Pub Date : 2018-06-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.101
Adam Gendźwiłł, J. Flis, Dariusz Stolicki
The article presents the usage of the preference votes in open-list proportional representation system (OLPR). The electoral rules condition the effi ciency of the casted votes, i.e. the extent to which the voters’ preferences affect the distribution of seats. In the OLPR system the “wasted votes” may refer not only to the representation of party preferences, but also personal preferences frequently expressing distinct territorial identities. Using the data from Polish Sejm elections, as well as the subnational elections, the authors analyze the usage and outcomes of the preference votes. During the last two decades in Sejm elections the share of effi cient preference votes (casted for the elected representatives) was only slightly higher than the share of votes casted for the losing candidates; in case of the subnational elections, the latter category of votes visibly prevailed. The authors analyze in detail the differences between the elections, parties and Sejm electoral districts, representing various characteristics. Non-parametrical regression analysis provides the list of factors infl uencing the effi ciency of preferential votes, which is generally in agreement with the theoretical expectations. The largest shares of effi cient preference votes may be observed in the districts of a high magnitude, and a lower level of fragmentation (both party and territorial).
{"title":"ZWYCIĘSKIE PREFERENCJE. SKUTECZNOŚĆ GŁOSÓW PREFERENCYJNYCH W SYSTEMIE PROPORCJONALNYM Z LISTAMI OTWARTYMI","authors":"Adam Gendźwiłł, J. Flis, Dariusz Stolicki","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.101","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the usage of the preference votes in open-list proportional representation system (OLPR). The electoral rules condition the effi ciency of the casted votes, i.e. the extent to which the voters’ preferences affect the distribution of seats. In the OLPR system the “wasted votes” may refer not only to the representation of party preferences, but also personal preferences frequently expressing distinct territorial identities. Using the data from Polish Sejm elections, as well as the subnational elections, the authors analyze the usage and outcomes of the preference votes. During the last two decades in Sejm elections the share of effi cient preference votes (casted for the elected representatives) was only slightly higher than the share of votes casted for the losing candidates; in case of the subnational elections, the latter category of votes visibly prevailed. The authors analyze in detail the differences between the elections, parties and Sejm electoral districts, representing various characteristics. Non-parametrical regression analysis provides the list of factors infl uencing the effi ciency of preferential votes, which is generally in agreement with the theoretical expectations. The largest shares of effi cient preference votes may be observed in the districts of a high magnitude, and a lower level of fragmentation (both party and territorial).","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43035158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.96
P. Tomczak
This paper reviews the literature regarding the anchoring heuristic. Despite substantial empirical background the anchoring effect cannot be fully explained with just one psychological mechanism. In the first part of the article the classical mechanisms of anchoring are discussed – the insufficient adjustment mechanism and the selective accessibility Additionally, alternative theoretical explanations of the anchoring effect are discussed. In the second part of the article experimental procedures that are used to investigate the anchoring effect are revised. According to the literature paying suffi cient attention to the anchor or compatibility between the anchor and the estimation target determine the effectiveness of the anchoring. However, collating those conditions with results obtained with different anchoring procedures show that those rules are not universal. Highlighted theoretical questions indicate a possible direction for further research aimed at fi nding one psychological mechanism that fully explains the anchoring effect.
{"title":"Dlaczego kotwica kotwiczy? Przegląd mechanizmów i zasad działania heurystyki zakotwiczenia","authors":"P. Tomczak","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.96","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.96","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the literature regarding the anchoring heuristic. Despite substantial empirical background the anchoring effect cannot be fully explained with just one psychological mechanism. In the first part of the article the classical mechanisms of anchoring are discussed – the insufficient adjustment mechanism and the selective accessibility Additionally, alternative theoretical explanations of the anchoring effect are discussed. In the second part of the article experimental procedures that are used to investigate the anchoring effect are revised. According to the literature paying suffi cient attention to the anchor or compatibility between the anchor and the estimation target determine the effectiveness of the anchoring. However, collating those conditions with results obtained with different anchoring procedures show that those rules are not universal. Highlighted theoretical questions indicate a possible direction for further research aimed at fi nding one psychological mechanism that fully explains the anchoring effect.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"93-110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47865347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.94
Agnieszka Lewandowska, J. Sokołowska, Andrzej Sopoćko
The aims of this study were: (1) to explore how individual investors assess the importance of macroeconomic and stock market cues in identifying market trends and (2) verifi cation of different weighting measures. In total, 176 individual Polish investors were examined with two different methods of measuring the importance of the cues. Direct measurements were carried out by asking participants to choose the 7 most important pieces of information out of a total of 16. The investors ranked these cues from most to least important. Then the participants were asked to distribute 100 points amongst the cues, so that the value assigned to each option refl ected its relative importance. Rank positions were transformed into approximate weights through the use of two methods: rank order centroid and rank-sum. Then the weights were compared to the weights explicitly provided by participants. In the second part of the experiment, 16 cues were presented on an information board. The participants were asked to select the most important cues to determine the market trend. The study showed that the results of direct and indirect measurements are consistent – in particular, that stock market cues are more important than others. Moreover, the weights assigned explicitly to the cues by participants are refl ected by the approximate weights calculated using the presented methods.
{"title":"Ocena ważności informacji przy diagnozie trendów giełdowych przez inwestorów indywidualnych","authors":"Agnieszka Lewandowska, J. Sokołowska, Andrzej Sopoćko","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.94","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.94","url":null,"abstract":"The aims of this study were: (1) to explore how individual investors assess the importance of macroeconomic and stock market cues in identifying market trends and (2) verifi cation of different weighting measures. In total, 176 individual Polish investors were examined with two different methods of measuring the importance of the cues. Direct measurements were carried out by asking participants to choose the 7 most important pieces of information out of a total of 16. The investors ranked these cues from most to least important. Then the participants were asked to distribute 100 points amongst the cues, so that the value assigned to each option refl ected its relative importance. Rank positions were transformed into approximate weights through the use of two methods: rank order centroid and rank-sum. Then the weights were compared to the weights explicitly provided by participants. In the second part of the experiment, 16 cues were presented on an information board. The participants were asked to select the most important cues to determine the market trend. The study showed that the results of direct and indirect measurements are consistent – in particular, that stock market cues are more important than others. Moreover, the weights assigned explicitly to the cues by participants are refl ected by the approximate weights calculated using the presented methods.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"39-58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41986814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.93
O. Orlova
The paper contributes to the literature on other-regarding preferences challenging the narrow self-interest assumption. Experimental evidence confirms that the same individuals might express different otherregarding preferences in different situations or contexts. The structure of their interaction, their relative positions in it might trigger different behavioral patterns. In this paper we propose a model of multi-level other-regarding preferences assuming that different levels are actualized depending on the context in which an individual has to take her decision. We analyze the experimental trust game letting the players have multi-level preferences. Under certain parameterization and asymmetric information assumption, we show that the share given up by the leader of the game in favor of the follower is strictly monotonically increasing with altruism of the former. It is also demonstrated that utilitarian social welfare is increasing with the leader’s altruism if the players are not extremely risk-averse. In the case when information for both players is incomplete, a separating equilibrium exists allowing to distinguish between leaders with different other-regarding preferences.
{"title":"Levels of other-regarding preferences and the structure of the interaction","authors":"O. Orlova","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.93","url":null,"abstract":"The paper contributes to the literature on other-regarding preferences challenging the narrow self-interest assumption. Experimental evidence confirms that the same individuals might express different otherregarding preferences in different situations or contexts. The structure of their interaction, their relative positions in it might trigger different behavioral patterns. In this paper we propose a model of multi-level other-regarding preferences assuming that different levels are actualized depending on the context in which an individual has to take her decision. We analyze the experimental trust game letting the players have multi-level preferences. Under certain parameterization and asymmetric information assumption, we show that the share given up by the leader of the game in favor of the follower is strictly monotonically increasing with altruism of the former. It is also demonstrated that utilitarian social welfare is increasing with the leader’s altruism if the players are not extremely risk-averse. In the case when information for both players is incomplete, a separating equilibrium exists allowing to distinguish between leaders with different other-regarding preferences.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"5-38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43365354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-15DOI: 10.7206/dec.1733-0092.97
J. Haman
{"title":"RECENZJA KSIĄŻKI WOJCIECHA RAFAŁOWSKIEGO „OPISYWANIE I WYJAŚNIANIE SYSTEMU PARTYJNEGO. METODY POMIARU”","authors":"J. Haman","doi":"10.7206/dec.1733-0092.97","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/dec.1733-0092.97","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"111-115"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49304988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.89
Rafał Muda
{"title":"RECENZJA KSIĄŻKI PHILIPA E. TETLOCKA I DANA GARDNERA „SUPERPROGNOZOWANIE. SZTUKA I NAUKA PROGNOZOWANIA”","authors":"Rafał Muda","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.89","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"14 1","pages":"115-120"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48165865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.91
Marek M. Kamiński, A. Wieczorek, M. Malawski
{"title":"Paradoks Abilene i inne medytacje na temat zarządzania - Jerry Harvey. Komentarze:","authors":"Marek M. Kamiński, A. Wieczorek, M. Malawski","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.91","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"14 1","pages":"129-138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42027926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.87
Przemysław Remin, Tomasz Tarczyński
The inspiration for writing this article was a relatively high number of invalid ballots in Poland’s local government election in 2014. We wanted to answer the following question: what might happen to a seat won in the d'Hondt-Jefferson electoral system if the invalid ballots were originally valid. We were interested in over-voted ballots, where one choice could be originally marked by a voter and other choices added by a biased commission. Would the number of such invalid ballots be potentially high enough to change the election result, if they were assigned to other parties as valid votes? Fundamental for weighing the influence of invalid ballots on the results of a contested election is the margin of victory of the winning candidate. The margin of victory is easy to calculate for a single-member district election method but in a d’Hondt-Jefferson method, it is complex and requires simulation of the whole system, by adding additional votes to different parties. We propose a method of operating the candidate’s margin of victory as the smallest number of additional votes needed by other competing parties to take that seat. For every seat, we introduce the indicator l as the ratio of the margin of victory and the number of invalid ballots. The indicator l allows for some assessment if the seat is being threatened by invalid ballots. The higher the value of the indicator, the more vulnerable the seat is. At a value of l lower than one, the seat is safe, as invalid ballots in any configuration, may not give it to other parties. We demonstrate the calculation of the margin of victory and the indicator l on the example of Poland’s local government elections to county councils conducted in 2014, where the seats are distributed by the d'Hondt-Jefferson method. Almost 17% of the votes were invalid at that time. Since there were no statistics on over-voted ballots we have assumed all invalid ballots could be originally valid and might be cast to any party. That drove us to a conclusion that 47% of all mandates were threatened. The defined margin of victory and the indicator l may be of practical use in resolving electoral protests by the courts, as they give a glimpse of the likelihood of changing the election outcome.
{"title":"Margines zwycięstwa kandydata i mandaty zagrożone w systemie d'Hondta-Jeffersona","authors":"Przemysław Remin, Tomasz Tarczyński","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.87","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.87","url":null,"abstract":"The inspiration for writing this article was a relatively high number of invalid ballots in Poland’s local government election in 2014. We wanted to answer the following question: what might happen to a seat won in the d'Hondt-Jefferson electoral system if the invalid ballots were originally valid. We were interested in over-voted ballots, where one choice could be originally marked by a voter and other choices added by a biased commission. Would the number of such invalid ballots be potentially high enough to change the election result, if they were assigned to other parties as valid votes? Fundamental for weighing the influence of invalid ballots on the results of a contested election is the margin of victory of the winning candidate. The margin of victory is easy to calculate for a single-member district election method but in a d’Hondt-Jefferson method, it is complex and requires simulation of the whole system, by adding additional votes to different parties. We propose a method of operating the candidate’s margin of victory as the smallest number of additional votes needed by other competing parties to take that seat. For every seat, we introduce the indicator l as the ratio of the margin of victory and the number of invalid ballots. The indicator l allows for some assessment if the seat is being threatened by invalid ballots. The higher the value of the indicator, the more vulnerable the seat is. At a value of l lower than one, the seat is safe, as invalid ballots in any configuration, may not give it to other parties. We demonstrate the calculation of the margin of victory and the indicator l on the example of Poland’s local government elections to county councils conducted in 2014, where the seats are distributed by the d'Hondt-Jefferson method. Almost 17% of the votes were invalid at that time. Since there were no statistics on over-voted ballots we have assumed all invalid ballots could be originally valid and might be cast to any party. That drove us to a conclusion that 47% of all mandates were threatened. The defined margin of victory and the indicator l may be of practical use in resolving electoral protests by the courts, as they give a glimpse of the likelihood of changing the election outcome.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"14 1","pages":"89-106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48891337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：