Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800203
Jeroen K. Joly, J. Hofmans
Political leaders need to stay informed about their constituents’ needs and the pros and cons of any course of action. Reviewing information from a variety of sources would be expected to result in decisions that best serve those constituents. In a study involving 269 Belgian politicians, we examined whether the information sources they used differed according to individuals’ position in the political hierarchy or their personality. We found that both factors could predict a politician's consultation of certain sources over others. Notably, elite political leaders (those with the most power and status) turned significantly more to sources produced by politically neutral groups (such as civil services or scientific institutions) than did politicians known as “backbenchers,” who have less clout. We document several such patterns and argue that these tendencies are problematic. Political parties and government entities interested in good governance should provide training to teach politicians and their staffs to explore varied perspectives.
{"title":"Hierarchy position & personality predict politicians’ choice of information sources","authors":"Jeroen K. Joly, J. Hofmans","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800203","url":null,"abstract":"Political leaders need to stay informed about their constituents’ needs and the pros and cons of any course of action. Reviewing information from a variety of sources would be expected to result in decisions that best serve those constituents. In a study involving 269 Belgian politicians, we examined whether the information sources they used differed according to individuals’ position in the political hierarchy or their personality. We found that both factors could predict a politician's consultation of certain sources over others. Notably, elite political leaders (those with the most power and status) turned significantly more to sources produced by politically neutral groups (such as civil services or scientific institutions) than did politicians known as “backbenchers,” who have less clout. We document several such patterns and argue that these tendencies are problematic. Political parties and government entities interested in good governance should provide training to teach politicians and their staffs to explore varied perspectives.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"15 - 25"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42604761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800202
Aditya Kotak, D. Moore
Election polls in the United States are more confident than accurate-meaning the reported margins of error often do not encompass the actual election outcomes in spite of pollsters claiming a 95% confidence level (that is, a 95% chance that their predictions will fall within the margin of error). In an analysis of polls for more than 6,000 contests, we have found that the actual vote total for a given candidate fell within the 95% confidence interval for just 60% of the polls. This degree of accuracy was reached only when the polls were conducted in the week before an election; accuracy was worse for polls conducted earlier. Polls would, in fact, need margins of error at least twice their current standard reported width to achieve 95% accuracy. We have also found that when laypeople read about poll results, they tend to overestimate the poll's accuracy, even when they have historical data demonstrating that the predictions made by polls are often inaccurate. These results illustrate polls’ vulnerability to overconfidence and the limitations of the lay public's understanding of these shortcomings. We conclude by suggesting ways that pollsters and reporters could enable the public to interpret poll data more realistically.
{"title":"Election polls are 95% confident but only 60% accurate","authors":"Aditya Kotak, D. Moore","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800202","url":null,"abstract":"Election polls in the United States are more confident than accurate-meaning the reported margins of error often do not encompass the actual election outcomes in spite of pollsters claiming a 95% confidence level (that is, a 95% chance that their predictions will fall within the margin of error). In an analysis of polls for more than 6,000 contests, we have found that the actual vote total for a given candidate fell within the 95% confidence interval for just 60% of the polls. This degree of accuracy was reached only when the polls were conducted in the week before an election; accuracy was worse for polls conducted earlier. Polls would, in fact, need margins of error at least twice their current standard reported width to achieve 95% accuracy. We have also found that when laypeople read about poll results, they tend to overestimate the poll's accuracy, even when they have historical data demonstrating that the predictions made by polls are often inaccurate. These results illustrate polls’ vulnerability to overconfidence and the limitations of the lay public's understanding of these shortcomings. We conclude by suggesting ways that pollsters and reporters could enable the public to interpret poll data more realistically.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"1 - 12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44384730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800205
J. McDonald, Jaclyn S. Piatak
Although women are increasingly represented in elected office, little is known about how a female candidate's gender influences voter approval when her messaging emphasizes her strong leadership ability—a character trait generally regarded as masculine. Drawing from theories of social cognition and gender stereotypes, we examine in this article how citizens react to male and female politicians who emphasize particular character traits. After synthesizing relevant literature, we report on a study conducted to see whether women lose public support for emphasizing their leadership ability—thus “going against type.” In a survey of more than 800 American adults, we found that respondents penalized a fictional woman running for Congress when her messaging to voters emphasized the core character trait of leadership, as opposed to compassion (a trait traditionally associated with women) or no character trait at all. In contrast, respondents viewed a fictional man more favorably when his messaging to voters went against type by highlighting compassion than when he emphasized leadership. These findings suggest that female candidates have fewer options than men do when selecting which personal characteristics to present in their messaging to gain the approval of the voting public. This result underscores the need for policies and programs that promote female leadership in all walks of life, thereby leading the public to associate leadership skill with both genders equally.
{"title":"Penalties for Going Against Type: How Sexism Shapes Voters’ Perceptions of Candidate Character","authors":"J. McDonald, Jaclyn S. Piatak","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800205","url":null,"abstract":"Although women are increasingly represented in elected office, little is known about how a female candidate's gender influences voter approval when her messaging emphasizes her strong leadership ability—a character trait generally regarded as masculine. Drawing from theories of social cognition and gender stereotypes, we examine in this article how citizens react to male and female politicians who emphasize particular character traits. After synthesizing relevant literature, we report on a study conducted to see whether women lose public support for emphasizing their leadership ability—thus “going against type.” In a survey of more than 800 American adults, we found that respondents penalized a fictional woman running for Congress when her messaging to voters emphasized the core character trait of leadership, as opposed to compassion (a trait traditionally associated with women) or no character trait at all. In contrast, respondents viewed a fictional man more favorably when his messaging to voters went against type by highlighting compassion than when he emphasized leadership. These findings suggest that female candidates have fewer options than men do when selecting which personal characteristics to present in their messaging to gain the approval of the voting public. This result underscores the need for policies and programs that promote female leadership in all walks of life, thereby leading the public to associate leadership skill with both genders equally.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"47 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46388976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800201
Russell S. Hassan
With the rise of identity politics and the election of populist political leaders in the United States and Europe, scholars of leadership, public affairs, and behavioral science have become increasingly interested in learning why voters elect leaders who may not be well suited for political office and how to address the problem. The articles in this issue of Behavioral Science & Policy focus on political leadership and contend with these timely and important questions. The authors are a diverse of group scholars trained in leadership, political science, public administration, and social psychology.
{"title":"Editor's note","authors":"Russell S. Hassan","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800201","url":null,"abstract":"With the rise of identity politics and the election of populist political leaders in the United States and Europe, scholars of leadership, public affairs, and behavioral science have become increasingly interested in learning why voters elect leaders who may not be well suited for political office and how to address the problem. The articles in this issue of Behavioral Science & Policy focus on political leadership and contend with these timely and important questions. The authors are a diverse of group scholars trained in leadership, political science, public administration, and social psychology.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"2 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42738398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800206
D. Moore, M. Bazerman
Expressions of confidence can give leaders credibility. In the political realm, they can earn votes and public approval for decisions made in office. Such support is justified when the confidence displayed is truly a sign that a leader (whether a candidate or an incumbent) is competent. However, when politicians are overconfident, the result can be the election of incompetent leaders and the adoption of misguided policies. In this article, we discuss processes that can lead to a confidence “arms race” that encourages politicians to display more confidence than their rivals do. We also illustrate how overconfidence and hyperbole have impaired responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in many nations and offer guidance for distinguishing politicians who display levels of confidence that reflect their true assessment of a situation from those who fake their self-assurance. We then suggest ways that leaders in all spheres can convey uncertainty honestly without losing credibility, and we propose a way to prevent overconfidence from resulting in ineffective or counterproductive legislation.
{"title":"Leadership & overconfidence","authors":"D. Moore, M. Bazerman","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800206","url":null,"abstract":"Expressions of confidence can give leaders credibility. In the political realm, they can earn votes and public approval for decisions made in office. Such support is justified when the confidence displayed is truly a sign that a leader (whether a candidate or an incumbent) is competent. However, when politicians are overconfident, the result can be the election of incompetent leaders and the adoption of misguided policies. In this article, we discuss processes that can lead to a confidence “arms race” that encourages politicians to display more confidence than their rivals do. We also illustrate how overconfidence and hyperbole have impaired responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in many nations and offer guidance for distinguishing politicians who display levels of confidence that reflect their true assessment of a situation from those who fake their self-assurance. We then suggest ways that leaders in all spheres can convey uncertainty honestly without losing credibility, and we propose a way to prevent overconfidence from resulting in ineffective or counterproductive legislation.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"59 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46722830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800204
Meng Li, David R. Glerum
In democracies, the public may assume that people elected to public office are qualified and suited for that office. However, history has demonstrated that this perception can be incorrect. One reason that unqualified individuals win elections is that voters do not always make logical or rational choices. Instead, they often rely on mental shortcuts called heuristics to make snap judgments about which candidate would do the best job. Unfortunately, these snap judgments can be inaccurate. In this article, we summarize heuristics commonly used by voters. These heuristics are often activated by candidate attributes such as appearance, age, ethnicity, and other characteristics that are not related to leadership potential. We also propose policy solutions to reduce the chance of incompetent leaders being elected. These policy solutions address the problem through two main strategies: increasing the number of candidates who have the proper qualifications and encouraging voters to evaluate candidates more deeply and deliberately. We suggest four ways to implement these strategies.
{"title":"Improving election outcomes through a better understanding of heuristic evaluation of candidates","authors":"Meng Li, David R. Glerum","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800204","url":null,"abstract":"In democracies, the public may assume that people elected to public office are qualified and suited for that office. However, history has demonstrated that this perception can be incorrect. One reason that unqualified individuals win elections is that voters do not always make logical or rational choices. Instead, they often rely on mental shortcuts called heuristics to make snap judgments about which candidate would do the best job. Unfortunately, these snap judgments can be inaccurate. In this article, we summarize heuristics commonly used by voters. These heuristics are often activated by candidate attributes such as appearance, age, ethnicity, and other characteristics that are not related to leadership potential. We also propose policy solutions to reduce the chance of incompetent leaders being elected. These policy solutions address the problem through two main strategies: increasing the number of candidates who have the proper qualifications and encouraging voters to evaluate candidates more deeply and deliberately. We suggest four ways to implement these strategies.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"27 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47100346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800106
Elizabeth Hood, J. Bartunek
When managers and other leaders of organizational change (change agents) introduce and implement major changes, responses from other members of the organization can fall along both passive-active and positive-negative dimensions. Change agents usually treat positive (approving) responses as good and negative (disapproving) responses as bad. They often ignore the passive-active dimension—that is, the degree of energy with which organizational members affected by change (change recipients) respond to the initiative. We suggest that change agents instead focus more on this passive-active dimension and work to elicit active responses to change even when these responses are negative, because active responses can lead to valuable improvements in the initiative. We provide three recommendations for assisting organizational leaders in encouraging and learning from the active feedback of change recipients.
{"title":"Encouraging employees’ active feedback & participation when rolling out major changes","authors":"Elizabeth Hood, J. Bartunek","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800106","url":null,"abstract":"When managers and other leaders of organizational change (change agents) introduce and implement major changes, responses from other members of the organization can fall along both passive-active and positive-negative dimensions. Change agents usually treat positive (approving) responses as good and negative (disapproving) responses as bad. They often ignore the passive-active dimension—that is, the degree of energy with which organizational members affected by change (change recipients) respond to the initiative. We suggest that change agents instead focus more on this passive-active dimension and work to elicit active responses to change even when these responses are negative, because active responses can lead to valuable improvements in the initiative. We provide three recommendations for assisting organizational leaders in encouraging and learning from the active feedback of change recipients.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"47 - 58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44473129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800102
J. Beshears, Richard T. Mason, S. Benartzi
We have developed a model for setting a default when a population is choosing among ordered choices—that is, ones listed in ascending or descending order. A company, for instance, might want to set a default contribution rate that will increase employees’ average contributions to a retirement savings plan. A key input of the model is the distribution of latent options—the percentages of a population that select each available choice in the absence of a preset default. The model treats the default as an attraction point that causes some people to shift from their latent preference toward the default. It specifies the strength of each possible default's pull on each latent option and thereby points policymakers to the default most likely to achieve a desired aim. We tested our model using data from field experiments relating to retirement savings. In addition to presenting the results, which support the model's validity, we discuss how the model relates to prior empirical evidence on defaults.
{"title":"How to choose a default","authors":"J. Beshears, Richard T. Mason, S. Benartzi","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800102","url":null,"abstract":"We have developed a model for setting a default when a population is choosing among ordered choices—that is, ones listed in ascending or descending order. A company, for instance, might want to set a default contribution rate that will increase employees’ average contributions to a retirement savings plan. A key input of the model is the distribution of latent options—the percentages of a population that select each available choice in the absence of a preset default. The model treats the default as an attraction point that causes some people to shift from their latent preference toward the default. It specifies the strength of each possible default's pull on each latent option and thereby points policymakers to the default most likely to achieve a desired aim. We tested our model using data from field experiments relating to retirement savings. In addition to presenting the results, which support the model's validity, we discuss how the model relates to prior empirical evidence on defaults.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"1 - 15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47728020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800105
I. Ritov, Stephen M. Garcia
The COVID-19 crisis has raised a dire dilemma among medical professionals. Faced with a shortage of critical equipment and supplies, how do hospital administrators and physicians determine whether to divert resources from one patient to another? Most decision-makers will prioritize saving younger patients over older ones, because older patients generally have a much shorter life expectancy. But emotions, such as those elicited when a patient's name is known and the patient is thereby humanized, can interfere with rational decision-making. At the height of the pandemic, we conducted three studies in which participants were asked to imagine being hospital officials tasked with allocating ventilators under two conditions: when the affected patients were and were not identified by name. Participants were less likely to reassign a ventilator from an older patient to a younger one when the patients had been named than when they had not. These results suggest that decisionmakers are more likely to make the efficient choice—the one that should save more years of life—when the individuals affected by the choice remain anonymous. When patients are humanized by being named, less rational and more emotional considerations appear to govern how people choose to distribute lifesaving equipment. Our findings imply that keeping patients anonymous may help facilitate the efficient allocation of scarce medical resources.
{"title":"Ventilator Allocations: The Effect of Mere Identifiability","authors":"I. Ritov, Stephen M. Garcia","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800105","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 crisis has raised a dire dilemma among medical professionals. Faced with a shortage of critical equipment and supplies, how do hospital administrators and physicians determine whether to divert resources from one patient to another? Most decision-makers will prioritize saving younger patients over older ones, because older patients generally have a much shorter life expectancy. But emotions, such as those elicited when a patient's name is known and the patient is thereby humanized, can interfere with rational decision-making. At the height of the pandemic, we conducted three studies in which participants were asked to imagine being hospital officials tasked with allocating ventilators under two conditions: when the affected patients were and were not identified by name. Participants were less likely to reassign a ventilator from an older patient to a younger one when the patients had been named than when they had not. These results suggest that decisionmakers are more likely to make the efficient choice—the one that should save more years of life—when the individuals affected by the choice remain anonymous. When patients are humanized by being named, less rational and more emotional considerations appear to govern how people choose to distribute lifesaving equipment. Our findings imply that keeping patients anonymous may help facilitate the efficient allocation of scarce medical resources.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"35 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65686282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/237946152200800104
Adi Berliner Senderey, R. Ohana, Shay Perchik, Ido Erev, R. Balicer
Inducing people to get vaccinated is critical for controlling the spread of COVID-19. We explored the effectiveness of two text messaging strategies for encouraging unvaccinated individuals to get their COVID-19 vaccination. One message emphasized social norms to harness people's tendency to act in ways that line up with society's expectations. The other message underscored the personal medical benefits of vaccination. Both messages indicated that the vaccine was reserved for the recipient at a nearby location. Over the course of eight days, the percentage of people who got vaccinated after receiving the medical benefit message was 2.1% higher than the percentage of people who got vaccinated after receiving the social norm message (p < .001). Our findings indicate that designing vaccination reminders that highlight the medical benefits of vaccination in addition to the availability of the vaccines can increase vaccination rates.
{"title":"Encouraging COVID-19 vaccination through behaviorally informed reminders: Results from a national randomized field experiment in Israel","authors":"Adi Berliner Senderey, R. Ohana, Shay Perchik, Ido Erev, R. Balicer","doi":"10.1177/237946152200800104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/237946152200800104","url":null,"abstract":"Inducing people to get vaccinated is critical for controlling the spread of COVID-19. We explored the effectiveness of two text messaging strategies for encouraging unvaccinated individuals to get their COVID-19 vaccination. One message emphasized social norms to harness people's tendency to act in ways that line up with society's expectations. The other message underscored the personal medical benefits of vaccination. Both messages indicated that the vaccine was reserved for the recipient at a nearby location. Over the course of eight days, the percentage of people who got vaccinated after receiving the medical benefit message was 2.1% higher than the percentage of people who got vaccinated after receiving the social norm message (p < .001). Our findings indicate that designing vaccination reminders that highlight the medical benefits of vaccination in addition to the availability of the vaccines can increase vaccination rates.","PeriodicalId":36971,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Science and Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":"25 - 32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43743258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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