Pub Date : 2021-06-28DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.778
C. Beaman
The modern world is noisy. Streets are cacophonies of traffic noise; homes and workplaces are replete with bleeping timers, announcements, and alarms. Everywhere there is the sound of human speech—from the casual chatter of strangers and the unwanted intrusion from electronic devices through to the conversations with friends and loved ones one may actually wish to hear. Unlike vision, it is not possible simply to “close our ears” and shut out the auditory world and nor, in many cases, is it desirable. On the one hand, soft background music or environmental sounds, such as birdsong or the noise of waves against the beach, is often comfortingly pleasurable or reassuring. On the other, alarms are usually auditory for a reason. Nevertheless, people somehow have to identify, from among the babble that surrounds them, the sounds and speech of interest and importance and to follow the thread of a chosen speaker in a crowded auditory environment. Additionally, irrelevant or unwanted chatter or other background noise should not hinder concentration on matters of greater interest or importance—students should ideally be able to study effectively despite noisy classrooms or university halls while still being open to the possibility of important interruptions from elsewhere. The scientific study of auditory attention has been driven by such practical problems: how people somehow manage to select the most interesting or most relevant speaker from the competing auditory demands made by the speech of others or isolate the music of the band from the chatter of the nightclub. In parallel, the causes of auditory distraction—and how to try to avoid it where necessary—have also been subject to scrutiny. A complete theory of auditory attention must account for the mechanisms by which selective attention is achieved, the causes of auditory distraction, and the reasons why individuals might differ in their ability in both cases.
{"title":"Auditory Attention","authors":"C. Beaman","doi":"10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.778","url":null,"abstract":"The modern world is noisy. Streets are cacophonies of traffic noise; homes and workplaces are replete with bleeping timers, announcements, and alarms. Everywhere there is the sound of human speech—from the casual chatter of strangers and the unwanted intrusion from electronic devices through to the conversations with friends and loved ones one may actually wish to hear. Unlike vision, it is not possible simply to “close our ears” and shut out the auditory world and nor, in many cases, is it desirable. On the one hand, soft background music or environmental sounds, such as birdsong or the noise of waves against the beach, is often comfortingly pleasurable or reassuring. On the other, alarms are usually auditory for a reason. Nevertheless, people somehow have to identify, from among the babble that surrounds them, the sounds and speech of interest and importance and to follow the thread of a chosen speaker in a crowded auditory environment. Additionally, irrelevant or unwanted chatter or other background noise should not hinder concentration on matters of greater interest or importance—students should ideally be able to study effectively despite noisy classrooms or university halls while still being open to the possibility of important interruptions from elsewhere. The scientific study of auditory attention has been driven by such practical problems: how people somehow manage to select the most interesting or most relevant speaker from the competing auditory demands made by the speech of others or isolate the music of the band from the chatter of the nightclub. In parallel, the causes of auditory distraction—and how to try to avoid it where necessary—have also been subject to scrutiny. A complete theory of auditory attention must account for the mechanisms by which selective attention is achieved, the causes of auditory distraction, and the reasons why individuals might differ in their ability in both cases.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128385750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-28DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.244
E. Higgins, E. Nakkawita
Self-discrepancy theory and regulatory focus theory are two related motivational theories. Self-discrepancy theory describes the associations between self and affect, positing that the relations among different sets of self-concepts influence a person’s emotional experience. A discrepancy between a person’s ideal self-guide (e.g., hopes and aspirations) and his or her actual self-concept produces dejection-related emotions (e.g., sadness), whereas a discrepancy between a person’s ought self-guide (e.g., duties and obligations) and his or her actual self-concept produces agitation-related emotions (e.g., anxiety). The intensity of these emotional experiences depends upon the magnitude and accessibility of the associated discrepancy. Regulatory focus theory builds on self-discrepancy theory, positing that distinct self-regulatory systems are reflected in the two types of self-guides proposed in self-discrepancy theory. The promotion system is motivated by ideal end-states, by pursuing hopes and aspirations; as a result, it is primarily concerned with the presence or absence of positive outcomes—with gains and non-gains. Given this focus on gains and non-gains, the promotion system is motivated by fundamental needs for nurturance and growth. In contrast, the prevention system is motivated by ought end-states, by fulfilling duties and obligations; as a result, it is primarily concerned with the presence or absence of negative outcomes—with losses and non-losses. Given this focus on losses and non-losses, the prevention system is motivated by fundamental needs for safety and security. The promotion and prevention systems predict a range of important variables relating to cognition, performance, and decision-making.
{"title":"Self-Discrepancy and Regulatory Focus","authors":"E. Higgins, E. Nakkawita","doi":"10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.244","url":null,"abstract":"Self-discrepancy theory and regulatory focus theory are two related motivational theories. Self-discrepancy theory describes the associations between self and affect, positing that the relations among different sets of self-concepts influence a person’s emotional experience. A discrepancy between a person’s ideal self-guide (e.g., hopes and aspirations) and his or her actual self-concept produces dejection-related emotions (e.g., sadness), whereas a discrepancy between a person’s ought self-guide (e.g., duties and obligations) and his or her actual self-concept produces agitation-related emotions (e.g., anxiety). The intensity of these emotional experiences depends upon the magnitude and accessibility of the associated discrepancy.\u0000 Regulatory focus theory builds on self-discrepancy theory, positing that distinct self-regulatory systems are reflected in the two types of self-guides proposed in self-discrepancy theory. The promotion system is motivated by ideal end-states, by pursuing hopes and aspirations; as a result, it is primarily concerned with the presence or absence of positive outcomes—with gains and non-gains. Given this focus on gains and non-gains, the promotion system is motivated by fundamental needs for nurturance and growth. In contrast, the prevention system is motivated by ought end-states, by fulfilling duties and obligations; as a result, it is primarily concerned with the presence or absence of negative outcomes—with losses and non-losses. Given this focus on losses and non-losses, the prevention system is motivated by fundamental needs for safety and security. The promotion and prevention systems predict a range of important variables relating to cognition, performance, and decision-making.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114720981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-26DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.93
N. Ashkanasy, A. Bialkowski
Beginning in the 1980s, interest in studying emotions in organizational psychology has been on the rise. Prior to 2003, however, researchers in organizational psychology and organizational behavior tended to focus on only one or two levels of analysis. Ashkanasy argued that emotions are more appropriately conceived of as spanning all levels of organizational analysis, and introduced a theory of emotions in organizations that spans five levels of analysis. Level 1 of the model refers to within-person temporal variations in mood and emotion, which employees experience in their everyday working lives. Level 2 refers to individual differences in emotional intelligence and trait affectivity (i.e., between-person emotional variables). Level 3 relates to the perception of emotions in dyadic interactions. Level 4 relates to the emotional states and process that take place between leaders and group members. Level 5 involves organization-wide variables. The article concludes with a discussion of how, via the concept of emotional intelligence, emotions at each level of the model form an integrated picture of emotions in organizational settings.
{"title":"Emotions at Work","authors":"N. Ashkanasy, A. Bialkowski","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.93","url":null,"abstract":"Beginning in the 1980s, interest in studying emotions in organizational psychology has been on the rise. Prior to 2003, however, researchers in organizational psychology and organizational behavior tended to focus on only one or two levels of analysis. Ashkanasy argued that emotions are more appropriately conceived of as spanning all levels of organizational analysis, and introduced a theory of emotions in organizations that spans five levels of analysis. Level 1 of the model refers to within-person temporal variations in mood and emotion, which employees experience in their everyday working lives. Level 2 refers to individual differences in emotional intelligence and trait affectivity (i.e., between-person emotional variables). Level 3 relates to the perception of emotions in dyadic interactions. Level 4 relates to the emotional states and process that take place between leaders and group members. Level 5 involves organization-wide variables. The article concludes with a discussion of how, via the concept of emotional intelligence, emotions at each level of the model form an integrated picture of emotions in organizational settings.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126931160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-26DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.637
M. Eby
Projective psychodiagnostics refers to the use of psychological instruments through which the subject is asked to respond to a set of ambiguous (though often suggestive) stimuli, thereby “projecting” aspects of their personality into these responses. The most prominent of these instruments includes the Rorschach Inkblot Technique, in which the subject is confronted with ten inkblots and is asked what these stimuli look like, and then what perceptual features make them look that way. Another common projective technique is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a storytelling exercise in which the subject responds with a narrative to a series of ambiguous but sometimes highly charged black and white pictures depicting human interactions. Over time, new pictures have been developed for similar storytelling instruments targeted to children (the Children’s Apperception Test) or different ethnic populations. Both of these tests emerged under the influence of psychodynamic theories, and of the work of Carl Jung, whose Word Association Test served as a projective measure of psychological conflicts. Finally, there is a series of drawing tests which, while less commonly used, have had a projective history, including human figure drawings, the Bender–Gestalt Test, and the Wartegg Drawing Completion Test. Projective instruments have been used in a variety of psychiatric settings and have been criticized for being insufficiently grounded in either quantitative measures or scientific validity. The Rorschach has emerged with increasingly statistically based scoring systems addressing perceptual features, language, and content in the assessment of risk and diagnosis. The TAT is essentially a structured interview (since most scoring systems are not used by clinicians), but it nonetheless appears to be useful in gleaning information about a subject’s relationships with other people. Drawing tasks and sentence completion tests (derived from word association tests) are less commonly used, though more prevalent with children whose verbal abilities may be more limited. In general, projective tests appear to have some limited ability to define diagnosis and risk (and can be especially helpful in defining thought disorder and prognosis), but they may be most useful in helping clinicians obtain a deeper picture of conflicts and resources within the person tested.
{"title":"Projective Psychodiagnostics: Inkblots, Stories, and Drawings as Clinical Measures","authors":"M. Eby","doi":"10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.637","url":null,"abstract":"Projective psychodiagnostics refers to the use of psychological instruments through which the subject is asked to respond to a set of ambiguous (though often suggestive) stimuli, thereby “projecting” aspects of their personality into these responses. The most prominent of these instruments includes the Rorschach Inkblot Technique, in which the subject is confronted with ten inkblots and is asked what these stimuli look like, and then what perceptual features make them look that way. Another common projective technique is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a storytelling exercise in which the subject responds with a narrative to a series of ambiguous but sometimes highly charged black and white pictures depicting human interactions. Over time, new pictures have been developed for similar storytelling instruments targeted to children (the Children’s Apperception Test) or different ethnic populations. Both of these tests emerged under the influence of psychodynamic theories, and of the work of Carl Jung, whose Word Association Test served as a projective measure of psychological conflicts. Finally, there is a series of drawing tests which, while less commonly used, have had a projective history, including human figure drawings, the Bender–Gestalt Test, and the Wartegg Drawing Completion Test.\u0000 Projective instruments have been used in a variety of psychiatric settings and have been criticized for being insufficiently grounded in either quantitative measures or scientific validity. The Rorschach has emerged with increasingly statistically based scoring systems addressing perceptual features, language, and content in the assessment of risk and diagnosis. The TAT is essentially a structured interview (since most scoring systems are not used by clinicians), but it nonetheless appears to be useful in gleaning information about a subject’s relationships with other people. Drawing tasks and sentence completion tests (derived from word association tests) are less commonly used, though more prevalent with children whose verbal abilities may be more limited. In general, projective tests appear to have some limited ability to define diagnosis and risk (and can be especially helpful in defining thought disorder and prognosis), but they may be most useful in helping clinicians obtain a deeper picture of conflicts and resources within the person tested.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121487918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-26DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.536
P. Brust-Renck, Rebecca B Weldon, V. Reyna
Everyday life is comprised of a series of decisions, from choosing what to wear to deciding what major to declare in college and whom to share a life with. Modern era economic theories were first brought into psychology in the 1950s and 1960s by Ward Edwards and Herbert Simon. Simon suggested that individuals do not always choose the best alternative among the options because they are bounded by cognitive limitations (e.g., memory). People who choose the good-enough option “satisfice” rather than optimize, because they are bounded by their limited time, knowledge, and computational capacity. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky were among those who took the next step by demonstrating that individuals are not only limited but are inconsistent in their preferences, and hence irrational. Describing a series of biases and fallacies, they elaborated intuitive strategies (i.e., heuristics) that people tend to use when faced with difficult questions (e.g., “What proportion of long-distance relationships break up within a year?”) by answering based on simpler, similar questions (e.g., “Do instances of swift breakups of long-distance relationships come readily to mind?”). More recently, the emotion-versus-reason debate has been incorporated into the field as an approach to how judgments can be governed by two fundamentally different processes, such as intuition (or affect) and reasoning (or deliberation). A series of dual-process approaches by Seymour Epstein, George Lowenstein, Elke Weber, Paul Slovic, and Ellen Peters, among others, attempt to explain how a decision based on emotional and/or impulsive judgments (i.e., system 1) should be distinguished from those that are based on a slow process that is governed by rules of reasoning (i.e., system 2). Valerie Reyna and Charles Brainerd and other scholars take a different approach to dual processes and propose a theory—fuzzy-trace theory—that incorporates many of the prior theoretical elements but also introduces the novel concept of gist mental representations of information (i.e., essential meaning) shaped by culture and experience. Adding to processes of emotion or reward sensitivity and reasoning or deliberation, fuzzy-trace theory characterizes gist as insightful intuition (as opposed to crude system 1 intuition) and contrasts it with verbatim or precise processing that does not consist of meaningful interpretation. Some of these new perspectives explain classic paradoxes and predict new effects that allow us to better understand human judgment and decision making. More recent contributions to the field include research in neuroscience, in particular from neuroeconomics.
{"title":"Judgment and Decision Making","authors":"P. Brust-Renck, Rebecca B Weldon, V. Reyna","doi":"10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.536","url":null,"abstract":"Everyday life is comprised of a series of decisions, from choosing what to wear to deciding what major to declare in college and whom to share a life with. Modern era economic theories were first brought into psychology in the 1950s and 1960s by Ward Edwards and Herbert Simon. Simon suggested that individuals do not always choose the best alternative among the options because they are bounded by cognitive limitations (e.g., memory). People who choose the good-enough option “satisfice” rather than optimize, because they are bounded by their limited time, knowledge, and computational capacity. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky were among those who took the next step by demonstrating that individuals are not only limited but are inconsistent in their preferences, and hence irrational. Describing a series of biases and fallacies, they elaborated intuitive strategies (i.e., heuristics) that people tend to use when faced with difficult questions (e.g., “What proportion of long-distance relationships break up within a year?”) by answering based on simpler, similar questions (e.g., “Do instances of swift breakups of long-distance relationships come readily to mind?”).\u0000 More recently, the emotion-versus-reason debate has been incorporated into the field as an approach to how judgments can be governed by two fundamentally different processes, such as intuition (or affect) and reasoning (or deliberation). A series of dual-process approaches by Seymour Epstein, George Lowenstein, Elke Weber, Paul Slovic, and Ellen Peters, among others, attempt to explain how a decision based on emotional and/or impulsive judgments (i.e., system 1) should be distinguished from those that are based on a slow process that is governed by rules of reasoning (i.e., system 2). Valerie Reyna and Charles Brainerd and other scholars take a different approach to dual processes and propose a theory—fuzzy-trace theory—that incorporates many of the prior theoretical elements but also introduces the novel concept of gist mental representations of information (i.e., essential meaning) shaped by culture and experience. Adding to processes of emotion or reward sensitivity and reasoning or deliberation, fuzzy-trace theory characterizes gist as insightful intuition (as opposed to crude system 1 intuition) and contrasts it with verbatim or precise processing that does not consist of meaningful interpretation. Some of these new perspectives explain classic paradoxes and predict new effects that allow us to better understand human judgment and decision making. More recent contributions to the field include research in neuroscience, in particular from neuroeconomics.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122065543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-25DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.513
P. Hegarty, Emma Sarter
Between the late 1960s and early 1980s, gender became an important topic in U.S. social psychology, raising questions about the conceptual relationship between “sex” and “gender.” A second-wave feminist project to describe differences between women and men as previously exaggerated and currently changeable was aligned with social psychology’s emphasis on the distorting power of stereotypes and the strong influence of immediate situations on human behavior. Feminism and social psychology both suggested psychology could foment social transformation, and the authors and participants of psychological research have undoubtedly become far less “womanless” in the past half-century. By the late 1980s several incommensurate social psychologies of gender existed, creating debates about the meaning of emphasizing gender differences and similarities and the gendered social psychology of psychological science itself. However, psychology remained largely a “white space” in the 1970s and 1980s, which were also “difficult decades” in transgender history. The increasing recognition of intersectional feminism and trans-affirmative perspectives in the 2010s set the context for regarding this history from different contemporary standpoints.
{"title":"The Social Psychology of Sex and Gender","authors":"P. Hegarty, Emma Sarter","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.513","url":null,"abstract":"Between the late 1960s and early 1980s, gender became an important topic in U.S. social psychology, raising questions about the conceptual relationship between “sex” and “gender.” A second-wave feminist project to describe differences between women and men as previously exaggerated and currently changeable was aligned with social psychology’s emphasis on the distorting power of stereotypes and the strong influence of immediate situations on human behavior. Feminism and social psychology both suggested psychology could foment social transformation, and the authors and participants of psychological research have undoubtedly become far less “womanless” in the past half-century. By the late 1980s several incommensurate social psychologies of gender existed, creating debates about the meaning of emphasizing gender differences and similarities and the gendered social psychology of psychological science itself. However, psychology remained largely a “white space” in the 1970s and 1980s, which were also “difficult decades” in transgender history. The increasing recognition of intersectional feminism and trans-affirmative perspectives in the 2010s set the context for regarding this history from different contemporary standpoints.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130361666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-23DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.837
S. Moorey, S. Hollon
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) has the strongest evidence base of all the psychological treatments for depression. It has been shown to be effective in reducing symptoms of depression and preventing relapse. All models of CBT share in common an assumption that emotional states are created and maintained through learned patterns of thoughts and behaviors and that new and more helpful patterns can be learned through psychological interventions. They also share a commitment to empirical testing of the theory and clinical practice. Beck’s Cognitive Therapy sees negative distorted thinking as central to depression and is the most established form of CBT for depression. Behavioral approaches, such as Behavioral Activation, which emphasize behavioral rather than cognitive change, also has a growing evidence base. Promising results are emerging from therapies such as Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) and rumination-focused therapy that focus on the process of managing thoughts rather than their content. Its efficacy-established CBT now faces the challenge of cost-effective dissemination to depressed people in the community.
{"title":"Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Depression","authors":"S. Moorey, S. Hollon","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.837","url":null,"abstract":"Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) has the strongest evidence base of all the psychological treatments for depression. It has been shown to be effective in reducing symptoms of depression and preventing relapse. All models of CBT share in common an assumption that emotional states are created and maintained through learned patterns of thoughts and behaviors and that new and more helpful patterns can be learned through psychological interventions. They also share a commitment to empirical testing of the theory and clinical practice. Beck’s Cognitive Therapy sees negative distorted thinking as central to depression and is the most established form of CBT for depression. Behavioral approaches, such as Behavioral Activation, which emphasize behavioral rather than cognitive change, also has a growing evidence base. Promising results are emerging from therapies such as Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) and rumination-focused therapy that focus on the process of managing thoughts rather than their content. Its efficacy-established CBT now faces the challenge of cost-effective dissemination to depressed people in the community.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123123706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-23DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.79
Julia Browne, C. Cather, K. Mueser
Common factors, or characteristics that are present across psychotherapies, have long been considered important to fostering positive psychotherapy outcomes. The contextual model offers an overarching theoretical framework for how common factors facilitate therapeutic change. Specifically, this model posits that improvements occur through three primary pathways: (a) the real relationship, (b) expectations, and (c) specific ingredients. The most-well-studied common factors, which also are described within the contextual model, include the therapeutic alliance, therapist empathy, positive regard, genuineness, and client expectations. Empirical studies have demonstrated that a strong therapeutic alliance, higher ratings of therapist empathy, positive regard, genuineness, and more favorable outcome expectations are related to improved treatment outcomes. Yet, the long-standing debate continues regarding whether psychotherapy outcomes are most heavily determined by these common factors or by factors specific to the type of therapy used. There have been calls for an integration of the two perspectives and a shift toward evaluating mechanisms as a way to move the field forward. Nonetheless, the common factors are valuable in treatment delivery and should be a focus in delivering psychotherapy.
{"title":"Common Factors in Psychotherapy","authors":"Julia Browne, C. Cather, K. Mueser","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.79","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.79","url":null,"abstract":"Common factors, or characteristics that are present across psychotherapies, have long been considered important to fostering positive psychotherapy outcomes. The contextual model offers an overarching theoretical framework for how common factors facilitate therapeutic change. Specifically, this model posits that improvements occur through three primary pathways: (a) the real relationship, (b) expectations, and (c) specific ingredients. The most-well-studied common factors, which also are described within the contextual model, include the therapeutic alliance, therapist empathy, positive regard, genuineness, and client expectations. Empirical studies have demonstrated that a strong therapeutic alliance, higher ratings of therapist empathy, positive regard, genuineness, and more favorable outcome expectations are related to improved treatment outcomes. Yet, the long-standing debate continues regarding whether psychotherapy outcomes are most heavily determined by these common factors or by factors specific to the type of therapy used. There have been calls for an integration of the two perspectives and a shift toward evaluating mechanisms as a way to move the field forward. Nonetheless, the common factors are valuable in treatment delivery and should be a focus in delivering psychotherapy.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123232344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-23DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.791
S. Pellis, V. Pellis
Play behavior is relatively rare in the animal kingdom, but is widespread, and in some lineages is very common not only in childhood but also in adulthood. It can take many forms, as playful actions can be directed to a social partner (social play), to an inanimate object (object play), or self-directed, as the animal, jumps, runs, and turns (locomotor-rotational play). Considerable progress has been made in understanding the neural, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms mammals use in regulating social play, but whether comparable mechanisms are used to regulate other forms of play, or apply to non-mammalian animals, remains to be resolved. Similarly, social play in some mammals has been demonstrated to benefit the development of sociocognitive skills and emotional resilience, while locomotor-rotational play can benefit the development of motor skills. The factors that allow some species to gain these benefits also remain to be resolved. Statistical approaches that take the relatedness of species into account are increasingly being applied to analyze a growing comparative database that includes species from many different lineages. In addition, mathematical and computational models are being used to test the explanatory power of various factors to account for the evolution of play. Coupled with new methods in neuroscience that provide a deeper understanding of the brain during play, these approaches will enable extraordinary progress in understanding play over the next few decades.
{"title":"Play","authors":"S. Pellis, V. Pellis","doi":"10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.791","url":null,"abstract":"Play behavior is relatively rare in the animal kingdom, but is widespread, and in some lineages is very common not only in childhood but also in adulthood. It can take many forms, as playful actions can be directed to a social partner (social play), to an inanimate object (object play), or self-directed, as the animal, jumps, runs, and turns (locomotor-rotational play). Considerable progress has been made in understanding the neural, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms mammals use in regulating social play, but whether comparable mechanisms are used to regulate other forms of play, or apply to non-mammalian animals, remains to be resolved. Similarly, social play in some mammals has been demonstrated to benefit the development of sociocognitive skills and emotional resilience, while locomotor-rotational play can benefit the development of motor skills. The factors that allow some species to gain these benefits also remain to be resolved. Statistical approaches that take the relatedness of species into account are increasingly being applied to analyze a growing comparative database that includes species from many different lineages. In addition, mathematical and computational models are being used to test the explanatory power of various factors to account for the evolution of play. Coupled with new methods in neuroscience that provide a deeper understanding of the brain during play, these approaches will enable extraordinary progress in understanding play over the next few decades.","PeriodicalId":339030,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology","volume":"208 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121197147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-22DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190236557.013.689
H. Klappenbach, A. Gentile, F. Ferrari, H. Scholten
Psychoanalysis in Argentina has been established as a profession since the foundation of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (1942), and the perspective of Melanie Klein initially predominated. Before that institutional event, Freud’s theories were considered in a more far-reaching and less homogeneous intellectual and medical field. At the beginning of the 20th century, Freud’s first readers in Argentina were strongly influenced by French culture and science. Although the initial mention of Freud’s work was by a Chilean doctor, Germán Greve, intellectuals such as José Ingenieros or Enrique Mouchet also read him from a critical perspective. In the 1950s and 1960s, consolidated psychoanalytic institutional spaces had been developed in Buenos Aires, while in the other provinces there was still the gestation of the institutional field that would allow the specific training of psychoanalysts. In two of the most important cities, Córdoba and Rosario, psychoanalysis was adopted by a group of intellectuals, physicians, and judges linked to the University Reform movement. Deodoro Roca, Jorge Orgaz, Saúl Taborda, Juan Filloy, and Gregorio Bermann adopted the Viennese theories, albeit from different perspectives. In Rosario, the figure of Pizarro Crespo not only integrated Freud’s ideas into a psychosomatic perspective, but, in an unsuspected way, constitutes the first reference to Jacques Lacan’s work in Argentina. Toward the 1960s, the creation of undergraduate psychology programs was marked by the presence of notable teachers linked to psychoanalysis. Around the same time, a new paradigm was introduced into psychoanalysis: Lacanianism. Within the framework of the reception of structuralism, the theories of Louis Althusser and the first discussions of Lacan’s teaching began to spread. This new paradigm had a decisive impact on different professional fields and varying social sciences in the country. While Oscar Masotta became one of the main disseminators of Lacan in Buenos Aires, Raúl Sciarretta and Rafael Paz were more relevant in other provinces of the country, particularly in the cities of Córdoba, Rosario, and Tucumán, cities where the institutionalization of psychoanalysis was strengthened from the 1970s onwards.
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