This dissertation will analyse the degree to which Bank of England note issues influenced the extent of credit expansion by the British banking system during the 1819-26 business cycle. The evidence presented, both theoretical and empirical, tends to suggest that such an influence did indeed exist to a considerable extent, partly due to the use of Bank of England notes by other banks as cash reserves and for clearing balances. It will therefore be argued that credit expansion by the country banks — often cited by previous studies as the primary cause of the Panic of 1825 — seems more likely to have been a proximate cause, with the neglected role of Bank of England note issues as a possible ultimate cause warranting greater consideration.
{"title":"Assessing the Impacts of British Monetary Policy in the Advent of the Panic of 1825. (BSc Dissertation, London School of Economics, 2018)","authors":"G. Pickering","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3194827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3194827","url":null,"abstract":"This dissertation will analyse the degree to which Bank of England note issues influenced the extent of credit expansion by the British banking system during the 1819-26 business cycle. The evidence presented, both theoretical and empirical, tends to suggest that such an influence did indeed exist to a considerable extent, partly due to the use of Bank of England notes by other banks as cash reserves and for clearing balances. It will therefore be argued that credit expansion by the country banks — often cited by previous studies as the primary cause of the Panic of 1825 — seems more likely to have been a proximate cause, with the neglected role of Bank of England note issues as a possible ultimate cause warranting greater consideration.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126064229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary policy affects the degree of strategic complementarity in firms' pricing decisions if it responds to the aggregate price level. In normal times, when monopolistic competitive firms increase their prices, the central bank raises interest rates, which lowers consumption demand and creates an incentive for firms to reduce their prices. Thereby, monetary policy reduces the degree of strategic complementarities among firms' pricing decisions and even turns prices into strategic substitutes if the effect of interest rates on demand is sufficiently strong. We show that this condition holds when monetary policy follows the Taylor principle. By contrast, in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound, pricing decisions are strategic complements. Our main contribution consists in relating the determinacy and stability of equilibria to strategic substitutability in prices. We discuss the consequences for dynamic adjustment processes and some policy implications. Abstract Monetary policy affects the degree of strategic complementarity in firms' pricing decisions if it responds to the aggregate price level. In normal times, when monopolis-tic competitive firms increase their prices, the central bank raises interest rates, which lowers consumption demand and creates an incentive for firms to reduce their prices. Thereby, monetary policy reduces the degree of strategic complementarities among firms' pricing decisions and even turns prices into strategic substitutes if the effect of interest rates on demand is sufficiently strong. We show that this condition holds when monetary policy follows the Taylor principle. By contrast, in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound, pricing decisions are strategic complements. Our main contribution consists in relating the determinacy and stability of equilibria to strategic substitutability in prices. We discuss the consequences for dynamic adjustment processes and some policy implications.
{"title":"Monetary Policy Obeying the Taylor Principle Turns Prices into Strategic Substitutes","authors":"Camille Cornand, Frank Heinemann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3157063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157063","url":null,"abstract":"Monetary policy affects the degree of strategic complementarity in firms' pricing decisions if it responds to the aggregate price level. In normal times, when monopolistic competitive firms increase their prices, the central bank raises interest rates, which lowers consumption demand and creates an incentive for firms to reduce their prices. Thereby, monetary policy reduces the degree of strategic complementarities among firms' pricing decisions and even turns prices into strategic substitutes if the effect of interest rates on demand is sufficiently strong. We show that this condition holds when monetary policy follows the Taylor principle. By contrast, in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound, pricing decisions are strategic complements. Our main contribution consists in relating the determinacy and stability of equilibria to strategic substitutability in prices. We discuss the consequences for dynamic adjustment processes and some policy implications. Abstract Monetary policy affects the degree of strategic complementarity in firms' pricing decisions if it responds to the aggregate price level. In normal times, when monopolis-tic competitive firms increase their prices, the central bank raises interest rates, which lowers consumption demand and creates an incentive for firms to reduce their prices. Thereby, monetary policy reduces the degree of strategic complementarities among firms' pricing decisions and even turns prices into strategic substitutes if the effect of interest rates on demand is sufficiently strong. We show that this condition holds when monetary policy follows the Taylor principle. By contrast, in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound, pricing decisions are strategic complements. Our main contribution consists in relating the determinacy and stability of equilibria to strategic substitutability in prices. We discuss the consequences for dynamic adjustment processes and some policy implications.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114284477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the impact of Chinese monetary policies on the excess bond yields of Chinese local bonds issued by Chinese local government entities. We find that an expansion in M2 generally raises the excess yields of the bonds of Chinese local government entities, and the impact is amplified for local bonds issued by local governments that are characterized as having a high degree of existing resource misallocation. Our estimation results confirm that local government bond excess yields can be used as an indicator of the riskiness of Chinese local government debt.
{"title":"Chinese Local Bond Spreads, Monetary Policy and 'Misallocation'","authors":"R. Dekle, Andrew Tsang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3162353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3162353","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of Chinese monetary policies on the excess bond yields of Chinese local bonds issued by Chinese local government entities. We find that an expansion in M2 generally raises the excess yields of the bonds of Chinese local government entities, and the impact is amplified for local bonds issued by local governments that are characterized as having a high degree of existing resource misallocation. Our estimation results confirm that local government bond excess yields can be used as an indicator of the riskiness of Chinese local government debt.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122120234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-21DOI: 10.16980/JITC.14.1.201802.93
Paul J. Pieper, Sang-in Hwang
U.S. monetary policy is determined primarily by the Federal Open Market Committee. This paper examined whether the Reserve Bank president’s voting behavior at the FOMC is influenced by economic conditions in their district, using new and precise estimates of district unemployment and a longer and more recent time series. We find that the district unemployment rate is the primary determinant of Regional Bank Presidents’ probability of dissension from FOMC policy decisions. In our baseline regression, a one percent increase in the district unemployment rate relative to the national rate increases the probability of a tightening dissension by 1.3 percentage points. This result is robust to addition of other explanatory variables and to the use of alternative estimation methods. The study also finds that the rate of dissension by Regional Bank Presidents does not depend upon either the national unemployment rate or national inflation rate. This suggests that Regional Bank Presidents react to these variables in the same manner as the rest of the FOMC.
{"title":"The Effect of Regional Economic Conditions on U.S. Monetary Policy","authors":"Paul J. Pieper, Sang-in Hwang","doi":"10.16980/JITC.14.1.201802.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.16980/JITC.14.1.201802.93","url":null,"abstract":"U.S. monetary policy is determined primarily by the Federal Open Market Committee. This paper examined whether the Reserve Bank president’s voting behavior at the FOMC is influenced by economic conditions in their district, using new and precise estimates of district unemployment and a longer and more recent time series. We find that the district unemployment rate is the primary determinant of Regional Bank Presidents’ probability of dissension from FOMC policy decisions. In our baseline regression, a one percent increase in the district unemployment rate relative to the national rate increases the probability of a tightening dissension by 1.3 percentage points. This result is robust to addition of other explanatory variables and to the use of alternative estimation methods. The study also finds that the rate of dissension by Regional Bank Presidents does not depend upon either the national unemployment rate or national inflation rate. This suggests that Regional Bank Presidents react to these variables in the same manner as the rest of the FOMC.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"300 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116881807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unconventional monetary policy (UMP) by the US Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and European Central Bank affects the geographical portfolio choice of international mutual fund managers. UMP prompts managers of mutual funds to rebalance their portfolios away from the country conducting UMP, and increase their geographical allocation to other developed markets; there is little evidence of rebalancing towards emerging markets. The international spillover effects from UMP announcement surprises are of small economic magnitude, in contrast to the effects of actual UMP operations in the form of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs). The results imply that while not contributing to QE-induced capital flows to emerging markets, mutual fund managers play a role in the transmission of unconventional monetary policy, in particular LSAPs, across developed markets.
{"title":"Unconventional Monetary Policy and the Portfolio Choice of International Mutual Funds","authors":"Gino Cenedese, Ilaf Elard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3606408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3606408","url":null,"abstract":"Unconventional monetary policy (UMP) by the US Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and European Central Bank affects the geographical portfolio choice of international mutual fund managers. UMP prompts managers of mutual funds to rebalance their portfolios away from the country conducting UMP, and increase their geographical allocation to other developed markets; there is little evidence of rebalancing towards emerging markets. The international spillover effects from UMP announcement surprises are of small economic magnitude, in contrast to the effects of actual UMP operations in the form of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs). The results imply that while not contributing to QE-induced capital flows to emerging markets, mutual fund managers play a role in the transmission of unconventional monetary policy, in particular LSAPs, across developed markets.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131536607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.
{"title":"Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality","authors":"Jonathan Benchimol, Lahcen Bounader","doi":"10.24149/gwp336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24149/gwp336","url":null,"abstract":"The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123117344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores whether the degree of household indebtedness can affect the effectiveness of monetary policy. We take an interacted panel VAR approach, using a panel of 23 countries, thereby obtaining several interesting findings, such as the responses of consumption and investment to monetary shocks are stronger in high levels of household debt. Furthermore, such responses become larger in a contractionary monetary policy stance rather than in an expansionary one, which suggests that monetary policy shocks have asymmetric effects. We have also found that monetary policy has a relatively larger impact in countries with higher share of adjustable-rate loans. Finally, we have found that when a country is in a high-debt state and in a contractionary policy stance, monetary policy is more powerful in countries with a higher share of adjustable-rate loans. We conjecture that these findings support the presence of a cash-flow channel with respect to the transmission of monetary policy in a high household debt state.
{"title":"Transmission of Monetary Policy in Times of High Household Debt","authors":"Youngjune Kim, Hyunjoon Lim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3094212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3094212","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores whether the degree of household indebtedness can affect the effectiveness of monetary policy. We take an interacted panel VAR approach, using a panel of 23 countries, thereby obtaining several interesting findings, such as the responses of consumption and investment to monetary shocks are stronger in high levels of household debt. Furthermore, such responses become larger in a contractionary monetary policy stance rather than in an expansionary one, which suggests that monetary policy shocks have asymmetric effects. We have also found that monetary policy has a relatively larger impact in countries with higher share of adjustable-rate loans. Finally, we have found that when a country is in a high-debt state and in a contractionary policy stance, monetary policy is more powerful in countries with a higher share of adjustable-rate loans. We conjecture that these findings support the presence of a cash-flow channel with respect to the transmission of monetary policy in a high household debt state.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116944396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christiaan Pattipeilohy, C. Bräuning, Jan Willem van den End, Renske Maas
We present an empirical approach to derive the implicit stance of monetary policy. The indicator can be interpreted as an implied short-term interest rate that is not restricted by the effective lower bound. Factor analysis is used to extract an expectations and term premium component from fitted yield curve data. Based on this, an implied short-term interest rate is constructed, which reflects how much the short-term rate should have fallen to achieve observed drop in long-term yields, assuming it could not have been caused by a fall in the term premium. Following Lombardi and Zhu (2014), we study how the implied rate performs as instrument for monetary policy analysis. Regression analyses suggests that the implied rate provides a good gauge for the identification of non-standard monetary policy shocks, and has responded significantly to financial stress as opposed to the output and inflation gap.
{"title":"Assessing the Effective Stance of Monetary Policy: A Factor-Based Approach","authors":"Christiaan Pattipeilohy, C. Bräuning, Jan Willem van den End, Renske Maas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3067911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3067911","url":null,"abstract":"We present an empirical approach to derive the implicit stance of monetary policy. The indicator can be interpreted as an implied short-term interest rate that is not restricted by the effective lower bound. Factor analysis is used to extract an expectations and term premium component from fitted yield curve data. Based on this, an implied short-term interest rate is constructed, which reflects how much the short-term rate should have fallen to achieve observed drop in long-term yields, assuming it could not have been caused by a fall in the term premium. Following Lombardi and Zhu (2014), we study how the implied rate performs as instrument for monetary policy analysis. Regression analyses suggests that the implied rate provides a good gauge for the identification of non-standard monetary policy shocks, and has responded significantly to financial stress as opposed to the output and inflation gap.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127687397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper attempts to borrow the tradition of estimating policy reaction functions in monetary policy literature and apply it to capital controls policy literature. Using a novel weekly dataset on capital controls policy actions in 21 emerging economies over the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2015, I examine the competitiveness and macroprudential motivations for capital control policies. I introduce a new proxy for competitiveness motivations: the weighted appreciation of an emerging-market currency against its top five trade competitors. The analysis shows that past emerging-market policy systematically responds to both competitiveness and macroprudential motivations. The choice of instruments is also systematic: policy-makers respond to competitiveness concerns by using both instruments - inflow tightening and outflow easing. They use only inflow tightening in response to macroprudential concerns. I also find evidence that that policy is acyclical to foreign debt but is countercyclical to domestic bank credit to the private non-financial sector. The adoption of explicit financial stability mandates by central banks or the creation of inter-agency financial stability councils increased the weight of macroprudential factors in the use of capital controls policies. Countries with higher exchange rate pass-through to export prices are more responsive to competitiveness concerns.
{"title":"Policy Rules for Capital Controls","authors":"G. Pasricha","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3040092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3040092","url":null,"abstract":"This paper attempts to borrow the tradition of estimating policy reaction functions in monetary policy literature and apply it to capital controls policy literature. Using a novel weekly dataset on capital controls policy actions in 21 emerging economies over the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2015, I examine the competitiveness and macroprudential motivations for capital control policies. I introduce a new proxy for competitiveness motivations: the weighted appreciation of an emerging-market currency against its top five trade competitors. The analysis shows that past emerging-market policy systematically responds to both competitiveness and macroprudential motivations. The choice of instruments is also systematic: policy-makers respond to competitiveness concerns by using both instruments - inflow tightening and outflow easing. They use only inflow tightening in response to macroprudential concerns. I also find evidence that that policy is acyclical to foreign debt but is countercyclical to domestic bank credit to the private non-financial sector. The adoption of explicit financial stability mandates by central banks or the creation of inter-agency financial stability councils increased the weight of macroprudential factors in the use of capital controls policies. Countries with higher exchange rate pass-through to export prices are more responsive to competitiveness concerns.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125653655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study shows that, in the United States, the effects of monetary policy on credit and housing markets have become considerably stronger relative to the impact on GDP since the mid-1980s, while the effects on inflation have become weaker. Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary policy may therefore have become associated with greater fluctuations in credit and housing markets, whereas stabilizing credit and house prices may have become less costly in terms of macroeconomic volatility. These changes in the aggregate impact of monetary policy can be explained by several important changes in the monetary transmission mechanism and in the composition of macroeconomic and credit aggregates. In particular, the stronger impact of monetary policy on credit is driven by a much higher responsiveness of mortgage credit and a larger share of mortgages in total credit since the 1980s.
{"title":"Monetary Policy Transmission and Trade-Offs in the United States: Old and New","authors":"Boris Hofmann, G. Peersman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3102346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102346","url":null,"abstract":"This study shows that, in the United States, the effects of monetary policy on credit and housing markets have become considerably stronger relative to the impact on GDP since the mid-1980s, while the effects on inflation have become weaker. Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary policy may therefore have become associated with greater fluctuations in credit and housing markets, whereas stabilizing credit and house prices may have become less costly in terms of macroeconomic volatility. These changes in the aggregate impact of monetary policy can be explained by several important changes in the monetary transmission mechanism and in the composition of macroeconomic and credit aggregates. In particular, the stronger impact of monetary policy on credit is driven by a much higher responsiveness of mortgage credit and a larger share of mortgages in total credit since the 1980s.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127540047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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