Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5007
Richard Lawrence
Frege says, at the end of a discussion of formalism in the Foundations of Arithmetic, that his own foundational program “could be called formal” but is “completely different” from the view he has just criticized. This essay examines Frege’s relationship to Hermann Hankel, his main formalist interlocutor in the Foundations, in order to make sense of these claims. The investigation reveals a surprising result: Frege’s foundational program actually has quite a lot in common with Hankel’s. This undercuts Frege’s claim that his own view is completely different from Hankel’s formalism, and motivates a closer examination of where the differences lie. On the interpretation offered here, Frege shares important parts of the formalist perspective, but differs in recognizing a kind of content for arithmetical terms which can only be made available via proof from prior postulates.
{"title":"Frege, Hankel, and Formalism in the Foundations","authors":"Richard Lawrence","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000Frege says, at the end of a discussion of formalism in the Foundations of Arithmetic, that his own foundational program “could be called formal” but is “completely different” from the view he has just criticized. This essay examines Frege’s relationship to Hermann Hankel, his main formalist interlocutor in the Foundations, in order to make sense of these claims. The investigation reveals a surprising result: Frege’s foundational program actually has quite a lot in common with Hankel’s. This undercuts Frege’s claim that his own view is completely different from Hankel’s formalism, and motivates a closer examination of where the differences lie. On the interpretation offered here, Frege shares important parts of the formalist perspective, but differs in recognizing a kind of content for arithmetical terms which can only be made available via proof from prior postulates. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45948388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5010
Tabea Rohr
In what follows, the difference between Frege’s and Schröder’s understanding of logical connectives will be investigated. It will be argued that Frege thought of logical connectives as concepts, whereas Schröder thought of them as operations. For Frege, logical connectives can themselves be connected. There is no substantial difference between the connectives and the concepts they connect. Frege’s distinction between concepts and objects is central to this conception, because it allows a method of concept formation which enables us to form concepts from the logical connectives alone. Schröder in contrast unifies the distinction between concepts and objects (which he calls elements and relatives), but keeps the distinction between logical connectives and what they connect. It will be argued that Frege’s particular way of perceiving logical connectives is crucial for his foundational project.
{"title":"Logical Concepts vs. Logical Operations","authors":"Tabea Rohr","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000In what follows, the difference between Frege’s and Schröder’s understanding of logical connectives will be investigated. It will be argued that Frege thought of logical connectives as concepts, whereas Schröder thought of them as operations. For Frege, logical connectives can themselves be connected. There is no substantial difference between the connectives and the concepts they connect. Frege’s distinction between concepts and objects is central to this conception, because it allows a method of concept formation which enables us to form concepts from the logical connectives alone. Schröder in contrast unifies the distinction between concepts and objects (which he calls elements and relatives), but keeps the distinction between logical connectives and what they connect. It will be argued that Frege’s particular way of perceiving logical connectives is crucial for his foundational project.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44098782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5030
Jacob Rump
I investigate the role of the subject in judgment in Kant, Frege, and Husserl, situating it in the broader and less-often-considered context of their accounts of presentation (Vorstellung) as well as judgment. Contemporary philosophical usage of “representation” tends to elide the question of what Kant called the constitution of content, because of a reluctance, traced to Frege’s anti-psychologism, to attend to subjectivity. But for Kant and Husserl, anti-psychologism allows for synthesis as the subjective act necessary for both “mere presentation” and judgment. In Begriffshrift, Frege alludes to a significant logical role for the subjective act of judgment, and in later work, traces of this logical role remain in the intensional notions of grasping a thought and judging as acknowledging its truth. But Frege’s anti-psychologism blocks interpreting these subjective notions in term of synthesis. Although similar in certain ways to Frege and equally anti-psychologistic, Husserl’s theory of judgment in the Logical Investigations maintains a role for subjective syntheses for presentations and judgments, and goes beyond Kant in allowing for a kind of objectivity at the level of non-judgment presentations. These two great anti-psychologists at the dawn of the parallel heydays of linguistic and phenomenological analysis are thus differentiated by the fates they assign to the act of synthesis.
{"title":"The Fate of the Act of Synthesis","authors":"Jacob Rump","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5030","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate the role of the subject in judgment in Kant, Frege, and Husserl, situating it in the broader and less-often-considered context of their accounts of presentation (Vorstellung) as well as judgment. Contemporary philosophical usage of “representation” tends to elide the question of what Kant called the constitution of content, because of a reluctance, traced to Frege’s anti-psychologism, to attend to subjectivity. But for Kant and Husserl, anti-psychologism allows for synthesis as the subjective act necessary for both “mere presentation” and judgment. In Begriffshrift, Frege alludes to a significant logical role for the subjective act of judgment, and in later work, traces of this logical role remain in the intensional notions of grasping a thought and judging as acknowledging its truth. But Frege’s anti-psychologism blocks interpreting these subjective notions in term of synthesis. Although similar in certain ways to Frege and equally anti-psychologistic, Husserl’s theory of judgment in the Logical Investigations maintains a role for subjective syntheses for presentations and judgments, and goes beyond Kant in allowing for a kind of objectivity at the level of non-judgment presentations. These two great anti-psychologists at the dawn of the parallel heydays of linguistic and phenomenological analysis are thus differentiated by the fates they assign to the act of synthesis.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44951327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5008
Landon D. C. Elkind
In this paper I argue that the two-dimensional character of Frege’s Begriffsschrift plays an epistemological role in his argument for the analyticity of arithmetic. First, I motivate the claim that its two-dimensional character needs a historical explanation. Then, to set the stage, I discuss Frege’s notion of a Begriffsschrift and Kant’s epistemology of mathematics as synthetic a priori and partly grounded in intuition, canvassing Frege’s sharp disagreement on these points. Finally, I argue that the two-dimensional character of Frege’s notations play the epistemological role of facilitating our grasp of logical truths (foundational and derived) independently of intuition. The rest of this paper critically evaluates Frege’s view and discusses Macbeth’s (2005) account.
{"title":"Frege's Curiously Two-Dimensional Concept-Script","authors":"Landon D. C. Elkind","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5008","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I argue that the two-dimensional character of Frege’s Begriffsschrift plays an epistemological role in his argument for the analyticity of arithmetic. First, I motivate the claim that its two-dimensional character needs a historical explanation. Then, to set the stage, I discuss Frege’s notion of a Begriffsschrift and Kant’s epistemology of mathematics as synthetic a priori and partly grounded in intuition, canvassing Frege’s sharp disagreement on these points. Finally, I argue that the two-dimensional character of Frege’s notations play the epistemological role of facilitating our grasp of logical truths (foundational and derived) independently of intuition. The rest of this paper critically evaluates Frege’s view and discusses Macbeth’s (2005) account.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46311971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5031
R. Boddy
What, in Frege’s view, makes definitions fruitful? In Grundlagen §70, Frege offers an answer: Unfruitful definitions are definitions that “could just as well be omitted and leave no link missing in the chain of our proofs”. The §70 passage, however, poses an interpretive puzzle as its characterization of fruitfulness appears to conflict with other conditions that Frege imposes on definitions, namely, eliminability and conservativeness. It appears that the only way to resolve this conflict is to attribute to Frege a notion of fruitfulness that is trivially satisfied and, hence, poorly motivated. I argue that this worry is misplaced. This is because Frege distinguishes between two roles of definitions, namely, between definitions qua explanations of concepts (analytic definitions), and definitions qua resources of a proof system (logical definitions). I use this distinction to argue that a fruitful definition, for Frege, is a definition that plays both roles, and that to play both roles, the definition has to be used in the proof of sentences containing the term so defined. Starting from §70, I develop and defend this reading of Frege’s notion of fruitful definition.
{"title":"Frege on the Fruitfulness of Definitions","authors":"R. Boddy","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5031","url":null,"abstract":"What, in Frege’s view, makes definitions fruitful? In Grundlagen §70, Frege offers an answer: Unfruitful definitions are definitions that “could just as well be omitted and leave no link missing in the chain of our proofs”. The §70 passage, however, poses an interpretive puzzle as its characterization of fruitfulness appears to conflict with other conditions that Frege imposes on definitions, namely, eliminability and conservativeness. It appears that the only way to resolve this conflict is to attribute to Frege a notion of fruitfulness that is trivially satisfied and, hence, poorly motivated. I argue that this worry is misplaced. This is because Frege distinguishes between two roles of definitions, namely, between definitions qua explanations of concepts (analytic definitions), and definitions qua resources of a proof system (logical definitions). I use this distinction to argue that a fruitful definition, for Frege, is a definition that plays both roles, and that to play both roles, the definition has to be used in the proof of sentences containing the term so defined. Starting from §70, I develop and defend this reading of Frege’s notion of fruitful definition.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67252948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5033
A. Yates
In Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege tried to show that arithmetic is logical by giving gap-free proofs from what he took to be purely logical basic laws. But how do we come to judge these laws as true, and to recognize them as logical? The answer must involve giving an account of the apparent arguments Frege provides for his axioms. Following Sanford Shieh, I take these apparent arguments to instead be exhibitions: the exercise of a logical capacity in order to bring us into a state of judgement. I provide an account of what sort of inferential capacities are at play in such exhibitions, and explain how they lead us to judge that Frege’s primitive laws are general and undeniable. I will also situate my account with respect to other rival interpretations, particularly the elucidatory interpretations of Joan Weiner and Thomas Ricketts.
在Grundgesetze der Arithmetik一书中，Frege试图通过从他认为纯粹是逻辑基本定律中给出无间隙证明来证明算术是合乎逻辑的。但是，我们如何判断这些定律是真实的，并认识到它们是合乎逻辑的呢？答案必须包括对弗雷格为其公理提供的明显论点进行说明。继谢之后，我认为这些明显的论点反而是一种展示：行使逻辑能力，使我们进入判断状态。我介绍了在这样的展览中，什么样的推理能力在起作用，并解释了它们是如何引导我们判断弗雷格的原始定律是普遍的和不可否认的。我还将把我的叙述与其他对立的解释放在一起，特别是琼·韦纳和托马斯·里基茨的阐释性解释。
{"title":"Strictures on an Exhibition","authors":"A. Yates","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i11.5033","url":null,"abstract":"In Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege tried to show that arithmetic is logical by giving gap-free proofs from what he took to be purely logical basic laws. But how do we come to judge these laws as true, and to recognize them as logical? The answer must involve giving an account of the apparent arguments Frege provides for his axioms. Following Sanford Shieh, I take these apparent arguments to instead be exhibitions: the exercise of a logical capacity in order to bring us into a state of judgement. I provide an account of what sort of inferential capacities are at play in such exhibitions, and explain how they lead us to judge that Frege’s primitive laws are general and undeniable. I will also situate my account with respect to other rival interpretations, particularly the elucidatory interpretations of Joan Weiner and Thomas Ricketts.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45624320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-27DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v9i10.4743
J. A. Smith
I offer an interpretation of Carnap and Quine’s views on cognitive significance and insignificance. The basic idea behind their views is as follows: to judge an expression is insignificant is to recommend it not be used in or explicated into languages used to express truth-valued judgments in inquiry; to judge an expression is significant is to recommend it be used in or explicated into such languages. These judgments are pragmatic judgments, made in light of purposes for language use in inquiry. For Carnap at least, these pragmatic judgments are non-cognitive. This basic idea is only a roughly correct statement of their views. This is because the details of the scientific languages they recommend for inquiry are necessary to understand their views and the way they understand their own views. Even so, I offer two reasons to suggest that this basic idea is worthy of our consideration today. First, it provides a conception of significance that captures the natural thought that epistemological concerns can lead us to consider expressions to be insignificant without requiring an objectionable form of verificationism. Second, if we appeal also to Carnap and Quine’s pluralistic attitude toward explication, we can make a pragmatic judgment that an expression is insignificant while judging it to be significant on a distinct explication of significance fit for describing and explaining natural language.
{"title":"Carnap and Quine on Sense and Nonsense","authors":"J. A. Smith","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i10.4743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i10.4743","url":null,"abstract":"I offer an interpretation of Carnap and Quine’s views on cognitive significance and insignificance. The basic idea behind their views is as follows: to judge an expression is insignificant is to recommend it not be used in or explicated into languages used to express truth-valued judgments in inquiry; to judge an expression is significant is to recommend it be used in or explicated into such languages. These judgments are pragmatic judgments, made in light of purposes for language use in inquiry. For Carnap at least, these pragmatic judgments are non-cognitive. This basic idea is only a roughly correct statement of their views. This is because the details of the scientific languages they recommend for inquiry are necessary to understand their views and the way they understand their own views. Even so, I offer two reasons to suggest that this basic idea is worthy of our consideration today. First, it provides a conception of significance that captures the natural thought that epistemological concerns can lead us to consider expressions to be insignificant without requiring an objectionable form of verificationism. Second, if we appeal also to Carnap and Quine’s pluralistic attitude toward explication, we can make a pragmatic judgment that an expression is insignificant while judging it to be significant on a distinct explication of significance fit for describing and explaining natural language.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46330280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that (1) McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because (2) Cavell rather regards terror as a mood that reveals the “truth of skepticism”, namely, that there is no conclusive evidence for necessary attunement on pain of a category error, and that (3) a precedent for McDowell’s misunderstanding is Hegel’s argument for necessary attunement in a system of knowing, whose refutation Schelling holds it is the “merit of skepticism” to provide.
{"title":"Schelling, Cavell, and the Truth of Skepticism","authors":"G. Bruno","doi":"10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4919","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that (1) McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because (2) Cavell rather regards terror as a mood that reveals the “truth of skepticism”, namely, that there is no conclusive evidence for necessary attunement on pain of a category error, and that (3) a precedent for McDowell’s misunderstanding is Hegel’s argument for necessary attunement in a system of knowing, whose refutation Schelling holds it is the “merit of skepticism” to provide.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44431441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds, external world scepticism). There is a standing puzzle about this notion of vertigo, however, forcefully pressed, for example, by McDowell. Why should a resolution of the sceptical problem, one that putatively completely undercuts the motivation for scepticism in that domain, nonetheless generate vertigo in this sense? I aim to resolve the puzzle, in a way that I believe underwrites this Cavellian notion, via consideration of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of rational evaluation in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty.
{"title":"Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4914","url":null,"abstract":"My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds, external world scepticism). There is a standing puzzle about this notion of vertigo, however, forcefully pressed, for example, by McDowell. Why should a resolution of the sceptical problem, one that putatively completely undercuts the motivation for scepticism in that domain, nonetheless generate vertigo in this sense? I aim to resolve the puzzle, in a way that I believe underwrites this Cavellian notion, via consideration of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of rational evaluation in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46963915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article I focus on Cavell’s theme of finding one’s voice, as it is articulated with reference to the philosophies of language of Wittgenstein and Austin. I start by spelling out Cavell’s Wittgensteinian-Austinian view of culture as the background for his approach to aesthetics and ethics. I then set out to explore the work done by the theme in aesthetics and ethics around the notion claim. I argue that Cavell’s effort to counter the pull of non-cognitivism in aesthetics and ethics, building on the notion claim, is not only illuminating of his unique way of inheriting the history of analytic philosophy but also gives us a glimpse of where and how Continental and analytic philosophy may again cross paths in the future.
{"title":"Cavell and the Quest for a Voice","authors":"Sofia Miguens","doi":"10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15173/JHAP.V9I9.4917","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I focus on Cavell’s theme of finding one’s voice, as it is articulated with reference to the philosophies of language of Wittgenstein and Austin. I start by spelling out Cavell’s Wittgensteinian-Austinian view of culture as the background for his approach to aesthetics and ethics. I then set out to explore the work done by the theme in aesthetics and ethics around the notion claim. I argue that Cavell’s effort to counter the pull of non-cognitivism in aesthetics and ethics, building on the notion claim, is not only illuminating of his unique way of inheriting the history of analytic philosophy but also gives us a glimpse of where and how Continental and analytic philosophy may again cross paths in the future.","PeriodicalId":36200,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42687474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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