The freak shows of the late 1800s and early 1900s, which traveled the nation exhibiting “human oddities” for profit, are regaining popularity as an underground form of entertainment. While some non-legal scholars have investigated the meaning of freak shows in American culture, little attention has been paid to the laws that regulate freak shows or the legal rights of freak show participants. This Article seeks to introduce legal discourse into the discussion of freak shows and, in the process, to comment on legal approaches to preventing discrimination against persons who are physically different. Drawing upon the theories and analysis of non-legal scholars and laws concerning employment of persons with disabilities, this Article examines statutes, ordinances, and case law that address freak shows. This Article argues that current laws and cases that address regulation and prohibition of freak shows are rendered ineffective because they fail to see beyond the fiction and drama of the freak show and instead adopt stigmatizing assumptions about persons with unusual bodies. The Article concludes that a better approach is to recognize that freak shows are a kind of theater subject to First Amendment protection. Courts should enforce anti-discrimination laws with the understanding that social assumptions, not physical conditions, are the root of discrimination against persons with unusual bodies.
{"title":"Dangerous Bodies: Freak Shows, Expression, and Exploitation","authors":"B. A. Fordham","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1604168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1604168","url":null,"abstract":"The freak shows of the late 1800s and early 1900s, which traveled the nation exhibiting “human oddities” for profit, are regaining popularity as an underground form of entertainment. While some non-legal scholars have investigated the meaning of freak shows in American culture, little attention has been paid to the laws that regulate freak shows or the legal rights of freak show participants. This Article seeks to introduce legal discourse into the discussion of freak shows and, in the process, to comment on legal approaches to preventing discrimination against persons who are physically different. Drawing upon the theories and analysis of non-legal scholars and laws concerning employment of persons with disabilities, this Article examines statutes, ordinances, and case law that address freak shows. This Article argues that current laws and cases that address regulation and prohibition of freak shows are rendered ineffective because they fail to see beyond the fiction and drama of the freak show and instead adopt stigmatizing assumptions about persons with unusual bodies. The Article concludes that a better approach is to recognize that freak shows are a kind of theater subject to First Amendment protection. Courts should enforce anti-discrimination laws with the understanding that social assumptions, not physical conditions, are the root of discrimination against persons with unusual bodies.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90157165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Musical Compositions Subject to Compulsory Licensing for Ringtones","authors":"Esq. Mario F. Gonzalez","doi":"10.5070/LR8121027068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/LR8121027068","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85217270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grasping for Air: Revised Article 9 and Intellectual Property in an Electronic World","authors":"Jennifer Sarnelli","doi":"10.5070/LR8111027057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/LR8111027057","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75523016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-09-22DOI: 10.1080/1473098042000275765
A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos
A connection between art and law is the focus of this article. This connection is based on their autopoietic, self-referential nature as described by Niklas Luhmann in his legal sociology and his treatise on art. Expectedly, the two systems have different behavioural patterns. While art takes a narcissistic pleasure in its self-referentiality and augments the paradox by reproducing itself and its structures as a conscious hyperreality, law is still tied up in its missionary role as an instrument for social justice and regards any insinuation to self-referentiality as an affront. While some basic but ultimately prosaic questions such as 'what is art?' and 'what is law?' will inevitably be posed, they will happily be left unanswered, not only for sanity's sake, but also for a specific methodological reason: the questions will be projected onto themselves in an attempt to locate the respective roles of the two systems - those of art and law. The result is an observation on whether there is indeed a need for an 'external', hallopoietic standpoint from which to exert critique and instigate social change, or whether the so-perceived 'offensiveness' of self-referentiality is a vehicle for unspectacular yet effective social amelioration.
{"title":"Beauty and the Beast: Art and Law in the Hall of Mirrors","authors":"A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos","doi":"10.1080/1473098042000275765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1473098042000275765","url":null,"abstract":"A connection between art and law is the focus of this article. This connection is based on their autopoietic, self-referential nature as described by Niklas Luhmann in his legal sociology and his treatise on art. Expectedly, the two systems have different behavioural patterns. While art takes a narcissistic pleasure in its self-referentiality and augments the paradox by reproducing itself and its structures as a conscious hyperreality, law is still tied up in its missionary role as an instrument for social justice and regards any insinuation to self-referentiality as an affront. While some basic but ultimately prosaic questions such as 'what is art?' and 'what is law?' will inevitably be posed, they will happily be left unanswered, not only for sanity's sake, but also for a specific methodological reason: the questions will be projected onto themselves in an attempt to locate the respective roles of the two systems - those of art and law. The result is an observation on whether there is indeed a need for an 'external', hallopoietic standpoint from which to exert critique and instigate social change, or whether the so-perceived 'offensiveness' of self-referentiality is a vehicle for unspectacular yet effective social amelioration.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"60 1","pages":"1-34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77199106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-09-22DOI: 10.1080/1473098042000275792
W. Vamplew
The Jockey Club, founded in 1752, has influenced racing for two centuries and controlled it by the consent of the racing industry since the 1870s. Despite legal challenges and public criticism of a self-perpetuating, private club governing a major British sport, it maintained its pre-eminent position until the 1990s. In 1993 it began to share power with the British Horseracing Board, though retaining the regulatory and disciplinary role. Failure to take full cognisance of human rights legislation, media publicity over corruption in the sport, and a conflict of interest via its ownership of racecourses led to proposals for a new, independent governing body.
{"title":"Reduced Horse Power: The Jockey Club and the Regulation of British Horseracing","authors":"W. Vamplew","doi":"10.1080/1473098042000275792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1473098042000275792","url":null,"abstract":"The Jockey Club, founded in 1752, has influenced racing for two centuries and controlled it by the consent of the racing industry since the 1870s. Despite legal challenges and public criticism of a self-perpetuating, private club governing a major British sport, it maintained its pre-eminent position until the 1990s. In 1993 it began to share power with the British Horseracing Board, though retaining the regulatory and disciplinary role. Failure to take full cognisance of human rights legislation, media publicity over corruption in the sport, and a conflict of interest via its ownership of racecourses led to proposals for a new, independent governing body.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"94-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73380470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-09-22DOI: 10.1080/1473098042000275783
E. Staurowsky
Since its passage in 1972, Title IX of the Education Amendments (44 Fed. Reg. at 71413) has, at times, provoked intense public interest and scrutiny when applied to federally funded, school-sponsored athletic programmes in the United States. In the year 2002, which marked the thirtieth anniversary of Title IX, the level and pace of the national debate on equity issues in athletics was again quite high. Within a contentious climate created by men’s sports advocates alleging that Title IX had been used to curtail or deny boys and young men equitable access to athletics, President George W. Bush charged the US Department of Education to appoint a commission to revisit longstanding and well-established enforcement guidelines, subjecting them to mass public comment and speculation. The purpose of this article is to examine the impact the appointment of the Commission on Opportunity on Athletics had on the national dialogue surrounding Title IX and its application to athletic programmes. The article concludes with an analysis of the political agenda behind the Commission’s work which was revealed in the tone and tenor of the Commission’s process and the final action taken by the Department of Education after the report of the Commission was issued.
自1972年通过以来，《教育修正案》第九条(44联邦法规)。(第71413条)在适用于美国联邦政府资助、学校赞助的体育项目时，有时会引起强烈的公众兴趣和审查。2002年是《教育法修正案第九条》颁布30周年，全国范围内关于体育公平问题的辩论的水平和速度再次相当高。在男子体育倡导者声称第九条被用来限制或剥夺男孩和年轻男性公平参加体育运动的机会所造成的争议气氛中，乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)总统责成美国教育部(Department of Education)任命一个委员会，重新审视长期以来建立良好的执行指南，并将其置于公众评论和猜测之中。本文的目的是研究任命体育机会委员会对围绕第九条及其在体育项目中的应用的全国对话的影响。文章最后分析了委员会工作背后的政治议程，这在委员会进程的基调和基调以及教育部在委员会报告发表后所采取的最后行动中得到了揭示。
{"title":"Title IX in its Third Decade: The Commission on Opportunity in Athletics","authors":"E. Staurowsky","doi":"10.1080/1473098042000275783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1473098042000275783","url":null,"abstract":"Since its passage in 1972, Title IX of the Education Amendments (44 Fed. Reg. at 71413) has, at times, provoked intense public interest and scrutiny when applied to federally funded, school-sponsored athletic programmes in the United States. In the year 2002, which marked the thirtieth anniversary of Title IX, the level and pace of the national debate on equity issues in athletics was again quite high. Within a contentious climate created by men’s sports advocates alleging that Title IX had been used to curtail or deny boys and young men equitable access to athletics, President George W. Bush charged the US Department of Education to appoint a commission to revisit longstanding and well-established enforcement guidelines, subjecting them to mass public comment and speculation. The purpose of this article is to examine the impact the appointment of the Commission on Opportunity on Athletics had on the national dialogue surrounding Title IX and its application to athletic programmes. The article concludes with an analysis of the political agenda behind the Commission’s work which was revealed in the tone and tenor of the Commission’s process and the final action taken by the Department of Education after the report of the Commission was issued.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"70-93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73275109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-09-22DOI: 10.1080/1473098042000275800
J. Spengler, D. Connaughton
The purpose of this research was to study legal cases which utilised the assumption of risk defence in sport and recreation lawsuits employing a quantitative approach. Assumption of risk has traditionally been an important defence in sport and recreation cases. Generally, those who voluntarily accept a known and appreciated risk when injured while participating in a recreational activity will be held to have assumed the inherent risks associated with participation in the activity. This study sought to identify selected case factors and outcomes in sport and recreation cases where the assumption of risk defence was raised. Published court decisions were selected, and key factors coded and statistically analysed. Variables of interest were categorised as plaintiff characteristics, governing law and situational variables. The variables were analysed using frequencies and cross-tabulation. The results revealed that assumption of risk was a successful defence for sport and recreation providers in the majority (63.8 per cent) of cases. Defendants were especially successful where the defendant was an individual (81.3 per cent), where a statute specific to the risks assumed in a sport or recreation activity applied (77.8 per cent), where the incident occurred in an outdoor remote setting (75.0 per cent), where warnings were provided (72.5 per cent), and where there was no supervision (71.8 per cent). Further research, using regression analysis to determine the variables that best predict case outcomes and to develop a better understanding of assumption of risk for those involved with the management of sport and recreation activities, is recommended.
{"title":"A Quantitative Approach to Assessing Legal Outcomes in Reported Sport and Recreation Negligence Cases Involving Assumption of Risk","authors":"J. Spengler, D. Connaughton","doi":"10.1080/1473098042000275800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1473098042000275800","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this research was to study legal cases which utilised the assumption of risk defence in sport and recreation lawsuits employing a quantitative approach. Assumption of risk has traditionally been an important defence in sport and recreation cases. Generally, those who voluntarily accept a known and appreciated risk when injured while participating in a recreational activity will be held to have assumed the inherent risks associated with participation in the activity. This study sought to identify selected case factors and outcomes in sport and recreation cases where the assumption of risk defence was raised. Published court decisions were selected, and key factors coded and statistically analysed. Variables of interest were categorised as plaintiff characteristics, governing law and situational variables. The variables were analysed using frequencies and cross-tabulation. The results revealed that assumption of risk was a successful defence for sport and recreation providers in the majority (63.8 per cent) of cases. Defendants were especially successful where the defendant was an individual (81.3 per cent), where a statute specific to the risks assumed in a sport or recreation activity applied (77.8 per cent), where the incident occurred in an outdoor remote setting (75.0 per cent), where warnings were provided (72.5 per cent), and where there was no supervision (71.8 per cent). Further research, using regression analysis to determine the variables that best predict case outcomes and to develop a better understanding of assumption of risk for those involved with the management of sport and recreation activities, is recommended.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"14 1","pages":"112-129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82102887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unlike the legal discourse in the United States, the relationship between copyright law and freedom of expression has not been directly discussed in English case law until recently, nor has it been discussed extensively in the literature. The article examines the relationship of copyright law and freedom of expression in the United Kingdom in light of Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., a case recently decided by the Court of Appeal. This claim, that there is some tension between the imperative of copyright law (thou shall not use another's expression, unless the use is fair) and the core of the right to freedom of expression, has been ignored for a variety of reasons. However, the recent enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, which came into force in October 2000, and its (partial) incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights, challenge this common wisdom. For the first time in English law, freedom of expression has gained an explicit status in the legal landscape. Consequently, Ashdown closely examined the relationship of copyright law and freedom of expression. The court concluded that, as a general rule, freedom of expression should have no impact on the regular course of copyright litigation. But it also observed that "...rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act...", and that "in these circumstances, ... the court is bound, ... to apply the [copyright] Act in a manner that accommodates the right of freedom of expression." This is a fascinating conclusion, especially in comparison to the consistent American judicial denial of any conflict between the two legal regimes. This article proposes a framework within which to examine the intriguing intersection of copyright law and freedom of expression. The analysis draws on the American experience and on a constitutional inquiry and proposes a framework within which to examine the intriguing intersection of copyright law and freedom of expression. The Ashdown case serves as a leading example. The author distinguishes between an internal conflict within copyright law and an external conflict, on the constitutional level, and argues that in interpreting copyright law both points of view should be taken. The article further attributes the denial of a conflict to the failure to separate the two points of view.
{"title":"Acknowledging the Conflict between Copyright Law and Freedom of Expression Under the Human Rights Act","authors":"Michael Birnhack","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.368961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.368961","url":null,"abstract":"Unlike the legal discourse in the United States, the relationship between copyright law and freedom of expression has not been directly discussed in English case law until recently, nor has it been discussed extensively in the literature. The article examines the relationship of copyright law and freedom of expression in the United Kingdom in light of Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., a case recently decided by the Court of Appeal. This claim, that there is some tension between the imperative of copyright law (thou shall not use another's expression, unless the use is fair) and the core of the right to freedom of expression, has been ignored for a variety of reasons. However, the recent enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, which came into force in October 2000, and its (partial) incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights, challenge this common wisdom. For the first time in English law, freedom of expression has gained an explicit status in the legal landscape. Consequently, Ashdown closely examined the relationship of copyright law and freedom of expression. The court concluded that, as a general rule, freedom of expression should have no impact on the regular course of copyright litigation. But it also observed that \"...rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act...\", and that \"in these circumstances, ... the court is bound, ... to apply the [copyright] Act in a manner that accommodates the right of freedom of expression.\" This is a fascinating conclusion, especially in comparison to the consistent American judicial denial of any conflict between the two legal regimes. This article proposes a framework within which to examine the intriguing intersection of copyright law and freedom of expression. The analysis draws on the American experience and on a constitutional inquiry and proposes a framework within which to examine the intriguing intersection of copyright law and freedom of expression. The Ashdown case serves as a leading example. The author distinguishes between an internal conflict within copyright law and an external conflict, on the constitutional level, and argues that in interpreting copyright law both points of view should be taken. The article further attributes the denial of a conflict to the failure to separate the two points of view.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82137758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-09-22DOI: 10.1080/14730980210001730511
Dominic Free
The High Court judgment in Beckingham v. Hodgens , delivered in July but as yet unreported, revisits the issue of the backing musician’s entitlement to a share of the copyright in a song on which he has played. The decision seems to put the law in this area back on the right path, from which it had strayed in Hadley & Others v. Kemp (the Spandau Ballet case) [1999] EMLR 589. It also demonstrates the continuing divergence between conventions in the music industry and the law in relation to music copyright.
今年7月，高等法院在“贝克汉姆诉霍金斯案”(Beckingham v. Hodgens)一案中作出了判决，但尚未报道。该判决重新审视了伴唱音乐家对自己演奏过的歌曲享有版权分成的问题。这一决定似乎使这一领域的法律回到了正确的道路上，而在哈德利等人诉肯普案(Spandau Ballet案)[1999]EMLR 589中，法律已经偏离了这一道路。它还表明，在音乐产业的惯例和有关音乐版权的法律之间的持续分歧。
{"title":"Beckingham v. Hodgens: The session musician's claim to music copyright","authors":"Dominic Free","doi":"10.1080/14730980210001730511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14730980210001730511","url":null,"abstract":"The High Court judgment in Beckingham v. Hodgens , delivered in July but as yet unreported, revisits the issue of the backing musician’s entitlement to a share of the copyright in a song on which he has played. The decision seems to put the law in this area back on the right path, from which it had strayed in Hadley & Others v. Kemp (the Spandau Ballet case) [1999] EMLR 589. It also demonstrates the continuing divergence between conventions in the music industry and the law in relation to music copyright.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"29 1","pages":"93-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78364715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-09-22DOI: 10.1080/14730980210001730481
David Fraser, Kathryn Mcmahon
Sport and broadcasting appear to enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Similarly, sport seems to play a central role in many current understandings of national identity. In this article, we explore some of the ways in which the legal regulation of sport broadcasting is often couched in terms of the protection of an essential, yet ill-defined, national interest. We offer a series of critiques of the competing interests at stake under such regulatory regimes - market power and competition, legally entrenched preferences for certain broadcast technologies, democracy and the construction of national identity. Through a critical and comparative analysis of the legal system of anti-siphoning and anti-hoarding legislation in effect in Australia, we attempt to highlight the confused and confusing state of broadcasting regulation there and in other jurisdictions in relation to access to key sporting events on television.
{"title":"When too much sport is barely enough: Broadcasting regulation and national identity","authors":"David Fraser, Kathryn Mcmahon","doi":"10.1080/14730980210001730481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14730980210001730481","url":null,"abstract":"Sport and broadcasting appear to enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Similarly, sport seems to play a central role in many current understandings of national identity. In this article, we explore some of the ways in which the legal regulation of sport broadcasting is often couched in terms of the protection of an essential, yet ill-defined, national interest. We offer a series of critiques of the competing interests at stake under such regulatory regimes - market power and competition, legally entrenched preferences for certain broadcast technologies, democracy and the construction of national identity. Through a critical and comparative analysis of the legal system of anti-siphoning and anti-hoarding legislation in effect in Australia, we attempt to highlight the confused and confusing state of broadcasting regulation there and in other jurisdictions in relation to access to key sporting events on television.","PeriodicalId":36418,"journal":{"name":"Interactive Entertainment Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"1-52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86648448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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