Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1861694
G. Bahgat
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1883575
G. Nonneman
Abstract This paper discusses European policies towards the Qatar crisis in the context of the evolution of broader past and present European policies towards the Gulf. It starts with a summary discussion of historical patterns of relations between Europe and the Gulf, before briefly sketching the major changes in the regional environment after the Second World War, beginning with the US supplanting the UK as the dominant hegemon, through to the changes wrought by Trump’s elevation to the US presidency. It then turns to a discussion of the effects of these changes for the Gulf and other regional states and their policy postures, before going on to examine the ways in which European states and the EU have interpreted and reacted to this changing environment. These reactions are often at one and the same time a reaction to the changes and uncertainties in US policy under Trump, since this changing US role is also a crucial ingredient both in the region and for Europe’s room for manoeuvre. Against this background, the paper will outline European policies towards the Gulf theater in particular, focusing on Iran and the JCPOA nuclear deal, and the GCC (or Qatar) crisis –– while also briefly considering the Yemen crisis and the impact of Gulf competition on and in the Libyan theater. From October 2018, the Khashoggi affair added an additional dimension to the crisis, as did the renewed oil price crash amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020.
{"title":"European Policies Towards the Gulf: Patterns, Dynamics, Evolution, and the case of the Qatar Blockade","authors":"G. Nonneman","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1883575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1883575","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper discusses European policies towards the Qatar crisis in the context of the evolution of broader past and present European policies towards the Gulf. It starts with a summary discussion of historical patterns of relations between Europe and the Gulf, before briefly sketching the major changes in the regional environment after the Second World War, beginning with the US supplanting the UK as the dominant hegemon, through to the changes wrought by Trump’s elevation to the US presidency. It then turns to a discussion of the effects of these changes for the Gulf and other regional states and their policy postures, before going on to examine the ways in which European states and the EU have interpreted and reacted to this changing environment. These reactions are often at one and the same time a reaction to the changes and uncertainties in US policy under Trump, since this changing US role is also a crucial ingredient both in the region and for Europe’s room for manoeuvre. Against this background, the paper will outline European policies towards the Gulf theater in particular, focusing on Iran and the JCPOA nuclear deal, and the GCC (or Qatar) crisis –– while also briefly considering the Yemen crisis and the impact of Gulf competition on and in the Libyan theater. From October 2018, the Khashoggi affair added an additional dimension to the crisis, as did the renewed oil price crash amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020.","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"75 1","pages":"278 - 304"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86135789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1861692
M. Al-Sudairi
{"title":"China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies","authors":"M. Al-Sudairi","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1861692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1861692","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"4 1","pages":"321 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81030010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1861695
F. Lawson
the Arab Peace Initiative is still presented as the correct path to end the conflict, but very little diplomatic efforts have been invested to convince or pressure the Israelis to accept it. Third, Turkey, the other major regional power, has not been able to provide the GCC states with the security assurances they need. Like Iran, Turkey is a non-Arab regional power, but, unlike Tehran, Ankara is a Sunni-majority state. Given the Ottoman legacy and President Erdoğan’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have never trusted Turkey. Furthermore, Ankara’s close ties to Doha has further fueled Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s mistrust. This rift between some GCC states and Turkey has positioned Israel as a regional power that can protect the Gulf Arabs from perceived Iranian threat. Fourth, as Jones and Guzansky rightly point out, not all GCC states perceive Iran as an enemy. Qatar shares the largest natural gas structure in the world –– the South Pars in Iran and North Field in Qatar ––with Iran. Accordingly, Doha has always maintained good neighborly relations with Tehran. Similarly, Muscat shares the Strait of Hormuz with Tehran, and the two nations have always enjoyed good working relations. Meanwhile, Kuwait has always sought to strike a balance between Riyadh, Tehran, and Baghdad. The rift between Qatar, on one side, and Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain (along with Egypt), on the other, means there is no unified Gulf Arab stance on Iran. Fifth, despite the increasingly warming ties between some GCC rulers and Israel, one can argue that more work is needed to get GCC societies to accept Israel. Stated differently, it seems that some Arab regimes are ahead of their people when it comes to normalizing relations with Israel. There are no accurate polls to survey how people in the GCC states feel about normalizing relations with the Jewish state. More efforts are needed to sell normalization to the public. Fraternal Enemies gives the reader a comprehensive background to the history of GCCIsrael ties and explores the main issues between the two sides. Jones and Guzansky make references to the strategic implications of this growing cooperation between the two sides. The last few months of 2020 have witnessed a number of significant developments that are likely to, positively or negatively, impact not only Israel and the GCC states, but the entire Middle East. These developments include establishing full diplomatic and economic ties between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel; the election of Joe Biden as president of the United States; and the growing animosity between Israel and Iran. How these developments will play out is yet to be seen.
{"title":"Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR","authors":"F. Lawson","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1861695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1861695","url":null,"abstract":"the Arab Peace Initiative is still presented as the correct path to end the conflict, but very little diplomatic efforts have been invested to convince or pressure the Israelis to accept it. Third, Turkey, the other major regional power, has not been able to provide the GCC states with the security assurances they need. Like Iran, Turkey is a non-Arab regional power, but, unlike Tehran, Ankara is a Sunni-majority state. Given the Ottoman legacy and President Erdoğan’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have never trusted Turkey. Furthermore, Ankara’s close ties to Doha has further fueled Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s mistrust. This rift between some GCC states and Turkey has positioned Israel as a regional power that can protect the Gulf Arabs from perceived Iranian threat. Fourth, as Jones and Guzansky rightly point out, not all GCC states perceive Iran as an enemy. Qatar shares the largest natural gas structure in the world –– the South Pars in Iran and North Field in Qatar ––with Iran. Accordingly, Doha has always maintained good neighborly relations with Tehran. Similarly, Muscat shares the Strait of Hormuz with Tehran, and the two nations have always enjoyed good working relations. Meanwhile, Kuwait has always sought to strike a balance between Riyadh, Tehran, and Baghdad. The rift between Qatar, on one side, and Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain (along with Egypt), on the other, means there is no unified Gulf Arab stance on Iran. Fifth, despite the increasingly warming ties between some GCC rulers and Israel, one can argue that more work is needed to get GCC societies to accept Israel. Stated differently, it seems that some Arab regimes are ahead of their people when it comes to normalizing relations with Israel. There are no accurate polls to survey how people in the GCC states feel about normalizing relations with the Jewish state. More efforts are needed to sell normalization to the public. Fraternal Enemies gives the reader a comprehensive background to the history of GCCIsrael ties and explores the main issues between the two sides. Jones and Guzansky make references to the strategic implications of this growing cooperation between the two sides. The last few months of 2020 have witnessed a number of significant developments that are likely to, positively or negatively, impact not only Israel and the GCC states, but the entire Middle East. These developments include establishing full diplomatic and economic ties between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel; the election of Joe Biden as president of the United States; and the growing animosity between Israel and Iran. How these developments will play out is yet to be seen.","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"326 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75407144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1896449
Kathryn King
ished his reputation in Riyadh, particularly with Crown Prince Abdallah (p. 142). One of Abdallah’s first actions as ruler was to remove Bandar from his post as Saudi ambassador in Washington (p. 147). US-Saudi relations subsequently went from bad to worse (p. 149), and stayed frosty as Barack Obama undertook a halting rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran and expressed guarded support for the popular uprisings that swept across the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010–11. Nevertheless, the uprisings prompted Abdallah to send Bandar to Pakistan and the PRC to inquire whether these two countries would come to the aid of the Saudi government if its efforts to placate the kingdom’s restive populace through massive state expenditures turned out to be unsuccessful (pp. 160–61). Abdallah rewardedBandar by appointing himhead of external security operations (p. 168).Yet as soon as Salman succeeded Abdallah as ruler, Bandar was unceremoniously cashiered (p. 169). How this affected the kingdom’s dealings with Washington is left largely unaddressed. Instead, the text focuses on Salman’s unprecedented reliance on his own sons, the war in Yemen, Saudi relations with Pakistan, Riyadh’s deepening rivalry with Tehran, and several other topics (pp. 169–79). The book closes with a discussion of the domestic problems that presently confront the kingdom’s leadership (pp. 199–203), which intimates that the energetic new crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman, could implement the kind of structural reforms that might ensure the regime’s survival. These remarks coexist uneasily with the “Preface to the Paperback Edition” of 2019, which accuses Crown PrinceMuhammad of ordering themurder of Jamal Khashoggi, supervising “themost repressive purge in the country’s modern history” (p. x), and initiating in Yemen “the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world today” (p. xi). Riedel in the update claims that “beneath the surface, the Kingdom is in turmoil, more unstable today than at any time since [the ouster of King Saud bin Abdul Aziz in] 1958” (p. xii). And Bandar bin Sultan is no longer there to put things right.
他在利雅得，特别是在阿卜杜拉王储面前树立了声誉(第142页)。阿卜杜拉作为统治者的第一个行动是解除班达尔在华盛顿的沙特大使职务(第147页)。随后，美国与沙特的关系每况愈下(第149页)，在巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)与伊朗伊斯兰共和国(Islamic Republic of Iran)断断续续地恢复友好关系，并对2010-11年开始席卷中东和北非的民众起义表示谨慎支持之际，美沙关系一直保持冷淡。尽管如此，起义促使阿卜杜拉派班达尔前往巴基斯坦和中国询问，如果沙特政府通过巨额国家支出安抚王国不安的民众的努力失败，这两个国家是否会援助沙特政府(第160-61页)。阿卜杜拉奖励班达尔，任命他为外部安全行动的负责人(第168页)。然而，萨勒曼一接替阿卜杜拉成为统治者，班达尔就被毫不客气地革职了(第169页)。这对沙特与美国的交易有何影响，基本上没有得到解决。相反，这本书聚焦于萨勒曼对自己儿子的空前依赖、也门战争、沙特与巴基斯坦的关系、利雅得与德黑兰日益加深的竞争，以及其他几个话题(第169-79页)。该书最后讨论了沙特领导层目前面临的国内问题(第199-203页)，暗示精力充沛的新王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(Muhammad bin Salman)可能会实施某种结构改革，以确保政权的生存。这些言论与2019年的“平装版序言”共存，后者指责王储穆罕默德下令谋杀贾马尔·卡舒吉，监督“该国现代史上最具镇压性的清洗”(第x页)，并在也门引发“当今世界上最严重的人道主义灾难”(第xi页)。里德尔在更新中声称“在表面之下，王国处于动荡之中，自1958年(沙特·本·阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹国王被驱逐)以来，今天比任何时候都更加不稳定”(第十二页)。班达尔·本·苏丹也不再是纠正错误的人了。
{"title":"Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia","authors":"Kathryn King","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1896449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1896449","url":null,"abstract":"ished his reputation in Riyadh, particularly with Crown Prince Abdallah (p. 142). One of Abdallah’s first actions as ruler was to remove Bandar from his post as Saudi ambassador in Washington (p. 147). US-Saudi relations subsequently went from bad to worse (p. 149), and stayed frosty as Barack Obama undertook a halting rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran and expressed guarded support for the popular uprisings that swept across the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010–11. Nevertheless, the uprisings prompted Abdallah to send Bandar to Pakistan and the PRC to inquire whether these two countries would come to the aid of the Saudi government if its efforts to placate the kingdom’s restive populace through massive state expenditures turned out to be unsuccessful (pp. 160–61). Abdallah rewardedBandar by appointing himhead of external security operations (p. 168).Yet as soon as Salman succeeded Abdallah as ruler, Bandar was unceremoniously cashiered (p. 169). How this affected the kingdom’s dealings with Washington is left largely unaddressed. Instead, the text focuses on Salman’s unprecedented reliance on his own sons, the war in Yemen, Saudi relations with Pakistan, Riyadh’s deepening rivalry with Tehran, and several other topics (pp. 169–79). The book closes with a discussion of the domestic problems that presently confront the kingdom’s leadership (pp. 199–203), which intimates that the energetic new crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman, could implement the kind of structural reforms that might ensure the regime’s survival. These remarks coexist uneasily with the “Preface to the Paperback Edition” of 2019, which accuses Crown PrinceMuhammad of ordering themurder of Jamal Khashoggi, supervising “themost repressive purge in the country’s modern history” (p. x), and initiating in Yemen “the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world today” (p. xi). Riedel in the update claims that “beneath the surface, the Kingdom is in turmoil, more unstable today than at any time since [the ouster of King Saud bin Abdul Aziz in] 1958” (p. xii). And Bandar bin Sultan is no longer there to put things right.","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"72 1","pages":"328 - 330"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85825063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1861693
Clemens Chay
{"title":"Being Young, Male and Saudi: Identity and Politics in a Globalized Kingdom","authors":"Clemens Chay","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1861693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1861693","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"7 ","pages":"323 - 324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21534764.2020.1861693","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72544761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1854273
Jocelyn Sage Mitchell, M. Al-Hammadi
Abstract How are nationalism and national identity shifting in Qatar as a result of the regional crisis? This study explores whether this moment of geopolitical fluidity allows for changes in sociocultural behavior and norms among Qatari citizens. Specifically, this research uses the case study of the newly opened National Museum of Qatar to examine a state-crafted narrative of national identity and society’s response to this narrative. Our original fieldwork highlights the museum’s combination of desert and sea lifestyles to create a “unity” narrative of Qatari national identity, and explores the mixed reactions of citizens who feel varying levels of representation and inclusion in this narrative. This study concludes with a critical analysis of the malleability of national identity during times of political upheaval.
{"title":"Nationalism and Identity in Qatar after 2017: The Narrative of the New National Museum","authors":"Jocelyn Sage Mitchell, M. Al-Hammadi","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1854273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1854273","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How are nationalism and national identity shifting in Qatar as a result of the regional crisis? This study explores whether this moment of geopolitical fluidity allows for changes in sociocultural behavior and norms among Qatari citizens. Specifically, this research uses the case study of the newly opened National Museum of Qatar to examine a state-crafted narrative of national identity and society’s response to this narrative. Our original fieldwork highlights the museum’s combination of desert and sea lifestyles to create a “unity” narrative of Qatari national identity, and explores the mixed reactions of citizens who feel varying levels of representation and inclusion in this narrative. This study concludes with a critical analysis of the malleability of national identity during times of political upheaval.","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"256 - 277"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73374689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1833413
David B. Roberts
Abstract Ontological security speaks to a kind of identitarian security and argues that actors need to have a surety and certainty in who and what they are in order to enjoy settled peaceable lives. As a furrow of international relations theory, it argues that states must attend to ontological security needs just as they are concerned about physical security needs. Applied to the Gulf context, analysis of ontological security concerns provides a set of coherent rationales explaining why ontological security pressures play in an exaggerated way on the United Arab Emirates and why, in this context, Qatar is a uniquely problematic Other. As such, uncovering these deeper, abstract security drivers provides a compelling explanation to explain the bitterness and animosity inherent to the UAE’s surprising decision to lead the 2017 blockade against Qatar.
{"title":"Ontological Security and the Gulf Crisis","authors":"David B. Roberts","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1833413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1833413","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ontological security speaks to a kind of identitarian security and argues that actors need to have a surety and certainty in who and what they are in order to enjoy settled peaceable lives. As a furrow of international relations theory, it argues that states must attend to ontological security needs just as they are concerned about physical security needs. Applied to the Gulf context, analysis of ontological security concerns provides a set of coherent rationales explaining why ontological security pressures play in an exaggerated way on the United Arab Emirates and why, in this context, Qatar is a uniquely problematic Other. As such, uncovering these deeper, abstract security drivers provides a compelling explanation to explain the bitterness and animosity inherent to the UAE’s surprising decision to lead the 2017 blockade against Qatar.","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"221 - 237"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80195285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1848614
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen
Abstract This article assesses how the decisions taken in and after 2011 in Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh strained and shattered the lingering consensus and common threat perception that had, since 1981, provided a baseline for regional cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It explores how the rifts after 2011 have hit on weak-points within the GCC in ways that complicate any potential recoherence or “coming-back-together” in anything close to the pre-2017 form. This occurred as the pragmatic flexibility within the GCC was eroded by a “zero-sum” mentality that has split GCC states along multiple lines rather than just a “clean” break over a specific issue. While the relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has become a new and exclusionary center of gravity in Arab Gulf politics, the article ends by examining the prospects for regional order against the backdrop of a fractured GCC and the prospects for greater balance as the disengagement of US interest accelerates the internationalization of the political economy and international relations of Persian Gulf states.
{"title":"The Regional Implications of the Gulf Crisis","authors":"Kristian Coates Ulrichsen","doi":"10.1080/21534764.2020.1848614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1848614","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article assesses how the decisions taken in and after 2011 in Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh strained and shattered the lingering consensus and common threat perception that had, since 1981, provided a baseline for regional cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It explores how the rifts after 2011 have hit on weak-points within the GCC in ways that complicate any potential recoherence or “coming-back-together” in anything close to the pre-2017 form. This occurred as the pragmatic flexibility within the GCC was eroded by a “zero-sum” mentality that has split GCC states along multiple lines rather than just a “clean” break over a specific issue. While the relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has become a new and exclusionary center of gravity in Arab Gulf politics, the article ends by examining the prospects for regional order against the backdrop of a fractured GCC and the prospects for greater balance as the disengagement of US interest accelerates the internationalization of the political economy and international relations of Persian Gulf states.","PeriodicalId":37102,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Arabian Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"305 - 320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84596610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2020.1828023
Justin J. Gengler
Abstract This article examines key questions of citizen-state, citizen-citizen, and citizen-expatriate relations in the Arab Gulf states through the lens of the 2017 Qatar blockade. It utilizes original public opinion survey data that allow examination of the embargo’s short-term impacts on social and political relations in Qatar as well as broader trends observed over the period from 2010 to 2019. Results lend support to some existing qualitative accounts suggesting changes in important social and political dynamics in Qatar after the blockade. However, survey data also show that such post-blockade differences are mostly reflections of larger attitudinal shifts witnessed over the course of the past decade, rather than isolated effects of the GCC crisis. This suggests the possibility that other Gulf Arab states are experiencing similar transformations in popular sociopolitical orientations and behavior brought on by the same long-term drivers.
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