From 1994–1998 to 2014–2018, the proportion of U.S. workers employed by state and local governments fell from 13.1 percent to 11.8 percent, but the number of state and local government employees rose from 16.8 million to 17.7 million. The number of state and local government employees in jobs not covered by Social Security increased from 4.2 million to 4.7 million. This increase suggests rising future Social Security Administration workloads to administer the Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset.
{"title":"Trends in Noncovered Employment and Earnings Among Employees of State and Local Governments, 1994 to 2018","authors":"P. Purcell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3908029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3908029","url":null,"abstract":"From 1994–1998 to 2014–2018, the proportion of U.S. workers employed by state and local governments fell from 13.1 percent to 11.8 percent, but the number of state and local government employees rose from 16.8 million to 17.7 million. The number of state and local government employees in jobs not covered by Social Security increased from 4.2 million to 4.7 million. This increase suggests rising future Social Security Administration workloads to administer the Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset.","PeriodicalId":366379,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Pension Coverage (Sub-Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116579726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past couple of decades, Americans have been seeking to work to older ages. The current COVID-19 recession notwithstanding, a long-term trend toward later retirement has sharply increased the labor force participation rate among older individuals. However, working to older ages requires more than a willingness on the part of workers; it requires employers to hire them on terms that are worthwhile. While employers often say they are open to employing older workers, evidence of discrimination in audit studies suggests reason to worry. One question is: Owhat jobs do employers really want older workers to do?O To answer this question, this brief, based on a recent paper, examines a sample of job postings from RetirementJobs.com, a national website that targets older workers. In addition to exploring the characteristics, location, and compensation of these postings, the analysis compares them to two other data sources on job openings: 1) the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), the federal governmentOs definitive source of aggregate statistics on job openings; and 2) a large general jobs board for workers of all ages. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section introduces RetirementJobs.com. Twenty percent of its listings are Odirect postingsO by employers aiming explicitly at older workers and 80 percent are cross-listings from CareerBuilder.com, which suggest employer willingness to hire older, as well as younger, workers. The second section reports on the characteristics of the jobs on RetirementJobs.com, and the third section compares the geographic dispersion of the jobs with those in the JOLTS and the characteristics of the jobs with a sample from the general jobs board. The results, at first blush, suggest reason for optimism. While the jobs posted on RetirementJobs.com represent a small fraction of job openings nationally, they nevertheless show the same geographic dispersion as jobs aimed at all age groups, cover a broad swath of occupations, and are likely to be full-time. They also offer higher wages than the postings on the general jobs board, although fewer of them mention health or retirement benefits. A somewhat less positive picture emerges when looking only at the direct postings specifically targeted to older workers. These postings tend to have substantially lower average wages than those aimed at a general audience and are even less likely to mention health or retirement benefits.
{"title":"What Jobs Do Employers Want Older Workers to Do?","authors":"A. Munnell, Gal Wettstein, Abigail N. Walters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3638576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3638576","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past couple of decades, Americans have been seeking to work to older ages. The current COVID-19 recession notwithstanding, a long-term trend toward later retirement has sharply increased the labor force participation rate among older individuals. However, working to older ages requires more than a willingness on the part of workers; it requires employers to hire them on terms that are worthwhile. While employers often say they are open to employing older workers, evidence of discrimination in audit studies suggests reason to worry. One question is: Owhat jobs do employers really want older workers to do?O To answer this question, this brief, based on a recent paper, examines a sample of job postings from RetirementJobs.com, a national website that targets older workers. In addition to exploring the characteristics, location, and compensation of these postings, the analysis compares them to two other data sources on job openings: 1) the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), the federal governmentOs definitive source of aggregate statistics on job openings; and 2) a large general jobs board for workers of all ages. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section introduces RetirementJobs.com. Twenty percent of its listings are Odirect postingsO by employers aiming explicitly at older workers and 80 percent are cross-listings from CareerBuilder.com, which suggest employer willingness to hire older, as well as younger, workers. The second section reports on the characteristics of the jobs on RetirementJobs.com, and the third section compares the geographic dispersion of the jobs with those in the JOLTS and the characteristics of the jobs with a sample from the general jobs board. The results, at first blush, suggest reason for optimism. While the jobs posted on RetirementJobs.com represent a small fraction of job openings nationally, they nevertheless show the same geographic dispersion as jobs aimed at all age groups, cover a broad swath of occupations, and are likely to be full-time. They also offer higher wages than the postings on the general jobs board, although fewer of them mention health or retirement benefits. A somewhat less positive picture emerges when looking only at the direct postings specifically targeted to older workers. These postings tend to have substantially lower average wages than those aimed at a general audience and are even less likely to mention health or retirement benefits.","PeriodicalId":366379,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Pension Coverage (Sub-Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125606334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Issue Brief uses EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM) to simulate the likely impact on retirement income adequacy of three of the Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act of 2019’s (SECURE Act’s) most important provisions:
Widening access to multiple employer plans (MEPs) through open MEPs.
Increasing the cap under which plan sponsors can automatically enroll workers in “safe harbor” retirement plans, from 10 percent of wages to 15 percent.
Covering long-term part-time employees.
The impact was measured with three different output metrics:
Retirement savings shortfalls give the present value of the simulated retirement deficits at retirement age (in 2019 dollars).
Retirement savings surpluses give the present value of simulated retirement surpluses at retirement age (in 2019 dollars).
Net retirement savings surpluses give the present value of simulated retirement surpluses less retirement deficits at retirement age (in 2019 dollars).
Given the lack of information currently available on likely take-up rates for open MEPs by small employers that do not currently offer a retirement plan, sensitivity analysis was performed utilizing a wide array of assumed take-up rates:
7.3 percent.
Baseline: 30–31 percent (depending on plan size).
66 percent.
100 percent.
In addition, the actual plan type of the open MEP was simulated three different ways:
Automatic enrollment (assuming a 90 percent participation rate).
Voluntary enrollment (assuming a 60 percent participation rate).
Baseline: A blended rate (assuming a 75 percent participation rate).
Together, the baseline adoption and non-participation scenarios form the baseline case scenario.
Overall Reductions in Retirement Savings Shortfalls From Open MEPs: Total Impact Aggregated Across All Age Cohorts
With adoption of open MEPs at approximately one-third and a non-participation rate of zero (everyone who is eligible chooses to participate), there is an overall 1.8 percent reduction in retirement savings deficit. One would assume that younger age cohorts would experience a larger impact from open MEPs given the longer time for which they may potentially benefit from the increased coverage. Indeed, this is what we find. Overall there is a 3.2 percent reduction in retirement deficit for those ages 35–39.
In the baseline case scenario there is approximately a one-third adoption rate and 25 percent non-participation: The reduction in retirement savings deficit is now 1.4 percent overall and 2.4 percent for those ages 35–39.
Impact of the Increased Cap on Contribution Escalation on the Baseline Case Scenario
The SECURE Act contains a provision that increases the cap on automatic contribution escalation within the 401(k) non-discrimination testing safe harbor from 10 to 15 percent of pay. Also taking into account the increase
{"title":"How Much More Secure does the SECURE Act make American Workers: Evidence from EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model®","authors":"Jack L. VanDerhei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3548207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3548207","url":null,"abstract":"This Issue Brief uses EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM) to simulate the likely impact on retirement income adequacy of three of the Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act of 2019’s (SECURE Act’s) most important provisions: <br><br>Widening access to multiple employer plans (MEPs) through open MEPs.<br><br>Increasing the cap under which plan sponsors can automatically enroll workers in “safe harbor” retirement plans, from 10 percent of wages to 15 percent.<br><br>Covering long-term part-time employees.<br><br>The impact was measured with three different output metrics:<br><br>Retirement savings shortfalls give the present value of the simulated retirement deficits at retirement age (in 2019 dollars).<br><br>Retirement savings surpluses give the present value of simulated retirement surpluses at retirement age (in 2019 dollars).<br><br>Net retirement savings surpluses give the present value of simulated retirement surpluses less retirement deficits at retirement age (in 2019 dollars).<br><br>Given the lack of information currently available on likely take-up rates for open MEPs by small employers that do not currently offer a retirement plan, sensitivity analysis was performed utilizing a wide array of assumed take-up rates:<br><br>7.3 percent.<br><br>Baseline: 30–31 percent (depending on plan size).<br><br>66 percent.<br><br>100 percent.<br><br>In addition, the actual plan type of the open MEP was simulated three different ways:<br><br>Automatic enrollment (assuming a 90 percent participation rate).<br><br>Voluntary enrollment (assuming a 60 percent participation rate).<br><br>Baseline: A blended rate (assuming a 75 percent participation rate).<br><br>Together, the baseline adoption and non-participation scenarios form the baseline case scenario.<br><br>Overall Reductions in Retirement Savings Shortfalls From Open MEPs: Total Impact Aggregated Across All Age Cohorts<br><br>With adoption of open MEPs at approximately one-third and a non-participation rate of zero (everyone who is eligible chooses to participate), there is an overall 1.8 percent reduction in retirement savings deficit. One would assume that younger age cohorts would experience a larger impact from open MEPs given the longer time for which they may potentially benefit from the increased coverage. Indeed, this is what we find. Overall there is a 3.2 percent reduction in retirement deficit for those ages 35–39.<br><br>In the baseline case scenario there is approximately a one-third adoption rate and 25 percent non-participation: The reduction in retirement savings deficit is now 1.4 percent overall and 2.4 percent for those ages 35–39.<br><br>Impact of the Increased Cap on Contribution Escalation on the Baseline Case Scenario<br><br>The SECURE Act contains a provision that increases the cap on automatic contribution escalation within the 401(k) non-discrimination testing safe harbor from 10 to 15 percent of pay. Also taking into account the increase","PeriodicalId":366379,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Pension Coverage (Sub-Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133544133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines whether pension cuts affecting current public employees encourage mid-career teachers and civil servants to separate from their employers. The analysis takes advantage of a 2005 reform to the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI) that dramatically reduced the generosity of benefits for current workers. Importantly, the cuts applied only to ERSRI members who had not vested by June 30, 2005. Vested ERSRI members and municipal government employees in Rhode Island were unaffected. This sharp difference in benefit generosity permits a triple-differences research design in which non-vested ERSRI members are compared, before and after the reform, to vested members and to all members of the Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island. The results show that the pension cut caused a 2.4-percentage-point increase in the rate of separation, implying an elasticity of labor supply with respect to pension benefits of around 0.25. Rhode Island teachers were significantly less responsive to the benefit cut than other occupations, in line with an existing literature on teacher labor supply, suggesting that the results from that literature may not generalize to the broader workforce.
{"title":"Do Pension Cuts for Current Employees Increase Separation?","authors":"Laura D. Quinby, Gal Wettstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3320704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3320704","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether pension cuts affecting current public employees encourage mid-career teachers and civil servants to separate from their employers. The analysis takes advantage of a 2005 reform to the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI) that dramatically reduced the generosity of benefits for current workers. Importantly, the cuts applied only to ERSRI members who had not vested by June 30, 2005. Vested ERSRI members and municipal government employees in Rhode Island were unaffected. This sharp difference in benefit generosity permits a triple-differences research design in which non-vested ERSRI members are compared, before and after the reform, to vested members and to all members of the Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island. The results show that the pension cut caused a 2.4-percentage-point increase in the rate of separation, implying an elasticity of labor supply with respect to pension benefits of around 0.25. Rhode Island teachers were significantly less responsive to the benefit cut than other occupations, in line with an existing literature on teacher labor supply, suggesting that the results from that literature may not generalize to the broader workforce.","PeriodicalId":366379,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Pension Coverage (Sub-Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114719820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ottawa provides its employees with defined-benefit pensions that promise relatively generous benefits to a large current and former workforce. Being largely unfunded, these plans require future taxpayer support. They also create taxpayer risk because the economic value of the benefits they will provide can fluctuate by tens of billions of dollars annually. Current accounting practices understate this burden and the risks these plans create for taxpayers and, potentially, for the employees themselves. Official figures on the current cost of these plans and their accumulated obligations are based on notional interest rates that are too high for this kind of commitment. Since pension promises are guaranteed by taxpayers and indexed to inflation, the appropriate rate for discounting the value of future payments should be the yield on federal-government real-return bonds (RRB), which for years has been much lower than the assumed rate in official figures. Correcting this distortion would produce a fair-value estimate of $245.9 billion for Ottawa's unfunded pension liability at the end of 2016/17 – around $27,000 per family of four and $96 billion higher than the reported number. Because the unfunded pension liability is part of Ottawa’s debt, applying this fair-value adjustment raises the net public debt from the $631.9 billion reported at the end 2016/17 to an adjusted $727.9 billion. Recent federal pension reforms raised participants’ share of the funding costs for these plans: for the main Public Service Plan, the reforms aimed at a 50:50 split between contributions from participants and contributions from the government as employer. Still, using notional interest rates that are higher than the appropriate ones means that the reported costs of these plans – and, therefore, the contribution rates that determine participants’ shares – are too low. Even the higher employee contributions anticipated by the reforms would leave the taxpayers’ true share far above 50 percent. A fair-value approach to the current service cost would ensure that participants and taxpayers share equally the actual cost of accruing benefits. Even 50:50 sharing of federal pensions’ actual costs as they accrue would leave taxpayers exposed to fluctuations in the value of previously earned benefits. Ottawa could protect taxpayers from this risk by capping employer contributions at a fixed share of pensionable pay. To relieve taxpayers of their current sole responsibility for risks in the federal plans, Ottawa would need to switch to a different type of plan with benefits based not only on salary and years of service but also on the plans’ funded status. Such plans, already common in much of the provincial public sector, have a variety of labels – shared-risk and target-benefit are two common ones. Their common feature is that when things do not go as expected, the plan sponsor and the employees share the costs and benefits of the new reality. More economically meaningful reportin
{"title":"Retiring Employees, Unretired Debt: The Surprising Hidden Cost of Federal Employee Pensions","authors":"W. Robson, A. Laurin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3188955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3188955","url":null,"abstract":"Ottawa provides its employees with defined-benefit pensions that promise relatively generous benefits to a large current and former workforce. Being largely unfunded, these plans require future taxpayer support. They also create taxpayer risk because the economic value of the benefits they will provide can fluctuate by tens of billions of dollars annually. Current accounting practices understate this burden and the risks these plans create for taxpayers and, potentially, for the employees themselves. Official figures on the current cost of these plans and their accumulated obligations are based on notional interest rates that are too high for this kind of commitment. Since pension promises are guaranteed by taxpayers and indexed to inflation, the appropriate rate for discounting the value of future payments should be the yield on federal-government real-return bonds (RRB), which for years has been much lower than the assumed rate in official figures. Correcting this distortion would produce a fair-value estimate of $245.9 billion for Ottawa's unfunded pension liability at the end of 2016/17 – around $27,000 per family of four and $96 billion higher than the reported number. Because the unfunded pension liability is part of Ottawa’s debt, applying this fair-value adjustment raises the net public debt from the $631.9 billion reported at the end 2016/17 to an adjusted $727.9 billion. Recent federal pension reforms raised participants’ share of the funding costs for these plans: for the main Public Service Plan, the reforms aimed at a 50:50 split between contributions from participants and contributions from the government as employer. Still, using notional interest rates that are higher than the appropriate ones means that the reported costs of these plans – and, therefore, the contribution rates that determine participants’ shares – are too low. Even the higher employee contributions anticipated by the reforms would leave the taxpayers’ true share far above 50 percent. A fair-value approach to the current service cost would ensure that participants and taxpayers share equally the actual cost of accruing benefits. Even 50:50 sharing of federal pensions’ actual costs as they accrue would leave taxpayers exposed to fluctuations in the value of previously earned benefits. Ottawa could protect taxpayers from this risk by capping employer contributions at a fixed share of pensionable pay. To relieve taxpayers of their current sole responsibility for risks in the federal plans, Ottawa would need to switch to a different type of plan with benefits based not only on salary and years of service but also on the plans’ funded status. Such plans, already common in much of the provincial public sector, have a variety of labels – shared-risk and target-benefit are two common ones. Their common feature is that when things do not go as expected, the plan sponsor and the employees share the costs and benefits of the new reality. More economically meaningful reportin","PeriodicalId":366379,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Pension Coverage (Sub-Topic)","volume":"16 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132640735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to provide "insurance guarantees" for qualified pension plans insufficiently funded to provide accrued vested benefits. The PBGC’s annual reports on the liabilities for plans it has taken over and the agency’s assets show that the Single Employer Program has seen this "net position" vary from a surplus of almost $10 billion in 2000, to a deficit of over $29 billion in 2012. The PBGC uses a proprietary Pension Insurance Modeling System to model future scenarios for their obligations. This paper offers observations on future pension plan funding and how this could affect the PIMS model, based on the current environment, and how the agency might respond to change.
{"title":"An Actuarial Perspective on Pension Plan Funding","authors":"Donald J. Segal","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2337142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2337142","url":null,"abstract":"The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to provide \"insurance guarantees\" for qualified pension plans insufficiently funded to provide accrued vested benefits. The PBGC’s annual reports on the liabilities for plans it has taken over and the agency’s assets show that the Single Employer Program has seen this \"net position\" vary from a surplus of almost $10 billion in 2000, to a deficit of over $29 billion in 2012. The PBGC uses a proprietary Pension Insurance Modeling System to model future scenarios for their obligations. This paper offers observations on future pension plan funding and how this could affect the PIMS model, based on the current environment, and how the agency might respond to change.","PeriodicalId":366379,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Pension Coverage (Sub-Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131552692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pension plans operated by state governments on behalf of their employees are underfunded by an estimated $452 billion according to official reports,1 with total liabilities of $2.8 trillion and total assets of $2.3 trillion in 2008. However, many economists argue that even these daunting liabilities are understated. Current public sector accounting methods allow plans to assume they can earn highv investment returns without any risk. Using methods that are required for private sector pensions, which value pension liabilities according to likelihood of payment rather than the return expected on pension assets, total liabilities amount to $5.2 trillion and the unfunded liability rises to $3 trillion. The ability of governments to pay for the retirement benefits promised to public sector workers runs up against the reality of limited resources.
{"title":"The Crisis in Public Sector Pension Plans: A Blueprint for Reform in New Jersey","authors":"Eileen Norcross, Andrew G. Biggs","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1991367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1991367","url":null,"abstract":"Pension plans operated by state governments on behalf of their employees are underfunded by an estimated $452 billion according to official reports,1 with total liabilities of $2.8 trillion and total assets of $2.3 trillion in 2008. However, many economists argue that even these daunting liabilities are understated. Current public sector accounting methods allow plans to assume they can earn highv investment returns without any risk. Using methods that are required for private sector pensions, which value pension liabilities according to likelihood of payment rather than the return expected on pension assets, total liabilities amount to $5.2 trillion and the unfunded liability rises to $3 trillion. The ability of governments to pay for the retirement benefits promised to public sector workers runs up against the reality of limited resources.","PeriodicalId":366379,"journal":{"name":"SIRN: Pension Coverage (Sub-Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124569965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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