The impact of the Levers of Control (LOC) framework on the accounting literature is undeniably large. The framework, however, has also been criticized for being vague and ambiguous. One of the central, but unclear, concepts in the LOC framework is the notion of balance. That is, the framework holds that control systems must be in balance in order to manage competing tensions such as that found between predictable goal achievement on the one hand and innovation on the other. The goal of our study is to make the concept of balance more explicit by providing empirically informed insights on different balancing arrangements that exist in a cross-section of business units. To empirically examine the concept of balance, we develop a survey and administer it in person to a convenience sample of business unit managers. Using responses from 217 managers, cluster analysis reveals four stable configurations of balance, which we label strategic stability, strategic vigilance, strategic exploitation, and strategic responsiveness. We examine organizational and contextual factors that further validate and help explain the observed patterns of balance. By shedding light on one of the key concepts in the LOC framework, our study helps to explicate a hitherto underspecified theoretical claim in that framework. This explication is a significant step in the further development of the framework, adding to its explanatory expressiveness as well as to its empirical contestability.
{"title":"An Empirical Analysis of the Levers of Control Framework","authors":"S. Widener","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.771994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.771994","url":null,"abstract":"The impact of the Levers of Control (LOC) framework on the accounting literature is undeniably large. The framework, however, has also been criticized for being vague and ambiguous. One of the central, but unclear, concepts in the LOC framework is the notion of balance. That is, the framework holds that control systems must be in balance in order to manage competing tensions such as that found between predictable goal achievement on the one hand and innovation on the other. The goal of our study is to make the concept of balance more explicit by providing empirically informed insights on different balancing arrangements that exist in a cross-section of business units. To empirically examine the concept of balance, we develop a survey and administer it in person to a convenience sample of business unit managers. Using responses from 217 managers, cluster analysis reveals four stable configurations of balance, which we label strategic stability, strategic vigilance, strategic exploitation, and strategic responsiveness. We examine organizational and contextual factors that further validate and help explain the observed patterns of balance. By shedding light on one of the key concepts in the LOC framework, our study helps to explicate a hitherto underspecified theoretical claim in that framework. This explication is a significant step in the further development of the framework, adding to its explanatory expressiveness as well as to its empirical contestability.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117026247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons the Securities Exchange Commission allowed shareholders' proposals to expense employee stock options to be voted upon at the annual meeting. We analyze the determinants of shareholders' votes for a sample of 107 firms. We hypothesize and find that votes for expensing are higher in firms with perceived excessive option compensation and lower expected earnings impact from expensing. Insiders' ownership is positively associated to votes against, while most types of institutional investors tend to vote for expensing. Finally, votes for are higher in larger firms, with higher interest coverage, higher leverage and lower returns.
{"title":"Stock Option Expensing: Evidence from Shareholders' Votes","authors":"F. Ferri, G. Markarian, Tatiana Sandino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.590349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.590349","url":null,"abstract":"In the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons the Securities Exchange Commission allowed shareholders' proposals to expense employee stock options to be voted upon at the annual meeting. We analyze the determinants of shareholders' votes for a sample of 107 firms. We hypothesize and find that votes for expensing are higher in firms with perceived excessive option compensation and lower expected earnings impact from expensing. Insiders' ownership is positively associated to votes against, while most types of institutional investors tend to vote for expensing. Finally, votes for are higher in larger firms, with higher interest coverage, higher leverage and lower returns.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116420387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study cross-sectional differences in pre-announcement and event-period private information acquisition across firm size and institutional ownership using trading volume reactions to earnings announcements. We find that abnormal volume associated with absolute price change increases with both firm size and institutional ownership, suggesting that pre-announcement private information acquisition increases with firm size and institutional ownership. We also find that abnormal volume independent of absolute price change increases with institutional ownership, suggesting that event-period private information acquisition increases with institutional ownership. In contrast, abnormal volume independent of absolute price change decreases with firm size, reflecting the previously documented positive relation between firm size and the precision of pre-announcement public information. By demonstrating that firm size and institutional ownership are determinants of pre-announcement and event--period private information acquisition, this study provides new insights regarding the incentive to acquire private information around earnings announcements and helps explain prior empirical results in trading volume reaction studies.
{"title":"Pre-Announcement and Event-Period Private Information: A Trading Volume Analysis of Firm Size and Institutional Ownership Effects","authors":"Richard A. Schneible Jr., D. Stevens","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.817565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.817565","url":null,"abstract":"We study cross-sectional differences in pre-announcement and event-period private information acquisition across firm size and institutional ownership using trading volume reactions to earnings announcements. We find that abnormal volume associated with absolute price change increases with both firm size and institutional ownership, suggesting that pre-announcement private information acquisition increases with firm size and institutional ownership. We also find that abnormal volume independent of absolute price change increases with institutional ownership, suggesting that event-period private information acquisition increases with institutional ownership. In contrast, abnormal volume independent of absolute price change decreases with firm size, reflecting the previously documented positive relation between firm size and the precision of pre-announcement public information. By demonstrating that firm size and institutional ownership are determinants of pre-announcement and event--period private information acquisition, this study provides new insights regarding the incentive to acquire private information around earnings announcements and helps explain prior empirical results in trading volume reaction studies.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"79 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133425454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Financial Accounting Standards Interpretation [FIN] No. 46 (R) provides guidance for investors, sponsors and transferors in ascertaining which variable interest entities should form part of relevant parties' financial statements. Given the complexity of this authoritative pronouncement, we show how a consultant, using an organized approach, helped a CPA firm adhere to this new pronouncement. The appended exhibits and associated explanations should help CPAs implement these provisions and provide guidance for helping companies and clients conform to these complex accounting pronouncements.
{"title":"Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities: Applying the Provisions of Fin 46 (R)","authors":"A. Reinstein, G. Lander, Stephen P. Danese","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.815745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.815745","url":null,"abstract":"Financial Accounting Standards Interpretation [FIN] No. 46 (R) provides guidance for investors, sponsors and transferors in ascertaining which variable interest entities should form part of relevant parties' financial statements. Given the complexity of this authoritative pronouncement, we show how a consultant, using an organized approach, helped a CPA firm adhere to this new pronouncement. The appended exhibits and associated explanations should help CPAs implement these provisions and provide guidance for helping companies and clients conform to these complex accounting pronouncements.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121420240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The fundamental premise of corporate finance is that the decisions of the managers (agents) should lead to value maximization for their shareholders (principals). When firms have excess cash flow, managers have to choose among the various alternatives for use of the funds, i.e., investments, operations, and cash payout (dividends and repurchases). The principal mechanisms used by firms to distribute excess cash flow and avoid agency conflict are dividends and share repurchases, with an increasing percentage going to repurchases. This study examines the use of share repurchases by banking firms to signal the market about future operating performance (signaling hypothesis), and to reduce agency conflicts (cash flow hypothesis). Previous empirical studies in the non-financial sector have shown weak support for signaling hypothesis and strong support for cash flow hypothesis. The results of this study show strong support for cash flow hypothesis, similar to the non-financial sector. However, the use of repurchase as signal by banking firms does not coincide with superior future performance, contradicting the results obtained in the non-financial sector. This study also examined the data on the banking firm's operating performance relative to its record of satisfying prior repurchase commitments before announcing new programs (time inconsistency hypothesis) during the study period. The results of the analysis do not support time inconsistency hypothesis, contradicting the results in the non-financial sector.
{"title":"Share Repurchases as Signals in Banking: Do They Work?","authors":"Kamala Raghavan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.772404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.772404","url":null,"abstract":"The fundamental premise of corporate finance is that the decisions of the managers (agents) should lead to value maximization for their shareholders (principals). When firms have excess cash flow, managers have to choose among the various alternatives for use of the funds, i.e., investments, operations, and cash payout (dividends and repurchases). The principal mechanisms used by firms to distribute excess cash flow and avoid agency conflict are dividends and share repurchases, with an increasing percentage going to repurchases. This study examines the use of share repurchases by banking firms to signal the market about future operating performance (signaling hypothesis), and to reduce agency conflicts (cash flow hypothesis). Previous empirical studies in the non-financial sector have shown weak support for signaling hypothesis and strong support for cash flow hypothesis. The results of this study show strong support for cash flow hypothesis, similar to the non-financial sector. However, the use of repurchase as signal by banking firms does not coincide with superior future performance, contradicting the results obtained in the non-financial sector. This study also examined the data on the banking firm's operating performance relative to its record of satisfying prior repurchase commitments before announcing new programs (time inconsistency hypothesis) during the study period. The results of the analysis do not support time inconsistency hypothesis, contradicting the results in the non-financial sector.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115499974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we suggest a holistic approach to the sales revenue variance that adds to traditional models by taking into account output efficiencies due to marketing strategies or returns. Traditional analysis of the sales revenue variance isolates the sales price and volume variances. The traditional model assumes the number of units sold equals the number of units that go into the market place, a sales efficiency of one (1). However, organizations do not always sell every unit of output. For example, defective items are returned or items are given away due to promotions or charity. The traditional variance model ignores any efficiency variance in the number of units sold as a percent of total units introduced into the market place, or output. The holistic approach to the sales revenue variance suggested in this paper isolates the efficiency variance in addition to the price and volume variance from the traditional models.
{"title":"Revenue Efficiency Variance: A Holistic Approach to Revenue Variance Analysis","authors":"C. Claiborne, Elizabeth T. Cole","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.771952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.771952","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we suggest a holistic approach to the sales revenue variance that adds to traditional models by taking into account output efficiencies due to marketing strategies or returns. Traditional analysis of the sales revenue variance isolates the sales price and volume variances. The traditional model assumes the number of units sold equals the number of units that go into the market place, a sales efficiency of one (1). However, organizations do not always sell every unit of output. For example, defective items are returned or items are given away due to promotions or charity. The traditional variance model ignores any efficiency variance in the number of units sold as a percent of total units introduced into the market place, or output. The holistic approach to the sales revenue variance suggested in this paper isolates the efficiency variance in addition to the price and volume variance from the traditional models.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127763850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maureen G. Butler, C. Callahan, Valaria P. Vendrzyk
We examine managerial incentive factors and the economic implications of mandatory debt accounting on the firm's cost of capital in the defense industry, a significant sector of the economy. In fiscal year 1999 alone, the Department of Defense awarded $124 billion to contractors for goods and services. We consider a unique mandatory accounting treatment and its resulting cash flow or debt subsidy in this industry, the Facilities Capital Cost of Money (FCCOM). To capture a defense-contracting spending cycle, we use 1988 as the study's base year and expand our test-years to include 1982 and 1994. We include 134 firms and examine 349 firm-year observations in the study. Using a control sample of commercial firms, we first document that mandatory debt accounting impacts managerial incentives and differentially influences the use of debt covenants restricting dividends in the defense industry. We also find that incentive factors explaining debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing are decidedly different for defense firms than for commercial firms. In addition, we report a significant negative relation between FCCOM and the existence of dividend covenants suggesting that, consistent with agency theory, the cash flow subsidy mitigates the need for these covenants. Finally, in a debt equity trade-off, we also demonstrate that the FCCOM debt subsidy leads to a lower cost of debt but an increased cost of equity capital within the defense sector. Our results suggest if firms face mandatory accounting that provides debt holders with a cash flow subsidy and a lower cost of debt capital, with a resultant increase in the cost of equity capital, investors seeking to minimize their risk posture may prefer to be debt holders in defense firms rather than in commercial firms, ceteris paribus.
{"title":"The Cost of Capital in the Defense Industry: Managerial Incentives and the Economic Impact of Mandatory Debt Accounting","authors":"Maureen G. Butler, C. Callahan, Valaria P. Vendrzyk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.772387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.772387","url":null,"abstract":"We examine managerial incentive factors and the economic implications of mandatory debt accounting on the firm's cost of capital in the defense industry, a significant sector of the economy. In fiscal year 1999 alone, the Department of Defense awarded $124 billion to contractors for goods and services. We consider a unique mandatory accounting treatment and its resulting cash flow or debt subsidy in this industry, the Facilities Capital Cost of Money (FCCOM). To capture a defense-contracting spending cycle, we use 1988 as the study's base year and expand our test-years to include 1982 and 1994. We include 134 firms and examine 349 firm-year observations in the study. Using a control sample of commercial firms, we first document that mandatory debt accounting impacts managerial incentives and differentially influences the use of debt covenants restricting dividends in the defense industry. We also find that incentive factors explaining debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing are decidedly different for defense firms than for commercial firms. In addition, we report a significant negative relation between FCCOM and the existence of dividend covenants suggesting that, consistent with agency theory, the cash flow subsidy mitigates the need for these covenants. Finally, in a debt equity trade-off, we also demonstrate that the FCCOM debt subsidy leads to a lower cost of debt but an increased cost of equity capital within the defense sector. Our results suggest if firms face mandatory accounting that provides debt holders with a cash flow subsidy and a lower cost of debt capital, with a resultant increase in the cost of equity capital, investors seeking to minimize their risk posture may prefer to be debt holders in defense firms rather than in commercial firms, ceteris paribus.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129084844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The sensitivity of the rank of the change in bonus compensation to firm performance is compared between CEOs and non-CEOs. Executives are classified into four groups: 1) CEOs, 2) high ranking executives, 3) business unit managers, and 4) low ranking executives. There are no differences in bonus compensation between the four categories of executives when firm performance is moderate. However, when performance is very bad (good), CEO bonus compensation is significantly smaller (larger). Differences between CEOs and non-CEOs are limited to differences in intercepts related to the sign of performance and not slope coefficients on performance.
{"title":"Relative Bonus Compensation: The Role of Executive Rank and Non-Linearity","authors":"Austin L. Reitenga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.772245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.772245","url":null,"abstract":"The sensitivity of the rank of the change in bonus compensation to firm performance is compared between CEOs and non-CEOs. Executives are classified into four groups: 1) CEOs, 2) high ranking executives, 3) business unit managers, and 4) low ranking executives. There are no differences in bonus compensation between the four categories of executives when firm performance is moderate. However, when performance is very bad (good), CEO bonus compensation is significantly smaller (larger). Differences between CEOs and non-CEOs are limited to differences in intercepts related to the sign of performance and not slope coefficients on performance.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123196914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While the need for, and the value of, Continuous Improvement (CI) Management in practice is well established; their successful implementation has proven problematic. Employee resistance, due to business cultural incompatibility, is considered a major cause. Unfortunately, current budgeting systems are not compatible with either implementation or management of CI. This paper uses innovative action research to combine research from production, accounting, and learning, to develop an accounting solution to this problem. The paper develops a theoretical justification for re-designing the accounting system to accommodate a formal continuous improvement process designed to teach employees a new business culture. The second part of the paper illustrates a process based product costing system designed for strategic decision making and planning in an 'in-process' improvement environment. By shifting from a scientific management strategy to a continuous improvement strategy the definitions of cost standards, product and period costs and out-sourcing criteria are challenged.
{"title":"Changing Accounting Systems to Support the Conversion and Management of a Continuous Improvement Business Culture","authors":"James T. Mackey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.773026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.773026","url":null,"abstract":"While the need for, and the value of, Continuous Improvement (CI) Management in practice is well established; their successful implementation has proven problematic. Employee resistance, due to business cultural incompatibility, is considered a major cause. Unfortunately, current budgeting systems are not compatible with either implementation or management of CI. This paper uses innovative action research to combine research from production, accounting, and learning, to develop an accounting solution to this problem. The paper develops a theoretical justification for re-designing the accounting system to accommodate a formal continuous improvement process designed to teach employees a new business culture. The second part of the paper illustrates a process based product costing system designed for strategic decision making and planning in an 'in-process' improvement environment. By shifting from a scientific management strategy to a continuous improvement strategy the definitions of cost standards, product and period costs and out-sourcing criteria are challenged.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123684519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much publicity has been given to audit failures by major CPA firms in recent years, resulting in passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and removing the authority to set auditing standards from the American Institute of CPAs. While much has been said and written about how to reform the major accounting firms, relatively little has been written about smaller CPA firms. This paper examines the perceived impact of proposed reforms on smaller CPA firms in the Sacramento Area. Responses were mixed. There was, however, much concern about the possibility of mandatory rotation of partners.
近年来，大型注册会计师事务所的审计失败引起了公众的广泛关注，导致《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)的通过，并取消了美国注册会计师协会(American Institute of CPA)制定审计标准的权力。虽然关于如何改革大型会计师事务所的说法和文章很多，但关于小型注册会计师事务所的文章相对较少。本文考察了在萨克拉门托地区对小型注册会计师事务所拟议改革的感知影响。人们的反应褒贬不一。但是，人们对强制性轮换伙伴的可能性非常关切。
{"title":"Recent Audit Failures and the Impact on Smaller Public Accounting Firms in the Sacramento Area","authors":"J. Corless, Thomas J. Beirne, Nancy L. Christie","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.614070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.614070","url":null,"abstract":"Much publicity has been given to audit failures by major CPA firms in recent years, resulting in passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and removing the authority to set auditing standards from the American Institute of CPAs. While much has been said and written about how to reform the major accounting firms, relatively little has been written about smaller CPA firms. This paper examines the perceived impact of proposed reforms on smaller CPA firms in the Sacramento Area. Responses were mixed. There was, however, much concern about the possibility of mandatory rotation of partners.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128666313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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