The New Chinese Empire: And What it Means for the United States. By Ross Terrill. New York: Basic Books, 2003. 432 pages. $30.00. Reviewed by Richard Halloran, formerly with The New York Times as a foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington, who writes about US and Asia relations from Honolulu. This is an altogether splendid book, lucid in writing, erudite without condescension, courageous in spirit. The author boldly predicts the end of the Communist Party's rule of China at a date uncertain but to be followed by a time of turbulence. The book should be read by military officers, political leaders, diplomats, business executives, and anyone else who plans to deal seriously with China over the next decade or longer. Terrill's fundamental theme is that the Communist Party is in many ways a lineal descendant of the Chinese dynasties of yore, notably the Manchu or Qing (Ch'ing) that ruled from 1644 to 1912. "The PRC," he writes, referring to the People's Republic of China, "is an empire in that it appropriates an imperial idea of China, reinventing a 2,500 year old autocracy to control its population and hector non-Chinese neighboring peoples." The author, who is at the Center for East Asian Research at Harvard, sees today's Chinese regime as a party-state in contrast to the nation-states of the West. In a nation-state, sovereignty resides in the people and power percolates from the bottom up. In Terrill's party-state, sovereignty is held by the party, which controls the government as power trickles down. That party-state, to borrow a Marxist phrase, contains the seeds of its own destruction. "The Beijing regime is overstretched on its western and southeastern flanks, deeply corrupt, politically unstable, yet extremely ambitious," Terrill says. It has become vulnerable because "Communism has outlived its world historical role. Economic growth and crude nationalism are insufficient supports for long-term continuance of a regime. No cultural tissue connects government and people. A hovering army of unemployed grows." Terrill, who has written six other books about China, asserts that China cannot evolve but will crash, as have the dynasties before it. "I believe the Chinese populace and the rest of the world really will notice when the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] loses its monopoly of political power," he contends. "No regime in Chinese history has ever given up power without bloodshed. I do not believe the CCP party-state will be the first." In the long run, Terrill holds out a gleam of hope for the Chinese and everyone who believes that democracy is the last best hope of the human race. He says a democratic China "will ultimately come into existence, ending the dream of a Chinese empire. China as a democratic federation could be a leading force in the world and our fruitful partner in Asia for decades." Such a nation, he maintains, "infused with the actual wishes, wisdom, and heterogeneous strands of thought of the popul
{"title":"The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means for the United States","authors":"R. Halloran","doi":"10.5860/choice.41-2337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.41-2337","url":null,"abstract":"The New Chinese Empire: And What it Means for the United States. By Ross Terrill. New York: Basic Books, 2003. 432 pages. $30.00. Reviewed by Richard Halloran, formerly with The New York Times as a foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington, who writes about US and Asia relations from Honolulu. This is an altogether splendid book, lucid in writing, erudite without condescension, courageous in spirit. The author boldly predicts the end of the Communist Party's rule of China at a date uncertain but to be followed by a time of turbulence. The book should be read by military officers, political leaders, diplomats, business executives, and anyone else who plans to deal seriously with China over the next decade or longer. Terrill's fundamental theme is that the Communist Party is in many ways a lineal descendant of the Chinese dynasties of yore, notably the Manchu or Qing (Ch'ing) that ruled from 1644 to 1912. \"The PRC,\" he writes, referring to the People's Republic of China, \"is an empire in that it appropriates an imperial idea of China, reinventing a 2,500 year old autocracy to control its population and hector non-Chinese neighboring peoples.\" The author, who is at the Center for East Asian Research at Harvard, sees today's Chinese regime as a party-state in contrast to the nation-states of the West. In a nation-state, sovereignty resides in the people and power percolates from the bottom up. In Terrill's party-state, sovereignty is held by the party, which controls the government as power trickles down. That party-state, to borrow a Marxist phrase, contains the seeds of its own destruction. \"The Beijing regime is overstretched on its western and southeastern flanks, deeply corrupt, politically unstable, yet extremely ambitious,\" Terrill says. It has become vulnerable because \"Communism has outlived its world historical role. Economic growth and crude nationalism are insufficient supports for long-term continuance of a regime. No cultural tissue connects government and people. A hovering army of unemployed grows.\" Terrill, who has written six other books about China, asserts that China cannot evolve but will crash, as have the dynasties before it. \"I believe the Chinese populace and the rest of the world really will notice when the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] loses its monopoly of political power,\" he contends. \"No regime in Chinese history has ever given up power without bloodshed. I do not believe the CCP party-state will be the first.\" In the long run, Terrill holds out a gleam of hope for the Chinese and everyone who believes that democracy is the last best hope of the human race. He says a democratic China \"will ultimately come into existence, ending the dream of a Chinese empire. China as a democratic federation could be a leading force in the world and our fruitful partner in Asia for decades.\" Such a nation, he maintains, \"infused with the actual wishes, wisdom, and heterogeneous strands of thought of the popul","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71098820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By Henry J. Kenny. Washington: Brassey's, 2002. 176 pages. $49.95 ($24.95 paper). With the end of America's Indochina war in the 1970s and the passage of time, Vietnam has slipped from the collective consciousness of US policymakers and the general public. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is no longer America's adversary, and in 2003 the sights of the George W. Bush Administration are focused on the "Axis of Evil" triumvirate and the tentacles of global terrorist networks. Today, communist Vietnam seems relatively inconsequential to the United States. What significance can a moderate-sized Southeast Asian country of 77 million experimenting with free-market economics and ruled by a seemingly anachronistic and repressive Leninist party-state have for the United States? Henry Kenny, a long-time Vietnam watcher, contends that Vietnam's significance is that it represents a counterweight to China in Southeast Asia. He asserts that encouraging a more strategically self-assured, economically vibrant, and democratically oriented Vietnam is in the US national interest. Kenny highlights the tyranny of geography, which dooms Vietnam to be forever in the shadow of the giant Chinese dragon. Indeed, in terms of population and area, Vietnam is roughly equivalent to a medium-sized Chinese province. As a consequence Vietnam has learned to be extremely wary of antagonizing its vast northern neighbor. That is not to suggest that Vietnam's relations with China have always been warm or even cordial. On the contrary, as Kenny notes, relations have tended to go through a cycle of cooperation and conflict, a pattern that dates back centuries. But mostly Vietnam has tended to accommodate China. While the Chinese and Vietnamese communist movements were allies in successive struggles against the French and then against South Vietnam (and its major patron, the United States), there were underlying tensions in the relationship which bubbled to the surface in the form of a brief but bloody border war in early 1979. The bad blood persisted until the 1990s when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the pragmatic concerns of both party-states resulted in a rapprochement. In 1999 the two countries resolved most of their land border disputes and the following year reached an accord over the dispute in the Gulf of Tonkin. Nevertheless, territorial disputes remain over islands and waters in the South China Sea. According to Kenny, four of the five potential flashpoints in the sea involve disputes between China and Vietnam. "Future conflict [between China and Vietnam] over the South China Sea," Kenny contends, "is a definite possibility." Vietnam is circumspect where China is concerned and, hence, extremely cautious in improving ties with the United States. Certainly Hanoi has been hesitant to host senior US officials, especially defense figures. A visit by Defense Secretary William Cohen, for example, had to be postponed twice in the late 1990s and finally took place in 2000. A visi
亨利·j·肯尼著。华盛顿:布拉西出版社，2002年。176页。49.95美元(纸质版24.95美元)。越南社会主义共和国不再是美国的对手，2003年，乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)政府的目光集中在“邪恶轴心”三巨头和全球恐怖主义网络的触角上。今天，共产主义越南对美国来说似乎无关紧要。一个拥有7700万人口的中等规模东南亚国家正在尝试自由市场经济，并被一个看似不合时宜的列宁主义党国统治，这对美国有什么意义呢?长期关注越南问题的亨利·肯尼(Henry Kenny)认为，越南的意义在于，它代表着在东南亚制衡中国的力量。他断言，鼓励一个更具战略自信、经济活力和民主导向的越南符合美国的国家利益。肯尼强调了地理的暴政，这注定了越南永远处于中国巨龙的阴影之下。事实上，就人口和面积而言，越南大约相当于中国的一个中等省份。因此，越南已经学会了极其警惕地对抗其北方的庞大邻国。这并不是说越南与中国的关系一直很友好，甚至是亲切的。相反，正如肯尼指出的那样，两国关系往往会经历一个合作与冲突的循环，这种模式可以追溯到几个世纪以前。但大多数情况下，越南倾向于迁就中国。虽然中国和越南的共产主义运动在对抗法国和南越(以及南越的主要赞助人美国)的连续斗争中是盟友，但两国关系中存在潜在的紧张关系，并以1979年初一场短暂但血腥的边境战争的形式浮出水面。这种仇恨一直持续到上世纪90年代，当时苏联解体，两个党国的务实关切促成了两国的和解。1999年，两国解决了大部分陆地边界争端，并于次年就北部湾争端达成协议。然而，围绕南中国海岛屿和水域的领土争端仍然存在。根据肯尼的说法，海上五个潜在的爆发点中有四个涉及中国和越南之间的争端。“未来(中国和越南之间)在南中国海问题上的冲突，”肯尼认为，“肯定是有可能的。”越南在涉及中国的问题上非常谨慎，因此在改善与美国的关系方面非常谨慎。当然，河内一直不愿接待美国高级官员，尤其是国防官员。例如，美国国防部长威廉·科恩(William Cohen)的访问在上世纪90年代末不得不两次推迟，最终在2000年才得以实现。2001年初，美国太平洋部队司令丹尼斯·布莱尔上将对越南的访问在最后一刻被河内取消。…
{"title":"Shadow of the Dragon: Vietnam's Continuing Struggle with China and the Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy","authors":"Andrew Scobell","doi":"10.5860/choice.40-4266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.40-4266","url":null,"abstract":"By Henry J. Kenny. Washington: Brassey's, 2002. 176 pages. $49.95 ($24.95 paper). With the end of America's Indochina war in the 1970s and the passage of time, Vietnam has slipped from the collective consciousness of US policymakers and the general public. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is no longer America's adversary, and in 2003 the sights of the George W. Bush Administration are focused on the \"Axis of Evil\" triumvirate and the tentacles of global terrorist networks. Today, communist Vietnam seems relatively inconsequential to the United States. What significance can a moderate-sized Southeast Asian country of 77 million experimenting with free-market economics and ruled by a seemingly anachronistic and repressive Leninist party-state have for the United States? Henry Kenny, a long-time Vietnam watcher, contends that Vietnam's significance is that it represents a counterweight to China in Southeast Asia. He asserts that encouraging a more strategically self-assured, economically vibrant, and democratically oriented Vietnam is in the US national interest. Kenny highlights the tyranny of geography, which dooms Vietnam to be forever in the shadow of the giant Chinese dragon. Indeed, in terms of population and area, Vietnam is roughly equivalent to a medium-sized Chinese province. As a consequence Vietnam has learned to be extremely wary of antagonizing its vast northern neighbor. That is not to suggest that Vietnam's relations with China have always been warm or even cordial. On the contrary, as Kenny notes, relations have tended to go through a cycle of cooperation and conflict, a pattern that dates back centuries. But mostly Vietnam has tended to accommodate China. While the Chinese and Vietnamese communist movements were allies in successive struggles against the French and then against South Vietnam (and its major patron, the United States), there were underlying tensions in the relationship which bubbled to the surface in the form of a brief but bloody border war in early 1979. The bad blood persisted until the 1990s when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the pragmatic concerns of both party-states resulted in a rapprochement. In 1999 the two countries resolved most of their land border disputes and the following year reached an accord over the dispute in the Gulf of Tonkin. Nevertheless, territorial disputes remain over islands and waters in the South China Sea. According to Kenny, four of the five potential flashpoints in the sea involve disputes between China and Vietnam. \"Future conflict [between China and Vietnam] over the South China Sea,\" Kenny contends, \"is a definite possibility.\" Vietnam is circumspect where China is concerned and, hence, extremely cautious in improving ties with the United States. Certainly Hanoi has been hesitant to host senior US officials, especially defense figures. A visit by Defense Secretary William Cohen, for example, had to be postponed twice in the late 1990s and finally took place in 2000. A visi","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71094151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-06-22DOI: 10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim150080060
S. Newland
{"title":"Patton's Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker. (Book Reviews)","authors":"S. Newland","doi":"10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim150080060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim150080060","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64417704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare against Civilians: Why It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again. (Book Reviews)","authors":"Douglas.V Johnson","doi":"10.5860/choice.40-1064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.40-1064","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71091700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-03-22DOI: 10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim100110087
R. G. Trefry
By John S. D. Eisenhower with Joanne Thompson Eisenhower. New York: The Free Press, 2001. 353 pages. $35.00. This latest offering by acclaimed historian John S. D. Eisenhower, with his wife Joanne Thompson Eisenhower, is a notable contribution to the increasing interest in World War I. Although World War I has had literally thousands of books written about it, relatively few are available at the present time, even in libraries, and even fewer have been read by present generations. This book provides readers and historians with a wealth of information logically presented with scholarship and integrity. The purpose of the book, in the words of the author, "is to strike a balance, to examine how the American Expeditionary Force came about; to describe the gargantuan efforts needed to create it, supply it, train it, and fight it; and in so doing to show how the modern Army was born." The book is divided into three main parts. Book One is entitled "Creating the AEF." It develops the international scene that found a small US Army on the Mexican border pursuing Pancho Villa, augmented by a militia force. The Army that fought on the border was woefully unprepared for participation in a struggle as colossal as the one ongoing in Europe. The story of how America entered World War I is succinctly presented. Of particular interest is the genesis both here and in France of the American Expeditionary Force. The selection of General Pershing and the Army politics of the time make for a fascinating story. The trials and tribulations experienced by General Pershing in creating an Army, as well as his problems in relationships with the Allied commanders at home and in Europe, provide lessons for any officer aspiring to high command and staff. Joint and combined operations, coalitions, politics, and statesmanship were but a few of the challenges presented to a comparatively innocent American high command. Of particular interest were Pershing's efforts to establish a logistical base and a training command that would mold the amateur American force into an efficient and sustained fighting machine. Book Two, entitled "Apprenticeship: The Opening Battles," is a story that closely parallels the problems faced by the Army at the start of World War II and Korea. One cannot help but be reminded that history repeats itself. This book is a primer on the responsibilities and the relationships between the Army Secretariat, the Army Staff, and the forces in the field. The first fights at Cantigny and Belleau Wood baptized the AEF in the brutal combat of World War I. …
约翰·s·d·艾森豪威尔与乔安妮·汤普森·艾森豪威尔。纽约:自由出版社，2001。353页。35.00美元。这本由著名历史学家约翰·s·d·艾森豪威尔和他的妻子乔安妮·汤普森·艾森豪威尔合著的最新著作，对人们对第一次世界大战日益增长的兴趣做出了显著的贡献。尽管关于第一次世界大战的书确实有成千上万本，但目前能找到的相对较少，即使在图书馆里也是如此，当代人读过的就更少了。这本书为读者和历史学家提供了丰富的信息，逻辑上呈现了学术和诚信。用作者的话说，这本书的目的是“寻求一种平衡，研究美国远征军是如何形成的;描述创造它、供应它、训练它和对抗它所需要的巨大努力;并以此展示现代军队是如何诞生的。”这本书分为三个主要部分。第一本书的题目是“创建AEF”。在国际舞台上，一支小型美国军队在墨西哥边境追捕潘乔·维拉，并得到一支民兵部队的增援。不幸的是，在边境作战的军队没有准备好参与一场像欧洲正在进行的那样规模巨大的斗争。美国如何加入第一次世界大战的故事被简洁地呈现出来。特别令人感兴趣的是美国远征军在这里和法国的起源。潘兴将军的入选和当时的军队政治构成了一个引人入胜的故事。潘兴将军在创建军队的过程中所经历的考验和磨难，以及他在国内和欧洲与盟军指挥官的关系问题，为任何有志于担任高级指挥和参谋的军官提供了教训。联合和联合行动、联盟、政治和政治家风度只是相对无辜的美国最高指挥部面临的挑战中的一小部分。潘兴为建立后勤基地和训练指挥部所做的努力尤其令人感兴趣，后者将把业余的美国军队塑造成一支高效、持久的战斗机器。第二本书名为《学徒:开场战役》(Apprenticeship: The Opening Battles)，这个故事与美国陆军在第二次世界大战和朝鲜战争开始时面临的问题密切相关。人们不得不提醒自己，历史会重演。这本书是一本关于陆军秘书处、陆军参谋和战场部队之间的责任和关系的入门书。在坎蒂尼和贝洛伍德的第一次战斗为AEF在第一次世界大战的残酷战斗中洗礼. ...
{"title":"Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I","authors":"R. G. Trefry","doi":"10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim100110087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim100110087","url":null,"abstract":"By John S. D. Eisenhower with Joanne Thompson Eisenhower. New York: The Free Press, 2001. 353 pages. $35.00. This latest offering by acclaimed historian John S. D. Eisenhower, with his wife Joanne Thompson Eisenhower, is a notable contribution to the increasing interest in World War I. Although World War I has had literally thousands of books written about it, relatively few are available at the present time, even in libraries, and even fewer have been read by present generations. This book provides readers and historians with a wealth of information logically presented with scholarship and integrity. The purpose of the book, in the words of the author, \"is to strike a balance, to examine how the American Expeditionary Force came about; to describe the gargantuan efforts needed to create it, supply it, train it, and fight it; and in so doing to show how the modern Army was born.\" The book is divided into three main parts. Book One is entitled \"Creating the AEF.\" It develops the international scene that found a small US Army on the Mexican border pursuing Pancho Villa, augmented by a militia force. The Army that fought on the border was woefully unprepared for participation in a struggle as colossal as the one ongoing in Europe. The story of how America entered World War I is succinctly presented. Of particular interest is the genesis both here and in France of the American Expeditionary Force. The selection of General Pershing and the Army politics of the time make for a fascinating story. The trials and tribulations experienced by General Pershing in creating an Army, as well as his problems in relationships with the Allied commanders at home and in Europe, provide lessons for any officer aspiring to high command and staff. Joint and combined operations, coalitions, politics, and statesmanship were but a few of the challenges presented to a comparatively innocent American high command. Of particular interest were Pershing's efforts to establish a logistical base and a training command that would mold the amateur American force into an efficient and sustained fighting machine. Book Two, entitled \"Apprenticeship: The Opening Battles,\" is a story that closely parallels the problems faced by the Army at the start of World War II and Korea. One cannot help but be reminded that history repeats itself. This book is a primer on the responsibilities and the relationships between the Army Secretariat, the Army Staff, and the forces in the field. The first fights at Cantigny and Belleau Wood baptized the AEF in the brutal combat of World War I. …","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64410186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-03-22DOI: 10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim160140005
W. Kiehl
{"title":"Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945","authors":"W. Kiehl","doi":"10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim160140005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim160140005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64419150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-01-01DOI: 10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim080050085
W. Zimmermann
A century ago, Americans across the country—rich and poor, black and white, urban and rural—engaged in a grassroots debate over whether their country should acquire colonies and become a global power on the European model. Warren Zimmermann’s book examines American imperialism in this age, weighs its positives and negatives, and suggests that this history has relevance for our own age in which “American empire” is again controversial. The study centers on the “fathers of modern American imperialism” (p. 8): John Hay, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt. Together, these men theorized and executed a strategy of naval building and territorial acquisition that thrust American power southward into Latin America and westward into Asia. Between 1898 and 1903 the United States acquired a formal empire consisting of Guam, Hawaii, Midway, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Samoa, and signed protectorate treaties with Cuba and Panama. It established coaling ports for naval and merchant vessels across the Pacific and in the Caribbean Sea. The Panama Canal, Roosevelt’s proudest accomplishment, would link both halves of the country’s new transoceanic sphere of influence. Zimmermann’s book begins with a description of the careers and “elements of character” (p. 14) of its five central protagonists. They are all
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"The Lacedaemonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands." Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War "Attack when they are unprepared, make your move when they do not expect it." "So a military force is established by deception, mobilized by gain, and adapted by division and combination." Sun Tzu, The Art of War In surveying the landscape of international politics, the Taiwan Strait stands out as an area with grave potential for seismic instability. Beijing argues that Taiwan remains a province of China, while Taiwan steadily establishes de facto independence and contemplates the formal announcement of national autonomy. Such a declaration would cross China's political "red line" and push Beijing to the use of force. The United States, meanwhile, clings to a policy of "strategic ambiguity," recognizing only one China, with diplomatic ties to Beijing and withholding diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. The United States argues that any Chinese military aggression against Taiwan would be a serious threat to American interests, but so far has stopped short of extending formal security guarantees to Taiwan, fearing that such agreements would embolden Taiwan to formally declare independence and trigger a conflict with China. The Bush Administration does appear to be edging toward a more assertive position in support of Ta iwan than was the case during the Clinton era, however. President Bush in April 2001 publicly stated that the United States would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. [1] Despite the intractable political dilemma, many commentators and observers dismiss the potential for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. They argue that China's public comments on reserving the right to use force to cut the Gordian knot amounts to little more than bluff and bluster because China will lack the military means to attack and occupy Taiwan for at least ten years. This confident assessment lends itself to the United States resting comfortably on its current policy position of strategic ambiguity and dismissing the potential for a military conflagration in the Taiwan Strait that could bring American and Chinese forces into direct combat. What if the prescience of these analysts is less than perfect? This article constructs a devil's advocate analysis to weigh against the analyses that see little prospect for major Chinese military action against Taiwan. It suggests that the Chinese could use strategic surprise to compensate for shortcomings in military capabilities and orchestrate a successful military campaign to take control of Taiwan. The Chinese could do so by readily deceiving outside observers about the scope of their sealift and airlift capabilities, which would fundamentally undermine the linchpin assumptions of sangui
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