Pub Date : 1989-11-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4277606
Phyllis Tharenou
{"title":"Self-Esteem at Work","authors":"Phyllis Tharenou","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4277606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4277606","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132381987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Today's strategists are at no loss for concepts and techniques to help them formulate strategies. Over the past 15 years, consultants and academic researchers have introduced a variety of powerful and pragmatic tools for answering the question, "Where and how should we compete?" Tools such as industry and competitor analysis, portfolio models, product life-cycle theory, and internal strength and weakness analysis have gained widespread use.1 Many executives now express satisfaction with the methods used to derive their business strategies. But many of these "best-laid plans" are failing to see the light of day. Plans to innovate fizzle out after a series of task-force meetings; plans to improve quality get no farther than some airy rhetoric and the hiring of a "quality guru"; and plans to become the low-cost producer bog down when corporate officers balk at expensive outlays for plant modernization. In short, many of our strategies simply aren't happening. Without successful implementation, a strategy is but a fantasy. This problem how to convert a new strategy into concrete competitive success is what managers now need frameworks for, and is the focus of our article. Actually, the widespread inability to implement strategy may be a sign that accepted approaches to strategy formulation are not as good as many think they are, for a well-conceived strategy is one that is implementable. For that reason, implementation must be considered during the formulation process, not later, when it may be too late. A tendency to treat formulation and implementation as two separate phases is at the root of many failed strategies.2 Regrettably, the recent trend among consultants and business schools to treat strategy formulation as being primarily based on industry and product/market economics exacerbates the schism. The strategist will not be able to nail down every action step when the strategy is first crafted nor, as we will later argue, should this even be attempted. However, he or she must have the ability to look ahead at the major implementation obstacles and ask, "Is this strategy workable? Can I make it happen?" If an honest assessment yields "no" or "only at an unacceptable risk," then the formulation process must continue. A great strategy is only great if it can actually be carried out. Thus, the guidelines we offer in this article about implementation must be in the mindset of the strategist even at the earliest formulation stages. Our ideas about strategy implementation have evolved on the basis of situations we have observed in numerous firms, as well as a long and careful reading of the literature on the topic.3 However, our thoughts have been crystallized and clarified particularly by a recent opportunity to study several successful and unsuccessful implementations of business strategies in a large multibusiness firm. The top management of this company, which we will call Globus, had concluded that the major difference between competitive succes
{"title":"Strategy Implementation as Substance and Selling","authors":"D. Hambrick, Albert A. Cannella","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.427740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.427740","url":null,"abstract":"Today's strategists are at no loss for concepts and techniques to help them formulate strategies. Over the past 15 years, consultants and academic researchers have introduced a variety of powerful and pragmatic tools for answering the question, \"Where and how should we compete?\" Tools such as industry and competitor analysis, portfolio models, product life-cycle theory, and internal strength and weakness analysis have gained widespread use.1 Many executives now express satisfaction with the methods used to derive their business strategies. But many of these \"best-laid plans\" are failing to see the light of day. Plans to innovate fizzle out after a series of task-force meetings; plans to improve quality get no farther than some airy rhetoric and the hiring of a \"quality guru\"; and plans to become the low-cost producer bog down when corporate officers balk at expensive outlays for plant modernization. In short, many of our strategies simply aren't happening. Without successful implementation, a strategy is but a fantasy. This problem how to convert a new strategy into concrete competitive success is what managers now need frameworks for, and is the focus of our article. Actually, the widespread inability to implement strategy may be a sign that accepted approaches to strategy formulation are not as good as many think they are, for a well-conceived strategy is one that is implementable. For that reason, implementation must be considered during the formulation process, not later, when it may be too late. A tendency to treat formulation and implementation as two separate phases is at the root of many failed strategies.2 Regrettably, the recent trend among consultants and business schools to treat strategy formulation as being primarily based on industry and product/market economics exacerbates the schism. The strategist will not be able to nail down every action step when the strategy is first crafted nor, as we will later argue, should this even be attempted. However, he or she must have the ability to look ahead at the major implementation obstacles and ask, \"Is this strategy workable? Can I make it happen?\" If an honest assessment yields \"no\" or \"only at an unacceptable risk,\" then the formulation process must continue. A great strategy is only great if it can actually be carried out. Thus, the guidelines we offer in this article about implementation must be in the mindset of the strategist even at the earliest formulation stages. Our ideas about strategy implementation have evolved on the basis of situations we have observed in numerous firms, as well as a long and careful reading of the literature on the topic.3 However, our thoughts have been crystallized and clarified particularly by a recent opportunity to study several successful and unsuccessful implementations of business strategies in a large multibusiness firm. The top management of this company, which we will call Globus, had concluded that the major difference between competitive succes","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127482170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-08-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274737
R. Kanter
{"title":"Becoming PALs: Pooling, Allying, and Linking Across Companies","authors":"R. Kanter","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274737","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129904348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-08-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274738
David A. Nadler, M. Tushman
O ne of the hallmarks of American business in the past decade has been the attempts by large organizations to manage large-scale planned change. In some cases — AT&T, Chrysler, and Apple, for example — the efforts have been dramatic and have captured public attention. Other cases, such as Corning Glass, Xerox, Citicorp, and GTE, have received less attention, but the changes have been no less profound. The concept of planned organizational change is not new; but this most recent generation of changes is somewhat different from what has gone before. First, they typically are initiated by the leaders of organizations rather than consultants or human resource specialists (although they have played significant roles in some cases). Second, they are closely linked to strategic business issues, not just questions of organizational process or style. Third, most of the changes can be traced direaly to external factors, such as new sources of competition, new technology, deregulation or legal initiatives, maturation of product sets, changes in ownership, or shifts in fundamental market struaure. Fourth,these changes affect the entire organization (whether it be a corporation or a business unit) rather than individual SBUs (strategic business units) or departments. Fifth, they are profound for the organization and its members because they usually influence organizational values regarding employees, customers, competition, or products. As a result of the past decade's changes, there are now more large visible examples than ever before of successful planned organizational change.
{"title":"Organizational Frame Bending: Principles for Managing Reorientation","authors":"David A. Nadler, M. Tushman","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274738","url":null,"abstract":"O ne of the hallmarks of American business in the past decade has been the attempts by large organizations to manage large-scale planned change. In some cases — AT&T, Chrysler, and Apple, for example — the efforts have been dramatic and have captured public attention. Other cases, such as Corning Glass, Xerox, Citicorp, and GTE, have received less attention, but the changes have been no less profound. The concept of planned organizational change is not new; but this most recent generation of changes is somewhat different from what has gone before. First, they typically are initiated by the leaders of organizations rather than consultants or human resource specialists (although they have played significant roles in some cases). Second, they are closely linked to strategic business issues, not just questions of organizational process or style. Third, most of the changes can be traced direaly to external factors, such as new sources of competition, new technology, deregulation or legal initiatives, maturation of product sets, changes in ownership, or shifts in fundamental market struaure. Fourth,these changes affect the entire organization (whether it be a corporation or a business unit) rather than individual SBUs (strategic business units) or departments. Fifth, they are profound for the organization and its members because they usually influence organizational values regarding employees, customers, competition, or products. As a result of the past decade's changes, there are now more large visible examples than ever before of successful planned organizational change.","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"120 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128490198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-08-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274744
C. Cox, C. Cooper
The purpose of the research described here was to find out more about the personality, background, and characteristics of successful managers. We were particularly interested in managers' psychological attributes and developmental influences, rather than in the roles they play and how they spend their time, which has been the focus of so many other studies; we wanted to know more about what they were like as people. Any discussion of successful managers inevitably raises the question of defining "success." We have avoided this issue by defining a successful manager as one who reaches the top of a major organization. Therefore, the conclusions outlined here are based on interviews with 45 chief executives of British companies with over 1,000 employees and a successful financial record. The interviews were semistructu red and explored such aspects of the executives' lives as family background and childhood, education, career pattern, motivation, and personality.
{"title":"The Making of the British CEO: Childhood, Work Experience, Personality, and Management Style","authors":"C. Cox, C. Cooper","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274744","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the research described here was to find out more about the personality, background, and characteristics of successful managers. We were particularly interested in managers' psychological attributes and developmental influences, rather than in the roles they play and how they spend their time, which has been the focus of so many other studies; we wanted to know more about what they were like as people. Any discussion of successful managers inevitably raises the question of defining \"success.\" We have avoided this issue by defining a successful manager as one who reaches the top of a major organization. Therefore, the conclusions outlined here are based on interviews with 45 chief executives of British companies with over 1,000 employees and a successful financial record. The interviews were semistructu red and explored such aspects of the executives' lives as family background and childhood, education, career pattern, motivation, and personality.","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126417976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-05-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274765
S. Ornstein
A good deal of attention has been directed at the suggestion that office design including the arrangement of offices, furnishings, and physical objects present in the work setting influences job performance, job attitudes, and impressions. With almost 40 million people currently working in 9 billion square feet of office space in the United States,1 even relatively small influences of office design on performance, attitudes, and impressions could have a large impact on productivity levels and employee attitudes. Many managers are unaware of the relationship between office design and various organizational behaviors, attitudes, and impressions. In this paper, I will (1) identify and describe the ways various elements of office design influence attitudes and behaviors, (2) identify and describe symbolic messages conveyed by office design, and (3) elaborate on actions managers can take that may result in more efficient and effective work environments.
{"title":"The Hidden Influences of Office Design","authors":"S. Ornstein","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274765","url":null,"abstract":"A good deal of attention has been directed at the suggestion that office design including the arrangement of offices, furnishings, and physical objects present in the work setting influences job performance, job attitudes, and impressions. With almost 40 million people currently working in 9 billion square feet of office space in the United States,1 even relatively small influences of office design on performance, attitudes, and impressions could have a large impact on productivity levels and employee attitudes. Many managers are unaware of the relationship between office design and various organizational behaviors, attitudes, and impressions. In this paper, I will (1) identify and describe the ways various elements of office design influence attitudes and behaviors, (2) identify and describe symbolic messages conveyed by office design, and (3) elaborate on actions managers can take that may result in more efficient and effective work environments.","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116432629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-05-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274764
Paula L. Rechner, D. Dalton
{"title":"The Impact of CEO as Board Chairperson on Corporate Performance: Evidence vs. Rhetoric","authors":"Paula L. Rechner, D. Dalton","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274764","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126769749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-05-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274763
J. P. Muczyk, B. C. Reimann
M ike Gantz knew he was in trouble. After only two years as vice-president of marketing and sales at Acme Products, his boss had just suggested he resign. Actually, Gantz had seen it coming. He had to admit he'd let Acme down by his inability to get things done the way he had in his previous job. But he still couldn't understand where he'd gone wrong. Prior to coming to Acme, Gantz had earned an excellent reputation as the best division sales manager in a large, diversified industrial firm. He credited much of his success to his highly participative management style. In implementing Management by Objectives (MBO), for example, he had actively involved his subordinates in goal setting and then granted them considerable latitude in meeting their goals. This approach had produced a highly motivated and productive team of subordinates. In fact, Gantz had been recruited to work the same magic at Acme Products, one of his former division's competitors. Unfortunately, the results of his considerable efforts had been very disappointing so far. After two years of his leadership, Acme had lost almost as much market share as top management had expected him to gain, customer dissatisfaction was at an all-time high, and turnover of salespeople had nearly tripled. As far as Acme Products was concerned, Gantz was a disaster and had to go! How could a manager with a proven record fail so badly? Could he have been the victim of the "Peter Principle" and found his level of incompetence? Maybe. But we believe that Mike Gantz's failure came about in large measure from his failure to diagnose the situation and adopt leader behaviors and MBO practices that were compatible with each other as well as appropriate to his new and different situation. Most of the managers reporting to him at Acme did not have the abilities or initiative of his previous subordinates. Nor did the new firm possess most of the well developed support systems to which Gantz had grown accustomed in his previous job. The new organization's culture was very different as well. While extensive participation and trust had been the norm at his previous firm, his new subordinates were used to being told exactly what to do and then having the boss follow up closely to make sure they were actually doing it right. Small wonder that Gantz's participative and permissive style frustrated his new subordinates and resulted in confusion rather than goal attainment. Gantz should have recognized the difference in the capabilities and expectations of his new subordinates and made himself available to be a supportive resource and coach, with more directive and decisive behavior. While the names have been changed to protect the guilty, the above scenario is all too real. It illustrates a very common problem: a failure to achieve a suitable match between leader behavior, MBO implementation, and the organizational situation. It is this very important match that we will consider in this article.
{"title":"MBO as a Complement to Effective Leadership","authors":"J. P. Muczyk, B. C. Reimann","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274763","url":null,"abstract":"M ike Gantz knew he was in trouble. After only two years as vice-president of marketing and sales at Acme Products, his boss had just suggested he resign. Actually, Gantz had seen it coming. He had to admit he'd let Acme down by his inability to get things done the way he had in his previous job. But he still couldn't understand where he'd gone wrong. Prior to coming to Acme, Gantz had earned an excellent reputation as the best division sales manager in a large, diversified industrial firm. He credited much of his success to his highly participative management style. In implementing Management by Objectives (MBO), for example, he had actively involved his subordinates in goal setting and then granted them considerable latitude in meeting their goals. This approach had produced a highly motivated and productive team of subordinates. In fact, Gantz had been recruited to work the same magic at Acme Products, one of his former division's competitors. Unfortunately, the results of his considerable efforts had been very disappointing so far. After two years of his leadership, Acme had lost almost as much market share as top management had expected him to gain, customer dissatisfaction was at an all-time high, and turnover of salespeople had nearly tripled. As far as Acme Products was concerned, Gantz was a disaster and had to go! How could a manager with a proven record fail so badly? Could he have been the victim of the \"Peter Principle\" and found his level of incompetence? Maybe. But we believe that Mike Gantz's failure came about in large measure from his failure to diagnose the situation and adopt leader behaviors and MBO practices that were compatible with each other as well as appropriate to his new and different situation. Most of the managers reporting to him at Acme did not have the abilities or initiative of his previous subordinates. Nor did the new firm possess most of the well developed support systems to which Gantz had grown accustomed in his previous job. The new organization's culture was very different as well. While extensive participation and trust had been the norm at his previous firm, his new subordinates were used to being told exactly what to do and then having the boss follow up closely to make sure they were actually doing it right. Small wonder that Gantz's participative and permissive style frustrated his new subordinates and resulted in confusion rather than goal attainment. Gantz should have recognized the difference in the capabilities and expectations of his new subordinates and made himself available to be a supportive resource and coach, with more directive and decisive behavior. While the names have been changed to protect the guilty, the above scenario is all too real. It illustrates a very common problem: a failure to achieve a suitable match between leader behavior, MBO implementation, and the organizational situation. It is this very important match that we will consider in this article.","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122991441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-05-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274762
R. Nielsen
W A / hat are the implications of Hamlet's question in the context of organizational ethics? What does it mean to be ethical in an organizational context? Should one suffer the slings and arrows of unethical organizational behavior? Should one try to take arms against unethical behaviors and by opposing, end them? The consequences of addressing organizational ethics issues can be unpleasant. One can be punished or fired; one's career can suffer, or one can be disliked, considered an outsider. It may take courage to oppose unethical and lead ethical organizational behavior. How can one address organizational ethics issues? Paul Tillich, in his book The Courage to Be, recognized, as Hamlet did, that dire consequences can result from standing up to and opposing unethical behavior. Tillich identified two approaches: being as an individual and being as a part of a group.' In an organizational context, these two approaches can be interpreted as follows: (1) Being as an individual can mean intervening to end unethical organizational behaviors by working against others and the organizations performing the unethical behaviors; and (2) being as a part can mean leading an ethical organizational change by working with others and the organization. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, depending on the individual, the organization, the relationships, and the situation, one or both of these approaches may be appropriate for addressing ethical issues. Being as an Individual
{"title":"Changing Unethical Organizational Behavior","authors":"R. Nielsen","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274762","url":null,"abstract":"W A / hat are the implications of Hamlet's question in the context of organizational ethics? What does it mean to be ethical in an organizational context? Should one suffer the slings and arrows of unethical organizational behavior? Should one try to take arms against unethical behaviors and by opposing, end them? The consequences of addressing organizational ethics issues can be unpleasant. One can be punished or fired; one's career can suffer, or one can be disliked, considered an outsider. It may take courage to oppose unethical and lead ethical organizational behavior. How can one address organizational ethics issues? Paul Tillich, in his book The Courage to Be, recognized, as Hamlet did, that dire consequences can result from standing up to and opposing unethical behavior. Tillich identified two approaches: being as an individual and being as a part of a group.' In an organizational context, these two approaches can be interpreted as follows: (1) Being as an individual can mean intervening to end unethical organizational behaviors by working against others and the organizations performing the unethical behaviors; and (2) being as a part can mean leading an ethical organizational change by working with others and the organization. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, depending on the individual, the organization, the relationships, and the situation, one or both of these approaches may be appropriate for addressing ethical issues. Being as an Individual","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115978551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1989-05-01DOI: 10.5465/AME.1989.4274772
D. Schweiger
{"title":"Surviving Merger and Acquisition","authors":"D. Schweiger","doi":"10.5465/AME.1989.4274772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1989.4274772","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":337734,"journal":{"name":"Academy of Management Executive","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130865600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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