Pub Date : 2017-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1322850
T. Manu
ABSTRACT The rigid interface between the enforcement provisions of patents under TRIPS standards and the institutional, technical and human resource capacity deficiencies means that political decisions to exploit the TRIPS flexibilities to promote access to medicines in the context of Africa is almost an exercise in futility. Notably, the Development Agenda under the auspices of WIPO often follows the North-South model, and the failings are well documented in the empirical literature, as this has brought little institutional change. For instance, the judiciary that could help to provide an interpretation of the TRIPS flexibilities to promote public health simply lacks capacity. At the same time, the Indian judiciary, through the lens of human rights norms, is widely known for its functional activism in the interpretation of the TRIPS provisions consistent with public health protection, and is the best example for African countries. It is on this basis that this paper attempts a critical exploration of judicial cooperation based on a South-South model with a view to underlining its doctrinal significance for African countries. Therefore, the author questions the rationality of African countries’ exclusive reliance on so-called North-South capacity building and argues that the South-South judicial cooperation model would provide a logical platform that could operate alongside the conventional North-South system for building institutional, technical, and human resource-based aspects of capacity for its judiciary to interpret TRIPS in a manner consistent with human rights norms to promote access to medicines.
{"title":"Interpretation of TRIPS provisions in a manner consistent with human rights instruments: a policy option for the exploration of South-South judicial cooperation","authors":"T. Manu","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1322850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1322850","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The rigid interface between the enforcement provisions of patents under TRIPS standards and the institutional, technical and human resource capacity deficiencies means that political decisions to exploit the TRIPS flexibilities to promote access to medicines in the context of Africa is almost an exercise in futility. Notably, the Development Agenda under the auspices of WIPO often follows the North-South model, and the failings are well documented in the empirical literature, as this has brought little institutional change. For instance, the judiciary that could help to provide an interpretation of the TRIPS flexibilities to promote public health simply lacks capacity. At the same time, the Indian judiciary, through the lens of human rights norms, is widely known for its functional activism in the interpretation of the TRIPS provisions consistent with public health protection, and is the best example for African countries. It is on this basis that this paper attempts a critical exploration of judicial cooperation based on a South-South model with a view to underlining its doctrinal significance for African countries. Therefore, the author questions the rationality of African countries’ exclusive reliance on so-called North-South capacity building and argues that the South-South judicial cooperation model would provide a logical platform that could operate alongside the conventional North-South system for building institutional, technical, and human resource-based aspects of capacity for its judiciary to interpret TRIPS in a manner consistent with human rights norms to promote access to medicines.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"17 1","pages":"1 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1322850","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46304952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1332897
Mohammud Jaamae Hafeez-Baig, Jordan English
ABSTRACT In Canada (Attorney General) v Fairmont Hotels Inc 2016 SCC 56 the Supreme Court of Canada corrected a wrong turn in the Canadian law of rectification, returning it to a position of harmony with the approach taken in English and Australian law. This note examines the case and explores the position adopted in two leading Commonwealth jurisdictions: England and Australia.
{"title":"The Supreme Court rectifies a wrong turn in Canadian law","authors":"Mohammud Jaamae Hafeez-Baig, Jordan English","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1332897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1332897","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Canada (Attorney General) v Fairmont Hotels Inc 2016 SCC 56 the Supreme Court of Canada corrected a wrong turn in the Canadian law of rectification, returning it to a position of harmony with the approach taken in English and Australian law. This note examines the case and explores the position adopted in two leading Commonwealth jurisdictions: England and Australia.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"17 1","pages":"144 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1332897","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44731337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1342756
Michael R. Douglas
ABSTRACT In The ‘Halcyon Isle’, a bare majority of the Privy Council held that questions as to the recognition of a foreign maritime lien are to be determined by the lex fori. The case divided the common law world. Recently, in The Ship ‘Sam Hawk’ v Reiter Petroleum Inc, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia held that The ‘Halcyon Isle’ should apply in Australia. The practical effect of the decision is that it will prevent many creditors, who could assert the existence of a maritime lien under United States law, from proceeding in rem in Australia. The case is also notable for providing a rare discussion of characterisation in a choice-of-law problem. This comment explores what The ‘Sam Hawk’ means for maritime law and private international law more broadly.
{"title":"Characterisation of a foreign maritime lien by the lex fori","authors":"Michael R. Douglas","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1342756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1342756","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In The ‘Halcyon Isle’, a bare majority of the Privy Council held that questions as to the recognition of a foreign maritime lien are to be determined by the lex fori. The case divided the common law world. Recently, in The Ship ‘Sam Hawk’ v Reiter Petroleum Inc, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia held that The ‘Halcyon Isle’ should apply in Australia. The practical effect of the decision is that it will prevent many creditors, who could assert the existence of a maritime lien under United States law, from proceeding in rem in Australia. The case is also notable for providing a rare discussion of characterisation in a choice-of-law problem. This comment explores what The ‘Sam Hawk’ means for maritime law and private international law more broadly.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"17 1","pages":"152 - 161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1342756","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43019909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1306943
M. Bari
ABSTRACT The resort to the extreme power of preventive detention, which contradicts the basic tenets of human rights by permitting executive dispensation of the right to liberty, is generally recognised as an administrative necessity in times of grave emergencies, such as war, external aggression, subversion or civil unrest, to prevent mischief against the state. Unlike the constitutions of India and Pakistan, the Constitution of Bangladesh did not originally warrant the exercise of the power of preventive detention under any circumstances. However, on 22 September 1973, the Constitution of Bangladesh was amended thereby empowering the Parliament to enact laws concerning preventive detention, without stipulating the safeguards necessary for mitigating the harshness of such laws. Furthermore, the 1973 Constitutional Amendment neither confines the power of preventive detention to formally declared periods of emergency nor specifies a maximum time-frame for keeping an individual in preventive custody. This article will argue that the weakness of the constitutional provisions concerning preventive detention has facilitated the excessive and unjust use of preventive detention during declared periods of emergency in Bangladesh. Consequently, this article will put forward recommendations for an amendment to the Constitution of Bangladesh inserting a number of guarantees that will prevent the abuse of the powers concerning preventive detention and also safeguard humane treatment of the individuals kept in preventive custody.
{"title":"Preventive detention laws in Bangladesh and their increased use during emergencies: a proposal for reform","authors":"M. Bari","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1306943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1306943","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The resort to the extreme power of preventive detention, which contradicts the basic tenets of human rights by permitting executive dispensation of the right to liberty, is generally recognised as an administrative necessity in times of grave emergencies, such as war, external aggression, subversion or civil unrest, to prevent mischief against the state. Unlike the constitutions of India and Pakistan, the Constitution of Bangladesh did not originally warrant the exercise of the power of preventive detention under any circumstances. However, on 22 September 1973, the Constitution of Bangladesh was amended thereby empowering the Parliament to enact laws concerning preventive detention, without stipulating the safeguards necessary for mitigating the harshness of such laws. Furthermore, the 1973 Constitutional Amendment neither confines the power of preventive detention to formally declared periods of emergency nor specifies a maximum time-frame for keeping an individual in preventive custody. This article will argue that the weakness of the constitutional provisions concerning preventive detention has facilitated the excessive and unjust use of preventive detention during declared periods of emergency in Bangladesh. Consequently, this article will put forward recommendations for an amendment to the Constitution of Bangladesh inserting a number of guarantees that will prevent the abuse of the powers concerning preventive detention and also safeguard humane treatment of the individuals kept in preventive custody.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"17 1","pages":"45 - 74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1306943","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48604272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1311514
Joe Tomlinson
ABSTRACT In the recent Privy Council decision of United Policyholders Group v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, Lord Carnwath supplied an interesting and helpful discussion of substantive legitimate expectations. This case note reflects on Lord Carnwath’s conclusions and how they speak to important current debates about the doctrine. In particular, it will be argued that Lord Carnwath’s conclusions provoke reflection on: (a) the status of the seminal Coughlan case in contemporary thinking about the doctrine; (b) how far claims about the advent of the protection of substantive expectations representing a worrying expansion of judicial power have been properly investigated; (c) whether it is necessary to reflect deeply on the theoretical basis of the principle; and (d) the defensibility of the ‘trend of modern authority’ to interpret the dicta in the Coughlan case ‘narrowly’.
{"title":"The narrow approach to substantive legitimate expectations and the trend of modern authority","authors":"Joe Tomlinson","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1311514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1311514","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the recent Privy Council decision of United Policyholders Group v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, Lord Carnwath supplied an interesting and helpful discussion of substantive legitimate expectations. This case note reflects on Lord Carnwath’s conclusions and how they speak to important current debates about the doctrine. In particular, it will be argued that Lord Carnwath’s conclusions provoke reflection on: (a) the status of the seminal Coughlan case in contemporary thinking about the doctrine; (b) how far claims about the advent of the protection of substantive expectations representing a worrying expansion of judicial power have been properly investigated; (c) whether it is necessary to reflect deeply on the theoretical basis of the principle; and (d) the defensibility of the ‘trend of modern authority’ to interpret the dicta in the Coughlan case ‘narrowly’.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"17 1","pages":"75 - 84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1311514","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48947313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1311513
Allan Beever
ABSTRACT This article examines the claim that assessment of the standard of care in the law of negligence utilises and must utilise considerations of utility. It argues that this position is mistaken. It also maintains that cases frequently thought to support this view do not do so. The article also examines the justice of appeals to utility in the relevant cases and examines the appropriate way to deal with emergency situations.
{"title":"Negligence and utility","authors":"Allan Beever","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1311513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1311513","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines the claim that assessment of the standard of care in the law of negligence utilises and must utilise considerations of utility. It argues that this position is mistaken. It also maintains that cases frequently thought to support this view do not do so. The article also examines the justice of appeals to utility in the relevant cases and examines the appropriate way to deal with emergency situations.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"17 1","pages":"109 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1311513","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45032505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1285103
J. Kothari, A. Ravi
ABSTRACT The last decade and a half have witnessed radical changes in the right to education in India. In 2002, a constitutional amendment codified the right to education as a fundamental constitutional right. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 (RTE Act) was subsequently enacted to provide a statutory framework for this right’s realisation. These developments have, however, not been without controversy, particularly with respect to the RTE Act’s application to linguistic and religious minority schools. In this article, we analyse the consequences of two Supreme Court judgments that exempted all minority schools from the purview of the Act. We argue that the minority exemption has diluted the core of the RTE Act, which was envisioned as a law guaranteeing the right and access to quality education to all children in India. We then make recommendations aimed at stemming the unwelcome consequences of these judgments.
{"title":"A battle of rights: the right to education of children versus rights of minority schools","authors":"J. Kothari, A. Ravi","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1285103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1285103","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The last decade and a half have witnessed radical changes in the right to education in India. In 2002, a constitutional amendment codified the right to education as a fundamental constitutional right. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 (RTE Act) was subsequently enacted to provide a statutory framework for this right’s realisation. These developments have, however, not been without controversy, particularly with respect to the RTE Act’s application to linguistic and religious minority schools. In this article, we analyse the consequences of two Supreme Court judgments that exempted all minority schools from the purview of the Act. We argue that the minority exemption has diluted the core of the RTE Act, which was envisioned as a law guaranteeing the right and access to quality education to all children in India. We then make recommendations aimed at stemming the unwelcome consequences of these judgments.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"195 - 218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1285103","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1272943
Md. Rizwanul Islam
ABSTRACT Recently in Bangladesh, there is a discernible (albeit rare) trend of the Supreme Court passing directives to the government for making laws for redressing specific wrongs or addressing some issues of public importance. While this type of directives is apparently motivated by a benevolent desire for ensuring better governance, this paper argues that this is an affront to the well-established theory of separation of powers and leads to undesired consequences. Though not intentional, this practice of issuing directives effectively undermines the government as well as the overall political system of Bangladesh. Arguably, this sort of judgments projects an image that the political forces in Bangladesh are dysfunctional and indirectly cements the power and image of apolitical forces in Bangladesh, which in the long run corrodes democratic values and undermines, if not threatens, the prospect of a functioning democracy in Bangladesh.
{"title":"Judges as legislators: benevolent exercise of powers by the higher judiciary in Bangladesh with not so benevolent consequences","authors":"Md. Rizwanul Islam","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1272943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1272943","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently in Bangladesh, there is a discernible (albeit rare) trend of the Supreme Court passing directives to the government for making laws for redressing specific wrongs or addressing some issues of public importance. While this type of directives is apparently motivated by a benevolent desire for ensuring better governance, this paper argues that this is an affront to the well-established theory of separation of powers and leads to undesired consequences. Though not intentional, this practice of issuing directives effectively undermines the government as well as the overall political system of Bangladesh. Arguably, this sort of judgments projects an image that the political forces in Bangladesh are dysfunctional and indirectly cements the power and image of apolitical forces in Bangladesh, which in the long run corrodes democratic values and undermines, if not threatens, the prospect of a functioning democracy in Bangladesh.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"219 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1272943","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59820928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1274128
Kenny Chng, Yihan Goh
ABSTRACT This note argues that the English Court of Appeal decision of MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd is a significant modification of the present understanding of consideration with respect to agreements to accept part-payments of a debt and to perform pre-existing duties, and that the preferred way forward for the development of the law should be judicial intervention by the Supreme Court to reconcile the logical inconsistencies between Foakes v Beer and Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.
{"title":"A renewed consideration of consideration: MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA CIV 553","authors":"Kenny Chng, Yihan Goh","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1274128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1274128","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This note argues that the English Court of Appeal decision of MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd is a significant modification of the present understanding of consideration with respect to agreements to accept part-payments of a debt and to perform pre-existing duties, and that the preferred way forward for the development of the law should be judicial intervention by the Supreme Court to reconcile the logical inconsistencies between Foakes v Beer and Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"323 - 332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1274128","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59820976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1276277
Steve Hedley
By many accounts, unjust enrichment is well-developed as an aspect of private law, distinct from property, contract and tort. But the reasons justifying it are not. The modern scholarship gives elaborate accounts describing the law, but has nothing substantial to offer as to why the law is there—or, indeed, whether it should be there at all. Charlie Webb’s Reason and Restitution: A Theory of Unjust Enrichment, recently published by Oxford University Press, now seeks to fill this gap. His conclusion is a striking one: while it is right that we have such a law, the reasons for it have nothing to do with unjust enrichment, and rather a lot to do with property, contract and wrongs. The idea that there is a distinct set of reasons, additional to those motivating the rest of private law, turns out to be an illusion.
{"title":"What is ‘unjust enrichment’ for?","authors":"Steve Hedley","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1276277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1276277","url":null,"abstract":"By many accounts, unjust enrichment is well-developed as an aspect of private law, distinct from property, contract and tort. But the reasons justifying it are not. The modern scholarship gives elaborate accounts describing the law, but has nothing substantial to offer as to why the law is there—or, indeed, whether it should be there at all. Charlie Webb’s Reason and Restitution: A Theory of Unjust Enrichment, recently published by Oxford University Press, now seeks to fill this gap. His conclusion is a striking one: while it is right that we have such a law, the reasons for it have nothing to do with unjust enrichment, and rather a lot to do with property, contract and wrongs. The idea that there is a distinct set of reasons, additional to those motivating the rest of private law, turns out to be an illusion.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"333 - 345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1276277","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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