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Logic and Voice 逻辑和声音
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4918
Espen Hammer
In this paper, I aim to reconstruct and discuss Stanley Cavell’s interpretation and critique of analytic philosophy. Cavell objects to the tradition of analytic philosophy that, in its eagerness to provide abstract, theoretical reconstructions, it has failed to understand the importance of “the human voice” for philosophy. First, I outline Cavell’s retelling of the history of analytic philosophy from Frege and Russell to ordinary language philosophy. Second, I turn to Cavell’s reading of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein in order to show what the suppression of the human voice is supposed to mean and entail. Central to Cavell’s account is a particular view of language according to which no structure can explain our capacity for sense-making. Third, I exemplify Cavell’s approach by analyzing his debate with Kripke. Kripke sees the absence of “rails” determining meaning as a skeptical problem and calls for a communal solution. Cavell, by contrast, accepts the absence of rails while highlighting the need for individual responsiveness. In the conclusion I contrast the analytic interest in theory, structure, and abstraction with what I see as Cavell’s humanism. While respectful of key aspects of the analytic tradition such as its commitment to rigor and transparency, Cavell wished to bring the human subject back into philosophy.
本文旨在重构和讨论卡维尔对分析哲学的阐释和批判。卡维尔反对分析哲学的传统,认为它急于提供抽象的、理论的重建,却未能理解“人的声音”对哲学的重要性。首先,我概述了卡维尔对从弗雷格和罗素到日常语言哲学的分析哲学史的复述。其次,我转向卡维尔对克尔凯郭尔和维特根斯坦的解读,以展示对人类声音的压制应该意味着什么和需要什么。卡维尔解释的核心是一种特殊的语言观点,根据这种观点,没有任何结构可以解释我们构建意义的能力。第三,我通过分析卡维尔与克里普克的辩论来举例说明卡维尔的方法。Kripke认为缺乏“轨道”来决定意义是一个令人怀疑的问题,并呼吁共同解决。相比之下,卡维尔接受了铁轨的缺失,同时强调了个人响应的必要性。在结束语中,我将对理论、结构和抽象的分析兴趣与卡维尔的人文主义进行了对比。虽然尊重分析传统的关键方面,如其对严谨性和透明性的承诺,卡维尔希望将人类主体带回哲学。
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引用次数: 0
Stanley Cavell on What We Say 斯坦利·卡维尔《我们说什么
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4915
Arata Hamawaki
In his early essay, “Must We Mean What We Say”, Cavell argues that the claims of ordinary language philosophers regarding “what we say when” are not empirical generalizations about a given group of speakers but are rather to be understood as measuring the limits of what counts as a coherent act of thinking and speaking. Cavell’s charge against the skeptic about the external world is that he seeks to think and speak beyond these limits. In this paper I compare Cavell’s response to the skeptic to Davidson’s. Both base their responses on a broadly Kantian approach that appeals to the conditions under which thinking or speaking about objects is possible. On this approach the skeptic isn’t giving a false answer to an intelligible question, but rather, the question to which the skeptic is giving an answer is shown to be in some way unintelligible. But while Davidson’s critique of the skeptic is based on the conditions of ascribing meaning to one’s words, and contents to one’s beliefs, Cavell’s critique is based on the failure of the skeptic to mean the words he uses in the way that he needs. This difference expresses an underlying disagreement about the meaning of “meaning”: for Davidson the world comes into view through the meaning of our words and concepts, through the contents of our beliefs; for Cavell, the world comes into view through the agreement in “criteria” that are a condition of applying words and concepts to the world. This difference illuminates what Cavell calls “the truth of skepticism”: the idea that “my relation to the world and to others in general is not one of knowing”.
卡维尔在其早期的文章《我们必须言出必行》中认为,普通语言哲学家关于“我们什么时候说什么”的说法并不是对特定说话者群体的经验概括,而是被理解为衡量思维和说话连贯行为的极限。卡维尔对这位对外部世界持怀疑态度的人的指控是,他试图超越这些限制来思考和说话。在这篇论文中,我将卡维尔对怀疑论者的回应与戴维森的回应进行了比较。两人的回答都基于广义的康德方法,该方法呼吁思考或谈论物体的条件是可能的。在这种方法中,怀疑论者并没有对一个可理解的问题给出错误的答案,而是怀疑论者给出答案的问题在某种程度上是难以理解的。但是,尽管戴维森对怀疑论者的批评是基于将意义赋予一个人的话语和内容赋予一个人信仰的条件,但卡维尔的批评是建立在怀疑论者未能以他需要的方式表达他所使用的词语的基础上的。这种差异表达了对“意义”含义的潜在分歧:对戴维森来说,世界是通过我们的词语和概念的含义,通过我们信仰的内容进入视野的;对卡维尔来说,世界是通过“标准”的一致性进入视野的,“标准”是将词语和概念应用于世界的条件。这种差异说明了卡维尔所说的“怀疑论的真理”:即“我与世界和其他人的关系不是一种了解”。
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引用次数: 0
Cavell and the "History of the Rejection of the Human" 卡维尔与“人类的拒斥史”
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4913
Edward Guetti
This essay focuses on the explosive claim Cavell inserts in the middle of The Claim of Reason that a narrative history of a certain style of philosophy should be called “Philosophy and the Rejection of the Human.” In order to understand the accusation, I shape interpretations of what Cavell means by nearly each of the terms of this dramatic sentence. I begin by comparing senses of “philosophy” by way of a comparison with Rorty’s critical review of The Claim of Reason; I proceed by underlining how, in Cavell’s work, the notion “human” and its rejection also is entangled with that which Cavell describes as “skepticism.” It is necessary, therefore, to understand whether there is a specific characteristic difference between skepticism and the style of philosophy that is implicated in the “rejection of the human.” It seems as if there should be a difference, given Cavell’s notorious approval of the truth or the moral of skepticism and the apparent criticism of the philosophical style that rejects the human. I show that the difference can be discovered by focusing on Cavell’s understanding of criteria. In particular, I emphasize the (open) space of a subject’s relation to criteria, a subjective claim to universality without objectivity, in pursuing and extending Cavell’s own appeal to Kant’s Critique of Judgment. It is this subjective component that is rejected in the style of philosophy that Cavell singles out.
这篇文章的重点是卡维尔在《理性的主张》中间插入的爆炸性声明,即某种哲学风格的叙事历史应该被称为“哲学与对人类的拒绝”。为了理解这一指控,我几乎用这句戏剧句子的每一个术语来解释卡维尔的意思。我首先通过与罗蒂对《理性的主张》的批判性评论的比较来比较“哲学”的意义;我首先强调,在卡维尔的作品中,“人”及其拒绝的概念是如何与卡维尔所描述的“怀疑论”纠缠在一起的。因此,有必要理解怀疑论与“拒绝人”所涉及的哲学风格之间是否存在特定的特征差异。“考虑到卡维尔对真理或怀疑主义道德的臭名昭著的认可,以及对拒绝人类的哲学风格的明显批评,似乎应该有区别。我表明,通过关注卡维尔对标准的理解,可以发现差异。特别是,我强调主体与标准关系的(开放)空间,这是一种对普遍性的主观要求,而不是客观性,在追求和扩展卡维尔自己对康德《判断批判》的吸引力时。卡维尔指出,正是这种主观成分在哲学风格中被拒绝了。
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引用次数: 1
Cavell’s Method 卡维尔方法
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4916
Sandra Laugier
It may be time to question analytic philosophy’s structural ignorance of the methods of ordinary language philosophy. Cavell’s Must We Mean What We Say? upsets the analytic tradition to this end, pursuing a “linguistic phenomenology” that focuses on ordinary language use as a resource for describing the world. Cavell thereby entrusts the tradition with a more ambitious and concrete philosophical task.
也许是时候质疑分析哲学对普通语言哲学方法的结构性无知了。卡维尔的《我们说话一定要认真吗?》?为此颠覆了分析传统,追求一种“语言现象学”,将普通语言的使用作为描述世界的资源。卡维尔因此赋予传统一项更宏大、更具体的哲学任务。
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引用次数: 0
Introduction to the Special Issue 特刊简介
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-11-06 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4912
Edward Guetti
~
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引用次数: 0
Notions of Existence in Frege 弗雷格的存在概念
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I8.4782
Dolf Rami
In this paper, I aim to present the main components of my non-standard interpretation of Frege’s views on existence to the English-speaking public (Rami 2017a, 2018, 2019a,b). First, I will outline the standard interpretation and show how to a great but not full extent the standard interpretation can be justified on the basis of Frege’s writings. Second, I show that the main error of the standard interpretation consists in the assimilation of the contents of the ordinary language expressions “exist” (“existiert”) and “there is” (“es gibt”) according to Frege. Third, I evaluate possible sources for this unfounded assimilation. After that, I outline my alternative interpretation that distinguishes in opposition to other non-standard interpretations between a substantive and a deflationary part of Frege’s complete conception of existence in analogy to Frege’s analysis of truth and negation. Fifthly, I justify my interpretation by the reconstruction of a so far overlooked master argument of Frege against the above-mentioned assimilation. In the last section, I introduce and discuss five objections against my interpretation that came to my attention.
在本文中,我的目标是向英语公众展示我对弗雷格存在观的非标准解释的主要组成部分(Rami 2017a, 2018, 2019a,b)。首先,我将概述标准解释,并展示如何在弗雷格著作的基础上,在很大程度上(但不是全部)证明标准解释是合理的。其次,我指出标准解释的主要错误在于同化了弗雷格所说的“存在”(existtiert)和“有”(es gibt)这两个普通语言表达的内容。第三,我评估了这种毫无根据的同化的可能来源。之后,我概述了我的另一种解释,它区别于弗雷格完整存在概念的实质部分和紧缩部分,与弗雷格对真理和否定的分析类似,与其他非标准解释不同。第五,我通过重建弗雷格反对上述同化的一个迄今为止被忽视的主要论点来证明我的解释。在最后一节中,我介绍并讨论了我注意到的反对我的解释的五个反对意见。
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引用次数: 0
An Argument for Completely General Facts 一个关于完全一般事实的论证
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-08-25 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I7.4439
Landon D. C. Elkind
In his 1918 logical atomism lectures, Russell argued that there are no molecular facts. But he posed a problem for anyone wanting to avoid molecular facts: we need truth-makers for generalizations of molecular formulas, but such truth-makers seem to be both unavoidable and to have an abominably molecular character. Call this the problem of generalized molecular formulas. I clarify the problem here by distinguishing two kinds of generalized molecular formula: incompletely generalized molecular formulas and completely generalized molecular formulas. I next argue that, if empty worlds are logically possible, then the model-theoretic and truth-functional considerations that are usually given address the problem posed by the first kind of formula, but not the problem posed by the second kind. I then show that Russell’s commitments in 1918 provide an answer to the problem of completely generalized molecular formulas: some truth-makers will be non-atomic facts that have no constituents. This shows that the neo-logical atomist goal of defending the principle of atomicity—the principle that only atomic facts are truth-makers—is not realizable.
在1918年的逻辑原子论讲座中,罗素认为不存在分子事实。但他给任何想要避免分子事实的人带来了一个问题:我们需要真理制造者来推广分子公式,但这种真理制造者似乎是不可避免的,而且具有令人憎恶的分子特征。这就是广义分子公式的问题。我通过区分两种广义分子式来澄清这个问题:不完全广义分子式和完全广义分子公式。接下来,我认为,如果空世界在逻辑上是可能的,那么通常给出的模型理论和真值函数考虑解决了第一类公式提出的问题,而不是第二类公式提出了问题。然后,我展示了罗素在1918年的承诺为完全广义分子公式的问题提供了答案:一些真相制造者将是没有成分的非原子事实。这表明,捍卫原子性原则——只有原子事实才是真理创造者的原则——的新逻辑原子主义目标是不可实现的。
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引用次数: 0
Review of Gottfried Gabriel & Sven Schlotter, Frege und die kontinentalen Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie 戈特弗里德·加布里埃尔、斯文·施洛特、弗雷格与分析哲学的大陆起源述评
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-08-25 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I7.4861
Günther Eder
~
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引用次数: 0
Review of José Zalabardo, Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus 评若泽·扎拉巴多、维特根斯坦《拖拉机》中的表现与现实
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i6.4818
Joshua Eisenthal
~
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引用次数: 0
Epistemic Realism in Bradley and Early Moore 布拉德利与早期摩尔的认识论现实主义
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.15173/JHAP.V9I6.4294
Francesco Pesci
In this paper I attempt to show how Moore’s early emancipation from Bradley’s absolute idealism presupposes a fundamental adherence to certain theses of absolute idealism itself. In particular, I argue that the idea of an immediate epistemic access to concepts and propositions that Moore endorses in his platonic atomism (Hylton) is a reworking of a form of epistemic realism already present in Bradley. Epistemic realism is the conjunction of two theses: i) reality is independent of any constructive work of the human mind; ii) reality is immediately (non-discursively) accessible to knowledge. In this paper I first focus on Moore’s early idealist phase (1897), suggesting that it should be understood as an attempt at isolating this thesis in Bradley against Kant’s transcendental idealism. I then suggest that it is on the background of an invariant adherence to it that we should understand Moore’s later rejection of monism and idealism (1898–9) through his anti-psychologism. I hence explore how epistemic realism is at work in Moore’s platonic atomism and conclude with some remarks about the further significance of Moore’s rejection of Kant.
在这篇论文中,我试图展示摩尔早期从布拉德利的绝对理想主义中解放出来,是如何预设对某些绝对理想主义本身的基本坚持的。特别是,我认为,摩尔在他的柏拉图原子论(Hylton)中支持的对概念和命题的直接认识论访问的想法是对布拉德利已经存在的一种认识现实主义形式的重新设计。认识现实主义是两个命题的结合:(1)现实独立于人类思想的任何建设性工作;ii)现实是可以立即(非话语性)获得知识的。在这篇论文中,我首先关注摩尔早期的唯心主义阶段(1897年),认为这应该被理解为试图将布拉德利的这篇论文与康德的先验唯心主义隔离开来。然后,我建议,正是在对其坚定不移的坚持的背景下,我们应该通过摩尔的反心理主义来理解他后来对一元论和唯心主义的拒绝(1898-9)。因此,我探讨了认识现实主义是如何在摩尔的柏拉图式原子主义中发挥作用的,并对摩尔拒绝康德的进一步意义发表了一些评论。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy
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