Pub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.1177/01914537231184493
Millicent Churcher
This paper develops the concept of epistemic apprenticeship as a response to failures among privileged social actors to perceive the knowledge bases of unjustly marginalised groups as sources of valuable insight. Inspired by Elizabeth Spelman’s reflections on apprenticeship and intersectional feminism, an epistemic apprenticeship represents an obverse form of apprenticeship; one in which socially privileged knowers become apprentices to those who do not enjoy equivalent power and privilege. This paper critiques and extends Spelman’s account of apprenticeship by focussing on how the institutional sedimentation of dominant social imaginaries works against the volitional and virtuous practice of apprenticeship, and by exploring what a commitment to epistemic apprenticeship demands at the level of institutional practice. As part of this discussion, I scrutinise the conditions under which institutionalised apprenticeships may fall short of their meliorative potential, and may obstruct rather than aid efforts to achieve greater epistemic justice.
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Pub Date : 2023-06-23DOI: 10.1177/01914537231184489
C. Barker
In his later lectures, Foucault analyzes confession as a key exercise of the Christian pastoral power. The pastoral power’s creation of a lifelong obligation to speak the truth of oneself is a ‘prelude’ to modern practices of government, and a key facet of modernity. There has been some confusion regarding the scope of Foucault’s study. Is it medieval Christian confessional practices or Christian obedience itself that is his theme? In this article, I revisit all of the later lectures touching on confession and avowal in order to clarify Foucault’s ambivalence about Christian proto-governmentality. Foucault exposes two regimes of truth, belief and confession, and offer a practice-based, confession-centred history of the pre-modern self. Connecting his lectures to his method of anarchaeology clarifies how the force of truth (the ‘you have to’) is, for Foucault, a fundamental if ambivalent historical-cultural problem of government.
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Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.1177/01914537231184485
H. Jackson
This article explores the effect that communications technology has on hegemonic power. The first section establishes a theoretical framework combining Foucault’s carceral archipelago theory with Chiara Bottici’s concept of the social imaginal describing the medium through which inter- and trans-subjective imagination occurs. The remainder employs this framework to examine how four technological innovations (print media, radio, television and Internet) impact the (re)production of discursive hegemonic ideology, integrating a variety of historical and contemporary theories on public discourse and ideological dominance. I conclude by arguing that each case demonstrates a dialectic pattern that explains the techno-social evolution of the carceral archipelago.
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Pub Date : 2023-06-19DOI: 10.1177/01914537231184406
Maša Mrovlje
Despite the recent revival of revolutionary commitment in response to left melancholia, I suggest that the contemporary academic left has not adequately addressed the difficulty of responding to failure as an inevitable aspect of revolutionary politics. The dominant tendency has been to try to offset the risk of failure by managing revolutionary action in line with a pre-given model of revolutionary change – only to limit the range of possibilities for revolutionary engagement. To address this problem, I draw on Rosa Luxemburg, a foremost revolutionary thinker, whose experiences of disappointment led her to rethink the notion of revolutionary commitment as a practice of learning from failure. This rethinking of commitment suggests a different way of engaging with failure – one that expands our imagination of political possibilities beyond the confines of the dominant contemporary responses to left melancholia and enriches their visions of revolutionary change.
{"title":"The disappointment of Rosa Luxemburg: Rethinking revolutionary commitment in the face of failure","authors":"Maša Mrovlje","doi":"10.1177/01914537231184406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231184406","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the recent revival of revolutionary commitment in response to left melancholia, I suggest that the contemporary academic left has not adequately addressed the difficulty of responding to failure as an inevitable aspect of revolutionary politics. The dominant tendency has been to try to offset the risk of failure by managing revolutionary action in line with a pre-given model of revolutionary change – only to limit the range of possibilities for revolutionary engagement. To address this problem, I draw on Rosa Luxemburg, a foremost revolutionary thinker, whose experiences of disappointment led her to rethink the notion of revolutionary commitment as a practice of learning from failure. This rethinking of commitment suggests a different way of engaging with failure – one that expands our imagination of political possibilities beyond the confines of the dominant contemporary responses to left melancholia and enriches their visions of revolutionary change.","PeriodicalId":339635,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Social Criticism","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115620086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-19DOI: 10.1177/01914537231184490
Ignas Kalpokas
From a Benjaminian point of view, AI-generated art is distinct from both ‘traditional’ art and technologically enabled reproduction, for example, photography and film. Instead of mere mechanical representation of the world as it is presented to a device, AI-generated art involves identification and inventive representation of data patterns. This specific mode of data-based generation exceeds mere surface-level mimicry and enables deeper meaning, namely, an insight into the collective unconscious of the society. In this way, AI-generated art is never detached from society and the predominant social conditions while also reflecting the technology-induced transformations that today’s societies are undergoing. Thus, AI-generated art can be seen as capable of partly reversing the loss of auratic capacities that hand ensued with mechanical reproduction. Still, as a matter of continuity, AI-generated works enable the maximisation of exhibition value and capacity for audience enjoyment, rendering AI-generated art perfect for the age of increasing distraction.
{"title":"Work of art in the Age of Its AI Reproduction","authors":"Ignas Kalpokas","doi":"10.1177/01914537231184490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231184490","url":null,"abstract":"From a Benjaminian point of view, AI-generated art is distinct from both ‘traditional’ art and technologically enabled reproduction, for example, photography and film. Instead of mere mechanical representation of the world as it is presented to a device, AI-generated art involves identification and inventive representation of data patterns. This specific mode of data-based generation exceeds mere surface-level mimicry and enables deeper meaning, namely, an insight into the collective unconscious of the society. In this way, AI-generated art is never detached from society and the predominant social conditions while also reflecting the technology-induced transformations that today’s societies are undergoing. Thus, AI-generated art can be seen as capable of partly reversing the loss of auratic capacities that hand ensued with mechanical reproduction. Still, as a matter of continuity, AI-generated works enable the maximisation of exhibition value and capacity for audience enjoyment, rendering AI-generated art perfect for the age of increasing distraction.","PeriodicalId":339635,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Social Criticism","volume":"44 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123181013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-18DOI: 10.1177/01914537231184494
Jonathan Harmat
The present inquiry concerns ‘affective governmentality’ and is guided by the following question: How did affects become intelligible objects of knowledge and what enabled a scientific conception of affect to turn into a distinctive government of affect? In answering this question, the article first outlines how a lineage of thinkers used the speculative tools of geometry to conceptualize and deduce human affects. Through an analysis of Spinoza’s Political Treatise, the article then investigates how this geometric conception of affect enabled a productive and indirect government of affect. The article’s contribution to the study of affective governmentality is twofold: First, it advances the methodological claim that the proper register to study affects in governmentality is anatomo-political rather than biopolitical. Second, the analysis of the Political Treatise exemplifies, nuances and substantiates our understanding of how desires and affects were reconceptualized geometrically to conceive a government of bodies and souls.
{"title":"The anatomo-politics of affect: An investigation of affective governmentality","authors":"Jonathan Harmat","doi":"10.1177/01914537231184494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231184494","url":null,"abstract":"The present inquiry concerns ‘affective governmentality’ and is guided by the following question: How did affects become intelligible objects of knowledge and what enabled a scientific conception of affect to turn into a distinctive government of affect? In answering this question, the article first outlines how a lineage of thinkers used the speculative tools of geometry to conceptualize and deduce human affects. Through an analysis of Spinoza’s Political Treatise, the article then investigates how this geometric conception of affect enabled a productive and indirect government of affect. The article’s contribution to the study of affective governmentality is twofold: First, it advances the methodological claim that the proper register to study affects in governmentality is anatomo-political rather than biopolitical. Second, the analysis of the Political Treatise exemplifies, nuances and substantiates our understanding of how desires and affects were reconceptualized geometrically to conceive a government of bodies and souls.","PeriodicalId":339635,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Social Criticism","volume":"281 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127510062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-17DOI: 10.1177/01914537231184486
Orlando Hawkins
In arguing that slavery is not a relic of the past, but a relational dynamic undergirded by an ontology of anti-Blackness that prevents Blacks from ever being considered human beings, the self-described Afropessimist, Frank Wilderson III, argues that Black people occupy the position of social death in the present. Due to this anti-Black condition, Wilderson concludes that no form of redress is possible to assuage, liberate, and redeem Black people from this anti-Black condition other than the “End of the World.” Drawing upon Fredrich Nietzsche’s understanding of the problem of nihilism and its existential consequences, I argue that while Afropessimism is useful for articulating the problem of anti-Blackness, it makes a nihilistic turn through Wilderson’s “End of the World” since there is no world where Blackness is experienced as anything other than social death. As a response to Wilderson, I conclude that the philosopher Jacqueline Scott’s life-affirming Nietzschean philosophy and her anti-racist activism in “Racial Nihilism as Racial Courage” is one adequate response to the nihilistic threat to Black America if Black people are condemned to a life of social death because of the enduring nature of anti-Black racism.
自称为非洲悲观主义者的弗兰克·怀尔德森三世(Frank Wilderson III)认为，奴隶制不是过去的遗物，而是一种以反黑人本体为基础的关系动态，这种本体使黑人永远无法被视为人类。他认为，黑人目前处于社会死亡的位置。由于这种反黑人的状况，Wilderson得出结论，除了“世界末日”之外，没有任何形式的补救措施可以缓解、解放和拯救黑人。借鉴弗里德里希·尼采对虚无主义问题及其存在主义后果的理解，我认为，虽然非洲悲观主义对阐明反黑性问题有用，但它通过威尔德森的“世界末日”进行了虚无主义的转向，因为除了社会死亡之外，没有任何世界可以将黑性体验为其他东西。作为对怀尔德森的回应，我总结道，哲学家杰奎琳·斯科特(Jacqueline Scott)肯定生命的尼采哲学和她在《种族虚无主义作为种族勇气》(Racial Nihilism As Racial Courage)中的反种族主义行动主义，是对虚无主义对美国黑人的威胁的一个充分回应，如果黑人因为反黑人种族主义的持久本质而注定要面临社会死亡的生活。
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Pub Date : 2023-06-11DOI: 10.1177/01914537231182912
Leonardo Fiorespino
The article aims to investigate the problematic relationship between populism and democracy by comparing the conceptions of ‘the people’ and popular sovereignty which they presuppose. In the first two sections, the populist and the democratic ‘peoples’ are reconstructed, and the unbridgeable gap dividing them is highlighted. The discussion of the democratic people requires a concise analysis of the main contemporary democratic frameworks, including deliberative democracy, ‘neo-Roman’ republicanism, agonistic democracy. The article works out the implications of the incompatibility between the two ‘sovereign peoples’ identified, and concludes that such an incompatibility undercuts the kinship of populism and democracy. While populism is often said to intertwine with democracy in some way, the article argues that it significantly departs from democratic theory and practice, and belongs to a distinct conceptual space. It cannot be made to overlap with ‘illiberal democracy’, a ‘democratic myth’, a crude electoral majoritarianism, nor does it amount to hiding undemocratic policies into properly democratic justifications. The boundary dividing populism and democracy, therefore, starts unfolding at the level of the conception of the people. While democratic theory invariably assumes a people intended as simultaneously heterogeneous and united, populism conceives of the people as a moral whole, internally undifferentiated, whose homogeneity and intrinsic righteousness preclude the task of specifying what popular sovereignty ultimately means. Such specification, on the other hand, is inescapable for any democrat assuming the people as a composite unity. The last section addresses four possible objections to the argument, variously formulated by Ernesto Laclau and by scholars approaching populism from a post-Laclauian or discursive-performative perspective.
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Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1177/01914537231176460
Vangelis Giannakakis
The present social-historical moment is marked by a sharp divide, a harrowing ‘communication breakdown’ between subject and object, between humanity and nature, between humanity and itself. This state of affairs pleads for the (re-)elaboration of a consciousness that resonates critically with the social, political and cultural realities of its time. This paper studies the lessons that can be drawn in this regard from the intersection between, on the one hand, Theodor W. Adorno’s ‘philosophical interpretation’ and his idea of an historically adequate consciousness, and, on the other, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ and his conception of the historically effected consciousness. The paper opens with a concise reconstruction of Adorno’s ‘philosophical interpretation’ as a critical response to instrumental rationality that borrows insights from radical historicism. The focus then shifts to Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ which is read as a similar type of protest against instrumental reason that privileges dialogical forms of enculturation. Finally, the paper closes with some suggestive yet inconclusive reflections on some important elements of convergence/divergence between the two thinkers, notably, their theorisations of immanent and transcended critique, the role they ascribe to tradition and language vis- à-vis experience, and the special place of ‘mimesis’ in it. Overall, the argument is made that a ‘negative hermeneutics’ may be what is needed to fashion new interpretations of the world, to foster alternative ways of thinking about and being in it, which, pace Marx, go hand in hand with its transformation – or, perhaps more aptly nowadays, the mere feat of sparing it.
当前的社会历史时刻以一种尖锐的分裂为标志，在主体与客体之间，在人类与自然之间，在人类与自身之间，一种令人痛苦的“沟通崩溃”。这种事态要求(重新)阐述一种意识，这种意识与当时的社会、政治和文化现实产生批判性的共鸣。本文研究了这方面的经验教训，一方面，西奥多·阿多诺(Theodor W. Adorno)的“哲学解释”和他关于历史上适当的意识的观点，另一方面，汉斯-乔治·伽达默尔(Hans-Georg Gadamer)的“哲学解释学”和他关于历史上受影响的意识的概念。本文以阿多诺的“哲学解释”的简明重建作为对工具理性的批判性回应，借用了激进历史主义的见解。然后焦点转移到伽达默尔的“哲学解释学”，它被解读为对工具理性的类似抗议，工具理性赋予了对话形式的文化。最后，本文以对两位思想家之间趋同/分歧的一些重要因素的一些暗示性但不确定的反思作为结束，特别是他们对内在和超越批判的理论，他们赋予传统和语言对à-vis经验的作用，以及“模仿”在其中的特殊地位。总的来说，这个论点是，“消极解释学”可能是时尚世界的新解释所需要的，以培养思考和存在于其中的替代方式，这，按照马克思的步伐，与世界的转变携手并进——或者，也许更贴切的是，仅仅是拯救世界的成就。
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Pub Date : 2023-05-06DOI: 10.1177/01914537231171418
Bernardo Ferro
In the preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel compares the philosopher’s work to the flight of the owl of Minerva: just as the latter begins only with the fall of dusk, so too is philosophy bound to ‘come on the scene’ too late to teach ‘what the world ought to be’. This well-known passage has been read in many quarters as a heavy, if not fatal blow to philosophy’s critical role. While some interpreters regard Hegel’s metaphor as an outright rejection of critical theory, others see it as a restriction of philosophy’s normative dimension. In this article, I argue against both of these interpretations. In my view, Hegel’s methodological indications are not incompatible with a critical outlook on received reality. What is more, they do not preclude the possibility of a radical critique of received reality. To show why, I argue that the Philosophy of Right is primarily aimed at a normative reconstruction of existing social and political arrangements, which entails both a retrospective and a prospective dimension. Moreover, I claim that this duality is one of the most original features of Hegel’s practical thought, and the key to its enduring political relevance.
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