This paper demonstrates how adding nominal wage rigidity to a standard sticky price model can create a mechanism by which increases in government spending cause increases in consumption. The increase in output arising from government purchases puts upward pressure on the price level. At a fixed short-run nominal wage, this bids down the real wage, which leads producers to increase labor demand. Increased labor demand allows households to both finance the tax bill associated with the government spending as well as increase their own consumption. Our approach does not rely upon existing ingredients for generating large fiscal multipliers, such as the zero lower bound, borrowing constrained households or an interaction between consumption and government purchases in the utility function.
{"title":"Sticky Wages, Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy Multipliers","authors":"Bill Dupor, Jingchao Li, Rong Li","doi":"10.20955/wp.2017.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2017.007","url":null,"abstract":"This paper demonstrates how adding nominal wage rigidity to a standard sticky price model can create a mechanism by which increases in government spending cause increases in consumption. The increase in output arising from government purchases puts upward pressure on the price level. At a fixed short-run nominal wage, this bids down the real wage, which leads producers to increase labor demand. Increased labor demand allows households to both finance the tax bill associated with the government spending as well as increase their own consumption. Our approach does not rely upon existing ingredients for generating large fiscal multipliers, such as the zero lower bound, borrowing constrained households or an interaction between consumption and government purchases in the utility function.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123109210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents’ partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded “cognitive discounting” parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is “ neo-Fisherian” in the long run, Keynesian in the short run. (JEL E12, E31, E43, E52, E62, E70)
{"title":"A Behavioral New Keynesian Model","authors":"X. Gabaix","doi":"10.1257/AER.20162005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20162005","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents’ partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded “cognitive discounting” parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is “ neo-Fisherian” in the long run, Keynesian in the short run. (JEL E12, E31, E43, E52, E62, E70)","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115825361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Koren W. Wong-Ervin, D. Ginsburg, A. Slonim, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Joshua D. Wright
Recent solicitations for comments on monetary penalties in China and Japan highlight opportunities to improve the deterrent effect of antitrust law by more closely aligning penalties with economic theory and evidence. When monetary penalties are not based upon economic analysis and clearly linked to identified harms, they are likely to generate costly errors, either by overdetering welfare-enhancing behavior or underdetering anticompetitive behavior.On June 17, 2016, China’s Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council requested comments on Draft Guidelines issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) for the calculation of illegal gains (disgorgement) and setting of fines issued. On July 13, 2016, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) requested comments on introducing flexibility into their administrative surcharge system, developing a settlement program, and reforming due process in conjunction with surcharge reform. Both proposed monetary penalty systems would benefit from a deeper grounding in economics. The NDRC’s Draft Guidelines provided only for the optional use of economic analysis in calculating illegal gains and appear to create a presumption that disgorgement would apply in addition to fines in nearly all cases. The JFTC’s consultation acknowledged that the current inflexible surcharge system could give rise to “unreasonable or unfair” surcharges, but did not require economic analysis to determine appropriate monetary penalties. In both countries, monetary penalties are applied broadly and are not based upon identified harms, although the JFTC’s consultation invited comments on whether differentiation by type of infringement was necessary.
{"title":"Monetary Penalties in China and Japan","authors":"Koren W. Wong-Ervin, D. Ginsburg, A. Slonim, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Joshua D. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2857044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2857044","url":null,"abstract":"Recent solicitations for comments on monetary penalties in China and Japan highlight opportunities to improve the deterrent effect of antitrust law by more closely aligning penalties with economic theory and evidence. When monetary penalties are not based upon economic analysis and clearly linked to identified harms, they are likely to generate costly errors, either by overdetering welfare-enhancing behavior or underdetering anticompetitive behavior.On June 17, 2016, China’s Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council requested comments on Draft Guidelines issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) for the calculation of illegal gains (disgorgement) and setting of fines issued. On July 13, 2016, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) requested comments on introducing flexibility into their administrative surcharge system, developing a settlement program, and reforming due process in conjunction with surcharge reform. Both proposed monetary penalty systems would benefit from a deeper grounding in economics. The NDRC’s Draft Guidelines provided only for the optional use of economic analysis in calculating illegal gains and appear to create a presumption that disgorgement would apply in addition to fines in nearly all cases. The JFTC’s consultation acknowledged that the current inflexible surcharge system could give rise to “unreasonable or unfair” surcharges, but did not require economic analysis to determine appropriate monetary penalties. In both countries, monetary penalties are applied broadly and are not based upon identified harms, although the JFTC’s consultation invited comments on whether differentiation by type of infringement was necessary.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131303512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the international transmission of the US monetary policy surprises. The US monetary policy surprises are defined by the gap between the actual fed fund rate and its forecast estimated a quarter ahead. The US monetary policy surprises are used as external shocks to investigate the spillover effects of policy uncertainty on other economies and address the endogeneity problem. The US is the base country where the monetary policy uncertainty shocks take place. I construct the each country’s international linkages such as the equity market and debt market linkages vis-a-vis the epicenter, US to investigate how the shocks are transmitted to other countries through those linkages. The empirical result shows that the equity market integration is associated with the business cycle divergence and the debt market integration is associated with the business cycle co-movement when the US policy uncertainty index is low. However, the equity market integration is associated with the business cycle comovement and the debt market integration plays insignificant role in transmitting the monetary policy surprises when the US policy uncertainty index is high.
{"title":"International Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy Surprises","authors":"Kyunghun Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2830292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2830292","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the international transmission of the US monetary policy surprises. The US monetary policy surprises are defined by the gap between the actual fed fund rate and its forecast estimated a quarter ahead. The US monetary policy surprises are used as external shocks to investigate the spillover effects of policy uncertainty on other economies and address the endogeneity problem. The US is the base country where the monetary policy uncertainty shocks take place. I construct the each country’s international linkages such as the equity market and debt market linkages vis-a-vis the epicenter, US to investigate how the shocks are transmitted to other countries through those linkages. The empirical result shows that the equity market integration is associated with the business cycle divergence and the debt market integration is associated with the business cycle co-movement when the US policy uncertainty index is low. However, the equity market integration is associated with the business cycle comovement and the debt market integration plays insignificant role in transmitting the monetary policy surprises when the US policy uncertainty index is high.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129274951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-05-01DOI: 10.5089/9781484361689.001
Giovanni Ganelli, Nour Tawk
We use a Global VAR model to study spillovers from the Bank of Japan’s quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE) on emerging Asia.1 Our main result is that, despite an appreciation of their currencies vis-a-vis the yen, the impact on emerging Asia’s GDP tended to be positive and significant. Our results suggest that the positive effect of QQE on expectations, by improving confidence, more than offset any negative exchange rate spillover due to expenditure switching from domestic demand to Japanese goods. They also suggest that spillovers from QQE might have worked mainly through the impact of expectations and improved confidence, captured by increases in equity prices, rather than through balance sheet adjustments which might have been captured by movements in the monetary base.
{"title":"Spillovers from Japan's Unconventional Monetary Policy to Emerging Asia: A Global VAR Approach","authors":"Giovanni Ganelli, Nour Tawk","doi":"10.5089/9781484361689.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484361689.001","url":null,"abstract":"We use a Global VAR model to study spillovers from the Bank of Japan’s quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE) on emerging Asia.1 Our main result is that, despite an appreciation of their currencies vis-a-vis the yen, the impact on emerging Asia’s GDP tended to be positive and significant. Our results suggest that the positive effect of QQE on expectations, by improving confidence, more than offset any negative exchange rate spillover due to expenditure switching from domestic demand to Japanese goods. They also suggest that spillovers from QQE might have worked mainly through the impact of expectations and improved confidence, captured by increases in equity prices, rather than through balance sheet adjustments which might have been captured by movements in the monetary base.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129498881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the late-1940s and the early-1950s Milton Friedman favored a rule under which fiscal policy would be used to generate changes in the money supply with the aim of stabilizing output at full employment. He believed that the economy is inherently unstable because of endogenous movements in money supply under a fractional-reserve banking system. In her work, Anna Schwartz downplayed the role of monetary factors in business cycles and the role of monetary policy as a stabilization tool. We show how the joint work of Friedman and Schwartz from 1948 to 1958 led Friedman to view money as the “primary mover” of the business cycle and underpinned his shift to a rule based on money growth so that discretionary monetary policy would not act as a source of destabilizing shocks. The decisive factor in the evolution of Friedman’s thinking was the empirical confirmation that the Great Depression had been both initiated and deepened by the Fed. The largely neglected influence of Clark Warburton on the evolution of Friedman’s thinking provides a missing -- but crucial -- link in explaining Friedman’s recognition of the role of monetary factors in the Great Depression and of the Fed’s ability to offset the destabilizing effects produced by shifts from deposits into currency under a fractional-reserve banking system.
{"title":"How Friedman and Schwartz Became Monetarists","authors":"J. Lothian, G. Tavlas","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2771357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2771357","url":null,"abstract":"During the late-1940s and the early-1950s Milton Friedman favored a rule under which fiscal policy would be used to generate changes in the money supply with the aim of stabilizing output at full employment. He believed that the economy is inherently unstable because of endogenous movements in money supply under a fractional-reserve banking system. In her work, Anna Schwartz downplayed the role of monetary factors in business cycles and the role of monetary policy as a stabilization tool. We show how the joint work of Friedman and Schwartz from 1948 to 1958 led Friedman to view money as the “primary mover” of the business cycle and underpinned his shift to a rule based on money growth so that discretionary monetary policy would not act as a source of destabilizing shocks. The decisive factor in the evolution of Friedman’s thinking was the empirical confirmation that the Great Depression had been both initiated and deepened by the Fed. The largely neglected influence of Clark Warburton on the evolution of Friedman’s thinking provides a missing -- but crucial -- link in explaining Friedman’s recognition of the role of monetary factors in the Great Depression and of the Fed’s ability to offset the destabilizing effects produced by shifts from deposits into currency under a fractional-reserve banking system.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"215 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121723940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study I examine the welfare implications of monetary policy by constructing a novel New Keynesian model that properly accounts for asset pricing facts. I find that the Ramsey optimal monetary policy yields an inflation rate above 3.5% and inflation volatility close to 1.5%. The same model calibrated to a counterfactually low equity premium implies an optimal inflation rate close to zero and inflation volatility less than 10 basis points, consistent with much of the existing literature. Relatively higher optimal inflation is due to the greater welfare costs of recessions associated with matching the equity premium. Additionally, the second order approximation allows monetary policy to have positive welfare effects on the labor share of income. I show that this channel is generally absent in standard macroeconomic models that do not take risk into account. Furthermore, the interest rate rule that comes closest to matching the dynamics of the optimal Ramsey policy puts a sizable weight on capital growth along with the price of capital, as it emphasizes stabilizing the medium to long term over the very short run.
{"title":"The Equity Premium, Long-Run Risk, & Optimal Monetary Policy","authors":"Anthony M. Diercks","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2670122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2670122","url":null,"abstract":"In this study I examine the welfare implications of monetary policy by constructing a novel New Keynesian model that properly accounts for asset pricing facts. I find that the Ramsey optimal monetary policy yields an inflation rate above 3.5% and inflation volatility close to 1.5%. The same model calibrated to a counterfactually low equity premium implies an optimal inflation rate close to zero and inflation volatility less than 10 basis points, consistent with much of the existing literature. Relatively higher optimal inflation is due to the greater welfare costs of recessions associated with matching the equity premium. Additionally, the second order approximation allows monetary policy to have positive welfare effects on the labor share of income. I show that this channel is generally absent in standard macroeconomic models that do not take risk into account. Furthermore, the interest rate rule that comes closest to matching the dynamics of the optimal Ramsey policy puts a sizable weight on capital growth along with the price of capital, as it emphasizes stabilizing the medium to long term over the very short run.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116817142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers potential alternatives to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) system of deposit insurance in the United States. We review the international and historical literature on deposit insurance which finds higher government involvement in the deposit insurance system increases the likelihood of bank failures and financial crises. We discuss three potential changes to the FDIC system. First, deposit insurance could be government mandated but privately administered as is done in most developed countries. Second, coverage levels could be lowered and supplemented by currently available private issuers. Third, the mandate on deposit insurance could be lifted and the supply of insurance privatized. Empirical evidence indicates these changes would reduce bank failures and financial crises.
{"title":"Alternatives to FDIC Deposit Insurance","authors":"Thomas L. Hogan, Kristin Johnson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2568767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2568767","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers potential alternatives to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) system of deposit insurance in the United States. We review the international and historical literature on deposit insurance which finds higher government involvement in the deposit insurance system increases the likelihood of bank failures and financial crises. We discuss three potential changes to the FDIC system. First, deposit insurance could be government mandated but privately administered as is done in most developed countries. Second, coverage levels could be lowered and supplemented by currently available private issuers. Third, the mandate on deposit insurance could be lifted and the supply of insurance privatized. Empirical evidence indicates these changes would reduce bank failures and financial crises.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133624506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This short and preliminary paper considers the relationship between fiscal, monetary and prudential policy instruments. It argues that the currently employed instruments (government borrowing, expansion of central bank balance sheets) do not address the underlying reason for slow global growth, the high levels of leverage in the (public and private) non-financial sector. It suggests that addressing this problem requires ‘monetary expansion by gift’ (also known as helicopter money). It further argues that this should be treated from an accounting perspective so that it does not result in any deterioration in central bank net worth and employment of this instrument should be independent of day-to-day political control and therefore conducted by an independent central bank as one of the basic monetary policy instruments. It also argues that macroprudential policies will then be needed to restrain unsustainable credit expansions and are operationally are best though as a branch of large exposure regulation, focusing on the exposure of institutions to systemic risks such as commercial property prices or maturity mismatch.
{"title":"Macroeconomic and Macroprudential Policy Making","authors":"A. Milne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2526742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526742","url":null,"abstract":"This short and preliminary paper considers the relationship between fiscal, monetary and prudential policy instruments. It argues that the currently employed instruments (government borrowing, expansion of central bank balance sheets) do not address the underlying reason for slow global growth, the high levels of leverage in the (public and private) non-financial sector. It suggests that addressing this problem requires ‘monetary expansion by gift’ (also known as helicopter money). It further argues that this should be treated from an accounting perspective so that it does not result in any deterioration in central bank net worth and employment of this instrument should be independent of day-to-day political control and therefore conducted by an independent central bank as one of the basic monetary policy instruments. It also argues that macroprudential policies will then be needed to restrain unsustainable credit expansions and are operationally are best though as a branch of large exposure regulation, focusing on the exposure of institutions to systemic risks such as commercial property prices or maturity mismatch.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133254846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that actively stabilizing economic activity plays a more prominent role in the conduct of monetary policy when potential output is subject to hysteresis. We augment a basic New Keynesian model by hysteresis in potential output and contrast simulation outcomes of this extended model to the standard model. We find that considering hysteresis allows for a more realistic propagation of macroeconomic shocks and persistent movements in output after monetary shocks. Our central policy implication of active output gap stabilization arises from stability analyses and welfare considerations.
{"title":"Hysteresis in Potential Output and Monetary Policy","authors":"D. Kienzler, K. Schmid","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12050","url":null,"abstract":"We show that actively stabilizing economic activity plays a more prominent role in the conduct of monetary policy when potential output is subject to hysteresis. We augment a basic New Keynesian model by hysteresis in potential output and contrast simulation outcomes of this extended model to the standard model. We find that considering hysteresis allows for a more realistic propagation of macroeconomic shocks and persistent movements in output after monetary shocks. Our central policy implication of active output gap stabilization arises from stability analyses and welfare considerations.","PeriodicalId":355111,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124617299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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