward D. Kleinbard, Michael S. Knoll, Rebecca M. Kysar, Zachary D. Liscow, Daniel N. Shaviro, John P. Steines, David A. Super, Clint Wallace, G. Yin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2805432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2805432","url":null,"abstract":"Amici file this brief to provide the Ninth Circuit with relevant background information on the basics of transfer pricing and cost-sharing agreements, and to advance four key points. First, the 2003 cost-sharing regulation at issue in this case is substantively reasonable under the commensurate-with-income standard. Although we agree with the government that this standard can be harmonized with the standard that generally governs Treasury’s rulemaking authority under section 482 (known as the arm’s-length standard), the focus of our brief is the commensurate-with-income authority. Properly understood, that authority provides a sufficient independent basis for the regulation. Indeed, the legislative history practically mandates that stock-based compensation be accounted for in cost-sharing agreements.Second, by requiring that Treasury rely exclusively on its commensurate-with-income authority in order to avail itself of that authority, the Tax Court misunderstood a basic principle of administrative law. To be sure, a court “must judge the propriety of [an agency’s action] solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.” S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). But a court must “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). And here, the cost-sharing regulation may be reasonably understood as an exercise of Treasury’s commensurate-with-income authority, and both the notice of proposed rulemaking and the preamble to the final cost-sharing regulation cited this authority.Third, even if this Court finds that Treasury’s explanation of the cost-sharing regulation is inadequate, the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that any error affected the procedure used or the substance of the decision reached. But it cannot carry this burden, because Treasury considered the comments submitted and responded accordingly. And Treasury reached a substantively reasonable conclusion that addresses the concerns that led Congress to create the commensurate-with-income standard in the first place. Therefore, at a minimum, this Court should remand the regulation to Treasury without vacating it, so that Treasury has an opportunity to clarify its explanation.Finally, invalidating the regulation would have significant policy consequences, resulting in billions of dollars of lost tax revenue due to this regulation alone. It would upset the past decade of cost-sharing agreements and adversely impact tax administration in a manner that reaches far beyond the regulation at issue here, at significant cost to the public fisc.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123679162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Commercial activities in space are going to expand thanks to new game-changing technologies being developed by Space Entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs have pledged to reduce the cost of accessing space, and plan to unlock new horizons for innovative space markets, such as mining space-based resources and space tourism. Signs are showing in Congress of the impact that the space technology phenomenon is having on the U.S. legal system and on other governments' policy decisions worldwide. Realizing the promise of expanding the United States' aerospace economy has raised myriad legal challenges, one of which is the issue of taxation. Thus, there is no time like the present to review the tax rules, at both the federal and the international levels, to ensure the sustainability of a policy that is clearly in the public interest. With the globalization of the world, the dramatically changing economic platforms and with the anticipated BEPS-driven changes to domestic law and double tax treaties once implemented, now might be the right time to rethink the current source rule for space-based income. A space tax regime should be formulated to ultimately prevent the space industry from engaging in the kind of harmful tax avoidance, through profit-shifting to tax havens, that has plagued income from the shipping industry. The space tax regime should also enable to provide some economic certainty (read: return on investment) to the entrepreneurial members of the private sector. This will ensure that they will embrace and promote the Second Space-Age while maintaining the peaceful state of affairs, and encourage the participation of multinational corporations and nongovernmental entities in the exploration of space and its commercial uses. In addition, an effort could be made to coordinate the approach to space-based taxation with the United States' international obligations under the Space law. This is the time to consider that a small step for legislation can be a giant leap towards a broad tax base. Space could very well be the right place to enforce a unique and different tax approach.
{"title":"Tax Infinity & Beyond","authors":"Galya Savir","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2812866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2812866","url":null,"abstract":"Commercial activities in space are going to expand thanks to new game-changing technologies being developed by Space Entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs have pledged to reduce the cost of accessing space, and plan to unlock new horizons for innovative space markets, such as mining space-based resources and space tourism. Signs are showing in Congress of the impact that the space technology phenomenon is having on the U.S. legal system and on other governments' policy decisions worldwide. Realizing the promise of expanding the United States' aerospace economy has raised myriad legal challenges, one of which is the issue of taxation. Thus, there is no time like the present to review the tax rules, at both the federal and the international levels, to ensure the sustainability of a policy that is clearly in the public interest. With the globalization of the world, the dramatically changing economic platforms and with the anticipated BEPS-driven changes to domestic law and double tax treaties once implemented, now might be the right time to rethink the current source rule for space-based income. A space tax regime should be formulated to ultimately prevent the space industry from engaging in the kind of harmful tax avoidance, through profit-shifting to tax havens, that has plagued income from the shipping industry. The space tax regime should also enable to provide some economic certainty (read: return on investment) to the entrepreneurial members of the private sector. This will ensure that they will embrace and promote the Second Space-Age while maintaining the peaceful state of affairs, and encourage the participation of multinational corporations and nongovernmental entities in the exploration of space and its commercial uses. In addition, an effort could be made to coordinate the approach to space-based taxation with the United States' international obligations under the Space law. This is the time to consider that a small step for legislation can be a giant leap towards a broad tax base. Space could very well be the right place to enforce a unique and different tax approach.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117207430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I learned most of what I know about being a lawyer, a teacher, and a scholar from Professor Douglas Kahn. For four months in the spring of 1997, Doug mesmerized and terrified me in the class that I feared would be my academic downfall—Partnership Taxation. In the years that followed, Doug has been a mentor and friend, encouraging and supporting me at every stage of my professional career. And my experience is not unique: Doug has inspired generations of law students in just the same way. There is no adequate way to thank Doug for everything he has given to students like me who have been lucky enough to sit in one of his classrooms. Doug is a force of nature—inspiring, challenging, and unquestionably dedicated to his students. Doug is the reason I became a tax lawyer, and he is also the reason that I became a law professor. Every day that I walk into a classroom, I try to do for my students what Doug did for me nineteen years ago. As a result, “thank you” has never felt like a serviceable way to communicate to Doug how grateful I am to have a role model like him.
{"title":"What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Complexity","authors":"Andrea Monroe","doi":"10.36639/mbelr.5.2.what","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36639/mbelr.5.2.what","url":null,"abstract":"I learned most of what I know about being a lawyer, a teacher, and a scholar from Professor Douglas Kahn. For four months in the spring of 1997, Doug mesmerized and terrified me in the class that I feared would be my academic downfall—Partnership Taxation. In the years that followed, Doug has been a mentor and friend, encouraging and supporting me at every stage of my professional career. And my experience is not unique: Doug has inspired generations of law students in just the same way. There is no adequate way to thank Doug for everything he has given to students like me who have been lucky enough to sit in one of his classrooms. Doug is a force of nature—inspiring, challenging, and unquestionably dedicated to his students. Doug is the reason I became a tax lawyer, and he is also the reason that I became a law professor. Every day that I walk into a classroom, I try to do for my students what Doug did for me nineteen years ago. As a result, “thank you” has never felt like a serviceable way to communicate to Doug how grateful I am to have a role model like him.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131326743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores areas where Moldovan tax authorities can increase tax (revenue) collection. We find that the overall tax gap – for personal income, business, value-added, and tobacco/alcohol excise taxes – likely comes to 20 percent of GDP. We show several methods for estimating Moldova’s various tax gaps – illustrating the methods with numerous “market sizing” estimates. We particularly illustrate the tax gap methodology using company taxes, where we employ both top-down and bottom-up methods in order to illustrate the general approach to tax gap analysis.
{"title":"Support to the Moldovan State Tax Service - Tax Gap Analysis and Findings","authors":"Bryane Michael","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2834610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834610","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores areas where Moldovan tax authorities can increase tax (revenue) collection. We find that the overall tax gap – for personal income, business, value-added, and tobacco/alcohol excise taxes – likely comes to 20 percent of GDP. We show several methods for estimating Moldova’s various tax gaps – illustrating the methods with numerous “market sizing” estimates. We particularly illustrate the tax gap methodology using company taxes, where we employ both top-down and bottom-up methods in order to illustrate the general approach to tax gap analysis.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116441782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Purpose: This paper aims to discuss the various anti-money laundering programmes that banks are required to put in place, to mitigate the tax evasion and money laundering risks in wealth management.Design/Methodology/Approach: This paper uses the “Panama Papers” revelations to illustrate the vulnerability of private banks to money laundering. Private banks are banks, or operational units within banks, which specialize in providing financial services to wealthy individuals. These services are often referred to as wealth management services.Findings: This paper determined that effective implementation is the key to lifting the veil of secrecy once and for all and eradicating tax evasion. Rather than create new laws and policies, efforts should focus on supporting effective implementation, and promoting enhanced cross-border and inter-agency co-operation on tax and financial crimes.Research Limitations: This paper will focus on one aspect of our banking system — wealth management — that may be particularly attractive to criminals who want to launder money.Originality/Value: While most articles are focused on the money laundering/tax evasion risks posed by offshore locations, this article is focused on domestic banks that allow funds to be transferred to offshore locations.
{"title":"Wealth Management, Tax Evasion and Money Laundering: The Panama Papers Case Study","authors":"Ehi Eric Esoimeme","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2790543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2790543","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose: This paper aims to discuss the various anti-money laundering programmes that banks are required to put in place, to mitigate the tax evasion and money laundering risks in wealth management.Design/Methodology/Approach: This paper uses the “Panama Papers” revelations to illustrate the vulnerability of private banks to money laundering. Private banks are banks, or operational units within banks, which specialize in providing financial services to wealthy individuals. These services are often referred to as wealth management services.Findings: This paper determined that effective implementation is the key to lifting the veil of secrecy once and for all and eradicating tax evasion. Rather than create new laws and policies, efforts should focus on supporting effective implementation, and promoting enhanced cross-border and inter-agency co-operation on tax and financial crimes.Research Limitations: This paper will focus on one aspect of our banking system — wealth management — that may be particularly attractive to criminals who want to launder money.Originality/Value: While most articles are focused on the money laundering/tax evasion risks posed by offshore locations, this article is focused on domestic banks that allow funds to be transferred to offshore locations.","PeriodicalId":330166,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Tax eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115671710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}