Ascertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent work in academic finance and an issue for policy-making at international development agencies. According to recent academic work, private enforcement of investor protection via both disclosure and private liability rules goes hand in hand with financial market development, but public enforcement fails to correlate with financial development and, hence, is unlikely to facilitate it. Our results confirm the disclosure result but reverse the results on both liability standards and public enforcement. We use securities regulators' resources to proxy for regulatory intensity of the securities regulator. When we do, financial depth regularly, significantly, and robustly correlates with stronger public enforcement. In horse races between these resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity and the most common measures of private enforcement, public enforcement is overall as important as disclosure in explaining financial market outcomes around the world and more important than private liability rules. Hence, policymakers who reject public enforcement as useful for financial market development are ignoring the best currently available evidence.
{"title":"Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence","authors":"H. Jackson, M. Roe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1000086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1000086","url":null,"abstract":"Ascertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent work in academic finance and an issue for policy-making at international development agencies. According to recent academic work, private enforcement of investor protection via both disclosure and private liability rules goes hand in hand with financial market development, but public enforcement fails to correlate with financial development and, hence, is unlikely to facilitate it. Our results confirm the disclosure result but reverse the results on both liability standards and public enforcement. We use securities regulators' resources to proxy for regulatory intensity of the securities regulator. When we do, financial depth regularly, significantly, and robustly correlates with stronger public enforcement. In horse races between these resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity and the most common measures of private enforcement, public enforcement is overall as important as disclosure in explaining financial market outcomes around the world and more important than private liability rules. Hence, policymakers who reject public enforcement as useful for financial market development are ignoring the best currently available evidence.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122974783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay considers the implications of Treasury holding common equity in banks participating in the federal government's bailout under the TARP program. The federal government's position as the dominant shareholder in the financial services and automotive sectors requires careful consideration of its shareholder rights. Governments are a very unique brand of shareholder. Without careful consideration and advance planning for how those shareholder rights and responsibilities will be managed, the unintended consequences to capital markets could be dramatic.
{"title":"The U.S. Government as Control Shareholder of the Financial and Automotive Sector: Implications and Analysis","authors":"J. Verret","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1348256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1348256","url":null,"abstract":"This essay considers the implications of Treasury holding common equity in banks participating in the federal government's bailout under the TARP program. The federal government's position as the dominant shareholder in the financial services and automotive sectors requires careful consideration of its shareholder rights. Governments are a very unique brand of shareholder. Without careful consideration and advance planning for how those shareholder rights and responsibilities will be managed, the unintended consequences to capital markets could be dramatic.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116154614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper executes a simple event study of the effects of securities litigation on stock returns. Securities litigation is a common occurrence on the US investment markets, via which shareholders aim to recover losses they have suffered as a result of managerial misconduct. Filing lawsuits, however, signals to the market in general that there is something wrong with the company, unless the market knows it already. In that case, litigation may have negative consequences on future stock returns of the company. Applying t-tests, this paper tests this hypothesis and finds that significant negative stock reaction to litigation is present but not overwhelmingly. Positive reaction to lawsuits can sometimes be observed. Negative reaction, however, is twice as common as positive reaction to lawsuits. Shareholders should not be concerned that filing a securities lawsuit will necessarily result in stock return declines.
{"title":"Securities Litigation and Stock Returns: A Simple Event Study","authors":"George Kalchev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.668643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.668643","url":null,"abstract":"This paper executes a simple event study of the effects of securities litigation on stock returns. Securities litigation is a common occurrence on the US investment markets, via which shareholders aim to recover losses they have suffered as a result of managerial misconduct. Filing lawsuits, however, signals to the market in general that there is something wrong with the company, unless the market knows it already. In that case, litigation may have negative consequences on future stock returns of the company. Applying t-tests, this paper tests this hypothesis and finds that significant negative stock reaction to litigation is present but not overwhelmingly. Positive reaction to lawsuits can sometimes be observed. Negative reaction, however, is twice as common as positive reaction to lawsuits. Shareholders should not be concerned that filing a securities lawsuit will necessarily result in stock return declines.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"3 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131506061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introducing quantitative rigor into the legal process has been proposed to reduce error and uncertainty in litigation. One area of law that would seem to be a candidate for such formalism would be proving causation. Yet most legal scholars balk at the idea that the legal principles of causation are based on anything as precise as, say, scientific causation. We believe that counterfactual analysis, a relatively recent trend in the philosophy of causation that is being applied in the social sciences, has a role in understanding causation in at least one important area of the law-shareholder class actions. The increasingly strict standards imposed by the Supreme Court over the past twenty years, culminating in the Dura decision, can be understood in the context of counterfactual analysis establishing loss causation. This approach then has important implications for estimating damages in shareholder class actions.
{"title":"Counterfactual Keys to Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class Actions","authors":"F. Dunbar, A. Sen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1333900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333900","url":null,"abstract":"Introducing quantitative rigor into the legal process has been proposed to reduce error and uncertainty in litigation. One area of law that would seem to be a candidate for such formalism would be proving causation. Yet most legal scholars balk at the idea that the legal principles of causation are based on anything as precise as, say, scientific causation. We believe that counterfactual analysis, a relatively recent trend in the philosophy of causation that is being applied in the social sciences, has a role in understanding causation in at least one important area of the law-shareholder class actions. The increasingly strict standards imposed by the Supreme Court over the past twenty years, culminating in the Dura decision, can be understood in the context of counterfactual analysis establishing loss causation. This approach then has important implications for estimating damages in shareholder class actions.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122500213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The interface and coordination of securities regulation of tender offers, merger review proceedings set up by competition law and any other bodies of sectoral regulation potentially applicable to a given transaction is a key issue in governing modern markets. Indeed, Securities Regulation, Competition Law and Regulation impose mandatory conditions and bureaucratic procedures on mergers and acquisitions - which are inspired in different objectives and with disparate aims - that may delay the execution of these transactions and, in some cases, even lead to the introduction of substantial changes in their terms. In comparison with the pre-existing legal rules, as this paper analyzes in detail, the new regulation of merger review and tender offer proceedings - both of 2007 - make compatible the satisfaction of private business interests with the adequate protection of investors' interests and the public interest in maintaining effective competition in the market, as well as the diverse objectives sought by other regulations, sensibly reducing the delays in tender offers that may distort the working of securities markets. However, several doubts and some problematic issues remain in the overlap of these different regulatory bodies (securities/competition/regulation) that require further reflections, which constitute the focus of the present article.
{"title":"Tender Offer Merger and Regulatory Review in Spanish Law (in Spanish)","authors":"F. Marcos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1337133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1337133","url":null,"abstract":"The interface and coordination of securities regulation of tender offers, merger review proceedings set up by competition law and any other bodies of sectoral regulation potentially applicable to a given transaction is a key issue in governing modern markets. Indeed, Securities Regulation, Competition Law and Regulation impose mandatory conditions and bureaucratic procedures on mergers and acquisitions - which are inspired in different objectives and with disparate aims - that may delay the execution of these transactions and, in some cases, even lead to the introduction of substantial changes in their terms. In comparison with the pre-existing legal rules, as this paper analyzes in detail, the new regulation of merger review and tender offer proceedings - both of 2007 - make compatible the satisfaction of private business interests with the adequate protection of investors' interests and the public interest in maintaining effective competition in the market, as well as the diverse objectives sought by other regulations, sensibly reducing the delays in tender offers that may distort the working of securities markets. However, several doubts and some problematic issues remain in the overlap of these different regulatory bodies (securities/competition/regulation) that require further reflections, which constitute the focus of the present article.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116938560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Today, criminals are capable of covertly stealing financial secrets from multinational corporations. Securities jurisprudence, however, has focused largely on the activities of insiders who secretly trade on information that they legally garner through their positions of trust, and has not addressed the culpability of "mere thieves" who trade on confidential financial information gained through illegal means. As such, a void in securities law exists regarding how to address the theft and use of confidential financial information by strangers under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Rule 10b-5. This article sets forth a jurisprudential analysis under which mere thieves who trade on stolen confidential information are liable for insider trading.
{"title":"Mere Thieves","authors":"Robert E. Steinbuch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1306801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1306801","url":null,"abstract":"Today, criminals are capable of covertly stealing financial secrets from multinational corporations. Securities jurisprudence, however, has focused largely on the activities of insiders who secretly trade on information that they legally garner through their positions of trust, and has not addressed the culpability of \"mere thieves\" who trade on confidential financial information gained through illegal means. As such, a void in securities law exists regarding how to address the theft and use of confidential financial information by strangers under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Rule 10b-5. This article sets forth a jurisprudential analysis under which mere thieves who trade on stolen confidential information are liable for insider trading.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134283012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper in German language summarizes recent developments in the law of collective investment schemes on the European level. It is structured in three parts. The first part deals with retail investment funds. In particular, it discusses the European Commission's proposal for a reform of Directive 85/611/EC published in July 2008 as well as the addendum proposed by CESR on 31 Oktober 2008 for the European passport for the UCITS management company. Moreover, the paper considers the extension of the UCITS framework into the sphere of non-harmonised Collective Investment Schemes (such as real-estate funds, hedge funds, commodities funds, and private equity). The second part summarizes the policy debate on a harmonized framework for sophisticated investments. This includes the proposals for a European private placement regime as well as a "Directive" on Hedge Funds and Private Equity, as suggested by the European Parliament's initiatives called Lehne-Report and Rasmussen-Report. The third part takes a look at the European approach towards Sovereign Wealth Funds and the legal embedding of the Santiago-Principles in the civil laws of the Member States. A brief look on financial stability funds established by the Member States in order to counter the financial markets and banking crisis completes the picture.
{"title":"Featuring Funds: European Developments in Financial Services Law (Fonds im Fokus: Europaeische Entwicklungen im Recht der Finanzintermediaere)","authors":"D. Zetzsche","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1303457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1303457","url":null,"abstract":"This paper in German language summarizes recent developments in the law of collective investment schemes on the European level. It is structured in three parts. The first part deals with retail investment funds. In particular, it discusses the European Commission's proposal for a reform of Directive 85/611/EC published in July 2008 as well as the addendum proposed by CESR on 31 Oktober 2008 for the European passport for the UCITS management company. Moreover, the paper considers the extension of the UCITS framework into the sphere of non-harmonised Collective Investment Schemes (such as real-estate funds, hedge funds, commodities funds, and private equity). The second part summarizes the policy debate on a harmonized framework for sophisticated investments. This includes the proposals for a European private placement regime as well as a \"Directive\" on Hedge Funds and Private Equity, as suggested by the European Parliament's initiatives called Lehne-Report and Rasmussen-Report. The third part takes a look at the European approach towards Sovereign Wealth Funds and the legal embedding of the Santiago-Principles in the civil laws of the Member States. A brief look on financial stability funds established by the Member States in order to counter the financial markets and banking crisis completes the picture.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133504148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2001, foreign investors have acquired roughly $5 trillion in U.S. securities--more than doubling their holdings of U.S. equities and bonds--as both official and private inflows have financed record U.S. current account deficits. Although the rapid growth of foreign holdings of U.S. securities raises concerns that foreign investors may have become too heavily weighted in U.S. assets, foreign investors have not in fact materially changed the relative allocations between U.S. and other foreign securities in their portfolios in recent years. Based on data from the most recent comprehensive surveys of foreign portfolio investment, the 2006 IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS), most foreign investors remain relatively more underweight in both U.S. equities and bonds than they do in foreign securities in general. Although the underweight position suggests that there remains potential for foreign investors to continue to acquire U.S. securities, econometric evidence indicates that the underweight position itself reflects a preference by foreign investors for securities of countries with which they have strong economic or cultural ties, consistent with recent research that suggests "location" or "information" preferences in both domestic and international portfolios. As securities markets abroad continue to deepen, such factors are likely to continue to attract investment from "nearby" markets, especially from European investors.
{"title":"Assessing the Potential for Further Foreign Demand for U.S. Assets: Has Financing U.S. Current Account Deficits Made Foreign Investors Overweight in U.S. Securities?","authors":"Carol C. Bertaut","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1292741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1292741","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2001, foreign investors have acquired roughly $5 trillion in U.S. securities--more than doubling their holdings of U.S. equities and bonds--as both official and private inflows have financed record U.S. current account deficits. Although the rapid growth of foreign holdings of U.S. securities raises concerns that foreign investors may have become too heavily weighted in U.S. assets, foreign investors have not in fact materially changed the relative allocations between U.S. and other foreign securities in their portfolios in recent years. Based on data from the most recent comprehensive surveys of foreign portfolio investment, the 2006 IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS), most foreign investors remain relatively more underweight in both U.S. equities and bonds than they do in foreign securities in general. Although the underweight position suggests that there remains potential for foreign investors to continue to acquire U.S. securities, econometric evidence indicates that the underweight position itself reflects a preference by foreign investors for securities of countries with which they have strong economic or cultural ties, consistent with recent research that suggests \"location\" or \"information\" preferences in both domestic and international portfolios. As securities markets abroad continue to deepen, such factors are likely to continue to attract investment from \"nearby\" markets, especially from European investors.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"282 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115337598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Audit quality can be defined as relating to the probability that financial statements contain no material omissions or misstatements. Previous research on the subject of audit quality relies on the assumption that large audit firms (Big 4) are homogenous in providing higher audit quality than small audit firms (non-Big 4). However, there is little evidence in extant literature supportive of quality differentials between Big 4 firms, except that the collapse of Arthur Anderson certainly undermines this assertion that large auditors are associated with higher audit quality. In this study, we develop a methodology to distinguish audit quality among Big 4 audit firms and attempt to question the homogenous audit quality assumption. In exploring this theme, this paper examines the audited disclosures made during the transition period under FRS 136 - Impairment of Assets (the Malaysian equivalent to IAS 36) of a sample of large Malaysian listed corporations who each have engaged Big 4 auditors. The results of this study are alarming, finding systemic failure on the part of Big 4 auditors in Malaysia to comply with even the most basic elements of the FRS 136 disclosure framework in relation to goodwill impairment testing.
{"title":"Questioning the Big 4 Audit Quality Assumption: New Evidence from Malaysia","authors":"T. Carlin, Nigel Finch, N. Laili","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1280790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1280790","url":null,"abstract":"Audit quality can be defined as relating to the probability that financial statements contain no material omissions or misstatements. Previous research on the subject of audit quality relies on the assumption that large audit firms (Big 4) are homogenous in providing higher audit quality than small audit firms (non-Big 4). However, there is little evidence in extant literature supportive of quality differentials between Big 4 firms, except that the collapse of Arthur Anderson certainly undermines this assertion that large auditors are associated with higher audit quality. In this study, we develop a methodology to distinguish audit quality among Big 4 audit firms and attempt to question the homogenous audit quality assumption. In exploring this theme, this paper examines the audited disclosures made during the transition period under FRS 136 - Impairment of Assets (the Malaysian equivalent to IAS 36) of a sample of large Malaysian listed corporations who each have engaged Big 4 auditors. The results of this study are alarming, finding systemic failure on the part of Big 4 auditors in Malaysia to comply with even the most basic elements of the FRS 136 disclosure framework in relation to goodwill impairment testing.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114478881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine voluntary disclosures around the exercise of CEO stock options. Previous research shows that managerial incentives depend on the intended disposition of the exercised options' underlying shares. When CEOs intend to sell the underlying shares of exercised options, they have an incentive to increase stock prices in the pre-exercise period. In contrast, when CEOs intend to hold the underlying shares, they have a tax incentive to decrease stock prices in the pre-exercise period. Consistent with these private incentives, we find a significant increase in the frequency and magnitude of good (bad) news announcements in the pre-exercise period when CEOs implement exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold) strategies. We provide some evidence that CEOs' propensities for opportunistic disclosures are positively related to the value of their exercised stock options. Lastly, we find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) generally reduces, but does not eliminate, this type of managerial opportunism.
{"title":"Voluntary Disclosures and the Exercise of CEO Stock Options","authors":"P. Brockman, Xiumin Martin, A. Puckett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1108119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108119","url":null,"abstract":"We examine voluntary disclosures around the exercise of CEO stock options. Previous research shows that managerial incentives depend on the intended disposition of the exercised options' underlying shares. When CEOs intend to sell the underlying shares of exercised options, they have an incentive to increase stock prices in the pre-exercise period. In contrast, when CEOs intend to hold the underlying shares, they have a tax incentive to decrease stock prices in the pre-exercise period. Consistent with these private incentives, we find a significant increase in the frequency and magnitude of good (bad) news announcements in the pre-exercise period when CEOs implement exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold) strategies. We provide some evidence that CEOs' propensities for opportunistic disclosures are positively related to the value of their exercised stock options. Lastly, we find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) generally reduces, but does not eliminate, this type of managerial opportunism.","PeriodicalId":336554,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Securities Law","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125969963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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