On 21 March 2016 the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued its first ever decision to compulsorily delist a company on the ground of seriously breaching the disclosure norms. It is the first case applying the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s 2015 delisting regulation and has substantial implications for the future operation of the delisting system in China. The effectiveness of the delisting system, particularly in regard to the issue of misrepresentation, largely depends on the functioning of the Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Interpretation issued in 2003. By virtue of examining the legislative purpose in the context of specific procedural devices adopted in the 2003 Interpretation, this article identifies the unfortunate status of investors and the causes thereof under China’s political and economic circumstances. It argues that the delisting system, which is built upon the unsatisfactory regime of investor protection, has put investors in a more disadvantageous position facing increased uncertainty and unpredictability. By going through crucial statutory provisions in the 2003 Interpretation and the delisting regulation, this article illustrates how the judiciary, the administrative authorities and the investors interact on this uneven playing field of stock market.
{"title":"Misrepresentation, Involuntary Delisting and Investor Protection - The Dilemma of Dislocated Regulation on Chinese Securities Market","authors":"Haifan Hu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3007037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3007037","url":null,"abstract":"On 21 March 2016 the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued its first ever decision to compulsorily delist a company on the ground of seriously breaching the disclosure norms. It is the first case applying the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s 2015 delisting regulation and has substantial implications for the future operation of the delisting system in China. The effectiveness of the delisting system, particularly in regard to the issue of misrepresentation, largely depends on the functioning of the Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Interpretation issued in 2003. By virtue of examining the legislative purpose in the context of specific procedural devices adopted in the 2003 Interpretation, this article identifies the unfortunate status of investors and the causes thereof under China’s political and economic circumstances. It argues that the delisting system, which is built upon the unsatisfactory regime of investor protection, has put investors in a more disadvantageous position facing increased uncertainty and unpredictability. By going through crucial statutory provisions in the 2003 Interpretation and the delisting regulation, this article illustrates how the judiciary, the administrative authorities and the investors interact on this uneven playing field of stock market.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125323509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper exploits the determinants of residential housing investment in 35 major cities from 2000 to 2009. Based on panel data analysis, empirical results suggest that residential housing investment boom is driven by urbanization, bank loans and economic growth. It is substantiated that housing investment is determined by housing specific factors such as housing sales and land sale price. One implication with retrospect to the historical development is the asymmetric policy effect of regulations: restrictive policies are less effective on containing housing investment while supportive policies are more effective on boosting housing investment. Market failure due to government’s discretionary policy thus occurs, resulting in the inefficient allocation of capital resources between residential and industrial land markets. Whether such development pattern is sustainable to the real economy remains to be explored.
{"title":"Residential Housing Development in China: Mainly Policy Driven?","authors":"Jing Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2786496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786496","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits the determinants of residential housing investment in 35 major cities from 2000 to 2009. Based on panel data analysis, empirical results suggest that residential housing investment boom is driven by urbanization, bank loans and economic growth. It is substantiated that housing investment is determined by housing specific factors such as housing sales and land sale price. One implication with retrospect to the historical development is the asymmetric policy effect of regulations: restrictive policies are less effective on containing housing investment while supportive policies are more effective on boosting housing investment. Market failure due to government’s discretionary policy thus occurs, resulting in the inefficient allocation of capital resources between residential and industrial land markets. Whether such development pattern is sustainable to the real economy remains to be explored.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126414684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hong Kong is one of the world’s financial powerhouses. Its capital market is the second largest in Asia and 8th largest in the world, in terms of total capitalization. Indeed, these statistics under-state the importance of Hong Kong’s capital markets. The stock exchanges in Hong Kong and Shanghai combine to give the People’s Republic of China two of the three leading exchanges in Asia and two of the important exchanges in the world. Moreover, Hong Kong is the spearhead of China’s effort to open and regulate its capital markets. The economy of both China and the world will be materially affected by China’s success in further developing and regulating Hong Kong’s financial markets. The book of In Investor Protection in Capital Markets - The Hong Kong Case, provides an illuminating and comprehensive examination of the institutions and regulations governing Hong Kong’s capital markets. The book offers an in-depth analysis of the regulation of and parties operating within Hong Kong’s market that should be invaluable to all interested in this important market: research scholars, business men, legal practitioners, and institutional and individual investors alike. Hong Kong’s markets initially developed in a laissez faire legal environment. This is no longer the case. The book leads the reader on a fascinating journey through the interlocking institutions and regulations aimed at protecting investors, largely through both mandated disclosure and liability for those who make material misstatements or engage in other misconduct.
{"title":"Front Matter for: Investor Protection in Capital Markets - The Case of Hong Kong","authors":"Shen Wei","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2701750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2701750","url":null,"abstract":"Hong Kong is one of the world’s financial powerhouses. Its capital market is the second largest in Asia and 8th largest in the world, in terms of total capitalization. Indeed, these statistics under-state the importance of Hong Kong’s capital markets. The stock exchanges in Hong Kong and Shanghai combine to give the People’s Republic of China two of the three leading exchanges in Asia and two of the important exchanges in the world. Moreover, Hong Kong is the spearhead of China’s effort to open and regulate its capital markets. The economy of both China and the world will be materially affected by China’s success in further developing and regulating Hong Kong’s financial markets. The book of In Investor Protection in Capital Markets - The Hong Kong Case, provides an illuminating and comprehensive examination of the institutions and regulations governing Hong Kong’s capital markets. The book offers an in-depth analysis of the regulation of and parties operating within Hong Kong’s market that should be invaluable to all interested in this important market: research scholars, business men, legal practitioners, and institutional and individual investors alike. Hong Kong’s markets initially developed in a laissez faire legal environment. This is no longer the case. The book leads the reader on a fascinating journey through the interlocking institutions and regulations aimed at protecting investors, largely through both mandated disclosure and liability for those who make material misstatements or engage in other misconduct.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"206 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133992098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article compares U.S. and Chinese economic policies in Latin America by focusing on U.S. and Chinese investment treaties with Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, the countries of the so-called Pacific Alliance, an organization that aims to promote free trade and investment with a focus toward the Asia-Pacific region.
{"title":"U.S. and Chinese Investment Treaties in Latin America: Convergence or Competition","authors":"Philip MacFarlane","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2518845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2518845","url":null,"abstract":"This article compares U.S. and Chinese economic policies in Latin America by focusing on U.S. and Chinese investment treaties with Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, the countries of the so-called Pacific Alliance, an organization that aims to promote free trade and investment with a focus toward the Asia-Pacific region.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121447261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On January 19, 2015, China’s Ministry of Commerce released a Draft proposal for a new Foreign Investment Law in order to solicit opinions from the public. This new law, which if promulgated will replace the existing laws governing foreign investments, will reduce restrictions on foreign investment and streamline the approval process for foreign investment. However, the law also constitutes a crackdown on foreign investment in sensitive sectors. Most notably, the law will bring the variable interest corporate structure within the definition of foreign investment, and therefore within the ambit of regulation. This structure has been widely used by foreign investors to circumvent restrictions and prohibitions imposed on foreign investment in China. Many of the largest Chinese companies listed on U.S. exchanges are operating in China through a variable interest entity. Their standing under the new law is therefore of paramount importance.Unfortunately, the proposed law does not provide much clarity regarding how existing and new variable interest entities will be treated. Instead, the Draft maintains a broad and flexible approach that has informed the last 30 years of economic transition in China. This approach allows Chinese regulators to engage in selective enforcement, and has therefore been a popular policy choice of the Communist Party of China in it’s desire to enjoy the benefits of a market economy, while maintaining tight control. However, it also leaves many questions unanswered and issues unresolved and reduces legal certainty.It is therefore important to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how the FIL fits with the overall objectives of the Communist Party of China, which can provide some indication as to how these unresolved issues may be addressed. Examining the proposed law in its larger context, as a step in China’s economic transition, it becomes clear that ultimately Beijing adopts a cautious approach to foreign investment. The Draft, if enacted in its current form is neither a death sentence nor a thumb of approval for the VIE corporate structure. Instead, its provisions are broad enough that the impact of the law will depend upon their interpretation by authorities and courts.
{"title":"China's Proposed New Foreign Investment Law: A New Era for Foreign Investment in China","authors":"Laura McCaskill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2824426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2824426","url":null,"abstract":"On January 19, 2015, China’s Ministry of Commerce released a Draft proposal for a new Foreign Investment Law in order to solicit opinions from the public. This new law, which if promulgated will replace the existing laws governing foreign investments, will reduce restrictions on foreign investment and streamline the approval process for foreign investment. However, the law also constitutes a crackdown on foreign investment in sensitive sectors. Most notably, the law will bring the variable interest corporate structure within the definition of foreign investment, and therefore within the ambit of regulation. This structure has been widely used by foreign investors to circumvent restrictions and prohibitions imposed on foreign investment in China. Many of the largest Chinese companies listed on U.S. exchanges are operating in China through a variable interest entity. Their standing under the new law is therefore of paramount importance.Unfortunately, the proposed law does not provide much clarity regarding how existing and new variable interest entities will be treated. Instead, the Draft maintains a broad and flexible approach that has informed the last 30 years of economic transition in China. This approach allows Chinese regulators to engage in selective enforcement, and has therefore been a popular policy choice of the Communist Party of China in it’s desire to enjoy the benefits of a market economy, while maintaining tight control. However, it also leaves many questions unanswered and issues unresolved and reduces legal certainty.It is therefore important to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how the FIL fits with the overall objectives of the Communist Party of China, which can provide some indication as to how these unresolved issues may be addressed. Examining the proposed law in its larger context, as a step in China’s economic transition, it becomes clear that ultimately Beijing adopts a cautious approach to foreign investment. The Draft, if enacted in its current form is neither a death sentence nor a thumb of approval for the VIE corporate structure. Instead, its provisions are broad enough that the impact of the law will depend upon their interpretation by authorities and courts.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128062239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine how policy instability is priced in interest rates. Policy instability refers to the likelihood that the current policy will be changed in the future in the absence of political power shifts. Chinese government’s experimental policymaking approach provides an ideal set of frequent policy flip-flops which allows us to identify the effect of policy changes. Conditional on the bureaucratic quality of policymaking, a good-quality policy reversal is related to reductions in interest rate term spread and volatility; a bad-quality policy reversal is related to increases in the spread and volatility. The bureaucratic quality is multi-dimensional and the moderating effect is stronger on interest rates when it is measured more precisely.
{"title":"The Moderating Effect of Bureaucratic Quality on the Pricing of Policy Instability","authors":"S. Lam, Weina Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1960292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1960292","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how policy instability is priced in interest rates. Policy instability refers to the likelihood that the current policy will be changed in the future in the absence of political power shifts. Chinese government’s experimental policymaking approach provides an ideal set of frequent policy flip-flops which allows us to identify the effect of policy changes. Conditional on the bureaucratic quality of policymaking, a good-quality policy reversal is related to reductions in interest rate term spread and volatility; a bad-quality policy reversal is related to increases in the spread and volatility. The bureaucratic quality is multi-dimensional and the moderating effect is stronger on interest rates when it is measured more precisely.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115016286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-04-15DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107449480.007
Henry Gao
On November 11, 2001, China finally acceded to the WTO in Doha, Qatar, at the 4th Ministerial Conference, which also launched the first negotiating Round of the new trade body since its establishment. As China is the largest country that has ever acceded to the WTO, many commentators predicted that its accession would change the dynamics of the negotiations. However, the commentators differ in their interpretations on how such change will affect the multilateral trading system. Some viewed this in a more positive light, pointing out that China would strengthen the developing country bloc and make the WTO a more balanced institution. Others, however, were not so optimistic. Instead, they argued that the Chinese accession would upset the existing power structure of the WTO and make it more difficult to conduct negotiations and reach decisions. Now in its tenth year of WTO membership, how has China changed the dynamics in the global trade negotiations? This chapter will address the impact of China in relation to the WTO negotiations. It commences with a brief discussion on how trade negotiations are conducted in the WTO, followed by an examination of China's participation in the Doha Round so far. As this chapter reveals, China started as a reluctant player in the negotiations, and only gradually made its way into the core decision-making group of the WTO rather late during the Round. Even though now China has been accepted as a member of the G-7, the most powerful group in the WTO, it has been playing only a supportive rather than a leading role. Judging from its behavior so far, we can see that China doesn’t really challenge the status quo. Instead, its modus operandi has largely been in conformity with the existing paradigm. The chapter explains the reasons for such low profile approaches, and also examines the value of the Chinese proposals so far from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. It then seeks to explain China’s choice of particular negotiation approaches, and concludes by considering China’s behavior in future negotiations, and the broader implications of China’s growing power on the WTO as a whole.
{"title":"From the Doha Round to the China Round: China's Growing Role in WTO Negotiations","authors":"Henry Gao","doi":"10.1017/CBO9781107449480.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107449480.007","url":null,"abstract":"On November 11, 2001, China finally acceded to the WTO in Doha, Qatar, at the 4th Ministerial Conference, which also launched the first negotiating Round of the new trade body since its establishment. As China is the largest country that has ever acceded to the WTO, many commentators predicted that its accession would change the dynamics of the negotiations. However, the commentators differ in their interpretations on how such change will affect the multilateral trading system. Some viewed this in a more positive light, pointing out that China would strengthen the developing country bloc and make the WTO a more balanced institution. Others, however, were not so optimistic. Instead, they argued that the Chinese accession would upset the existing power structure of the WTO and make it more difficult to conduct negotiations and reach decisions. \u0000 \u0000Now in its tenth year of WTO membership, how has China changed the dynamics in the global trade negotiations? This chapter will address the impact of China in relation to the WTO negotiations. It commences with a brief discussion on how trade negotiations are conducted in the WTO, followed by an examination of China's participation in the Doha Round so far. As this chapter reveals, China started as a reluctant player in the negotiations, and only gradually made its way into the core decision-making group of the WTO rather late during the Round. Even though now China has been accepted as a member of the G-7, the most powerful group in the WTO, it has been playing only a supportive rather than a leading role. Judging from its behavior so far, we can see that China doesn’t really challenge the status quo. Instead, its modus operandi has largely been in conformity with the existing paradigm. \u0000 \u0000The chapter explains the reasons for such low profile approaches, and also examines the value of the Chinese proposals so far from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. It then seeks to explain China’s choice of particular negotiation approaches, and concludes by considering China’s behavior in future negotiations, and the broader implications of China’s growing power on the WTO as a whole.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122347617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the use and effects of the presumptions of market dominance in antitrust litigation in China (Article 19 Antimonopoly Law). To this end, thirteen court decisions in cases of abuse of market dominance were analyzed. We found that the presumptions are mentioned in eight cases. The presence of the presumptions, however, did not influence the court’s rationale and findings in a meaningful way. In those cases in which the presumptions are cited and market dominance found (three cases), the court’s views were guided less by the logic underlying the presumptions than by the fact that the defendants held a monopoly position due to patent holdings or exclusive rights. In the other five cases that cite the presumptions, the defendants operated in a competitive market and dominance was not found. Here, the plaintiffs systematically failed to satisfy the requirements of the presumption due to problems of market definition and measurement of market shares. In terms of effects, the possibility that the presumptions connote a shift in the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant remains unclear, and further guidance from the Chinese courts on this issue is critical.
{"title":"The Role of Presumptions of Market Dominance in Civil Litigation in China","authors":"Félix E. Mezzanotte, Liyang Hou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2557249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2557249","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the use and effects of the presumptions of market dominance in antitrust litigation in China (Article 19 Antimonopoly Law). To this end, thirteen court decisions in cases of abuse of market dominance were analyzed. We found that the presumptions are mentioned in eight cases. The presence of the presumptions, however, did not influence the court’s rationale and findings in a meaningful way. In those cases in which the presumptions are cited and market dominance found (three cases), the court’s views were guided less by the logic underlying the presumptions than by the fact that the defendants held a monopoly position due to patent holdings or exclusive rights. In the other five cases that cite the presumptions, the defendants operated in a competitive market and dominance was not found. Here, the plaintiffs systematically failed to satisfy the requirements of the presumption due to problems of market definition and measurement of market shares. In terms of effects, the possibility that the presumptions connote a shift in the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant remains unclear, and further guidance from the Chinese courts on this issue is critical.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129062548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the context of rapid demographic, political and economic change, the Chinese pension system has evolved from a scheme almost exclusively for urban and public sector workers to one with broad national coverage. However, this apparent success masks structural and governance deficiencies, which if left unresolved, could threaten the equity, adequacy and security of future retirement incomes. This article examines the key demographic challenges for China and their implications for the pension system. We then review and critically assess the current pension arrangements, including recent initiatives, and highlight likely future reforms. Overall, we advocate that the key to sustainable reform will be the establishment of a regulatory framework with well-defined governance structures for both publicly and privately managed pension assets.
{"title":"Pension Reform in China: Racing Against the Demographic Clock","authors":"H. Bateman, K. Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2380479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2380479","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of rapid demographic, political and economic change, the Chinese pension system has evolved from a scheme almost exclusively for urban and public sector workers to one with broad national coverage. However, this apparent success masks structural and governance deficiencies, which if left unresolved, could threaten the equity, adequacy and security of future retirement incomes. This article examines the key demographic challenges for China and their implications for the pension system. We then review and critically assess the current pension arrangements, including recent initiatives, and highlight likely future reforms. Overall, we advocate that the key to sustainable reform will be the establishment of a regulatory framework with well-defined governance structures for both publicly and privately managed pension assets.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121424876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I tried to connect the text of the Chinese tort law with the institutional context of lawmaking in China from a political economy perspective. Two determinants, political influence and populist pressure, were identified for the tort law legislation in China, and a simple spatial model was presented to demonstrate the mechanism through which these determinants might have affected the text of the law. In particular, my research suggested that, when injurers’ political influence kept constant, the populist pressure on the injurer group tended to push the tort law rules toward the pro-victim end. On the contrary, with the similar populist pressure, the politically influential injurers could induce legal rules to their advantage. Even within a particular type of torts, the subgroup of injurers who were better organized to exert political influence would be rewarded with more favorable rules on torts than their fellow injurers, especially where populist pressure was moderate. Hopefully, this research will inspire more efforts among students of Chinese law to explore the operation of law at the microscopic level against the macroscopic institutional backdrops of this country.
{"title":"Understanding the Law of Torts in China: A Political Economy Perspective","authors":"Wei Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2515449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2515449","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I tried to connect the text of the Chinese tort law with the institutional context of lawmaking in China from a political economy perspective. Two determinants, political influence and populist pressure, were identified for the tort law legislation in China, and a simple spatial model was presented to demonstrate the mechanism through which these determinants might have affected the text of the law. In particular, my research suggested that, when injurers’ political influence kept constant, the populist pressure on the injurer group tended to push the tort law rules toward the pro-victim end. On the contrary, with the similar populist pressure, the politically influential injurers could induce legal rules to their advantage. Even within a particular type of torts, the subgroup of injurers who were better organized to exert political influence would be rewarded with more favorable rules on torts than their fellow injurers, especially where populist pressure was moderate. Hopefully, this research will inspire more efforts among students of Chinese law to explore the operation of law at the microscopic level against the macroscopic institutional backdrops of this country.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121877568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}