Maëlys de la Rupelle, Quheng Deng, Li Shi, Thomas Vendryes
Like most other developing countries, China experiences huge migration outflows from rural areas. Their most striking characteristic is a high geographical and temporal mobility. Rural migrants keep going back and forth between origin villages and destination areas. In this paper, we show that this temporary feature of migration can be linked to land rights insecurity. As village land ownership remains collective and as land use rights can be periodically reallocated, individual out-migration can result in deprivation of those rights. Moreover, the intensity of this insecurity varies according to the village-level management of land and the contractual status of land plots. We use these variations to identify the effect of land rights insecurity on migration behavior. Empirical results based on representative 2002 rural data demonstrate substantial impact.
{"title":"Land Rights Insecurity and Temporary Migration in Rural China","authors":"Maëlys de la Rupelle, Quheng Deng, Li Shi, Thomas Vendryes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1530672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1530672","url":null,"abstract":"Like most other developing countries, China experiences huge migration outflows from rural areas. Their most striking characteristic is a high geographical and temporal mobility. Rural migrants keep going back and forth between origin villages and destination areas. In this paper, we show that this temporary feature of migration can be linked to land rights insecurity. As village land ownership remains collective and as land use rights can be periodically reallocated, individual out-migration can result in deprivation of those rights. Moreover, the intensity of this insecurity varies according to the village-level management of land and the contractual status of land plots. We use these variations to identify the effect of land rights insecurity on migration behavior. Empirical results based on representative 2002 rural data demonstrate substantial impact.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123333938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is to clarify the current liability of Online Service Providers (OSPs) in China and argue that a better legal frame work should be introduced in the future. Comparing the situations in the US and Australia, this paper will explore how traditional liabilities in China, the safe harbor provisions and aid and abetment standards are applied in the recent OSPs cases.
{"title":"Safe Harbors and Joint Liability of the OSPs in China - A Comparative Study between the US and Australia and China","authors":"Lin Xie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1358467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1358467","url":null,"abstract":"This article is to clarify the current liability of Online Service Providers (OSPs) in China and argue that a better legal frame work should be introduced in the future. Comparing the situations in the US and Australia, this paper will explore how traditional liabilities in China, the safe harbor provisions and aid and abetment standards are applied in the recent OSPs cases.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121782122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides background information on the likely challenges the rise of China and India will pose for the economy of the EU. The purpose is mainly descriptive, namely to spell out what kind of trading partner China and India will represent for the EU in the foreseeable future. A first observation is that India is several times smaller than China in economic terms. Moreover, because its investment rates in both human and physical capital are much lower than in China, its growth potential is likely to remain more limited.China already now exports more manufacturing goods than all other emerging markets together. But its export structure is also evolving rapidly and has become rather similar to that of advanced economies like the EU. This 'convergence' is likely the result of a very rapid accumulation of human and especially physical capital. If current trends continue, China will have a capital/labor ratio similar to that of the EU by the end of the next decade. In terms of human capital, China has already caught up considerably, but further progress will be slowed down by its stable demographics and the still low enrollment ratio in tertiary education. In both areas, India lags China by several decades.The rapid accumulation of capital suggests that the emergence of China will put adjustment pressures mainly on capital-intensive industries, not the traditional sectors, such as textiles. Another source of friction that is likely to emerge derives from the abundance of coal in China, resulting in a relatively carbon- and energy-intensive economy.
{"title":"China and India: Implications for the EU Economy","authors":"D. Gros","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1337973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337973","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides background information on the likely challenges the rise of China and India will pose for the economy of the EU. The purpose is mainly descriptive, namely to spell out what kind of trading partner China and India will represent for the EU in the foreseeable future. A first observation is that India is several times smaller than China in economic terms. Moreover, because its investment rates in both human and physical capital are much lower than in China, its growth potential is likely to remain more limited.China already now exports more manufacturing goods than all other emerging markets together. But its export structure is also evolving rapidly and has become rather similar to that of advanced economies like the EU. This 'convergence' is likely the result of a very rapid accumulation of human and especially physical capital. If current trends continue, China will have a capital/labor ratio similar to that of the EU by the end of the next decade. In terms of human capital, China has already caught up considerably, but further progress will be slowed down by its stable demographics and the still low enrollment ratio in tertiary education. In both areas, India lags China by several decades.The rapid accumulation of capital suggests that the emergence of China will put adjustment pressures mainly on capital-intensive industries, not the traditional sectors, such as textiles. Another source of friction that is likely to emerge derives from the abundance of coal in China, resulting in a relatively carbon- and energy-intensive economy.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115400330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nontradable shares (NTS) are an unparalleled feature of the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and represented a major hurdle to domestic financial market development. After some failed attempts, in 2005 the Chinese authorities have launched a structural reform program aiming at eliminating NTS. In this paper, we evaluate the stock price effects of the actual implementation of this reform in 368 firms. The NTS reform generated a statistically significant 8 percent positive abnormal return over the event window, adjusting prices for the compensation requested by tradable shareholders. Results are consistent with the expectation of improved economic fundamentals such as better corporate governance and enhanced liquidity.
{"title":"The Nontradable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market","authors":"Bernardo Bortolotti, A. Beltratti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.944412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.944412","url":null,"abstract":"Nontradable shares (NTS) are an unparalleled feature of the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and represented a major hurdle to domestic financial market development. After some failed attempts, in 2005 the Chinese authorities have launched a structural reform program aiming at eliminating NTS. In this paper, we evaluate the stock price effects of the actual implementation of this reform in 368 firms. The NTS reform generated a statistically significant 8 percent positive abnormal return over the event window, adjusting prices for the compensation requested by tradable shareholders. Results are consistent with the expectation of improved economic fundamentals such as better corporate governance and enhanced liquidity.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128643201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-01DOI: 10.1002/9780470712870.CH1
Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima
Since the early 1980s, China has begun gradually integrating with the global system. In doing so the country has moved toward its own unique brand of market socialism, which recognizes private ownership, and is adopting market institutions and pursuing industrial change within the framework of an urban economic environment. The process of transition has now permeated every corner of Chinese life and no organization has been left untouched. Yet industrial organization in China-especially in the state sector-has been slow to shed many of the distinctive structural characteristics of the old line Maoist era state enterprises. The main prong of the industrial strategy in support of urban change is ownership reform that transforms state-owned enterprises into corporate entities with majority state ownership or places them wholly in private hands, in the process also bolstering the incentives for and the dynamism of the private sector. While the central government spearheads the ownership reform initiative, in the majority of cases the actual implementation is in the hands of municipal, county, and prefectural governments that must coordinate their efforts with other factors influencing urban changes. This paper situates industrial change in China within the context of urban development and examines the interplay of broad reform strategy with local implementation, and its actual practice by the reformed firms.
{"title":"Two Decades of Reform: The Changing Organization Dynamics of Chinese Industrial Firms","authors":"Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima","doi":"10.1002/9780470712870.CH1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470712870.CH1","url":null,"abstract":"Since the early 1980s, China has begun gradually integrating with the global system. In doing so the country has moved toward its own unique brand of market socialism, which recognizes private ownership, and is adopting market institutions and pursuing industrial change within the framework of an urban economic environment. The process of transition has now permeated every corner of Chinese life and no organization has been left untouched. Yet industrial organization in China-especially in the state sector-has been slow to shed many of the distinctive structural characteristics of the old line Maoist era state enterprises. The main prong of the industrial strategy in support of urban change is ownership reform that transforms state-owned enterprises into corporate entities with majority state ownership or places them wholly in private hands, in the process also bolstering the incentives for and the dynamism of the private sector. While the central government spearheads the ownership reform initiative, in the majority of cases the actual implementation is in the hands of municipal, county, and prefectural governments that must coordinate their efforts with other factors influencing urban changes. This paper situates industrial change in China within the context of urban development and examines the interplay of broad reform strategy with local implementation, and its actual practice by the reformed firms.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128524393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper focuses on why 'indicators' and evaluative questions about the external form of commercial law in transition economies are now so much in vogue. I trace the objectives and methods of a four different evaluative projects sponsored by the World Bank and USAID that are designed to assess and ultimately to rank the legal systems of transition economies. One obvious impetus for the evaluative turn in technical legal assistance is that there are so many legal systems in 'transition' and so much money is being spent on them. Another is that global bureaucracies such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank and the postindustrial states that sponsor them are predisposed to using evaluative techniques as forms of audit and control. The 'indicators' of commercial law now used in legal technical assistance projects are designed to allow ranking of legal systems according to their compliance with 'best-practice' models of commercial law in countries assumed to have well-established 'rule of law'. Significantly, the rankings are intended in many cases to guide allocative decision-making. This is the process that I call the 'law reform Olympics'.
本文的重点是为什么“指标”和评估问题的外部形式的商业法在转型经济现在如此流行。我追溯了世界银行和美国国际开发署赞助的四个不同评估项目的目标和方法，这些项目旨在评估并最终对转型经济体的法律制度进行排名。技术法律援助向评估性转变的一个明显推动力是，有如此多的法律制度处于“转型”阶段，而且在这些制度上投入了如此多的资金。另一个原因是，世界银行(World Bank)、国际货币基金组织(IMF)、欧洲复兴开发银行(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)、亚洲开发银行(Asian Development Bank)等全球官僚机构，以及赞助它们的后工业化国家，倾向于使用评估技术作为审计和控制的形式。目前在法律技术援助项目中使用的商法“指标”是为了在假定已经建立了完善的“法治”的国家中，根据法律制度对商法“最佳实践”模式的遵守情况进行排名。值得注意的是，在许多情况下，排名旨在指导分配决策。我把这个过程称为“法律改革奥运会”。
{"title":"The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transition Economies","authors":"V. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.893682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.893682","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on why 'indicators' and evaluative questions about the external form of commercial law in transition economies are now so much in vogue. I trace the objectives and methods of a four different evaluative projects sponsored by the World Bank and USAID that are designed to assess and ultimately to rank the legal systems of transition economies. One obvious impetus for the evaluative turn in technical legal assistance is that there are so many legal systems in 'transition' and so much money is being spent on them. Another is that global bureaucracies such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank and the postindustrial states that sponsor them are predisposed to using evaluative techniques as forms of audit and control. The 'indicators' of commercial law now used in legal technical assistance projects are designed to allow ranking of legal systems according to their compliance with 'best-practice' models of commercial law in countries assumed to have well-established 'rule of law'. Significantly, the rankings are intended in many cases to guide allocative decision-making. This is the process that I call the 'law reform Olympics'.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121425688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author taught law to officials of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1982, and conducted on-site case-studies of wholly foreign-owned, wholly Chinese-owned and Chinese-foreign joint venture enterprises in the Shekou Industrial Zone. This is a JD-MBA thesis for Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School.
{"title":"Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: Regulations and 1982 Case Studies","authors":"Ta-kuang (T.K.) Chang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2925738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2925738","url":null,"abstract":"The author taught law to officials of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1982, and conducted on-site case-studies of wholly foreign-owned, wholly Chinese-owned and Chinese-foreign joint venture enterprises in the Shekou Industrial Zone. This is a JD-MBA thesis for Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1983-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130018178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents findings from a content analysis of all 460 Dear Lawyer Bao (DLB) legal advice columns ever published in its ten-year history (1989-98) in the Beijing Evening News. While much sociolegal research has focused on the exercise of power in the legal process through the control of meaning in verbal, private face-to-face interactions, this paper reveals similar meaning-making processes at play in publicly disseminated writing where the audience is far larger, the potential impact far wider, and the role of the state far greater. Lawyer Bao's popular image as valiant defender of ordinary people in trouble obscured and thus enhanced both the degree to which he was beholden to the state and the effectiveness with which he did the bidding of the state against the interests of the very letter-writers he purported to help. His ultimate allegiance to the state is reflected in two empirical patterns. First, the temporal distribution of problem topics featured in the DLB column corresponds less to shifts in public sentiment or objective popular needs and more to legislation, policy shifts, and political campaigns. Second, whether Lawyer Bao legitimized or delegitimized letter-writers' claims was determined primarily by the extent to which state interests were at stake in the problem at hand. Lawyer Bao tended to delegitimize labor grievances, housing demolition, collective grievances of any kind, and other claims construed as potentially destabilizing or of challenge to state priorities.
{"title":"Dear Lawyer Bao: Everyday Problems, Legal Advice, and State Power in China","authors":"Ethan Michelson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.922103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.922103","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents findings from a content analysis of all 460 Dear Lawyer Bao (DLB) legal advice columns ever published in its ten-year history (1989-98) in the Beijing Evening News. While much sociolegal research has focused on the exercise of power in the legal process through the control of meaning in verbal, private face-to-face interactions, this paper reveals similar meaning-making processes at play in publicly disseminated writing where the audience is far larger, the potential impact far wider, and the role of the state far greater. Lawyer Bao's popular image as valiant defender of ordinary people in trouble obscured and thus enhanced both the degree to which he was beholden to the state and the effectiveness with which he did the bidding of the state against the interests of the very letter-writers he purported to help. His ultimate allegiance to the state is reflected in two empirical patterns. First, the temporal distribution of problem topics featured in the DLB column corresponds less to shifts in public sentiment or objective popular needs and more to legislation, policy shifts, and political campaigns. Second, whether Lawyer Bao legitimized or delegitimized letter-writers' claims was determined primarily by the extent to which state interests were at stake in the problem at hand. Lawyer Bao tended to delegitimize labor grievances, housing demolition, collective grievances of any kind, and other claims construed as potentially destabilizing or of challenge to state priorities.","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125373830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781316181553.006
Chao Xi
China’s enthusiasm for domestic implementation of Basel III presents an intriguing case for the comparative literature on financial regulation, in particular, the “soft” nature of international financial law. This research argues that China’s adoption of Basel III has been driven, in part, the “private” institutional interests of the CBRC. It demonstrates that the CBRC’s regulatory mandates necessitate efforts to put in place and enforce strict capital standards and rules that ran counter to the powerful domestic vested interests, inter alia, the regulated Chinese banks, and the all-mighty central and local government agencies, as well as state-owned enterprises, that own and control these banks. As an adaptive strategy, the CBRC has relentlessly pushed for the adoption of capital standards and rules it favors in the Basel III decision-making process, so as to lend itself the authority and legitimacy necessary to enact and enforce its favored rules against regulated Chinese banks in the name of complying with China’s international commitments under Basel III.
{"title":"Why Has Basel III Become Hard Law for China? The Domestic Political Economy of International Financial Law","authors":"Chao Xi","doi":"10.1017/CBO9781316181553.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316181553.006","url":null,"abstract":"China’s enthusiasm for domestic implementation of Basel III presents an intriguing case for the comparative literature on financial regulation, in particular, the “soft” nature of international financial law. This research argues that China’s adoption of Basel III has been driven, in part, the “private” institutional interests of the CBRC. It demonstrates that the CBRC’s regulatory mandates necessitate efforts to put in place and enforce strict capital standards and rules that ran counter to the powerful domestic vested interests, inter alia, the regulated Chinese banks, and the all-mighty central and local government agencies, as well as state-owned enterprises, that own and control these banks. As an adaptive strategy, the CBRC has relentlessly pushed for the adoption of capital standards and rules it favors in the Basel III decision-making process, so as to lend itself the authority and legitimacy necessary to enact and enforce its favored rules against regulated Chinese banks in the name of complying with China’s international commitments under Basel III.<br>","PeriodicalId":356075,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Law eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130448981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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