Pub Date : 2022-07-20DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i6.5227
Cory Juhl
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{"title":"Review of Gary Ebbs, Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry","authors":"Cory Juhl","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i6.5227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i6.5227","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49379300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-20DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i6.4930
James Pearson
Burton Dreben taught a generation of scholars the value of closely attending to the recent philosophical past. But the few papers he authored do little to capture his philosophical voice. In this article, I turn instead to an unpublished transcript of Dreben in conversation with his contemporaries. In addition to yielding insights into a transitional period in W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s thought, I argue that this document showcases Dreben in his element, revealing the way that he shaped the views of key analytic philosophers. More broadly, I argue that by writing conversationalists like Dreben into our histories we can capture the collaborative nature of philosophy.
{"title":"Writing Conversationalists into History","authors":"James Pearson","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i6.4930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i6.4930","url":null,"abstract":"Burton Dreben taught a generation of scholars the value of closely attending to the recent philosophical past. But the few papers he authored do little to capture his philosophical voice. In this article, I turn instead to an unpublished transcript of Dreben in conversation with his contemporaries. In addition to yielding insights into a transitional period in W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s thought, I argue that this document showcases Dreben in his element, revealing the way that he shaped the views of key analytic philosophers. More broadly, I argue that by writing conversationalists like Dreben into our histories we can capture the collaborative nature of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42507069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902
A. Trybus, B. Linsky
The article describes the background of Roman Ingarden's 1922 review of Leon Chwistek's book Wielość rzeczywistości (The Plurality of Realities), and the back-and-forth that followed. Despite the differences, the two shared some interesting similarities. Both authors had important ties to the intellectual happenings outside Poland and were not considerd mainstream at home. In the end, however, it is these connections that allowed them to gain recognition. Ingarden, who had been a student of Husserl, became the leading phenomenologist in the postwar Poland. For Chwistek, a painter, philosopher, and logician interested in Russell’s work, such connections meant that he won the competition for a professorship at the university in Lwów over Alfred Tarski. Until recently, Chwistek’s place in Polish logic remains unclear and Ingarden’s interactions with Polish logic and the Vienna Circle have not been investigated extensively. A deeper look at this intellectual fracas between Ingarden and Chwistek helps one in the study of the complicated mesh of alliances within the Lwów-Warsaw School. The article also identifies the origins of the split between phenomenology and the analytic philosophical tradition in Poland. The article is also accompanied by the translations of the reviews.
{"title":"Two Poles Worlds Apart","authors":"A. Trybus, B. Linsky","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i5.4902","url":null,"abstract":"The article describes the background of Roman Ingarden's 1922 review of Leon Chwistek's book Wielość rzeczywistości (The Plurality of Realities), and the back-and-forth that followed. Despite the differences, the two shared some interesting similarities. Both authors had important ties to the intellectual happenings outside Poland and were not considerd mainstream at home. In the end, however, it is these connections that allowed them to gain recognition. Ingarden, who had been a student of Husserl, became the leading phenomenologist in the postwar Poland. For Chwistek, a painter, philosopher, and logician interested in Russell’s work, such connections meant that he won the competition for a professorship at the university in Lwów over Alfred Tarski. Until recently, Chwistek’s place in Polish logic remains unclear and Ingarden’s interactions with Polish logic and the Vienna Circle have not been investigated extensively. A deeper look at this intellectual fracas between Ingarden and Chwistek helps one in the study of the complicated mesh of alliances within the Lwów-Warsaw School. The article also identifies the origins of the split between phenomenology and the analytic philosophical tradition in Poland.\u0000The article is also accompanied by the translations of the reviews.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41336383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i4.4829
Bryan Pickel
This paper reconstructs Susan Stebbing’s account of intelligentdealing with a problem and defends this account against chargesthat it relies on a “censurable kind” of intellectualism. This chargewas made in Stebbing’s own time by Laird and Wittgenstein. MichaelKremer has recently made the case that Stebbing is also a proximatetarget of Gilbert Ryle’s attack on intellectualism. This paper arguesthat Stebbing should indeed be counted as an intellectualist since sheholds that intelligent dealing with a problem requires propositionalthought. Yet, for Stebbing, thinking is an activity of a whole personand is enabled and constrained by their dispositions. This complexpicture of a thinker enables Stebbing’s account to resist argumentstargeting certain forms of intellectualism such as Ryle’s regressargument. It also helps her to respond to the charge that sheoveremphasizes the importance of intellectual failures. On the picturethat emerges, Stebbing offers a strikingly modern epistemology thatincorporates the social features of a person as well as their purelyintellectual features.
{"title":"Susan Stebbing's Intellectualism","authors":"Bryan Pickel","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i4.4829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i4.4829","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000This paper reconstructs Susan Stebbing’s account of intelligentdealing with a problem and defends this account against chargesthat it relies on a “censurable kind” of intellectualism. This chargewas made in Stebbing’s own time by Laird and Wittgenstein. MichaelKremer has recently made the case that Stebbing is also a proximatetarget of Gilbert Ryle’s attack on intellectualism. This paper arguesthat Stebbing should indeed be counted as an intellectualist since sheholds that intelligent dealing with a problem requires propositionalthought. Yet, for Stebbing, thinking is an activity of a whole personand is enabled and constrained by their dispositions. This complexpicture of a thinker enables Stebbing’s account to resist argumentstargeting certain forms of intellectualism such as Ryle’s regressargument. It also helps her to respond to the charge that sheoveremphasizes the importance of intellectual failures. On the picturethat emerges, Stebbing offers a strikingly modern epistemology thatincorporates the social features of a person as well as their purelyintellectual features.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42263133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i3.4410
Gilad Nir
By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. I further show that the argument seeks to undermine core commitments of Frege’s and Russell’s. But the reductio, as I read it, is not intended to establish the falsity of any of their specific assumptions. Rather, its aim is to make manifest the indeterminacies that underlie the language in which these assumptions are framed, and establish the need for a transformation of that language. So understood, Wittgenstein’s argument exemplifies his idea that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity of elucidation. The interpretation I propose bears on one of the central debates in the literature, namely how we should understand Wittgenstein’s contention that his elucidations succeed despite being nonsensical.
{"title":"Wittgenstein's Reductio","authors":"Gilad Nir","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i3.4410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i3.4410","url":null,"abstract":"By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. I further show that the argument seeks to undermine core commitments of Frege’s and Russell’s. But the reductio, as I read it, is not intended to establish the falsity of any of their specific assumptions. Rather, its aim is to make manifest the indeterminacies that underlie the language in which these assumptions are framed, and establish the need for a transformation of that language. So understood, Wittgenstein’s argument exemplifies his idea that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity of elucidation. The interpretation I propose bears on one of the central debates in the literature, namely how we should understand Wittgenstein’s contention that his elucidations succeed despite being nonsensical.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47523400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i3.5135
Roberta Ballarin
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{"title":"Review of Sanford Shieh, Necessity Lost","authors":"Roberta Ballarin","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i3.5135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i3.5135","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43690522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-26DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i2.5097
James Pearson
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{"title":"Review of Matt LaVine, Race, Gender, and the History of Early Analytic Philosophy","authors":"James Pearson","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i2.5097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i2.5097","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46716218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-26DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i2.4737
O. Spinney
I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect to propositional unity.
{"title":"Analysis, Decomposition, and Unity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus","authors":"O. Spinney","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i2.4737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i2.4737","url":null,"abstract":"I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect to propositional unity.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47218103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i1.4786
Tammo Lossau
Moral error theory is comprised of two parts: a denial of the existence of objective values, and a claim about the ways in which we attempt to make reference to such objective values. John Mackie is sometimes presented as endorsing the view that we necessarily presuppose such objective values in our moral language and thought. In a series of recent papers, though, Victor Moberger (2017), Selim Berker (2019), and Michael Ridge (2020) point out that Mackie does not seem to commit himself to this view. They argue that Mackie thinks this reference to objective values can, and perhaps should, be detached from our moral statements and judgments. In this paper, I argue that Moberger, Berker, and Ridge are right to point out that Mackie stops short of claiming a necessary connection between moral language and a commitment to objective values, but that he does not endorse the contrary claim either. Instead, Mackie stays neutral on the question whether it is possible to assert moral statements or make moral judgments without presupposing objective value. This is because he does not need to take a position on this matter. Mackie only engages with the conceptual analysis of moral language and thought to the extent required to achieve his argumentative goals: he wants to reject revisionary analyses of moral language and to refute the idea that we can assume moral truths to be in alignment with ordinary moral language.
{"title":"Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms","authors":"Tammo Lossau","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i1.4786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i1.4786","url":null,"abstract":"Moral error theory is comprised of two parts: a denial of the existence of objective values, and a claim about the ways in which we attempt to make reference to such objective values. John Mackie is sometimes presented as endorsing the view that we necessarily presuppose such objective values in our moral language and thought. In a series of recent papers, though, Victor Moberger (2017), Selim Berker (2019), and Michael Ridge (2020) point out that Mackie does not seem to commit himself to this view. They argue that Mackie thinks this reference to objective values can, and perhaps should, be detached from our moral statements and judgments. In this paper, I argue that Moberger, Berker, and Ridge are right to point out that Mackie stops short of claiming a necessary connection between moral language and a commitment to objective values, but that he does not endorse the contrary claim either. Instead, Mackie stays neutral on the question whether it is possible to assert moral statements or make moral judgments without presupposing objective value. This is because he does not need to take a position on this matter. Mackie only engages with the conceptual analysis of moral language and thought to the extent required to achieve his argumentative goals: he wants to reject revisionary analyses of moral language and to refute the idea that we can assume moral truths to be in alignment with ordinary moral language.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42306439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v10i1.5066
H. Sluga
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{"title":"Review of Joan Weiner, Taking Frege At His Word","authors":"H. Sluga","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v10i1.5066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v10i1.5066","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>~</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46358050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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