{"title":"Multiculturalism in Canadian Society: A Re-evaluation","authors":"R. Magsino","doi":"10.7202/1073093ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073093ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71191498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Complexities of Reasons: A Critical Review of Siegel's Rationality Redeemed?","authors":"F. Ellett","doi":"10.7202/1073101AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073101AR","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46878240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Memory: Harry Samuel Broudy 1905-1998","authors":"M. J. Jackson","doi":"10.7202/1073091AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073091AR","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48734544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Imagination and Imaginative: A Trial Separation for Educational Practice","authors":"Mark Frein","doi":"10.7202/1073104ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1073104ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71191733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Even though a culture which rejects objective values cannot justify educational authority, it cannot function without it. Consequently, it tends to resorts to hidden forms of authority which are more manipulative than overt authority. Covert forms of authority subject people to normalizing judgment to detect signs of deviancy while getting them involved in discourses and practices that produce new desires suitable for the frictionless functioning of society. Epistemic authority tends to deteriorate to "regimes of truth" that control beliefs through power politics. Education involves children in practices that are regarded as valuable. It assumes that some practices are preferable to others and that students ought to be guided to the valued alternatives. This means that some choices are made for children instead of just letting them act on their preferences. In that sense education presupposes authority, both deontic and epistemic. Deontic authority is concerned with the authority to give orders, epistemic authority is concerned with competence. Teachers need deontic authority to coordinate the pedagogical situation. In addition, teachers need to be epistemic authorities: they ought to master the subject matter and the pedagogical knowledge needed for teaching. The crucial question is whether such an educational authority can be justified. That is, whether there are valuable practices and genuine knowledge, whether their value or validity can be established, and whether there are ways of coordinating social activity to reach the valued goals. To use authority for the benefit of the student presupposes a conception of what is really good for her. If the good is something completely subjective, something relative to individual choice, the exercise of authority is an attempt to mould students according to the preferences of those in authority. Ultimately it does not make a difference whether it is the interests of the "I" (the individual teacher) or the "we" (the group she represents or society) which determines the nature of the manipulation. In the absence of objective values, the exercise of educational authority tends to become manipulative. The argument of this paper begins by focusing on some fundamental reasons for the necessity of authority for complex practices like education. It then proceeds to discuss whether educational authority can be justified. I argue that an adequate Paioousis 14:2, 2001 21 justification presupposes objective values. The attempt to educate in value subjectivist and relativist frameworks involves a cognitive dissonance which has undesirable consequences for the practice. Even though the terminology of objective values is repulsive to many modem thinkers, it is not possible to avoid thinking in terms of the good life, or to replace such talk by the idea of disengaged freedom together with the meta-ethics of the fact/value dichotomy. Even those who in theory assume that values are subjective and independent of the orde
{"title":"Educational Authority and Manipulation","authors":"T. Puolimatka","doi":"10.7202/1072796AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1072796AR","url":null,"abstract":"Even though a culture which rejects objective values cannot justify educational authority, it cannot function without it. Consequently, it tends to resorts to hidden forms of authority which are more manipulative than overt authority. Covert forms of authority subject people to normalizing judgment to detect signs of deviancy while getting them involved in discourses and practices that produce new desires suitable for the frictionless functioning of society. Epistemic authority tends to deteriorate to \"regimes of truth\" that control beliefs through power politics. Education involves children in practices that are regarded as valuable. It assumes that some practices are preferable to others and that students ought to be guided to the valued alternatives. This means that some choices are made for children instead of just letting them act on their preferences. In that sense education presupposes authority, both deontic and epistemic. Deontic authority is concerned with the authority to give orders, epistemic authority is concerned with competence. Teachers need deontic authority to coordinate the pedagogical situation. In addition, teachers need to be epistemic authorities: they ought to master the subject matter and the pedagogical knowledge needed for teaching. The crucial question is whether such an educational authority can be justified. That is, whether there are valuable practices and genuine knowledge, whether their value or validity can be established, and whether there are ways of coordinating social activity to reach the valued goals. To use authority for the benefit of the student presupposes a conception of what is really good for her. If the good is something completely subjective, something relative to individual choice, the exercise of authority is an attempt to mould students according to the preferences of those in authority. Ultimately it does not make a difference whether it is the interests of the \"I\" (the individual teacher) or the \"we\" (the group she represents or society) which determines the nature of the manipulation. In the absence of objective values, the exercise of educational authority tends to become manipulative. The argument of this paper begins by focusing on some fundamental reasons for the necessity of authority for complex practices like education. It then proceeds to discuss whether educational authority can be justified. I argue that an adequate Paioousis 14:2, 2001 21 justification presupposes objective values. The attempt to educate in value subjectivist and relativist frameworks involves a cognitive dissonance which has undesirable consequences for the practice. Even though the terminology of objective values is repulsive to many modem thinkers, it is not possible to avoid thinking in terms of the good life, or to replace such talk by the idea of disengaged freedom together with the meta-ethics of the fact/value dichotomy. Even those who in theory assume that values are subjective and independent of the orde","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47220609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Programs of directive moral education (DME) that attempt to pre-rationally condition particular values are often criticized as violating autonomy. A common defense of DME is that if individuals, later in life, can respond to reasons, then autonomy has not been violated. In this paper I argue that this defense is a weak one because it does not pay sufficient attention to what is involved in responding to reasons. By adopting a theory of practical reasoning, I show that the reasons we can respond to are determined by the values that we hold. As such, the source of those values is crucial. If we are responding to reasons based merely upon values we have been conditioned to hold, then autonomy is compromised. We must, rather, hold values that we have chosen for our own. In this way I argue that authenticity is a necessary component of autonomy.
{"title":"Authentic Autonomy: A Practical Reasoning Critique of Directive Moral Education","authors":"Scott Priestman","doi":"10.7202/1072795AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1072795AR","url":null,"abstract":"Programs of directive moral education (DME) that attempt to pre-rationally condition particular values are often criticized as violating autonomy. A common defense of DME is that if individuals, later in life, can respond to reasons, then autonomy has not been violated. In this paper I argue that this defense is a weak one because it does not pay sufficient attention to what is involved in responding to reasons. By adopting a theory of practical reasoning, I show that the reasons we can respond to are determined by the values that we hold. As such, the source of those values is crucial. If we are responding to reasons based merely upon values we have been conditioned to hold, then autonomy is compromised. We must, rather, hold values that we have chosen for our own. In this way I argue that authenticity is a necessary component of autonomy.","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48483788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outside/Inside: Criterion Referenced Assessment and the Behaviorist/Constructivist Dilemma","authors":"Dennis Cato","doi":"10.7202/1072821AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1072821AR","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71191218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay offers a critical analysis of Locke's and Rousseau's basic assumptions upon which classical liberalism is built: rationalism, universalism, and individualism. I then describe an alternative starting place for democracy with a transactional view of individuals-in-relation-to-others. I then offer specific educational examples to help me sketch two themes that illustrate problems with classical liberalism and how a transactional democracy-always-in-the-making can help to solve these problems.
{"title":"Beyond Liberal Democracy: Diverse Educational Relations","authors":"B. Thayer-bacon","doi":"10.7202/1072682AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1072682AR","url":null,"abstract":"This essay offers a critical analysis of Locke's and Rousseau's basic assumptions upon which classical liberalism is built: rationalism, universalism, and individualism. I then describe an alternative starting place for democracy with a transactional view of individuals-in-relation-to-others. I then offer specific educational examples to help me sketch two themes that illustrate problems with classical liberalism and how a transactional democracy-always-in-the-making can help to solve these problems.","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42746668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A World of Our Own: Heesoon Bai and the Flight into Romanticism","authors":"Dennis Cato","doi":"10.7202/1072688ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1072688ar","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71190465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Concerns are raised regarding the place of the arts in education, specifically as they are used in the social science context of educational research under the title ‘arts-based research’. An examination of Elliot Eisner’s claim that art is research concludes that, though the arts may be used for display, data, or heuristic in educational research, they are not being recognised for their distinctive characteristics. John White’s critique of the theory of multiple intelligences is revisited to mitigate common claims for the arts based upon Gardner. Given the dominance of scientism in today’s research climate, it is argued that the arts should take their rightful place to balance research in its quest for certainty; that they be the antagonist mode of thought called for by John Stuart Mill.
{"title":"A Reflection on Arts‐Based Research","authors":"M. Forrest","doi":"10.7202/1079436AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1079436AR","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns are raised regarding the place of the arts in education, specifically as they are used in the social science context of educational research under the title ‘arts-based research’. An examination of Elliot Eisner’s claim that art is research concludes that, though the arts may be used for display, data, or heuristic in educational research, they are not being recognised for their distinctive characteristics. John White’s critique of the theory of multiple intelligences is revisited to mitigate common claims for the arts based upon Gardner. Given the dominance of scientism in today’s research climate, it is argued that the arts should take their rightful place to balance research in its quest for certainty; that they be the antagonist mode of thought called for by John Stuart Mill.","PeriodicalId":36151,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiry in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42582551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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