Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2022.2082719
Jun Bai, Chuang Li, Shasha Li, Weiting Luo
ABSTRACT Using a sample of listed state-owned enterprises in China from 2013 to 2018, this paper focuses on the impacts of compensation regulation policy on the changes of incentive mode for SOE executives. We find that after the policy, the compensation incentive channel for highly-paid executives has been replaced by political promotion as an alternative incentive mechanism. Further analysis shows that ingratiatory behaviour has become the main channel for SOE executives to seek promotion after the policy. Our results provide support for the relationship hypothesis relating to the political promotion of SOE executives, and such effects are more pronounced within younger SOE executives with lower enterprise level and marketisation degree. Finally, we find that the existence of alternative benefit acquisition channels such as equity incentive, perquisite consumption and the degree of mixed ownership reform of SOE has weakened the relationship between compensation regulation and political promotion of SOE executives.
{"title":"Compensation regulation and political promotion of executives of state-owned enterprises——Quasi-natural experiment based on the reform of compensation regulation in China","authors":"Jun Bai, Chuang Li, Shasha Li, Weiting Luo","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2022.2082719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2022.2082719","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Using a sample of listed state-owned enterprises in China from 2013 to 2018, this paper focuses on the impacts of compensation regulation policy on the changes of incentive mode for SOE executives. We find that after the policy, the compensation incentive channel for highly-paid executives has been replaced by political promotion as an alternative incentive mechanism. Further analysis shows that ingratiatory behaviour has become the main channel for SOE executives to seek promotion after the policy. Our results provide support for the relationship hypothesis relating to the political promotion of SOE executives, and such effects are more pronounced within younger SOE executives with lower enterprise level and marketisation degree. Finally, we find that the existence of alternative benefit acquisition channels such as equity incentive, perquisite consumption and the degree of mixed ownership reform of SOE has weakened the relationship between compensation regulation and political promotion of SOE executives.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"549 - 570"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48626004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2022.2053375
Zhi Jin, Chenghao Huang
ABSTRACT Using the implementation of “Golden Tax Phase III” as a quasi-natural experiment, we take the difference-in-differences (DID) method to examine how changes in taxation technology affect firm donations. Specifically, “Golden Tax Phase III” has reduced the donation level of private enterprises (−21.6%). Moreover, the treatment effect is particularly pronounced in regions with low taxation capacity and enterprises with high tax avoidance. Additional tests show that enhanced tax enforcement decreases rent-seeking donations rather than squeezes out market-oriented donations, and the reduction of donations is not due to the deterioration of cash flow capacity. Overall, these results suggest that the improvement of taxation technology will restrict rent-seeking behaviour and regulate the corporate social responsibility activities of the enterprises. This study not only enriches the relevant research on tax enforcement and corporate social responsibility but also emphasises the significant impact of information infrastructure construction.
{"title":"Tax enforcement and corporate donations: evidence from Chinese ‘Golden Tax Phase III’","authors":"Zhi Jin, Chenghao Huang","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2022.2053375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2022.2053375","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Using the implementation of “Golden Tax Phase III” as a quasi-natural experiment, we take the difference-in-differences (DID) method to examine how changes in taxation technology affect firm donations. Specifically, “Golden Tax Phase III” has reduced the donation level of private enterprises (−21.6%). Moreover, the treatment effect is particularly pronounced in regions with low taxation capacity and enterprises with high tax avoidance. Additional tests show that enhanced tax enforcement decreases rent-seeking donations rather than squeezes out market-oriented donations, and the reduction of donations is not due to the deterioration of cash flow capacity. Overall, these results suggest that the improvement of taxation technology will restrict rent-seeking behaviour and regulate the corporate social responsibility activities of the enterprises. This study not only enriches the relevant research on tax enforcement and corporate social responsibility but also emphasises the significant impact of information infrastructure construction.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"526 - 548"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49481999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2022.2082717
Shangkun Liang, Yanfeng Jiang, Junli Yu, Wei Xu
ABSTRACT Tunnelling by large shareholders is a problem representative of ownership concentration. Large shareholders may interfere with a firm’s information disclosure to support their tunnelling behaviour, causing a high stock price crash risk. Using listed companies in China from 2001 to 2019 as a sample, we find that more severe tunnelling can lead to a higher risk of stock price crashes. Moreover, we investigate potential factors such as internal control, operational performance, and split-share reforms, that may affect the aforementioned relationship. A high level of internal control and good operational performance will weaken the relationship, and the relationship is stronger before split-share reforms. The findings of this study contribute to a better understanding of the relationship given China’s institutional background and better investor protection.
{"title":"Large shareholders’ tunneling and stock price crash risk","authors":"Shangkun Liang, Yanfeng Jiang, Junli Yu, Wei Xu","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2022.2082717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2022.2082717","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Tunnelling by large shareholders is a problem representative of ownership concentration. Large shareholders may interfere with a firm’s information disclosure to support their tunnelling behaviour, causing a high stock price crash risk. Using listed companies in China from 2001 to 2019 as a sample, we find that more severe tunnelling can lead to a higher risk of stock price crashes. Moreover, we investigate potential factors such as internal control, operational performance, and split-share reforms, that may affect the aforementioned relationship. A high level of internal control and good operational performance will weaken the relationship, and the relationship is stronger before split-share reforms. The findings of this study contribute to a better understanding of the relationship given China’s institutional background and better investor protection.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"469 - 489"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60498852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2021.2009175
Jing Du, Wanfu Li, B. Lin, Donghui Wu
ABSTRACT This paper examines the determinants of internal audit outsourcing from the macro perspective of financial ecological environment. We find that in regions with a poor financial ecological environment, firms are more likely to outsource internal audit and more inclined to outsource to other service providers than to accounting firms that provide financial report audit services for them. Furthermore, those firms with high financing constraints and non-state-owned firms are more likely to outsource internal audit in poor financial ecological environments. Firms outsourcing internal audit in poor financial ecological environments will have low debt financing costs. These results suggest firms in weak financial ecological environments tend to use internal audit outsourcing to enhance investor confidence and reduce financing costs. This paper helps expand the literature related to the determinants of internal audit outsourcing from a macro perspective, and provide a reference for improving the resource-allocation efficiency of the governance-oriented internal audit.
{"title":"Financial ecological environment and internal audit outsourcing: evidence from survey in China","authors":"Jing Du, Wanfu Li, B. Lin, Donghui Wu","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2021.2009175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2021.2009175","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines the determinants of internal audit outsourcing from the macro perspective of financial ecological environment. We find that in regions with a poor financial ecological environment, firms are more likely to outsource internal audit and more inclined to outsource to other service providers than to accounting firms that provide financial report audit services for them. Furthermore, those firms with high financing constraints and non-state-owned firms are more likely to outsource internal audit in poor financial ecological environments. Firms outsourcing internal audit in poor financial ecological environments will have low debt financing costs. These results suggest firms in weak financial ecological environments tend to use internal audit outsourcing to enhance investor confidence and reduce financing costs. This paper helps expand the literature related to the determinants of internal audit outsourcing from a macro perspective, and provide a reference for improving the resource-allocation efficiency of the governance-oriented internal audit.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"289 - 310"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42510783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2021.2009177
Xiangyan Shi, Danlu Bu, Caihong Wen, Zong Lan
ABSTRACT This paper studies the effect of the controlling shareholder’s financial background on the corporate financialization. We find that controlling shareholder’s financial background has a significant positive impact on corporate financialization, and the positive impact is more obvious in credit advantage firms and firms with poor institutional environment and real investment environment. Firms with financial controlling shareholders will increase long-term value reserving financial investment, and firms’ financialization trend with lower financing constraints is more sensitive to controlling shareholders’ financial background, suggesting that speculating is the essential motivation of firms’ financialization, rather than precautionary saving. The mechanism test shows that controlling shareholder’s financial background mainly promotes corporate financialization by increasing the financial long-term equity investments at the parent company level. Finally, there is an inverted U relationship between corporate financialization and investment efficiency, and the marginal effect of corporate financialization on investment efficiency is greater in firms with financial shareholders.
{"title":"Financial background of controlling shareholder and corporate financialization","authors":"Xiangyan Shi, Danlu Bu, Caihong Wen, Zong Lan","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2021.2009177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2021.2009177","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper studies the effect of the controlling shareholder’s financial background on the corporate financialization. We find that controlling shareholder’s financial background has a significant positive impact on corporate financialization, and the positive impact is more obvious in credit advantage firms and firms with poor institutional environment and real investment environment. Firms with financial controlling shareholders will increase long-term value reserving financial investment, and firms’ financialization trend with lower financing constraints is more sensitive to controlling shareholders’ financial background, suggesting that speculating is the essential motivation of firms’ financialization, rather than precautionary saving. The mechanism test shows that controlling shareholder’s financial background mainly promotes corporate financialization by increasing the financial long-term equity investments at the parent company level. Finally, there is an inverted U relationship between corporate financialization and investment efficiency, and the marginal effect of corporate financialization on investment efficiency is greater in firms with financial shareholders.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"383 - 407"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44676189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2021.2009176
Liangliang Wang, Haiyang Zhang, Lu Zhang, Xiru Guo
ABSTRACT The subsidiary’s profit distribution results in the cash transfer from the subsidiary to the parent company. We investigate the effect of this cash transfer on the business group’s agency cost. Using the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2017, we find that the profits distributed by subsidiaries lead to the decrease of the agency costs of the business group as a whole. The channel analysis reveals that the profits are transferred to parent company whose governance efficiency is relatively higher and the total free cash flows are reduced. Further research finds that the agency cost reduced effect is more significant in business groups with higher subsidiary business importance and subsidiary debt financing importance, and in groups with lower growth of the subsidiary. Finally, we report that the subsidiary’s profit distribution has value-added effect. This paper generates new insights into the “black box” of the internal operation of business groups and provides comprehensive implications for policy makers.
{"title":"Dividend from subsidiaries and the agency cost of business groups","authors":"Liangliang Wang, Haiyang Zhang, Lu Zhang, Xiru Guo","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2021.2009176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2021.2009176","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The subsidiary’s profit distribution results in the cash transfer from the subsidiary to the parent company. We investigate the effect of this cash transfer on the business group’s agency cost. Using the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2017, we find that the profits distributed by subsidiaries lead to the decrease of the agency costs of the business group as a whole. The channel analysis reveals that the profits are transferred to parent company whose governance efficiency is relatively higher and the total free cash flows are reduced. Further research finds that the agency cost reduced effect is more significant in business groups with higher subsidiary business importance and subsidiary debt financing importance, and in groups with lower growth of the subsidiary. Finally, we report that the subsidiary’s profit distribution has value-added effect. This paper generates new insights into the “black box” of the internal operation of business groups and provides comprehensive implications for policy makers.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"311 - 332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49096559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2021.2009178
Qiong Wang, Kemin Wang
ABSTRACT This study investigates the effects of high-speed rail (HSR) introduction in China on small investors’ on-site participation in shareholders’ general meetings, which is used to measure the ‘inverse distance–participation syndrome’. We find that HSR introductionhas a significantly positive effect on small investors’ on-site attendance. The poorer the transportation infrastructure connecting other cities before HSR introduction, the shorter the distance between HSR station and the firm’s headquarters after HSR introduction, and the more nonlocal investors the firm has, the higher the attendance rate. Small shareholder activism that arises with HSR introduction results in a higher likelihood of proposal rejection, fewer tunnelling by large shareholders, and less earnings manipulation. Overall, our results show that HSR introduction reduces monitoring costs for small shareholders and increases their on-site participation. Our findings provide important implications for policymakers on encouraging small shareholder activism.
{"title":"Does high-speed rail stimulate shareholder activism by small investors in China?","authors":"Qiong Wang, Kemin Wang","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2021.2009178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2021.2009178","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study investigates the effects of high-speed rail (HSR) introduction in China on small investors’ on-site participation in shareholders’ general meetings, which is used to measure the ‘inverse distance–participation syndrome’. We find that HSR introductionhas a significantly positive effect on small investors’ on-site attendance. The poorer the transportation infrastructure connecting other cities before HSR introduction, the shorter the distance between HSR station and the firm’s headquarters after HSR introduction, and the more nonlocal investors the firm has, the higher the attendance rate. Small shareholder activism that arises with HSR introduction results in a higher likelihood of proposal rejection, fewer tunnelling by large shareholders, and less earnings manipulation. Overall, our results show that HSR introduction reduces monitoring costs for small shareholders and increases their on-site participation. Our findings provide important implications for policymakers on encouraging small shareholder activism.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"408 - 431"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43352030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2021.2009180
Xiongyuan Wang, Luofan Bu, Xuan Peng
ABSTRACT This study aims at addressing the economic consequences of the adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT) in China. As the fundamental technology for the next-generation information technology, IoT is supposed to have the most profound and comprehensive influence on both business operation and accounting information environment. By using a difference-in-differences method, our findings focusing on earnings management activities in China-listed firms around the adoption of IoT confirm the conjecture that such technology effectively deters accrual-based and real earnings management. The results are also robust to dynamic analysis, instrumental variable approach, PSM analysis, placebo tests and other robustness tests. Furthermore, we also document that the reduction in real earnings management due to IoT adoption has positive implications on the capital market, financing and investment activities and long-term operational efficiency. Taken together, we reveal the promising prospects of IoT adoption on corporate accounting information and establish the association between information technology and efficiency of resource allocation.
{"title":"Internet of things adoption, earnings management, and resource allocation efficiency","authors":"Xiongyuan Wang, Luofan Bu, Xuan Peng","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2021.2009180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2021.2009180","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study aims at addressing the economic consequences of the adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT) in China. As the fundamental technology for the next-generation information technology, IoT is supposed to have the most profound and comprehensive influence on both business operation and accounting information environment. By using a difference-in-differences method, our findings focusing on earnings management activities in China-listed firms around the adoption of IoT confirm the conjecture that such technology effectively deters accrual-based and real earnings management. The results are also robust to dynamic analysis, instrumental variable approach, PSM analysis, placebo tests and other robustness tests. Furthermore, we also document that the reduction in real earnings management due to IoT adoption has positive implications on the capital market, financing and investment activities and long-term operational efficiency. Taken together, we reveal the promising prospects of IoT adoption on corporate accounting information and establish the association between information technology and efficiency of resource allocation.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"333 - 359"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49470026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2021.2009179
Shuwei Sun, Tusheng Xiao, Yulong Yang, Xincheng Wang
ABSTRACT The under-performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) resulting from impairment of goodwill is of great interest to regulators and investors. This study investigates the performance of M&As from the perspective of home bias. The results indicate that (1) Post-merger performance is worse when purchased companies are in high-level executives’ hometowns. (2) When located in the executives’ hometown, listed companies pay higher premiums, and further loss of goodwill occurs in the following years. Integration efficiency after M&As is lower, as reflected in the higher degree of excess employees. (3) Cross-sectional analyses indicate that M&A under-performance only occurs when the province has a low level of market development, listed companies are non-state-owned enterprises, or listed companies’ executives are older. (4) Interactive effect test results suggest that fund holding, analyst following and media coverage can alleviate the negative impact of home bias on long-term performance.
{"title":"Inter-regional M&As, home bias and the post-merger performance","authors":"Shuwei Sun, Tusheng Xiao, Yulong Yang, Xincheng Wang","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2021.2009179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2021.2009179","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The under-performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) resulting from impairment of goodwill is of great interest to regulators and investors. This study investigates the performance of M&As from the perspective of home bias. The results indicate that (1) Post-merger performance is worse when purchased companies are in high-level executives’ hometowns. (2) When located in the executives’ hometown, listed companies pay higher premiums, and further loss of goodwill occurs in the following years. Integration efficiency after M&As is lower, as reflected in the higher degree of excess employees. (3) Cross-sectional analyses indicate that M&A under-performance only occurs when the province has a low level of market development, listed companies are non-state-owned enterprises, or listed companies’ executives are older. (4) Interactive effect test results suggest that fund holding, analyst following and media coverage can alleviate the negative impact of home bias on long-term performance.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"360 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44459361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2021.1980954
T. Zhang, Xinmin Zhang, Daoguang Yang
ABSTRACT Will industrial policy affect corporate tax avoidance? Based on China’s listed corporations which are in the current stage of industrial transformation and upgrading, this paper investigates how the provincial industrial policy impact corporate tax avoidance. The results show that provincial industrial policy can suppress corporate’s incentive to avoid tax and this relationship is stronger in non-SOE group. Further study finds that the release of provincial policy enhances the prospect of influenced industries, leading the improvement of firm performance, helping firms obtain more government subsidies and bank loans and finally suppress corporate tax avoidance. On the other hand, industrial policy is a crucial channel through which listed firms can build political connections with local government. To maintain the relationship with local government, the affected firms are willing to suppress corporate tax avoidance.
{"title":"Does industrial policy suppress corporate tax avoidance? —— a study on the perspective of provincial industrial policy","authors":"T. Zhang, Xinmin Zhang, Daoguang Yang","doi":"10.1080/21697213.2021.1980954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2021.1980954","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Will industrial policy affect corporate tax avoidance? Based on China’s listed corporations which are in the current stage of industrial transformation and upgrading, this paper investigates how the provincial industrial policy impact corporate tax avoidance. The results show that provincial industrial policy can suppress corporate’s incentive to avoid tax and this relationship is stronger in non-SOE group. Further study finds that the release of provincial policy enhances the prospect of influenced industries, leading the improvement of firm performance, helping firms obtain more government subsidies and bank loans and finally suppress corporate tax avoidance. On the other hand, industrial policy is a crucial channel through which listed firms can build political connections with local government. To maintain the relationship with local government, the affected firms are willing to suppress corporate tax avoidance.","PeriodicalId":37215,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"143 - 167"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45907301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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