If at the end of the day, we drop the hybrid term and simply gain a better understanding of the large gray space between our idealized bins and pristine western categorizations, we will have made progress. --Frank Hoffman (1) The defense enterprise is abuzz with lively debates on "hybrid threats" and "hybrid war." Yet, newly emergent defense trends do not automatically merit exquisite definitions, new doctrine, or new operating concepts. As Frank Hoffman implies, such a caveat might be true of "hybrid warfare." Hybrid war may not yet be reducible to a pristine, doctrine-ready definition. Continued efforts by Hoffman and others to describe it, however, remain invaluable. (2) This trend is admittedly unsatisfying to concept developers and doctrine writers. By nature, they want to neatly categorize and define every aspect of military affairs. Yet, in this instance, patience is a virtue. For its part, too, the defense bureaucracy cannot rush to artificially dismiss a wider universe of defense-relevant, "wicked" challenges, in favor of a more limited and "tame" set of not-so-new, defense-specific ones. (3) Unfortunately, the hybrid debate is moving in this direction. Too many analysts gravitate toward solving only narrow tactical-to-operational hybrid military problems. In that context, hybrid threats are nettlesome "high-low" combinations of capabilities and methods--i.e., violent "irregular" forces that possess advanced military capabilities or "regulars" who skillfully combine conventional and unconventional warfare. A similar "reduction" occurred with irregular warfare (IW) following the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. As a consequence, the Department of Defense (DOD) quickly took refuge in IW's "military science"--direct-action counterterrorism, application of the military aspects of counterinsurgency, and security force assistance--without fully recognizing that DOD would, under many circumstances, be responsible for much of IW's "social science" as well. Following a similar course regarding hybrid challenges is a grave mistake. Any rush to define DOD's "hybrid" challenge too precisely is a diversion for a Defense Department facing more fundamental issues. It is unclear whether hybrid military threats will ever be singular points of emphasis for doctrine, concepts, or material solutions. For many strategists, the defense challenges described as hybrid are actually examples of cunning leadership in opposition to US or western military superiority. (4) What is clear, however, upon even a cursory examination of current and future operating environments, is that the word hybrid itself aptly describes the majority of DOD's contemporary missions and responsibilities. In short, war alone is not the only thing that is hybrid; an array of broader defense issues is hybrid as well. The defense portfolio is irrevocably diverse. It should be permanently acknowledged as such in defense management practices. DOD in totality--its subordinate service department
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Torture: When the Unthinkable Is Morally Permissible. By Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. 114 pages. $53.50 ($17.95 paper). This slim volume is essentially an extended commentary that builds on a controversial op-ed piece the authors published in the Australian newspapers The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald in May 2005. In that piece, the authors, both professors of law in Australia, argued "the belief that torture is always wrong is ... misguided....It is this type of absolutist and shortsighted rhetoric that lies at the core of many distorted moral judgments...." As the tone and placement of the original article would indicate, this book is more a work of strident advocacy than of cool and dispassionate analysis, although to be sure, it touches on all the relevant legal and philosophical issues that bear on the question. The authors begin by acknowledging the absolute legal prohibition on torture in international law and arguing that this restriction is precisely what should be changed. They argue for carving out a narrow exception that would allow a utilitarian calculus to permit torture in cases where lives are at risk, the potential harm of an attack is immediate, there are no other possible means of obtaining information within the time available, the person to be tortured has committed a significant level of wrongdoing, and there is high likelihood that he or she does possess relevant information that, if obtained, will prevent the loss of life. Bagaric and Clarke note that, despite the prohibitions on torture, it in fact is widely practiced around the world, even by nations that would most stridently condemn it publicly. In light of that reality, the authors argue, it would be better if torture were legalized (in the very narrow range of cases they have in mind). Further, having legalized it, they posit there should be a prior-review legal mechanism for issuing a "torture warrant" as a much preferable alternative to retrospective decisions regarding torture already committed. The short chapters that follow review the main counterarguments to the legalization proposal. The first is the "slippery slope" objection--allowing practice A, which might be morally acceptable, will eventually lead because of either logic or social acceptance to allowing practice B, which is clearly morally unacceptable. The consequence of a slippery slope argument is that one ought not, therefore, to allow A in the first place. Bagaric and Clarke reject this objection on the grounds that it is inherently speculative. The second objection is that acceptance of torture will lead to a general dehumanization of the society that practices it. This critique the authors dismiss on the grounds that it focuses too narrowly on one relationship---between torturer and tortured--to the neglect of the larger framework of affected parties that include the innocents to be saved as a result of information extracted through the use
{"title":"Torture: When the Unthinkable Is Morally Permissible","authors":"M. Cook","doi":"10.5860/choice.45-2875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.45-2875","url":null,"abstract":"Torture: When the Unthinkable Is Morally Permissible. By Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. 114 pages. $53.50 ($17.95 paper). This slim volume is essentially an extended commentary that builds on a controversial op-ed piece the authors published in the Australian newspapers The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald in May 2005. In that piece, the authors, both professors of law in Australia, argued \"the belief that torture is always wrong is ... misguided....It is this type of absolutist and shortsighted rhetoric that lies at the core of many distorted moral judgments....\" As the tone and placement of the original article would indicate, this book is more a work of strident advocacy than of cool and dispassionate analysis, although to be sure, it touches on all the relevant legal and philosophical issues that bear on the question. The authors begin by acknowledging the absolute legal prohibition on torture in international law and arguing that this restriction is precisely what should be changed. They argue for carving out a narrow exception that would allow a utilitarian calculus to permit torture in cases where lives are at risk, the potential harm of an attack is immediate, there are no other possible means of obtaining information within the time available, the person to be tortured has committed a significant level of wrongdoing, and there is high likelihood that he or she does possess relevant information that, if obtained, will prevent the loss of life. Bagaric and Clarke note that, despite the prohibitions on torture, it in fact is widely practiced around the world, even by nations that would most stridently condemn it publicly. In light of that reality, the authors argue, it would be better if torture were legalized (in the very narrow range of cases they have in mind). Further, having legalized it, they posit there should be a prior-review legal mechanism for issuing a \"torture warrant\" as a much preferable alternative to retrospective decisions regarding torture already committed. The short chapters that follow review the main counterarguments to the legalization proposal. The first is the \"slippery slope\" objection--allowing practice A, which might be morally acceptable, will eventually lead because of either logic or social acceptance to allowing practice B, which is clearly morally unacceptable. The consequence of a slippery slope argument is that one ought not, therefore, to allow A in the first place. Bagaric and Clarke reject this objection on the grounds that it is inherently speculative. The second objection is that acceptance of torture will lead to a general dehumanization of the society that practices it. This critique the authors dismiss on the grounds that it focuses too narrowly on one relationship---between torturer and tortured--to the neglect of the larger framework of affected parties that include the innocents to be saved as a result of information extracted through the use ","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71118648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Tet Offensive: A Concise History. By James H. Willbanks. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 272 pages. $29.50. James Willbanks, a retired Army officer and military historian, is Director of the Department of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the author of two previous books on the Vietnam War, one being his timely 2004 volume, Abandoning Vietnam. Detailing persuasive arguments for why Vietnamization failed, Abandoning Vietnam was published at a time in the Iraq conflict when it appeared Washington was hurtling toward another Vietnam-like disaster by contemplating the implementation of a rapid withdrawal. Advocates of this strategy advised that the way out of America's dilemma in Iraq was to "train and withdraw," the sooner, the better. This advice to hastily "Iraqify" the war and pull out, journalist Bob Woodward recently contended, came from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen and the commander in Iraq at the time, General George Casey, in the wake of growing frustrations with and lack of public support for the apparently never-ending maelstrom of violence in faction-tom Iraq. Professor Willbanks's account of the Vietnamization debacle indirectly raised the specter of a repeat performance by Washington related to Iraq. Thanks to the "Surge" and a single-minded President who refused to accept less than victory, this strategy was averted. With The Tet Offensive, Willbanks has once again produced a volume that, while focusing on wartime events occurring some 40 years ago, has particular relevance. The author's recounting of the offensive and associated issues is brief (122 pages of text), but well-documented (130 pages of appendices, including source notes, a useful Chronology, Glossary, 33 pages of reproduced documents, Bibliography, and Index). For anyone interested in probing and learning from the Tet Offensive but overwhelmed with the plethora of sources, Willbanks's volume is certainly the most up-to-date and helpful starting point known to this reviewer. Willbanks organizes his work into two parts. Part I, "Historical Overview," is a vivid, concise, and eminently readable recounting of the attacks that comprised the Tet Offensive, including battles in Saigon, Khe Sanh, and Hue, as well as the nationwide onslaughts by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units. Part II is an engaging examination of the "Issues and Interpretations" spawned by the offensive and contains well-written and stimulating discussions of topics such as Hanoi's motivations and objectives in launching the attacks, analysis of the offensive as an intelligence failure, the controversy regarding mass executions in Hue, Hanoi's rationale for besieging Khe Sanh (as a diversion or a serious attempt to achieve another Dien Bien Phu?), and the role of the media during and following Hanoi's election-year gambit. …
春节攻势:简史。詹姆斯·h·威尔班克斯著。纽约:哥伦比亚大学出版社，2007。272页。29.50美元。詹姆斯·威尔班克斯是一名退役军官和军事历史学家，现任美国陆军指挥与参谋学院军事历史系主任。他之前写过两本关于越南战争的书，其中一本是2004年出版的《放弃越南》。《放弃越南》一书详细阐述了越南化失败的有说服力的论据，当时正值伊拉克冲突，华盛顿正在考虑实施快速撤军，似乎正朝着另一场越南式的灾难猛冲而去。这一战略的支持者建议，美国摆脱伊拉克困境的方法是“训练后撤军”，越快越好。记者鲍勃·伍德沃德(Bob Woodward)最近声称，这种匆忙将战争“伊拉克化”并撤出的建议，是参谋长联席会议主席迈克尔·马伦上将(Admiral Michael Mullen)和当时的驻伊拉克指挥官乔治·凯西将军(General George Casey)提出的，因为在派系纷争的伊拉克，人们对显然永无止境的暴力漩涡日益感到失望，而且缺乏公众支持。威尔班克斯教授对越战失败的描述间接地引发了华盛顿在伊拉克问题上重蹈覆辙的担忧。多亏了“增兵”和一心一意的总统拒绝接受失败，这一战略才得以避免。在《春节攻势》一书中，威尔班克斯再次出版了一本聚焦于大约40年前发生的战争事件的书，它尤其具有现实意义。作者对冒犯性和相关问题的叙述是简短的(122页的文本)，但有充分的记录(130页的附录，包括源注释、有用的年表、术语表、33页的复制文档、参考书目和索引)。对于那些对探索和学习春节攻势感兴趣但又被大量资料淹没的人来说，威尔班克斯的书无疑是笔者所知的最新和最有帮助的起点。威尔班克斯将他的工作分为两部分。第一部分“历史概览”(Historical Overview)生动、简洁、极具可读性，叙述了春节攻势中的进攻，包括在西贡、溪山和顺化的战斗，以及北越和越共部队在全国范围内的进攻。第二部分是对进攻所产生的“问题和解释”的引人入胜的研究，包含了对河内发动攻击的动机和目标、分析进攻作为情报失败、关于顺化大规模处决的争议、河内围攻溪山的理由(作为转移注意力或认真尝试实现另一个奠边府?)等主题的精彩讨论。以及媒体在河内大选年期间和之后的角色。…
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Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. By Richard J. Samuels. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007. 277 pages. $49.95 ($19.95 paper). The author, a scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has specialized in Japanese affairs for many years, identifies his thesis in the opening line: "Many Japanese analysts do not believe Japan now has a coherent grand strategy, and more than a few insist that it has never had one." This reviewer agrees with that judgment. Professor Samuels, however, strives mightily over the next 210 pages to show that Japan, indeed, has had a grand strategy since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 when it left its feudal age and leapt into the modern era. "Japanese security policy," Samuels asserts, "has traveled a consistent path since the nineteenth century." In that time, Japan entered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 to ally itself with Britain, then a powerful empire whose navy ruled the waves. In 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact to join the Axis of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, which Samuels fails to mention. After that pact ended in utter defeat, Japan signed a mutual security treaty with the United States. Samuels sees all those alliances and relationships as crafting a grand strategy. They might be better labeled, in the kindest interpretation, as a series of pragmatic and expedient maneuvers to align Japan with the prevailing power of the time. Japan, a middle-sized, resource-poor island nation, is stuck in a rough neighborhood and needs outside friends to survive, not to mention prosper. The author makes much of the "Yoshida Doctrine," named for the late Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, the towering figure who led Japan out of the valley of death following World War II. The Japanese, however, do not favor doctrines, preferring instead vague guidelines that permit freedom of action when circumstances change. Yoshida, ever the practical politician, is not known to have ever used the term. Nor did his "deshi" or followers such as Prime Ministers Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Sato, Kakuei Tanaka, and on through Kiichi Miyazawa, a lineage lasting until 1993. Samuels says the first Japanese to cite the Yoshida Doctrine was Masataka Kosaka, who in 1963 was credited with first use of the term. It is interesting that the author only identifies him as an adviser of Yoshida's. In any event, most scholars agree that the concept of the Yoshida Doctrine rests on two principles: (1) Rely on America to ensure Japan's security while Japan does the minimum necessary to defend itself, and (2) Place maximum effort on economic development, largely through export of goods to pay for much-needed imports. Japan has put those two principles of security policy into practice for the last half century. The nation spends only one percent of its gross national product on defense, a limit endorsed by Japanese taxpayers. Its armed forces are about the 25th largest in the world and are circumscribed wi
保护日本:东京的大战略与东亚的未来。理查德·塞缪尔斯著。伊萨卡，纽约:康奈尔大学出版社，2007。277页。49.95美元(纸质书19.95美元)。作者是麻省理工学院(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)的学者，多年来一直专门研究日本事务。他在书的开头就指出了自己的论点:“许多日本分析人士不相信日本现在有一个连贯的大战略，而且有不少人坚持认为日本从未有过一个大战略。”本文评论员同意这一判断。然而，萨缪尔斯教授在接下来的210页中不遗余力地表明，自1868年明治维新(Meiji Restoration)以来，日本确实有一个宏大的战略，当时日本离开了封建时代，跨入了现代。“日本的安全政策，”塞缪尔斯断言，“自19世纪以来一直走在一条一致的道路上。”当时，日本加入了1902年的英日同盟，与当时海军统治海洋的强大帝国英国结盟。该条约以彻底失败告终后，日本与美国签署了一项共同安全条约。塞缪尔认为所有这些联盟和关系都是在制定一个大战略。从最善意的角度来看，它们或许更应该被称为一系列务实和权宜之计，目的是让日本与当时的主流大国保持一致。日本是一个中等规模、资源贫乏的岛国，周边环境恶劣，需要外部的朋友才能生存，更不用说繁荣了。作者以二战后带领日本走出死亡之谷的杰出人物、已故首相吉田茂(Shigeru Yoshida)的名字命名了“吉田主义”。然而，日本人不喜欢教条主义，而是喜欢模糊的指导方针，允许在情况变化时自由行动。吉田曾经是一位务实的政治家，但据说他从未使用过这个词。他的“德系”或追随者，如首相池田大作、佐藤荣作、田中角荣，以及宫泽喜一，也都没有，他们的世系一直延续到1993年。塞缪尔斯说，第一个引用吉田主义的日本人是小坂正孝，1963年，他被认为是第一个使用这个词的人。有趣的是，作者只指出他是吉田的顾问。无论如何，大多数学者都同意吉田主义的概念建立在两个原则之上:(1)依靠美国来确保日本的安全，而日本只做必要的最低限度的自卫;(2)最大限度地致力于经济发展，主要是通过出口商品来支付急需的进口商品。在过去的半个世纪里，日本将这两项安全政策原则付诸实践。日本的国防开支只占国民生产总值的1%，这是日本纳税人认可的上限。它的武装力量是世界上第25大的，并且受到宪法、法律和政治的限制。…
{"title":"Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia","authors":"R. Halloran","doi":"10.5860/choice.45-4040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.45-4040","url":null,"abstract":"Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. By Richard J. Samuels. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007. 277 pages. $49.95 ($19.95 paper). The author, a scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has specialized in Japanese affairs for many years, identifies his thesis in the opening line: \"Many Japanese analysts do not believe Japan now has a coherent grand strategy, and more than a few insist that it has never had one.\" This reviewer agrees with that judgment. Professor Samuels, however, strives mightily over the next 210 pages to show that Japan, indeed, has had a grand strategy since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 when it left its feudal age and leapt into the modern era. \"Japanese security policy,\" Samuels asserts, \"has traveled a consistent path since the nineteenth century.\" In that time, Japan entered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 to ally itself with Britain, then a powerful empire whose navy ruled the waves. In 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact to join the Axis of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, which Samuels fails to mention. After that pact ended in utter defeat, Japan signed a mutual security treaty with the United States. Samuels sees all those alliances and relationships as crafting a grand strategy. They might be better labeled, in the kindest interpretation, as a series of pragmatic and expedient maneuvers to align Japan with the prevailing power of the time. Japan, a middle-sized, resource-poor island nation, is stuck in a rough neighborhood and needs outside friends to survive, not to mention prosper. The author makes much of the \"Yoshida Doctrine,\" named for the late Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, the towering figure who led Japan out of the valley of death following World War II. The Japanese, however, do not favor doctrines, preferring instead vague guidelines that permit freedom of action when circumstances change. Yoshida, ever the practical politician, is not known to have ever used the term. Nor did his \"deshi\" or followers such as Prime Ministers Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Sato, Kakuei Tanaka, and on through Kiichi Miyazawa, a lineage lasting until 1993. Samuels says the first Japanese to cite the Yoshida Doctrine was Masataka Kosaka, who in 1963 was credited with first use of the term. It is interesting that the author only identifies him as an adviser of Yoshida's. In any event, most scholars agree that the concept of the Yoshida Doctrine rests on two principles: (1) Rely on America to ensure Japan's security while Japan does the minimum necessary to defend itself, and (2) Place maximum effort on economic development, largely through export of goods to pay for much-needed imports. Japan has put those two principles of security policy into practice for the last half century. The nation spends only one percent of its gross national product on defense, a limit endorsed by Japanese taxpayers. Its armed forces are about the 25th largest in the world and are circumscribed wi","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71119166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-09-22DOI: 10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim170230054
M. W. Markel
Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. By Jeffrey Record. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007.192 pages. $24.95. Beating Goliath attempts to answer an interesting and important question: Is there some dynamic at work that explains why insurgents are capable of defeating larger, stronger powers? As a historian, this reviewer is inclined to deny that an infinitely complex human endeavor like warfare can be reduced to a simple model, preferring instead to explain the results of particular conflicts in terms of contingent circumstances. That inclination may be misplaced. Recently, insurgents have prevailed over major powers often enough to make one suspect the existence of some underlying dynamic. Similar outcomes in such disparate circumstances seem unlikely to be the result of sheer coincidence. The mantra that "every war is different" is singularly unhelpful to statesmen who cannot hope to master the social intricacies of every possible arena of conflict, or to the military bureaucracy which develops forces for those wars. Jeffrey Record does us all a service by raising the question in such a concise and readable form. The author does a good job of assessing previous attempts to articulate that dynamic. Early on, he makes the point that most insurgencies fail, something we should all remember. The major schools of thought on why insurgencies succeed or fail include asymmetry of commitment (Andrew Mack), strategic interaction (Ivan Arreguin-Toft), and democracies' inability to employ sufficient brutality in an effort to win (Gil Merom). There are significant theoretical and empirical shortcomings with each theory, which Record ably and dispassionately identifies. The biggest shortcoming, in Record's view, is their failure to accord the factor of external support its due weight. As the author puts it, "There are few if any examples of colonial or post-colonial insurgencies that prevailed without foreign help." He illustrates the importance of such help with brief but pithy analyses of prominent insurgent victories, including the American Revolution, the Spanish guerrillas against Napoleon, the Chinese Civil War, France and America in Indochina, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In each of these cases, external support sustained the insurgency and sometimes, as the French, Spanish, and Dutch war against Britain during the American Revolution, subsumed it. Record reminds us that external help can be indirect, often in the form of exerting military pressure on the stronger power in other theaters. These analyses amply support Record's argument that the role of external assistance has to be considered along with Arreguin-Toft's theory of strategic interaction and Mack's thesis of disparity of interests. Unfortunately for Record, his analysis of the current war in Iraq is a "snapshot in time" and no longer up to date. Beating Goliath was published in the spring of 2007, when conventional wisdom held that the situation there was an irredeemable mess. One
{"title":"Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win","authors":"M. W. Markel","doi":"10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim170230054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim170230054","url":null,"abstract":"Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. By Jeffrey Record. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007.192 pages. $24.95. Beating Goliath attempts to answer an interesting and important question: Is there some dynamic at work that explains why insurgents are capable of defeating larger, stronger powers? As a historian, this reviewer is inclined to deny that an infinitely complex human endeavor like warfare can be reduced to a simple model, preferring instead to explain the results of particular conflicts in terms of contingent circumstances. That inclination may be misplaced. Recently, insurgents have prevailed over major powers often enough to make one suspect the existence of some underlying dynamic. Similar outcomes in such disparate circumstances seem unlikely to be the result of sheer coincidence. The mantra that \"every war is different\" is singularly unhelpful to statesmen who cannot hope to master the social intricacies of every possible arena of conflict, or to the military bureaucracy which develops forces for those wars. Jeffrey Record does us all a service by raising the question in such a concise and readable form. The author does a good job of assessing previous attempts to articulate that dynamic. Early on, he makes the point that most insurgencies fail, something we should all remember. The major schools of thought on why insurgencies succeed or fail include asymmetry of commitment (Andrew Mack), strategic interaction (Ivan Arreguin-Toft), and democracies' inability to employ sufficient brutality in an effort to win (Gil Merom). There are significant theoretical and empirical shortcomings with each theory, which Record ably and dispassionately identifies. The biggest shortcoming, in Record's view, is their failure to accord the factor of external support its due weight. As the author puts it, \"There are few if any examples of colonial or post-colonial insurgencies that prevailed without foreign help.\" He illustrates the importance of such help with brief but pithy analyses of prominent insurgent victories, including the American Revolution, the Spanish guerrillas against Napoleon, the Chinese Civil War, France and America in Indochina, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In each of these cases, external support sustained the insurgency and sometimes, as the French, Spanish, and Dutch war against Britain during the American Revolution, subsumed it. Record reminds us that external help can be indirect, often in the form of exerting military pressure on the stronger power in other theaters. These analyses amply support Record's argument that the role of external assistance has to be considered along with Arreguin-Toft's theory of strategic interaction and Mack's thesis of disparity of interests. Unfortunately for Record, his analysis of the current war in Iraq is a \"snapshot in time\" and no longer up to date. Beating Goliath was published in the spring of 2007, when conventional wisdom held that the situation there was an irredeemable mess. One ","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64420883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-11-01DOI: 10.4324/9781315613246-28
C. Ceulemans
According to the Just War tradition a war can only be just if two sets of principles are satisfied. (1) First there is the jus ad bellum. These principles tell us when it is just to start a war. There has to be a good reason or a just cause in order for a war to be morally permissible (self-defense, defense of others, putting a stop to human rights violations). The decision to go to war has to be taken by a legitimate authority. Those who wage war need to be motivated by good intentions (desire to promote a more stable peace). War should not only be a last resort (necessity), it must also offer a reasonable chance of success. Moreover, the good the warring party hopes to obtain should outweigh the evil caused by the war (proportionality). The second set of principles, the jus in bello or the right in the war, focuses on the moral constraints that need to be observed during hostilities. Noncombatants must never be the intentional target of military actions (discrimination), and the military utility of a particular act of war has to outweigh the damage it will cause. It is clear that combatants, whatever side they are on, have a moral and legal obligation to respect the in hello principles. This is what ethicists call their in bello responsibility. Can combatants be held responsible for participating in an unjust war? Do they, aside from their in hello responsibility, have an ad bellum responsibility? If so, this would mean that combatants have a duty to judge the justice of the war and refuse to participate in an immoral conflict. Those combatants who would not take such an ad bellum responsibility seriously, and simply follow orders, would risk being considered unjust combatants. Anyone who studies the moral and legal reality of warfare will quickly notice that this presumption of military ad bellum responsibility is firmly rejected. (2) At the core of the Just War tradition is the fundamental doctrine of the moral equality of combatants. Basically this doctrine says that the realm of responsibility of combatants on all sides is equally limited to that of the jus in bello. Combatants cannot be held responsible for the just or unjust nature of the war in which they participate. The ad bellum responsibility belongs solely to the political decisionmakers. Despite its basic role in the normative appreciation of war, the doctrine of moral equality of combatants is not beyond dispute. Even Michael Walzer, who is a strong defender of a strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, admits that this moral dualism can be somewhat puzzling. (3) It is, after all, far from obvious that the moral status of a combatant in a defensive war is the same as that of a combatant participating in a war of aggression. The former is clearly engaged in a morally legitimate activity (self-defense), whereas the latter is contributing to what most would term a criminal act. So, how can these two be moral equals? Should we not add an ad bellum responsibility for c
{"title":"The Moral Equality of Combatants","authors":"C. Ceulemans","doi":"10.4324/9781315613246-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315613246-28","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Just War tradition a war can only be just if two sets of principles are satisfied. (1) First there is the jus ad bellum. These principles tell us when it is just to start a war. There has to be a good reason or a just cause in order for a war to be morally permissible (self-defense, defense of others, putting a stop to human rights violations). The decision to go to war has to be taken by a legitimate authority. Those who wage war need to be motivated by good intentions (desire to promote a more stable peace). War should not only be a last resort (necessity), it must also offer a reasonable chance of success. Moreover, the good the warring party hopes to obtain should outweigh the evil caused by the war (proportionality). The second set of principles, the jus in bello or the right in the war, focuses on the moral constraints that need to be observed during hostilities. Noncombatants must never be the intentional target of military actions (discrimination), and the military utility of a particular act of war has to outweigh the damage it will cause. It is clear that combatants, whatever side they are on, have a moral and legal obligation to respect the in hello principles. This is what ethicists call their in bello responsibility. Can combatants be held responsible for participating in an unjust war? Do they, aside from their in hello responsibility, have an ad bellum responsibility? If so, this would mean that combatants have a duty to judge the justice of the war and refuse to participate in an immoral conflict. Those combatants who would not take such an ad bellum responsibility seriously, and simply follow orders, would risk being considered unjust combatants. Anyone who studies the moral and legal reality of warfare will quickly notice that this presumption of military ad bellum responsibility is firmly rejected. (2) At the core of the Just War tradition is the fundamental doctrine of the moral equality of combatants. Basically this doctrine says that the realm of responsibility of combatants on all sides is equally limited to that of the jus in bello. Combatants cannot be held responsible for the just or unjust nature of the war in which they participate. The ad bellum responsibility belongs solely to the political decisionmakers. Despite its basic role in the normative appreciation of war, the doctrine of moral equality of combatants is not beyond dispute. Even Michael Walzer, who is a strong defender of a strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, admits that this moral dualism can be somewhat puzzling. (3) It is, after all, far from obvious that the moral status of a combatant in a defensive war is the same as that of a combatant participating in a war of aggression. The former is clearly engaged in a morally legitimate activity (self-defense), whereas the latter is contributing to what most would term a criminal act. So, how can these two be moral equals? Should we not add an ad bellum responsibility for c","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70653165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
HE Treaty of Paris and the President's Naval program have focused the Nation's thought on peace, or, perhaps to be more precise, on the avoidance of war. Yet, because of the diametrically opposed methods of approach used in them, and because of the exaggerated claims which are sure to be set forth by the proponents and antagonists of these measures, the exact status of war, from a moral viewpoint, may be greatly clouded. Hence in this paper we purpose to examine the question of war and to determine the conditions justifying or condemning this instrument of nations. "War is a contention carried on by force of arms between sovereign states, or communities having in this regard the right of states." That war is not instrinsically wrong is evident both from the Divine Positive Law and from the Natural Law. For John the Baptist, in his instruction to the soldiers, says nothing about laying down their arms; which certainly he would have said if war were never justifiable before God. Furthermore, the Natural Law confers on nations the moral powers necessary to the purpose of the nation; viz., to obtain its corporate rights and the rights of its citizens. To forbid it the use of coercion in maintaining intact and inviolable these rights would be to label the end and duties of the nation meaningless, since each nation, being supreme in its temporal affairs, is without a superior to which it can appeal. "The right of self-defense is part of the law of our nature·, and it is the indispensable duty of civil society to protect its members in the enjoyment of their rights, both of person and property."8 Nations may surrender a part of this right by pacts and treaties, but it is only with the consent of the individual nations that international courts may exercise this right, as in the nation alone does the Natural Law implant this right. But of more practical importance than the fact that war is.
{"title":"The Morality of War","authors":"Brian Orend","doi":"10.5860/choice.44-2057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.44-2057","url":null,"abstract":"HE Treaty of Paris and the President's Naval program have focused the Nation's thought on peace, or, perhaps to be more precise, on the avoidance of war. Yet, because of the diametrically opposed methods of approach used in them, and because of the exaggerated claims which are sure to be set forth by the proponents and antagonists of these measures, the exact status of war, from a moral viewpoint, may be greatly clouded. Hence in this paper we purpose to examine the question of war and to determine the conditions justifying or condemning this instrument of nations. \"War is a contention carried on by force of arms between sovereign states, or communities having in this regard the right of states.\" That war is not instrinsically wrong is evident both from the Divine Positive Law and from the Natural Law. For John the Baptist, in his instruction to the soldiers, says nothing about laying down their arms; which certainly he would have said if war were never justifiable before God. Furthermore, the Natural Law confers on nations the moral powers necessary to the purpose of the nation; viz., to obtain its corporate rights and the rights of its citizens. To forbid it the use of coercion in maintaining intact and inviolable these rights would be to label the end and duties of the nation meaningless, since each nation, being supreme in its temporal affairs, is without a superior to which it can appeal. \"The right of self-defense is part of the law of our nature·, and it is the indispensable duty of civil society to protect its members in the enjoyment of their rights, both of person and property.\"8 Nations may surrender a part of this right by pacts and treaties, but it is only with the consent of the individual nations that international courts may exercise this right, as in the nation alone does the Natural Law implant this right. But of more practical importance than the fact that war is.","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71113939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"All you need to know is that there was a before 9/11 and an after 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves came off." --Corer Black, CIA (1) Before 9/11, many nations battled terrorists and mufti-clad insurgents in places like Ireland, Israel, and Algeria and subsequently detained these nontraditional combatants. These nations deliberated the applicability and relevance of the Geneva Conventions (2) and frequently decided to conduct their detainee and interrogation operations by other standards. (3) The United States had faced similarly ambiguous combatants in past conflicts, choosing "to extend basic prisoner of war protections to such persons ... based upon strong policy considerations, and ... not necessarily based on any conclusion that the United States was obligated to do so as a matter of law." (4) After 9/11, however, the United States ceased viewing its efforts against terrorism as a police enforcement action and embarked upon a Global War on Terrorism. (5) The Bush Administration asserted this was "a new kind of war" that justified reconsidering the manner in which the Laws of War would be interpreted and applied. (6) According to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "The reality is, the set of facts that exist today with al Qaeda and the Taliban were not necessarily the set of facts that were considered when the Geneva Conventions were fashioned." (7) Certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions were even considered "quaint." (8) The United States has, by its post-9/11 policies and actions, demonstrated that the standards for conducting detainee operations, and perhaps the Geneva Conventions themselves, are ripe for reform. The war on terror is in its fourth year, yet there has been little academic or political agreement on what detention and interrogation techniques are ethically advisable and legally allowed. US detainee operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo have been labeled a "gray zone" by one analyst. (9) US classification of detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay as "unlawful combatants" has aroused voluminous and vociferous academic debate, (10) complicated because there are no internationally accepted, clearly delineated detention and interrogation standards for treating "unlawful combatants." Even in Iraq, where the Administration conceded the Geneva Conventions applied, the overall post-9/11 paradigm shift prompted the Army's command to conduct a deliberative analysis of acceptable interrogation and detention techniques. (11) The Department of Defense is currently undergoing a more comprehensive formal initiative, with the Army acting as the lead agent. (12) To describe the complexity of conducting modern military operations in an urban environment, US Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak used the metaphor of a "three-block war," (13) an environment wherein soldiers or marines simultaneously fight a high-intensity conflict in one block, suppress a simmering insurgency in another block, and facilitate humanitarian aid in a
“你只需要知道9/11之前有一个，9/11之后有一个。9/11事件之后，人们开始动手了。”在9/11之前，许多国家在爱尔兰、以色列和阿尔及利亚等地与恐怖分子和多衣叛乱分子作战，随后拘留了这些非传统的战斗人员。这些国家审议了《日内瓦公约》的适用性和相关性，并经常决定按其他标准进行被拘留者和审讯行动。(3)美国在过去的冲突中也遇到过类似的模棱两可的战斗人员，选择“将基本的战俘保护扩大到这些人……基于强有力的政策考虑，并且……并不一定是基于美国有义务这样做的任何结论。”然而，在9/11之后，美国不再将其反恐努力视为一种警察执法行动，而是开始了一场全球反恐战争。布什政府声称这是“一种新型战争”，因此有理由重新考虑如何解释和适用战争法。(6)根据国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德的说法，“现实情况是，今天存在于基地组织和塔利班的一系列事实不一定是日内瓦公约制定时所考虑的一系列事实。”(7)《日内瓦公约》的某些条款甚至被认为是“古怪的”。(8)美国在9/11事件后的政策和行动表明，实施拘留行动的标准，或许还有《日内瓦公约》本身，改革的时机已经成熟。反恐战争已经进入了第四个年头，但对于什么样的拘留和审讯手段在道德上是可取的、在法律上是允许的，学术界或政界几乎没有达成一致。一位分析人士称，美国在阿富汗、伊拉克和关塔那摩的拘留行动属于“灰色地带”。(9)美国将阿富汗和关塔那摩湾的在押人员归类为“非法战斗人员”，引起了广泛而激烈的学术争论。(10)由于没有国际上公认的、明确界定的对待“非法战斗人员”的拘留和审讯标准，问题变得复杂。即使在政府承认适用日内瓦公约的伊拉克，9/11事件后的总体模式转变也促使陆军指挥部对可接受的审讯和拘留手段进行审慎分析。(11)国防部目前正在进行一项更全面的正式倡议，陆军作为牵头机构。(12)为了描述在城市环境中进行现代军事行动的复杂性，美国海军陆战队将军查尔斯·c·克鲁拉克(Charles C. Krulak)使用了“三街区战争”的比喻，即士兵或海军陆战队同时在一个街区进行高强度冲突，在另一个街区镇压沸腾的叛乱，并在连续的第三个街区促进人道主义援助的环境。进行军事行动的军队必须预料到在三个街区内会遇到友军、敌军和中立人员。出于战略、行动或战术的原因，可以对这三个区域的在押人员进行审讯。正如认识到“三区战争”的性质使指挥官能够在这种环境中成功地开展行动一样，在被拘留者行动的新灰色地带内澄清分界线是至关重要的。划定潜在被拘留者的类别是第一步。确定每一类被拘留者的审讯限制和其他法律责任是合乎逻辑的下一步。《日内瓦公约》为审议不同类别的被拘留者提供了基础;它们还为区分不同类别的待遇提供了法律、伦理和道德框架。发布一个“后9/11”框架，并清楚地表明，美国忠实地遵守一个表述清晰、理由充分的新标准，可以在很大程度上支持美国的政策和战略。…
{"title":"Six Floors of Detainee Operations in the Post-9/11 World","authors":"T. Ayres","doi":"10.21236/ada432745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada432745","url":null,"abstract":"\"All you need to know is that there was a before 9/11 and an after 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves came off.\" --Corer Black, CIA (1) Before 9/11, many nations battled terrorists and mufti-clad insurgents in places like Ireland, Israel, and Algeria and subsequently detained these nontraditional combatants. These nations deliberated the applicability and relevance of the Geneva Conventions (2) and frequently decided to conduct their detainee and interrogation operations by other standards. (3) The United States had faced similarly ambiguous combatants in past conflicts, choosing \"to extend basic prisoner of war protections to such persons ... based upon strong policy considerations, and ... not necessarily based on any conclusion that the United States was obligated to do so as a matter of law.\" (4) After 9/11, however, the United States ceased viewing its efforts against terrorism as a police enforcement action and embarked upon a Global War on Terrorism. (5) The Bush Administration asserted this was \"a new kind of war\" that justified reconsidering the manner in which the Laws of War would be interpreted and applied. (6) According to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, \"The reality is, the set of facts that exist today with al Qaeda and the Taliban were not necessarily the set of facts that were considered when the Geneva Conventions were fashioned.\" (7) Certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions were even considered \"quaint.\" (8) The United States has, by its post-9/11 policies and actions, demonstrated that the standards for conducting detainee operations, and perhaps the Geneva Conventions themselves, are ripe for reform. The war on terror is in its fourth year, yet there has been little academic or political agreement on what detention and interrogation techniques are ethically advisable and legally allowed. US detainee operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo have been labeled a \"gray zone\" by one analyst. (9) US classification of detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay as \"unlawful combatants\" has aroused voluminous and vociferous academic debate, (10) complicated because there are no internationally accepted, clearly delineated detention and interrogation standards for treating \"unlawful combatants.\" Even in Iraq, where the Administration conceded the Geneva Conventions applied, the overall post-9/11 paradigm shift prompted the Army's command to conduct a deliberative analysis of acceptable interrogation and detention techniques. (11) The Department of Defense is currently undergoing a more comprehensive formal initiative, with the Army acting as the lead agent. (12) To describe the complexity of conducting modern military operations in an urban environment, US Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak used the metaphor of a \"three-block war,\" (13) an environment wherein soldiers or marines simultaneously fight a high-intensity conflict in one block, suppress a simmering insurgency in another block, and facilitate humanitarian aid in a","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67988662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-01DOI: 10.1057/9781403980335_10
Philip M. Seib
{"title":"The News Media and the \"Clash of Civilizations\"","authors":"Philip M. Seib","doi":"10.1057/9781403980335_10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403980335_10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35242,"journal":{"name":"Parameters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58223929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871. By Geoffrey Wawro. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 327 pages. $35.00. Reviewed by Dr. Eugenia C. Kiesling, Professor of History, US Military Academy. For 40 years, no historian has dared to risk comparison with Michael Howard's Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 by publishing an English-language history of the Franco-Prussian War. Professor Geoffrey Wawro is not only brave but has succeeded in producing, if not a replacement for Howard, a worthy companion volume. Even more than Howard's book, this is straightforward military history, a study of armies and battles with little discussion of national policy, and with no concern for the economic or other domestic aspects of the war. As such, it is a useful work. The Franco-Prussian War was a military proving ground in an age full of uncertainties. French long-service professionals fought against Prussian conscripts, Chassepot rifles and Mitrailleuse machine guns against the Dreyse needle gun, Krupp's new steel breech-loading six-pounder gun against the French army's four-pounder bronze muzzle-loaders, an efficient general staff against a poor one. No one knew how these various contests would turn out, and Wawro offers an enthralling narrative of how battles were won and lost. As such, it ought to be of great interest to the professional soldier as well as the military historian. In introducing the two armies, Wawro touches only briefly on the fairly well-understood subject of contemporary technological developments and their impact on military tactics. That decision reflects a reasonable economy of force, especially as the necessary points are clearly illustrated in the battle narratives. More problematic is the absence of discussion of the technology's effects at the operational and strategic levels of war. For example, because Wawro says little about railroads, readers unfamiliar with the subject may fail to recognize the technological background to General Helmut von Moltke's prediction for battles of encirclement. One advantage of being the second person to write on a given war is there is no historiography to bother about. Wawro's book is all the more readable for the absence of arguments with other historians. On the other hand, a historiographical discussion would have had the salutary effect of forcing Wawro to take more rigorous positions on certain points of controversy. In particular, Wawro does not situate himself vis-a-vis the triumphalist school of German military history, which sees the Prussian army of 1870 as a model of inexorable efficiency, the precursor of the Wehrmacht of the early years of World War II. If one believes this theory, Germans rolled over France in 1870 and 1940 (and almost in 1914) because their army was overwhelmingly superior in quality of soldiers, leadership, doctrine, organization, and use of technology. This school emphasizes the German General Staff sy
普法战争:1870-1871年德国对法国的征服。杰弗里·沃罗著。纽约:剑桥大学出版社，2003。327页。35.00美元。由美国军事学院历史学教授Eugenia C. Kiesling博士审阅。40年来，没有一位历史学家敢冒险将其与迈克尔·霍华德的《普法战争:1870-1871年德国入侵法国》相提并论，出版一部关于普法战史的英文著作。Geoffrey Wawro教授不仅勇敢，而且成功地写出了一本有价值的配套著作，如果不是霍华德的替代品的话。与霍华德的书相比，这本书更直截了当，是一本关于军队和战斗的研究，几乎没有讨论国家政策，也没有关注战争的经济或其他国内方面。因此，这是一部有用的作品。普法战争是一个充满不确定性时代的军事试验场。法国长期服役的专业人员与普鲁士应征入伍的士兵作战，与德雷塞针枪(Dreyse needle gun)作战，与克虏伯(Krupp)新型六磅钢制后膛装填枪作战，与法国军队的四磅青铜口膛装填枪作战，与一支高效的总参谋部对抗一支贫乏的总参谋部作战。没有人知道这些不同的竞赛结果如何，Wawro提供了一个引人入胜的故事，讲述了战斗是如何获胜和失败的。因此，无论是职业军人还是军事历史学家，都应该对它产生极大的兴趣。在介绍这两支军队时，Wawro只是简单地谈到了当代技术发展及其对军事战术的影响这一相当容易理解的主题。这一决定反映了合理的武力节约，特别是在战斗叙述中清楚地说明了必要的要点。更有问题的是，缺乏对该技术在作战和战略层面上的影响的讨论。例如，由于Wawro很少提到铁路，不熟悉这一主题的读者可能无法认识到赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇将军(Helmut von Moltke)对包围战的预测的技术背景。作为第二个人写一场特定战争的一个好处是，不需要为历史编纂而烦恼。Wawro的书因为没有与其他历史学家争论而更具可读性。另一方面，史学上的讨论将会产生有益的影响，迫使Wawro在某些争议点上采取更严格的立场。特别是，Wawro并没有将自己与德国军事史的必胜主义学派相对立，后者将1870年的普鲁士军队视为不可避免的效率的典范，是第二次世界大战早期德国国防军的前身。如果有人相信这个理论，德国人在1870年和1940年(几乎在1914年)击败了法国，因为他们的军队在士兵素质、领导能力、学说、组织和技术使用方面都具有压倒性的优势。这个学派强调德国的总参谋部制度和一种积极的战争方式，其特点是像战争理论和作战艺术。在书的早期，Wawro似乎属于必胜主义阵营。他在“1870年的军队”一章中将“法国军队的罪恶”与以“理论和技术创新”为标志的普鲁士战争计划进行了比较。他令人反感地将法国的方法(有序但缓慢而死板)与混乱表象背后的惊人的、有目的的能量进行了比较。但作战叙事中很少提到“特技”和“作战艺术”，以至于无法证明这些概念对德国胜利的重要性。例如，作战艺术“支配”特定行动的说法回避了定义作战艺术和解释学说如何将其意志强加给军队的问题。…
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