This paper aims to show an efficiency frontier among the Brazilian Accounting Master Degrees by DEA.
本文旨在通过DEA来展示巴西会计硕士学位之间的效率边界。
{"title":"Frontier of Efficiency in Brazilian Accounting Master Degree: A DEA Approach","authors":"Antonio Nunes Pereira","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1433002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1433002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to show an efficiency frontier among the Brazilian Accounting Master Degrees by DEA.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"89 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131544269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rick Johnston, A. Leone, Sundaresh Ramnath, Ya‐wen Yang
Many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13-week periods. For these firms each fiscal year contains 52 weeks, which leaves out one/two day(s) a year. To compensate, one extra week is added to every fifth/sixth year; consequently, one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks. We find evidence of predictable stock returns and forecast errors in 14-week quarters, which suggests that investors and analysts do not, on average, adjust their expectations for the extra week. The ease with which 14-week quarters can be predicted, and expectations adjusted, suggests a surprising lack of effort on the part of investors and analysts.
{"title":"14-Week Quarters","authors":"Rick Johnston, A. Leone, Sundaresh Ramnath, Ya‐wen Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1463646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1463646","url":null,"abstract":"Many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13-week periods. For these firms each fiscal year contains 52 weeks, which leaves out one/two day(s) a year. To compensate, one extra week is added to every fifth/sixth year; consequently, one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks. We find evidence of predictable stock returns and forecast errors in 14-week quarters, which suggests that investors and analysts do not, on average, adjust their expectations for the extra week. The ease with which 14-week quarters can be predicted, and expectations adjusted, suggests a surprising lack of effort on the part of investors and analysts.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131827392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bruce K. Billings, Richard M. Morton, Tianming Zhang
Prior research on meeting or beating earnings expectations focuses on managers' incentives to keep stock prices inflated by avoiding negative earnings surprises. However, in certain situations, managers may be motivated to depress stock prices in order to maximize their utility. We hypothesize and find evidence suggesting that managers opportunistically avoid reporting earnings that meet or beat analyst expectations to depress stock prices and hence lower the cost of share repurchases. Complementary to this, we find that the decline in meeting or beating among firms repurchasing shares is temporary. Building on results in Gong et al. (2008), we also provide evidence that stock prices decline more substantially and consistently when firms fail to meet or beat relative to merely reporting negative performance-adjusted abnormal accruals, suggesting failing to meet or beat may reflect a more comprehensive and effective strategy to depress prices. Further, we find a substantial incremental downward price effect for failing to meet or beat after controlling for the sign of abnormal accruals. This study complements prior research that focuses on incentives to meet or beat expectations by presenting the "other side of the story" and therefore provides a more complete picture of managers' opportunistic behavior related to analysts' earnings expectations.
{"title":"Managers' Incentives to Avoid Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations: The Role of Open Market Repurchases","authors":"Bruce K. Billings, Richard M. Morton, Tianming Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1266889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1266889","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research on meeting or beating earnings expectations focuses on managers' incentives to keep stock prices inflated by avoiding negative earnings surprises. However, in certain situations, managers may be motivated to depress stock prices in order to maximize their utility. We hypothesize and find evidence suggesting that managers opportunistically avoid reporting earnings that meet or beat analyst expectations to depress stock prices and hence lower the cost of share repurchases. Complementary to this, we find that the decline in meeting or beating among firms repurchasing shares is temporary. Building on results in Gong et al. (2008), we also provide evidence that stock prices decline more substantially and consistently when firms fail to meet or beat relative to merely reporting negative performance-adjusted abnormal accruals, suggesting failing to meet or beat may reflect a more comprehensive and effective strategy to depress prices. Further, we find a substantial incremental downward price effect for failing to meet or beat after controlling for the sign of abnormal accruals. This study complements prior research that focuses on incentives to meet or beat expectations by presenting the \"other side of the story\" and therefore provides a more complete picture of managers' opportunistic behavior related to analysts' earnings expectations.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116387377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the effect of Chief Financial Officers’ (CFOs’) individual philosophy or “style” on corporate accounting choices. We track 359 CFOs across different firms over time and investigate whether CFO-specific factors explain a firm’s accounting choices. We find that, across a wide range of accounting choices, individual CFOs are an important determinant of accounting practices. Moreover, the effect of CFO styles appears to be stronger under conditions of high CFO discretion and high CFO job demands. We also trace the CFO style to observable CFO characteristics by examining whether CFOs’ gender, age, and educational background affect their styles. We find limited evidence of the impact of these CFO characteristics on accounting choices, suggesting that these common and observable characteristics capture only a small portion of CFO styles.
{"title":"Do CFOs Have Styles of Their Own? An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Individual CFOs on Financial Reporting Practices","authors":"Weili Ge, Dawn Matsumoto, J. Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1266893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1266893","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effect of Chief Financial Officers’ (CFOs’) individual philosophy or “style” on corporate accounting choices. We track 359 CFOs across different firms over time and investigate whether CFO-specific factors explain a firm’s accounting choices. We find that, across a wide range of accounting choices, individual CFOs are an important determinant of accounting practices. Moreover, the effect of CFO styles appears to be stronger under conditions of high CFO discretion and high CFO job demands. We also trace the CFO style to observable CFO characteristics by examining whether CFOs’ gender, age, and educational background affect their styles. We find limited evidence of the impact of these CFO characteristics on accounting choices, suggesting that these common and observable characteristics capture only a small portion of CFO styles.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129741195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
No prior study the author is aware of has considered the associations between motivation and distraction factors and student performance in advanced level undergraduate accounting courses. This study considers the associations between these two factors and student performance in Advanced Accounting, Auditing, and Contemporary Issues in Financial Accounting courses. The author conducted this study in a highly diversified, commuter, public university. Using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), Pearson, and Spearman correlation statistical tests, the study shows that some of the motivation factors are significantly associated with student performance in the above-mentioned three courses. However, the distraction factors have no significant negative association with student performance. One important implication of this study is that accounting faculty need to find ways to motivate their students, but need not discourage them to take more courses per semester or work more hours per week outside of school.
{"title":"Motivation and Distraction Factors Associated with Student Performance in Advanced Level Undergraduate Accounting Courses: An Empirical Study","authors":"Mostafa M. Maksy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1266788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1266788","url":null,"abstract":"No prior study the author is aware of has considered the associations between motivation and distraction factors and student performance in advanced level undergraduate accounting courses. This study considers the associations between these two factors and student performance in Advanced Accounting, Auditing, and Contemporary Issues in Financial Accounting courses. The author conducted this study in a highly diversified, commuter, public university. Using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), Pearson, and Spearman correlation statistical tests, the study shows that some of the motivation factors are significantly associated with student performance in the above-mentioned three courses. However, the distraction factors have no significant negative association with student performance. One important implication of this study is that accounting faculty need to find ways to motivate their students, but need not discourage them to take more courses per semester or work more hours per week outside of school.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122563495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines how transfer pricing participation is related to satisfaction and organizational outcome. We propose and test a structural equation model that includes both direct and indirect links between participation and organizational outcome which is measured by transfer pricing effectiveness and firm performance. Based on the data collected from a cross-sectional survey of subsidiary/division managers in China and applying the structural equation modeling technique, we find that transfer pricing participation affects transfer pricing effectiveness not only directly but also indirectly through both affective and cognitive mechanisms as intervening variables. However, we do not find any direct impact of transfer pricing participation on firm performance. Transfer pricing participation affects performance only indirectly through affective and cognitive mechanisms. The findings of this study contribute to the accounting literature and enhance our understanding of participation behavior and its consequences in transfer pricing decisions.
{"title":"Participation in Transfer Pricing: The Role of Affective and Cognitive Mechanisms","authors":"Shimin Chen, Fei Pan, Yue Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1216222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1216222","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how transfer pricing participation is related to satisfaction and organizational outcome. We propose and test a structural equation model that includes both direct and indirect links between participation and organizational outcome which is measured by transfer pricing effectiveness and firm performance. Based on the data collected from a cross-sectional survey of subsidiary/division managers in China and applying the structural equation modeling technique, we find that transfer pricing participation affects transfer pricing effectiveness not only directly but also indirectly through both affective and cognitive mechanisms as intervening variables. However, we do not find any direct impact of transfer pricing participation on firm performance. Transfer pricing participation affects performance only indirectly through affective and cognitive mechanisms. The findings of this study contribute to the accounting literature and enhance our understanding of participation behavior and its consequences in transfer pricing decisions.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130300529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates strategic cost allocation in a single-period principal-agent setting, where the principal has two contractible performance measures available for contracting and the agent controls two productive tasks subject to moral hazard. In this setting, cost allocation shifts profit between the two performance measures (or between two taxable entities). There are two sources of error in cost allocation: random noise and strategic cost allocation under the agent's control. We first provide conditions under which such cost allocation errors lead the principal to abandon cost allocation and rely on a simple aggregate performance measure. We next consider a setting where the two performance measures represent divisional profits that are taxed at different rates. In this setting, the agent's ability strategically shift costs between the divisional performance measures is beneficial to the principal and leads to different relative performance weights for the two divisional performance measures.
{"title":"Incentives, Cost Allocation and Taxes in a Multi-task Setting","authors":"Bjorn Jorgensen, Susan Cohen Kulp, M. Maedler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1215282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1215282","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates strategic cost allocation in a single-period principal-agent setting, where the principal has two contractible performance measures available for contracting and the agent controls two productive tasks subject to moral hazard. In this setting, cost allocation shifts profit between the two performance measures (or between two taxable entities). There are two sources of error in cost allocation: random noise and strategic cost allocation under the agent's control. We first provide conditions under which such cost allocation errors lead the principal to abandon cost allocation and rely on a simple aggregate performance measure. We next consider a setting where the two performance measures represent divisional profits that are taxed at different rates. In this setting, the agent's ability strategically shift costs between the divisional performance measures is beneficial to the principal and leads to different relative performance weights for the two divisional performance measures.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124846900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines Funds from Operations (FFO), a non-GAAP summary performance measure used extensively by the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry, by comparing the quality of accruals in FFO and in net income. Accrual quality is empirically evaluated from regressions relating accruals to past, present, future cash flows and changes in revenue, with larger residuals implying lower accrual quality. Results show that the accruals component of FFO is of higher quality than the accruals component of net income. The study then considers how the individual accrual items excluded from FFO, but included in net income contribute to the accrual quality differences of the two measures. I show that all these accrual items (including depreciation and some non-recurring accruals) are of low quality and are insignificant in predicting future cash flows. Since accounting depreciation is supposed to help match revenue with expenses, it is surprising to find that depreciation accruals are of low quality for the REIT industry. Further analysis on depreciation shows that the low quality of depreciation accruals for REIT firms is due to estimation errors and managerial manipulation and, to some extent, extreme changes in market inflation.
{"title":"Comparing the Quality of Accruals for Alternative Summary Performance Measures in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Industry","authors":"Desmond Tsang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.929540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.929540","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines Funds from Operations (FFO), a non-GAAP summary performance measure used extensively by the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry, by comparing the quality of accruals in FFO and in net income. Accrual quality is empirically evaluated from regressions relating accruals to past, present, future cash flows and changes in revenue, with larger residuals implying lower accrual quality. Results show that the accruals component of FFO is of higher quality than the accruals component of net income. The study then considers how the individual accrual items excluded from FFO, but included in net income contribute to the accrual quality differences of the two measures. I show that all these accrual items (including depreciation and some non-recurring accruals) are of low quality and are insignificant in predicting future cash flows. Since accounting depreciation is supposed to help match revenue with expenses, it is surprising to find that depreciation accruals are of low quality for the REIT industry. Further analysis on depreciation shows that the low quality of depreciation accruals for REIT firms is due to estimation errors and managerial manipulation and, to some extent, extreme changes in market inflation.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129696414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-05-01DOI: 10.2308/ACCR.2006.81.3.617
Benjamin C. Ayers, John (Xuefeng) Jiang, P. Yeung
We investigate whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating earnings benchmarks hold for comparisons of groups segregated at other points in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analystsbased unexpected earnings. We refer to these points as “pseudo” targets. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and beating the profit benchmark extends to pseudo targets throughout the earnings distribution. We find similar results for the earnings change distribution. In contrast, we find few positive associations between discretionary accruals and beating pseudo targets derived from analysts‐based unexpected earnings. We develop an additional analysis that accounts for the systematic association between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and earnings intensifies around the actual profit benchmark (i.e., where earnings management i...
{"title":"Discretionary Accruals and Earnings Management: An Analysis of Pseudo Earnings Targets","authors":"Benjamin C. Ayers, John (Xuefeng) Jiang, P. Yeung","doi":"10.2308/ACCR.2006.81.3.617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ACCR.2006.81.3.617","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating earnings benchmarks hold for comparisons of groups segregated at other points in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analystsbased unexpected earnings. We refer to these points as “pseudo” targets. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and beating the profit benchmark extends to pseudo targets throughout the earnings distribution. We find similar results for the earnings change distribution. In contrast, we find few positive associations between discretionary accruals and beating pseudo targets derived from analysts‐based unexpected earnings. We develop an additional analysis that accounts for the systematic association between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and earnings intensifies around the actual profit benchmark (i.e., where earnings management i...","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117278797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper provides evidence that the threat of litigation influences managers' accounting and insider trading choices in firms experiencing deteriorating financial performance. We analyze the two-year period preceding technical default for 462 firms during 1983-1997. Our sample firms have deteriorating performance during this period (abnormal returns of -27.5%) and, as in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), we find upwards earnings management in the year preceding default (Year -1), but not in the year of default (Year 0). We find that debt contracts and insider selling incentives independently contribute to the Year -1 earnings management. Our tests that examine the timing of the measurement of insider selling relative to earnings management reveal that: (1) managers manage Year -1 earnings upwards when they engage in abnormal levels of selling in Year -1, consistent with earnings management distancing the sale of stock from the revelation of bad news, and (2) managers refrain from managing Year -1 earnings when they trade closer to the event of default (in Year 0). These two distinct patterns suggest that the threat of litigation matters to managers of firms with deteriorating performance. Our finding that contemporaneous insider selling is associated with upwards earnings management should be of interest to researchers who study, and professionals who oversee (e.g., directors, auditors, and regulators) management in firms with deteriorating performance.
{"title":"Does the Threat of Litigation Explain Insider Selling and Earnings Management in Distressed Firms?","authors":"M. Beneish, Eric Press, Mark E. Vargus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.930827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930827","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides evidence that the threat of litigation influences managers' accounting and insider trading choices in firms experiencing deteriorating financial performance. We analyze the two-year period preceding technical default for 462 firms during 1983-1997. Our sample firms have deteriorating performance during this period (abnormal returns of -27.5%) and, as in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), we find upwards earnings management in the year preceding default (Year -1), but not in the year of default (Year 0). We find that debt contracts and insider selling incentives independently contribute to the Year -1 earnings management. Our tests that examine the timing of the measurement of insider selling relative to earnings management reveal that: (1) managers manage Year -1 earnings upwards when they engage in abnormal levels of selling in Year -1, consistent with earnings management distancing the sale of stock from the revelation of bad news, and (2) managers refrain from managing Year -1 earnings when they trade closer to the event of default (in Year 0). These two distinct patterns suggest that the threat of litigation matters to managers of firms with deteriorating performance. Our finding that contemporaneous insider selling is associated with upwards earnings management should be of interest to researchers who study, and professionals who oversee (e.g., directors, auditors, and regulators) management in firms with deteriorating performance.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"186 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123008198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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