Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.63
Marianna A. Klochko
This essay proposes that time preference is an essential component of analysis of collective behavior and provision of public goods. It addresses the validity of the assumption that time preference, as a parameter in individual utility functions, is exogenous and fi xed. While individual time discounting is used to predict many social phenomena, it is quite often applied in a fi xed form where the possibility of change is rarely discussed. The mechanism of change in individual time discounting is explored in different social contexts, using student, inmate and drug addict populations. This study establishes that certain parameters, such as the length of exposure to new environment and new social connections, are of extreme importance in determining the degree of change in time discounting.
{"title":"The endogeneity of time preference and analysis of collective behavior","authors":"Marianna A. Klochko","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.63","url":null,"abstract":"This essay proposes that time preference is an essential component of analysis of collective behavior and provision of public goods. It addresses the validity of the assumption that time preference, as a parameter in individual utility functions, is exogenous and fi xed. While individual time discounting is used to predict many social phenomena, it is quite often applied in a fi xed form where the possibility of change is rarely discussed. The mechanism of change in individual time discounting is explored in different social contexts, using student, inmate and drug addict populations. This study establishes that certain parameters, such as the length of exposure to new environment and new social connections, are of extreme importance in determining the degree of change in time discounting.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"107-122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.52
M. Kaminski
{"title":"Introduction: The seductive power of Mancur Olson","authors":"M. Kaminski","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.52","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.52","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"7-14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.53
Jong-Seong An
Professor Olson’s first lecture, predictably, was on the logic of collective action, and he talked about the formation and behavior of interest groups in the light of their economic interests. An interest group arises when the benefits it can derive by taking collective action outweigh the cost of taking that action. The cost, in turn, is shared among the members of that interest group. In a small group, members are able to observe the actions and behavior of one another. If one member refuses to pay his share of the cost, it will have a negative impact on other members and might even undermine the group’s collective action. Therefore, members participating in small interest groups are usually obliged to pay their share of the cost in order to continue engaging in collective actions. As a group grows in size, however, it becomes increasingly easy for members to enjoy a free-ride. From the perspective of an individual in a large group who pays a tiny fraction of the total cost, it might appear that the group’s collective actions could continue even if he or she defaults on paying their share – as long as other members continue to pay theirs. So individuals in large groups might be tempted to benefit from their group’s collective actions without paying towards the cost. But once the number of these selfishly inclined members increase, it becomes impossible for the group to support itself and its actions.
{"title":"REMEMBERING PROFESSOR MANCUR OLSON","authors":"Jong-Seong An","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.53","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Olson’s first lecture, predictably, was on the logic of collective action, and he talked about the formation and behavior of interest groups in the light of their economic interests. An interest group arises when the benefits it can derive by taking collective action outweigh the cost of taking that action. The cost, in turn, is shared among the members of that interest group. In a small group, members are able to observe the actions and behavior of one another. If one member refuses to pay his share of the cost, it will have a negative impact on other members and might even undermine the group’s collective action. Therefore, members participating in small interest groups are usually obliged to pay their share of the cost in order to continue engaging in collective actions. As a group grows in size, however, it becomes increasingly easy for members to enjoy a free-ride. From the perspective of an individual in a large group who pays a tiny fraction of the total cost, it might appear that the group’s collective actions could continue even if he or she defaults on paying their share – as long as other members continue to pay theirs. So individuals in large groups might be tempted to benefit from their group’s collective actions without paying towards the cost. But once the number of these selfishly inclined members increase, it becomes impossible for the group to support itself and its actions.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"15-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.56
M. McGuire
{"title":"Remembering Mancur Olson: and Auld Lang Syne","authors":"M. McGuire","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.56","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"29-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.65
P. Ordeshook
Even if we ignore the consequences of Russia’s intervention into Ukraine’s internal affairs, Ukraine confronts some seemingly insurmountable problems in transitioning to a stable and prosperous state. Having inherited a top down and largely corrupt political structure, there are those who see decentralization in some form as a partial solution. Here, though, we argue that decentralization, even if crafted on the European Union template of subsidiarity, can introduce problems of collective action that would further undermine the country’s viability. To avoid exacerbating the problems of collective action occasioned by Ukraine’s fractured political economic system, decentralization must proceed with an understanding of how those problems are treated in successful federal states
{"title":"Mancur Olson, collective action and the design of a federal state: The case of Ukraine","authors":"P. Ordeshook","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.65","url":null,"abstract":"Even if we ignore the consequences of Russia’s intervention into Ukraine’s internal affairs, Ukraine confronts some seemingly insurmountable problems in transitioning to a stable and prosperous state. Having inherited a top down and largely corrupt political structure, there are those who see decentralization in some form as a partial solution. Here, though, we argue that decentralization, even if crafted on the European Union template of subsidiarity, can introduce problems of collective action that would further undermine the country’s viability. To avoid exacerbating the problems of collective action occasioned by Ukraine’s fractured political economic system, decentralization must proceed with an understanding of how those problems are treated in successful federal states","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"155-170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.61
L. Balcerowicz
The paper fi rst highlights Olson’s contribution to social sciences. Two main dimensions of political regimes are then distinguished. Features of economically successful reforms are defi ned. Next, the situational determinants of market reforms are discussed. Against this background a special case is analyzed: reforms after socialism. Finally, the deterioration of economic systems and their causes are presented.
{"title":"On the economics and the political economy of reforms","authors":"L. Balcerowicz","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.61","url":null,"abstract":"The paper fi rst highlights Olson’s contribution to social sciences. Two main dimensions of political regimes are then distinguished. Features of economically successful reforms are defi ned. Next, the situational determinants of market reforms are discussed. Against this background a special case is analyzed: reforms after socialism. Finally, the deterioration of economic systems and their causes are presented.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"67-90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.62
M. Kaminski
Non-cooperative games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Asymmetric Coordination and others are primary tools used for modeling collective action. I consider formal models that are close cousins of such standard games: Schelling’s games, Kuran’s dominos and partition function form games. For certain empirical problems, each of these formalisms may have advantages over standard games. Among the benefi ts there are mathematical simplicity, more intuitive depiction of represented phenomena, and better operationalizability. I formalize all three models and prove simple existence theorems for two of them. The detailed examples of applications include vaccination, unpredictability of revolutions, and electoral coalitions.
{"title":"Schelling games, Kuran dominos and electoral coalitions. Non-standard game-theoretic models of collective action","authors":"M. Kaminski","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.62","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.62","url":null,"abstract":"Non-cooperative games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Asymmetric Coordination and others are primary tools used for modeling collective action. I consider formal models that are close cousins of such standard games: Schelling’s games, Kuran’s dominos and partition function form games. For certain empirical problems, each of these formalisms may have advantages over standard games. Among the benefi ts there are mathematical simplicity, more intuitive depiction of represented phenomena, and better operationalizability. I formalize all three models and prove simple existence theorems for two of them. The detailed examples of applications include vaccination, unpredictability of revolutions, and electoral coalitions.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"91-106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.46
Grzegorz Lissowski
The cost-benefit analysis has a long history, especially in the United States. Its widespread use in Europe is connected with the requirements of the European Commission, the European Union, that preceded the selection of projects financed from EU funds or was the basis for the evaluation of projects. The aim of this article is to draw attention to the social aspects of this analysis, as they conducted limited analysis to the economic and financial aspects.
{"title":"Społeczne aspekty analizy kosztów i korzyści","authors":"Grzegorz Lissowski","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.46","url":null,"abstract":"The cost-benefit analysis has a long history, especially in the United States. Its widespread use in Europe is connected with the requirements of the European Commission, the European Union, that preceded the selection of projects financed from EU funds or was the basis for the evaluation of projects. The aim of this article is to draw attention to the social aspects of this analysis, as they conducted limited analysis to the economic and financial aspects.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"47-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.45
Patricia C. Rodda
Although refugees are offered the potential of asylum protection through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, many states are attempting to curtail the number of asylum applications received each year. Several scholars have argued that even without such deterrence measures, some refugees are less likely to receive a positive asylum decision than others. Using country level data for 32 European states, this project examines the effects of various characteristics – including gender, age, and state of origin – on the likelihood of being granted asylum. This study is a first attempt at empirically testing the asylum literature’s anecdotal evidence of bias in the decision-making processes in determining the outcomes of asylum claims.
{"title":"Decision-making processes and asylum claims in Europe: an empirical analysis of refugee characteristics and asylum application outcomes","authors":"Patricia C. Rodda","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.45","url":null,"abstract":"Although refugees are offered the potential of asylum protection through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, many states are attempting to curtail the number of asylum applications received each year. Several scholars have argued that even without such deterrence measures, some refugees are less likely to receive a positive asylum decision than others. Using country level data for 32 European states, this project examines the effects of various characteristics – including gender, age, and state of origin – on the likelihood of being granted asylum. This study is a first attempt at empirically testing the asylum literature’s anecdotal evidence of bias in the decision-making processes in determining the outcomes of asylum claims.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"23-46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.48
Marek M. Kamiński
The paper starts with the definitions of five major voting methods that can be applied in single-member districts. Then the political consequences of single-member districts are discussed. The special attention is paid to those consequences that are considered negative and to potential ways of neutralizing them. The next section compares selected subtle effects of using simple majority rule versus alternative vote. The final section reviews methods that mix proportional representation and majoritarian components.
{"title":"Metody głosowania w okręgach jednomandatowych i ich własności","authors":"Marek M. Kamiński","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.48","url":null,"abstract":"The paper starts with the definitions of five major voting methods that can be applied in single-member districts. Then the political consequences of single-member districts are discussed. The special attention is paid to those consequences that are considered negative and to potential ways of neutralizing them. The next section compares selected subtle effects of using simple majority rule versus alternative vote. The final section reviews methods that mix proportional representation and majoritarian components.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"105-122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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