The current project of the IASB to issue accounting standards for small and medium firms (so-called “IFRS for SMEs”) intends to further boost the accounting harmonization process. At the same time, the standards have been discussed and criticized from several parts and the European Commission has decided to not adopt them for the moment. Di Pietra et al. (2008) and Quagli and Paoloni (2012) show that the preparation process of the IFRS for SMEs does not fully involve some important constituencies that would be strongly affected by the new standards, in primis chartered accountants. We conducted an extensive survey of 1,269 Italian Chartered Accountants (CAs) and ten interviews with presidents of the local CAs’ Associations to detect any possible “decoupling” between the structures and activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). First, we assess CAs’ attitude towards the new standards and, in particular, we document the role played by the perception of the financial and economic benefits of the new standards and the understanding of the technical and the reasons that led to the preparation of the IFRS for SMEs. Second, we study the heterogeneity among CAs and we find that the level of knowledge of these standards and the perceived relevance of tax rules positively influence the perception of the new standards, whereas the length of the CA’s professional experience has a negative effect.
{"title":"Unravelling the ‘Black Box’ of the Accounting Profession: Evidence from the IFRS for SMEs","authors":"A. Ghio, R. Verona","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2379716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2379716","url":null,"abstract":"The current project of the IASB to issue accounting standards for small and medium firms (so-called “IFRS for SMEs”) intends to further boost the accounting harmonization process. At the same time, the standards have been discussed and criticized from several parts and the European Commission has decided to not adopt them for the moment. Di Pietra et al. (2008) and Quagli and Paoloni (2012) show that the preparation process of the IFRS for SMEs does not fully involve some important constituencies that would be strongly affected by the new standards, in primis chartered accountants. We conducted an extensive survey of 1,269 Italian Chartered Accountants (CAs) and ten interviews with presidents of the local CAs’ Associations to detect any possible “decoupling” between the structures and activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). First, we assess CAs’ attitude towards the new standards and, in particular, we document the role played by the perception of the financial and economic benefits of the new standards and the understanding of the technical and the reasons that led to the preparation of the IFRS for SMEs. Second, we study the heterogeneity among CAs and we find that the level of knowledge of these standards and the perceived relevance of tax rules positively influence the perception of the new standards, whereas the length of the CA’s professional experience has a negative effect.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132114109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brant E. Christensen, Thomas C. Omer, Nathan Y. Sharp, Marjorie K. Shelley
Prior research has established that from 2000 to 2007, auditors incorporated clients’ financial reporting risk in their pricing of audit engagements (Charles et al. 2010; Doogar et al. 2010, 2013). However, regulators have expressed concern that the economic downturn and pressure from clients to reduce audit fees has had a negative impact on auditor effort. Our evidence suggests a marked decline in the pricing of financial reporting risk during the 2006-2010 period, further suggesting a reduced focus on the risk of misreporting during that period. This decline is particularly evident among non-industry expert auditors. Connecting these findings to audit quality, we observe a higher likelihood of subsequent accounting restatements among clients whose financial reporting risk appears to be insufficiently incorporated in audit fees, particularly among clients of small audit firm offices. Our results are consistent with a return to the commoditization of financial statement audits and its negative impact on audit quality.
先前的研究已经确定，从2000年到2007年，审计师将客户的财务报告风险纳入审计业务定价(Charles et al. 2010;Doogar et al. 2010, 2013)。然而，监管机构表示担心，经济低迷和客户要求降低审计费用的压力对审计师的工作产生了负面影响。我们的证据表明，2006-2010年期间财务报告风险的定价显著下降，进一步表明在此期间对误报风险的关注有所减少。这种下降在非行业专业审计人员中尤为明显。将这些发现与审计质量联系起来，我们观察到，在那些财务报告风险似乎没有充分纳入审计费用的客户中，特别是在小型审计事务所办事处的客户中，后续会计重述的可能性更高。我们的结果与财务报表审计商品化的回归及其对审计质量的负面影响是一致的。
{"title":"Pork Bellies and Public Company Audits: Have Audits Once Again Become Just Another Commodity?","authors":"Brant E. Christensen, Thomas C. Omer, Nathan Y. Sharp, Marjorie K. Shelley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2184413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184413","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research has established that from 2000 to 2007, auditors incorporated clients’ financial reporting risk in their pricing of audit engagements (Charles et al. 2010; Doogar et al. 2010, 2013). However, regulators have expressed concern that the economic downturn and pressure from clients to reduce audit fees has had a negative impact on auditor effort. Our evidence suggests a marked decline in the pricing of financial reporting risk during the 2006-2010 period, further suggesting a reduced focus on the risk of misreporting during that period. This decline is particularly evident among non-industry expert auditors. Connecting these findings to audit quality, we observe a higher likelihood of subsequent accounting restatements among clients whose financial reporting risk appears to be insufficiently incorporated in audit fees, particularly among clients of small audit firm offices. Our results are consistent with a return to the commoditization of financial statement audits and its negative impact on audit quality.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"2017 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122709040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.
{"title":"Why Do Countries Mandate Accrual Accounting for Tax Purposes?","authors":"I. Goncharov, M. Jacob","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1912003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1912003","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129934491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates whether the properties of sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts are associated with the adverse macroeconomic conditions that exist at the time of their initial hire or major promotion. We find that analysts who begin their career in an economic recession are more conservative in their earnings forecasts: they are more pessimistic, less likely to be leaders, deviate less from the consensus, and more (less) likely to issue negative (positive) bold revisions. They are also asymmetrically more likely to respond to bad rather than good news during recessions, when bad news is abundant. Our results are not subsumed by analysts' characteristics and incentives identified in prior literature. Overall, we find that their forecast properties are associated with the adverse macroeconomic conditions at the time of initial hire or major promotion.
{"title":"Recession Analysts and Conservative Forecasting","authors":"Michael B. Clement, Kelvin K. F. Law","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2307253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2307253","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates whether the properties of sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts are associated with the adverse macroeconomic conditions that exist at the time of their initial hire or major promotion. We find that analysts who begin their career in an economic recession are more conservative in their earnings forecasts: they are more pessimistic, less likely to be leaders, deviate less from the consensus, and more (less) likely to issue negative (positive) bold revisions. They are also asymmetrically more likely to respond to bad rather than good news during recessions, when bad news is abundant. Our results are not subsumed by analysts' characteristics and incentives identified in prior literature. Overall, we find that their forecast properties are associated with the adverse macroeconomic conditions at the time of initial hire or major promotion.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114183953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose that idiosyncratic benefits from adhering to social norms explain the heterogeneity in honesty documented in many situations where misrepresentation yields a financial benefit. Further, information about the honesty of one's peers modifies the descriptive norm and hence, one's own honesty. We test these hypotheses in a reporting experiment with two managers in which one manager observes the reports of a peer. Managers’ honesty decreases when peers are less honest and increases when peers are more honest. The importance of the maintaining norms schema — assessed by the DIT-2 — explains these adjustments and, moreover, explains variation in reporting honesty in vacuo.
{"title":"Rotten Apples and Sterling Examples: Moral Reasoning and Peer Influences on Honesty in Managerial Reporting","authors":"Steven Huddart, Hong Qu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2133072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133072","url":null,"abstract":"We propose that idiosyncratic benefits from adhering to social norms explain the heterogeneity in honesty documented in many situations where misrepresentation yields a financial benefit. Further, information about the honesty of one's peers modifies the descriptive norm and hence, one's own honesty. We test these hypotheses in a reporting experiment with two managers in which one manager observes the reports of a peer. Managers’ honesty decreases when peers are less honest and increases when peers are more honest. The importance of the maintaining norms schema — assessed by the DIT-2 — explains these adjustments and, moreover, explains variation in reporting honesty in vacuo.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"211 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124376860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates how directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (hereafter D&O insurance) affects corporate diversification and post-diversification performance. Using a sample of 671 Taiwanese listed firms, we find that excessive D&O liability insurance is positively associated with corporate diversification, particularly unrelated diversification. In addition, we find that when diversification does occur, excessive D&O liability insurance worsens the shareholder value destroyed a firm’s diversification. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that excessive D&O liability insurance induces value-destroying empire building. Our results are robust to different model specifications and alternative measures of firm performance.
{"title":"Effects of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance on Corporate Diversification","authors":"H. Chi, J. Gong, Tzu-Ching Weng, Guang-Zheng Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312952","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates how directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (hereafter D&O insurance) affects corporate diversification and post-diversification performance. Using a sample of 671 Taiwanese listed firms, we find that excessive D&O liability insurance is positively associated with corporate diversification, particularly unrelated diversification. In addition, we find that when diversification does occur, excessive D&O liability insurance worsens the shareholder value destroyed a firm’s diversification. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that excessive D&O liability insurance induces value-destroying empire building. Our results are robust to different model specifications and alternative measures of firm performance.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122797401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior literature shows that social networks from outside have great impact on the firm performance. This study focuses on the impact of social network on firm performance especially from the depth of the social network created by key shareholders. In addition, firms in emerging markets face intensive competition. Therefore, this study also examines the different impacts of key shareholders’ social network on firm performance under different levels of market competition in an emerging market. The empirical results show that the depth of shareholder network has significant positive impact on firm performance. In addition, the results also show that key shareholder network has more positive effect on firm performance under high market competition than that of low market competition.
{"title":"Market Competition, Social Network and Firm Performance: An Emerging Economy Test","authors":"C. Chuang, Cheng-Jen Huang, A. Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312555","url":null,"abstract":"Prior literature shows that social networks from outside have great impact on the firm performance. This study focuses on the impact of social network on firm performance especially from the depth of the social network created by key shareholders. In addition, firms in emerging markets face intensive competition. Therefore, this study also examines the different impacts of key shareholders’ social network on firm performance under different levels of market competition in an emerging market. The empirical results show that the depth of shareholder network has significant positive impact on firm performance. In addition, the results also show that key shareholder network has more positive effect on firm performance under high market competition than that of low market competition.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133145063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accuracy of cost accounting systems is a central issue in management accounting theory and practice. Over time a large set of allocation mechanisms has been developed and refined with the goal of providing accurate cost estimates of objects. Any bias in provided cost information is supposed to lead to sub-optimal decisions, however, this is true only if a perfectly rational decision making process takes place. During the last few decades, many survey based research on firm's pricing highlighted the widespread use of full-cost pricing. In this paper we analyze the interaction between biases in the costing systems and full-cost pricing. Results show that under certain circumstances firms may profit from biases in the costing system when such a kind of pricing approach is employed.
{"title":"Profiting from Cost Mis-Allocation: An Analysis of the Interaction Among Biases in Reported Costs and Full-Cost Pricing","authors":"G. Coller, Paolo Collini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312142","url":null,"abstract":"Accuracy of cost accounting systems is a central issue in management accounting theory and practice. Over time a large set of allocation mechanisms has been developed and refined with the goal of providing accurate cost estimates of objects. Any bias in provided cost information is supposed to lead to sub-optimal decisions, however, this is true only if a perfectly rational decision making process takes place. During the last few decades, many survey based research on firm's pricing highlighted the widespread use of full-cost pricing. In this paper we analyze the interaction between biases in the costing systems and full-cost pricing. Results show that under certain circumstances firms may profit from biases in the costing system when such a kind of pricing approach is employed.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130401056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Managers in decentralized organizations often face incentives against cooperation. In these situations, accounting information can increase cooperation when it reveals the cooperativeness of other managers' prior actions. The extent to which accounting information reveals other managers' prior actions, however, can depend on its aggregation. This study provides theory-consistent experimental evidence of the effects of accounting information aggregation on managerial cooperation when managers face incentives against cooperation. Based on the psychology theory of non-consequential reasoning, I predict and find that managerial cooperation is higher when accounting information is aggregated than when it is disaggregated. When accounting information is aggregated and does not reveal the cooperativeness of managers' prior actions, individuals frame the decision to cooperate as a group decision and prefer cooperation because it is the only action that leads to the best group outcome. JEL Classifications: D81; M4.
{"title":"Accounting Information Aggregation and Managerial Cooperation","authors":"Eric J. Marinich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312652","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Managers in decentralized organizations often face incentives against cooperation. In these situations, accounting information can increase cooperation when it reveals the cooperativeness of other managers' prior actions. The extent to which accounting information reveals other managers' prior actions, however, can depend on its aggregation. This study provides theory-consistent experimental evidence of the effects of accounting information aggregation on managerial cooperation when managers face incentives against cooperation. Based on the psychology theory of non-consequential reasoning, I predict and find that managerial cooperation is higher when accounting information is aggregated than when it is disaggregated. When accounting information is aggregated and does not reveal the cooperativeness of managers' prior actions, individuals frame the decision to cooperate as a group decision and prefer cooperation because it is the only action that leads to the best group outcome.\u0000 JEL Classifications: D81; M4.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128029297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While human capital theory and upper echelon theory predicts that a firm should innovate better when its CEO possess more human capital, this relationship has been difficult to measure empirically. As a result, little is known about the part that individual CEO plays in explaining innovation performance. In this paper, using a unique dataset on S&P 500 CEO human capital between 1996 and 2003, I examine whether the CEO specific human capital having a critical firm expertise or science expertise affects firm innovation. This paper aims to empirically explore the effects of science specific human capital and firm specific human capital on innovation efficiency. My findings support the idea that CEOs that gather more specific human capital promote better innovation for the firm. I also find that science-specialists CEOs promote innovation performance than firm-specialists CEOs and generalists CEO. My analyses indicate that both types of human capital do matter in the context of innovation. I offer an alternative view of how intangible special human capital promotes firm outcomes by comparative advantages.
{"title":"Human Capital between Generalists and Specialists: How Does It Impact Innovation?","authors":"KwangJoo Koo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312896","url":null,"abstract":"While human capital theory and upper echelon theory predicts that a firm should innovate better when its CEO possess more human capital, this relationship has been difficult to measure empirically. As a result, little is known about the part that individual CEO plays in explaining innovation performance. In this paper, using a unique dataset on S&P 500 CEO human capital between 1996 and 2003, I examine whether the CEO specific human capital having a critical firm expertise or science expertise affects firm innovation. This paper aims to empirically explore the effects of science specific human capital and firm specific human capital on innovation efficiency. My findings support the idea that CEOs that gather more specific human capital promote better innovation for the firm. I also find that science-specialists CEOs promote innovation performance than firm-specialists CEOs and generalists CEO. My analyses indicate that both types of human capital do matter in the context of innovation. I offer an alternative view of how intangible special human capital promotes firm outcomes by comparative advantages.","PeriodicalId":356551,"journal":{"name":"American Accounting Association Meetings (AAA)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126265117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：