{"title":"International Symposium Concluded: A Reply to Horvath","authors":"V. V. Kraevskii","doi":"10.7202/1073402ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073402ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45041533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Total Form as a Moveable Feast: A Response to Walsh","authors":"Dianne Bogdan","doi":"10.7202/1073400ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073400ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42400616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making a Case for Adult Educational Rights","authors":"K. Wain","doi":"10.7202/1073344ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073344ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71194460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I am pleased to be given the opportunity to respond to Richard Barren's and Howard Woodhouse's stimulating replies to my article "Education and the Mattet Model" in the most recent issue of Paideusis1 Because Woodhouse's paper introduces a problem which is instantiated by Barren's reply, I will deal with it first. It consists of two main steps. First, it briefly explains the general pattern of my case, with whose argument it essentially agrees. Then it provides a revealing illustration of a main claim of my article's argument-namely, that the academic community itself has so internalized the currently dominant ideology of the "free market" that its members are sometimes unable to rationally entertain criticism of it. The case Woodhouse reports is that of two senior York University professors of philosophy, Joseph Agassi and Ian Jarvie, who replied to an earlier article of mine2 Woodhouse points out that while Agassi and Jarvie categorically deny there is any conflict whatever between market and educational goals and methods, they do not think it anywhere necessary to provide any reason or argument against the contradictions clearly identified in the article. Since the contradictions specified in the article would, Woodhouse argues, be perfectly evident to the members of a first-year philosophy class, and since, moreover, it is a normal requirement of reason to provide some justification for what you categorically deny, he concludes that Agassi and Jarvie's reply presents us with a paradigm case where "rationality has been abandoned" by unconditional adherence to market doctrine. Woodhouse suggests that in this unreasoned presupposition of a dominant form of social life we are able to see the depth of the market model's hold on the current academic mind. Are we now facing a kind of deep-structural social indoctrination where it is no longer thought conceivable to doubt the ruling ideology of the day? We might think of the problem here as akin to that of the mediaeval schoolmen in their presupposition of theological dogma. Given principles of belief are simply assumed as the ultimate ordering structure of our thoughts and our lives, even by those whose post-medieval business it is to question such conditioned certitudes.
{"title":"Beyond Market Theology: Reply to Barrett and Woodhouse","authors":"J. McMurtry","doi":"10.7202/1073349AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073349AR","url":null,"abstract":"I am pleased to be given the opportunity to respond to Richard Barren's and Howard Woodhouse's stimulating replies to my article \"Education and the Mattet Model\" in the most recent issue of Paideusis1 Because Woodhouse's paper introduces a problem which is instantiated by Barren's reply, I will deal with it first. It consists of two main steps. First, it briefly explains the general pattern of my case, with whose argument it essentially agrees. Then it provides a revealing illustration of a main claim of my article's argument-namely, that the academic community itself has so internalized the currently dominant ideology of the \"free market\" that its members are sometimes unable to rationally entertain criticism of it. The case Woodhouse reports is that of two senior York University professors of philosophy, Joseph Agassi and Ian Jarvie, who replied to an earlier article of mine2 Woodhouse points out that while Agassi and Jarvie categorically deny there is any conflict whatever between market and educational goals and methods, they do not think it anywhere necessary to provide any reason or argument against the contradictions clearly identified in the article. Since the contradictions specified in the article would, Woodhouse argues, be perfectly evident to the members of a first-year philosophy class, and since, moreover, it is a normal requirement of reason to provide some justification for what you categorically deny, he concludes that Agassi and Jarvie's reply presents us with a paradigm case where \"rationality has been abandoned\" by unconditional adherence to market doctrine. Woodhouse suggests that in this unreasoned presupposition of a dominant form of social life we are able to see the depth of the market model's hold on the current academic mind. Are we now facing a kind of deep-structural social indoctrination where it is no longer thought conceivable to doubt the ruling ideology of the day? We might think of the problem here as akin to that of the mediaeval schoolmen in their presupposition of theological dogma. Given principles of belief are simply assumed as the ultimate ordering structure of our thoughts and our lives, even by those whose post-medieval business it is to question such conditioned certitudes.","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45781384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contradicting the Market","authors":"Howard R. Woodhouse","doi":"10.7202/1073357ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073357ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71195326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of our understanding and knowledge of the world is based on the authoritative pronouncements of experts. Both our scientific and historical understanding is grounded in this way. Think of germ theory, astronomy, plate techtonics, ancient history, dinosaurs, the origin of humans; it does not take much reflection to see that most of our understanding of the world is, in fact, grounded on information supplied and warranted by experts. Given how much of our knowledge has this basis, one would think that epistemologists would have given detailed consideration to the issue of appeal to scientific and other intellectual authority. But appeals to authority and the role that authority plays in knowledge have received little attention in modem philosophy. Indeed, philosophers generally have been opposed to such appeals since the birth of Western philosophy. Greek philosophy distinguished itself from Greek theology by rejecting appeals to authority (the wisdom of the ancients or the oracle's supply of the word of god) as the primary basis of knowledge and replacing those appeals with appeals to observation and reason as the basis of knowledge. Philosophy in many ways began with rejection of authoritative pronouncements and, when philosophy revived in the seventeenth century, the aversion to authority reappeared. By rejecting the authority of both Aristotle and the church, Descartes, Bacon, and Locke helped pave the way for modem science. These authors all rejected the appeal to any authority and, in doing so, marked the beginning of modern philosophy with its emphasis on individual confirmation of claims. As a result of this history, most contemporary introductions to epistemology do not even mention the issue of appeals to experts and authority, and there is little in contemporary epistemological literature that concerns itself with this topic.1 But one might expect critical thinking, with its concern for the practical needs of knowledge assessment, would devote considerably more attention to appeals to authority. In fact, most critical thinking texts do not even refer to appeals to authority and only a few texts give the subject significant treatment; none of these treatments is adequate, in part, perhaps because there is no epistemological theory on which to base such a treatment. Of those that do treat such appeals, many give appeals a definite secondary and necessary evil status. For example, Walton states:
{"title":"Assessing Expert Claims: Critical Thinking and the Appeal to Authority","authors":"M. Battersby","doi":"10.7202/1073304AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073304AR","url":null,"abstract":"Much of our understanding and knowledge of the world is based on the authoritative pronouncements of experts. Both our scientific and historical understanding is grounded in this way. Think of germ theory, astronomy, plate techtonics, ancient history, dinosaurs, the origin of humans; it does not take much reflection to see that most of our understanding of the world is, in fact, grounded on information supplied and warranted by experts. Given how much of our knowledge has this basis, one would think that epistemologists would have given detailed consideration to the issue of appeal to scientific and other intellectual authority. But appeals to authority and the role that authority plays in knowledge have received little attention in modem philosophy. Indeed, philosophers generally have been opposed to such appeals since the birth of Western philosophy. Greek philosophy distinguished itself from Greek theology by rejecting appeals to authority (the wisdom of the ancients or the oracle's supply of the word of god) as the primary basis of knowledge and replacing those appeals with appeals to observation and reason as the basis of knowledge. Philosophy in many ways began with rejection of authoritative pronouncements and, when philosophy revived in the seventeenth century, the aversion to authority reappeared. By rejecting the authority of both Aristotle and the church, Descartes, Bacon, and Locke helped pave the way for modem science. These authors all rejected the appeal to any authority and, in doing so, marked the beginning of modern philosophy with its emphasis on individual confirmation of claims. As a result of this history, most contemporary introductions to epistemology do not even mention the issue of appeals to experts and authority, and there is little in contemporary epistemological literature that concerns itself with this topic.1 But one might expect critical thinking, with its concern for the practical needs of knowledge assessment, would devote considerably more attention to appeals to authority. In fact, most critical thinking texts do not even refer to appeals to authority and only a few texts give the subject significant treatment; none of these treatments is adequate, in part, perhaps because there is no epistemological theory on which to base such a treatment. Of those that do treat such appeals, many give appeals a definite secondary and necessary evil status. For example, Walton states:","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44187507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Speaking in Our Own Voices: Plato's Protagoras and the Crisis of Education","authors":"James Crooks","doi":"10.7202/1073261ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073261ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71194104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Dogma Not Worth Exhuming: Empiricism in Language, Intelligence, and Thought","authors":"S. Norris","doi":"10.7202/1073248ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073248ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hanging Together with Richard Rorty","authors":"Dennis Cato","doi":"10.7202/1073176ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073176ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71191790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introduction Philosophers Bertrand Russell and John Dewey contributed much to the intellectual history of the twentieth century. These great thinkers, whose lives overlapped, shared many interests. Their influence went beyond technical philosophy into the realms of social policy and politics where both men exercised influence in significant ways. Both were liberal political thinkers who wished to create a more equitable society; both attempted to define and articulate the nature and meaning of democracy. John Dewey produced important perspectives on democracy, education, and knowledge despite being often less than clear in his thinking and writing. Gutek tells us that educators sometimes "did not accept Dewey's entire philosophy because they did not understand his difficult and often confusing prose" (Gutek, 1991, p. 342). Bertrand Russell was a clear and concise writer and thinker. His ideas remain valuable, helpful, and accessible to the modem reader. For most, Dewey must be interpreted in order to be understood. A careful reading of Dewey on democracy demonstrates limits to his views; sometimes, these are obscured by his style. Russell, on the other hand, can offer contemporary readers important insights into life within a democratic society. Russell provides an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of democracy in all its complexity; Dewey often makes assumptions about society which have lost their relevance as social life has become more complex. In writing about Dewey, Russell said:
哲学家伯特兰·罗素和约翰·杜威对二十世纪的思想史贡献良多。这些伟大的思想家，他们的生活重叠，有许多共同的兴趣。他们的影响超越了技术哲学，进入了社会政策和政治领域，在这些领域，两人都以重要的方式施加了影响。两人都是自由主义政治思想家，希望创造一个更公平的社会;两者都试图界定和阐明民主的性质和意义。约翰·杜威提出了关于民主、教育和知识的重要观点，尽管他的思想和写作常常不够清晰。Gutek告诉我们，教育工作者有时“不接受杜威的整个哲学，因为他们不理解他的难懂和经常令人困惑的散文”(Gutek, 1991, p. 342)。伯特兰·罗素是一位简洁明了的作家和思想家。他的思想对现代读者来说仍然很有价值，很有帮助，很容易理解。对大多数人来说，杜威必须被解释才能被理解。仔细阅读杜威关于民主的论述就会发现他观点的局限性;有时，这些被他的风格所掩盖。另一方面，罗素可以为当代读者提供关于民主社会生活的重要见解。罗素提供了一种对民主在其所有复杂性中的长处和弱点的理解;杜威经常对社会做出假设，但随着社会生活变得越来越复杂，这些假设已经失去了相关性。罗素在论及杜威时说:
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