Radical right parties in Europe have been in negotiations since 2018 in order to form a single, unified group in the European Parliament. Today, there are two competing caucuses: one, which is considered the “extreme right” by European standards; and another, which is a collection of far-right, Euroskeptic parties. A unified caucus would challenge the leadership of mainstream conservatives and Christian Democrats in the Parliament and be a show of strength by the radical right. For those who are at the origin of this attempt, namely Marine Le Pen from the French National Rally and Matteo Salvini, leader of the Italian Lega, the goal is also to mainstream their ideology by reaching an alliance with the Hungarian Fidesz party and the Polish Law and Justice Party. Both have become the beacons of illiberal democracy and role models for Western parties that used to be labeled “extreme right” and in need of a break from their past. However, tactical as well as ideological issues have, so far, prevented this unification of the radical right from becoming a reality.
{"title":"The Transnational Networks of the European Radical Populist Right and the Beacon of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy","authors":"Jean-Yves Camus","doi":"10.53483/wcjv3537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/wcjv3537","url":null,"abstract":"Radical right parties in Europe have been in negotiations since 2018 in order to form a single, unified group in the European Parliament. Today, there are two competing caucuses: one, which is considered the “extreme right” by European standards; and another, which is a collection of far-right, Euroskeptic parties. A unified caucus would challenge the leadership of mainstream conservatives and Christian Democrats in the Parliament and be a show of strength by the radical right. For those who are at the origin of this attempt, namely Marine Le Pen from the French National Rally and Matteo Salvini, leader of the Italian Lega, the goal is also to mainstream their ideology by reaching an alliance with the Hungarian Fidesz party and the Polish Law and Justice Party. Both have become the beacons of illiberal democracy and role models for Western parties that used to be labeled “extreme right” and in need of a break from their past. However, tactical as well as ideological issues have, so far, prevented this unification of the radical right from becoming a reality.","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122234356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russia’s return to Latin America since the 2000s now presents a mixed picture. Initially forged with a view to economic growth and trade diversification, the ties between Latin American countries and Russia have gradually become more political in nature, with public diplomacy in both emphasizing the rejection of liberalism and the West. Russia has thus been able to deploy a soft power strategy based on two pillars: its media of influence, which have been favorably received by “pink tide” governments, as well as the militant leftist networks in the Spanish-speaking world. In this article, I show that the counter-hegemonic dialogue between the various components of the Latin-American left and Russia can be described as “illiberal.” First, it is entirely context-dependent and does not follow any political line underpinned by a common dogma. Second, it can be explained by an ideological framework largely inherited from the Soviet past that is present on the Latin American left and exploited by Russia today. Third, it operates through a collection of narratives that echo the main historical struggles of the Latin American left: anti-Americanism, anti-colonialism, and anti-liberalism.
{"title":"From Counter-Hegemonic Dialogue to Illiberal Understanding: Russian-Latin American Relations (2000–2023)","authors":"Diego Soliz","doi":"10.53483/xcmv3557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/xcmv3557","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s return to Latin America since the 2000s now presents a mixed picture. Initially forged with a view to economic growth and trade diversification, the ties between Latin American countries and Russia have gradually become more political in nature, with public diplomacy in both emphasizing the rejection of liberalism and the West. Russia has thus been able to deploy a soft power strategy based on two pillars: its media of influence, which have been favorably received by “pink tide” governments, as well as the militant leftist networks in the Spanish-speaking world. In this article, I show that the counter-hegemonic dialogue between the various components of the Latin-American left and Russia can be described as “illiberal.” First, it is entirely context-dependent and does not follow any political line underpinned by a common dogma. Second, it can be explained by an ideological framework largely inherited from the Soviet past that is present on the Latin American left and exploited by Russia today. Third, it operates through a collection of narratives that echo the main historical struggles of the Latin American left: anti-Americanism, anti-colonialism, and anti-liberalism.","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"295 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123238630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The far right has always taken an interest in the Middle Ages. For the French revolutionary far right, which shares an ideological matrix influenced by Julius Evola, fascination with the Middle Ages revolves around the image of the Holy Germanic Roman Empire as a political model for Europe opposed to the modern nation-state. The romantic image of the medieval knight also offers a watered-down way to celebrate and legitimize violence without having to allude to a taboo National Socialism. This obsession with the Middle Ages contrasts with the reality that these revolutionary far-right movements were rather pro-Arab during the Cold War decades. This shift reveals the transformation of their thinking and the new dominance of the Identitarian notion of ethnic withdrawal, with the knight as the symbol of a pure racial warrior defending his society against Muslim invasion.
极右翼一直对中世纪很感兴趣。法国革命的极右翼受到朱利叶斯·埃沃拉(Julius Evola)的共同意识形态影响，他们对中世纪的迷恋围绕着神圣的日耳曼罗马帝国(Holy Germanic Roman Empire)作为欧洲反对现代民族国家的政治模式的形象。中世纪骑士的浪漫形象也提供了一种淡化的方式来庆祝和合法化暴力，而不必暗指禁忌的国家社会主义。这种对中世纪的痴迷与这些革命极右翼运动在冷战时期相当亲阿拉伯的现实形成了鲜明对比。这种转变揭示了他们思想的转变，以及种族退出的身份主义概念的新主导地位，骑士作为一个纯粹的种族战士的象征，捍卫他的社会不受穆斯林入侵。
{"title":"The New Knight: The French Far Right’s View of the Middle Ages","authors":"Stéphane François","doi":"10.53483/vcht2524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/vcht2524","url":null,"abstract":"The far right has always taken an interest in the Middle Ages. For the French revolutionary far right, which shares an ideological matrix influenced by Julius Evola, fascination with the Middle Ages revolves around the image of the Holy Germanic Roman Empire as a political model for Europe opposed to the modern nation-state. The romantic image of the medieval knight also offers a watered-down way to celebrate and legitimize violence without having to allude to a taboo National Socialism. This obsession with the Middle Ages contrasts with the reality that these revolutionary far-right movements were rather pro-Arab during the Cold War decades. This shift reveals the transformation of their thinking and the new dominance of the Identitarian notion of ethnic withdrawal, with the knight as the symbol of a pure racial warrior defending his society against Muslim invasion.","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123879086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores how the pandemic crisis resulted in a confluence of neo-fascist groups such as Forza Nuova and CasaPound, national-populist parties such as Lega and Brothers of Italy, the Orange Vests of former General Pappalardo and COVID-19 deniers. Since March 2020, the Italian far right has consciously based its strategy on spreading conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and opposing any type of restrictive measures, from the lockdown to mask mandates and vaccination. The attempts to build a mass anti-vaccine movement permeated with neo-fascist influences may have stalled, but it would be mistaken to think that the battle has been lost: the impact of COVID deniers on the political landscape goes beyond poll results. The contemporary ideological fluidity favors mainstreaming negationist slogans, for instance through the unexpected overlap between the far right and New Age culture. The real struggle is conducted in the field of ideas and cultural hegemony, where a profound illiberal, anti-scientific, and conspiracy sentiment continues to gain support in Italy thanks to the overlap between neo-fascists, national-populists, and COVID deniers.
本文探讨了疫情危机如何导致新力量党(Forza Nuova)和CasaPound等新法西斯主义团体、意大利联盟党(Lega and Brothers of Italy)等民族民粹主义政党、前帕帕拉多将军(General Pappalardo)的橙色背心运动和新冠肺炎否认者的汇合。自2020年3月以来，意大利极右翼有意识地将其战略建立在传播关于COVID-19的阴谋论上，并反对从封锁到口罩禁令和疫苗接种等任何类型的限制措施。建立一场充满新法西斯主义影响的大规模反疫苗运动的尝试可能已经停滞不前，但认为这场战斗已经失败是错误的:COVID否认者对政治格局的影响超出了民意调查结果。当代意识形态的流动性有利于将否定主义口号主流化，例如通过极右翼和新时代文化之间意想不到的重叠。真正的斗争是在思想和文化霸权领域进行的，在意大利，由于新法西斯主义者、民族民粹主义者和COVID否认者之间的重叠，深刻的非自由主义、反科学和阴谋情绪继续得到支持。
{"title":"The Great Convergence: How the Italian Far Right and COVID Deniers Tried to Seize the Momentum","authors":"G. Savino","doi":"10.53483/vchu2525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/vchu2525","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores how the pandemic crisis resulted in a confluence of neo-fascist groups such as Forza Nuova and CasaPound, national-populist parties such as Lega and Brothers of Italy, the Orange Vests of former General Pappalardo and COVID-19 deniers. Since March 2020, the Italian far right has consciously based its strategy on spreading conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and opposing any type of restrictive measures, from the lockdown to mask mandates and vaccination. The attempts to build a mass anti-vaccine movement permeated with neo-fascist influences may have stalled, but it would be mistaken to think that the battle has been lost: the impact of COVID deniers on the political landscape goes beyond poll results. The contemporary ideological fluidity favors mainstreaming negationist slogans, for instance through the unexpected overlap between the far right and New Age culture. The real struggle is conducted in the field of ideas and cultural hegemony, where a profound illiberal, anti-scientific, and conspiracy sentiment continues to gain support in Italy thanks to the overlap between neo-fascists, national-populists, and COVID deniers.","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129556635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article provides an overview of the juridical discourse that acted as a basis for the historical development of Brazilian illiberalism. Without setting aside the question of an inner tension between liberal and illiberal theories of Brazilian constitutionalism, but focusing primarily on antiliberal and illiberal positions, this article presents the leading theories of Brazilian constitutional scholars. It shows that the seeds of illiberalism were planted under the flag of a specific type of authoritarian constitutionalism, which was developed under different constitutions, but which mainly refers to the 1937 Constitution. It discusses the theories of movements such as integralismo, the legal thought of authors such as Francisco José Oliveira Viana and Francisco Campos, and concepts such as national security. The article also explores, under the 1988 Constitution, the authoritarian reminiscences that favored the structuring and diffusion of the current Bolsonarist illiberalism. Finally, it debates the chances for the endurance of illiberalism in Brazil and whether or not it could benefit from wider popular acceptance.
{"title":"Illiberalism in Brazil: From Constitutional Authoritarianism to Bolsonarism","authors":"Emilio Peluso Neder Meyer","doi":"10.53483/xcmt3554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/xcmt3554","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides an overview of the juridical discourse that acted as a basis for the historical development of Brazilian illiberalism. Without setting aside the question of an inner tension between liberal and illiberal theories of Brazilian constitutionalism, but focusing primarily on antiliberal and illiberal positions, this article presents the leading theories of Brazilian constitutional scholars. It shows that the seeds of illiberalism were planted under the flag of a specific type of authoritarian constitutionalism, which was developed under different constitutions, but which mainly refers to the 1937 Constitution. It discusses the theories of movements such as integralismo, the legal thought of authors such as Francisco José Oliveira Viana and Francisco Campos, and concepts such as national security. The article also explores, under the 1988 Constitution, the authoritarian reminiscences that favored the structuring and diffusion of the current Bolsonarist illiberalism. Finally, it debates the chances for the endurance of illiberalism in Brazil and whether or not it could benefit from wider popular acceptance.","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129827343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite being under-studied, Guillaume Faye (1949-2019) is probably one of the most central figures of the current Euro-American Identitarian movement, and a key inspiration for global white nationalism. Whether it is of “archeofuturism” or the “convergence of catastrophes”, his concepts are still widely commented on and taken up throughout the world within the far right, becoming nowadays more and more popular. His transition from pro-Arabism in the 1980s to a violent rejection of Islam at the end of the following decade is symptomatic of the evolution of the nationalist-revolutionary far right. Both biographical and analytical, this article proposes to return in detail to this major figure of today’s white nationalism.
{"title":"Guillaume Faye (1949-2019): At the Forefront of a New Theory of White Nationalism","authors":"Stéphane François, Adrien Nonjon","doi":"10.53483/wcjt3535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/wcjt3535","url":null,"abstract":"Despite being under-studied, Guillaume Faye (1949-2019) is probably one of the most central figures of the current Euro-American Identitarian movement, and a key inspiration for global white nationalism. Whether it is of “archeofuturism” or the “convergence of catastrophes”, his concepts are still widely commented on and taken up throughout the world within the far right, becoming nowadays more and more popular. His transition from pro-Arabism in the 1980s to a violent rejection of Islam at the end of the following decade is symptomatic of the evolution of the nationalist-revolutionary far right. Both biographical and analytical, this article proposes to return in detail to this major figure of today’s white nationalism.","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128795793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces three cases of politicians from Western European countries who in the past have been affiliated with populist parties and recently converted to Islam. This article examines how an act of conversion to Islam enables these politicians to continue advancing their agendas. We argue that the public announcement of conversion allows these individuals to transmit their conservative political program directly to their audiences, circumventing the autocracy of leaders of their respective populist parties. In the converts’ rhetoric, Islam—universalized and freed from ethnocultural associations with Muslim minority communities—fulfils social and ethical functions abandoned by a “secularized” Christianity and, thereby, wages a struggle against cultural liberalism. We posit that conversion to Islam among politicians who have been previously associated with populist parties does not necessarily mean a 180-degree turn from outspoken anti-Muslim sentiments to fully embracing the culture of “the Muslim Other.” Instead, it manifests a movement within the right of the political spectrum: from open anti-multiculturalism to cultural conservatism, from defining European identity as exclusively secular and rational to seeing it as inherently spiritual yet compatible with the Enlightenment ideas on rationalism.
{"title":"Political Conversion to Islam Among the European Right","authors":"Gulnaz Sibgatullina, Tahir Abbas","doi":"10.53483/vcis3529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/vcis3529","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces three cases of politicians from Western European countries who in the past have been affiliated with populist parties and recently converted to Islam. This article examines how an act of conversion to Islam enables these politicians to continue advancing their agendas. We argue that the public announcement of conversion allows these individuals to transmit their conservative political program directly to their audiences, circumventing the autocracy of leaders of their respective populist parties. In the converts’ rhetoric, Islam—universalized and freed from ethnocultural associations with Muslim minority communities—fulfils social and ethical functions abandoned by a “secularized” Christianity and, thereby, wages a struggle against cultural liberalism. We posit that conversion to Islam among politicians who have been previously associated with populist parties does not necessarily mean a 180-degree turn from outspoken anti-Muslim sentiments to fully embracing the culture of “the Muslim Other.” Instead, it manifests a movement within the right of the political spectrum: from open anti-multiculturalism to cultural conservatism, from defining European identity as exclusively secular and rational to seeing it as inherently spiritual yet compatible with the Enlightenment ideas on rationalism.","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123532687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, edited by András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, Stephen Holmes (Routledge, 2022, ISBN 9780367260545)","authors":"Maria Snegovaya, Mihai Varga, Julian G. Waller","doi":"10.53483/xclx3551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/xclx3551","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131885229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nineteenth-century Western civilization was based on four institutions: the balance of power, the international gold standard, the liberal state, and the self-regulating market. For Polanyi, the source and “matrix of the system” was the self-regulating market, which was the governing law of a liberal economy. The latter was a stark utopia that annihilated the substance of society. In his view, society would react to this by attempting to protect itself. Polanyi called this process, which destroyed nineteenth-century Western civilization, double movement. The origin of the destruction is rooted in “the utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system.” Fascism and socialism were responses to that self-regulating market. Polanyi’s thesis and analysis look very similar to the resurgence of illiberalism today. The expansion of neoliberal ideology brought about the “countermovement” of radicalism, which, at its root, is a reaction to the liberal utopia Polanyi mentioned. How can we understand Polanyi’s critique of liberalism and its relevance to contemporary liberalism in the sense of “double movement”?
{"title":"Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation: The Critique of Liberalism and the Emergence of Illiberalism","authors":"Tuğberk Samur","doi":"10.53483/wcku3542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/wcku3542","url":null,"abstract":"Nineteenth-century Western civilization was based on four institutions: the balance of power, the international gold standard, the liberal state, and the self-regulating market. For Polanyi, the source and “matrix of the system” was the self-regulating market, which was the governing law of a liberal economy. The latter was a stark utopia that annihilated the substance of society. In his view, society would react to this by attempting to protect itself. Polanyi called this process, which destroyed nineteenth-century Western civilization, double movement. The origin of the destruction is rooted in “the utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system.” Fascism and socialism were responses to that self-regulating market. Polanyi’s thesis and analysis look very similar to the resurgence of illiberalism today. The expansion of neoliberal ideology brought about the “countermovement” of radicalism, which, at its root, is a reaction to the liberal utopia Polanyi mentioned. How can we understand Polanyi’s critique of liberalism and its relevance to contemporary liberalism in the sense of “double movement”?","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131498181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their exercise of power, illiberal democracies—as plebiscitarian leader democracies—rely on systematic falsification of facts and ideas and rule by cheating. This type of governance is related to state-centered domination over the public sphere and society. The illiberalism of these regimes is partly related to the needs of domination and partly responds to the regimes’ constituencies’ clear authoritarian predispositions and historically determined collective narcissism. These factors contribute to the inherent anti-rationality of the regime, which precludes liberal public discourse. The institutionalization (normalization) of cheating has serious moral consequences: moral indignation in the context of public affairs is numbed.
{"title":"Regimes of Cheating and the (A)morality of Illiberalism","authors":"András Sajó","doi":"10.53483/wckv3543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53483/wckv3543","url":null,"abstract":"In their exercise of power, illiberal democracies—as plebiscitarian leader democracies—rely on systematic falsification of facts and ideas and rule by cheating. This type of governance is related to state-centered domination over the public sphere and society. The illiberalism of these regimes is partly related to the needs of domination and partly responds to the regimes’ constituencies’ clear authoritarian predispositions and historically determined collective narcissism. These factors contribute to the inherent anti-rationality of the regime, which precludes liberal public discourse. The institutionalization (normalization) of cheating has serious moral consequences: moral indignation in the context of public affairs is numbed. ","PeriodicalId":370884,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Illiberalism Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116304317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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