Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.123
M. Kościelniak, T. Tyszka
In this article we attempt to summarize the findings from a number of studies on the asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect, decoy effect). This is a phenomenon where popularity of one of the decision alternatives increases when accompanied by a similar but inferior (dominated) option. Scientifi c research and numerous observational studies show that the attraction effect occurs in various fi elds, incl. the economy, politics, law or medicine. In the literature there are many ambiguities and contradictory theories about, for example, its determinants in the light of the dual-systems theory. It is not entirely clear whether the phenomenon of asymmetric domination is the result of a refl ective, deliberative way of information processing or of quick and intuitive thinking. There is also no unequivocal answer to the question whether this effect is a manifestation of human irrationality or whether it is an adaptive and effective decision-making strategy in conditions of uncertainty and information noise. The article contains a broad overview of research on the effect of asymmetric dominance among people and animals. The changes in the susceptibility to this effect across the lifespan are analysed. Finally, the paper discusses using the asymmetric dominance effect to achieve socially desirable goals as described in the theory of libertarian paternalism.
{"title":"Nieistotne alternatywy wyboru mają znaczenie. Przegląd wiedzy o efekcie asymetrycznej dominacji","authors":"M. Kościelniak, T. Tyszka","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.123","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we attempt to summarize the findings from a number of studies on the asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect, decoy effect). This is a phenomenon where popularity of one of the decision alternatives increases when accompanied by a similar but inferior (dominated) option. Scientifi c research and numerous observational studies show that the attraction effect occurs in various fi elds, incl. the economy, politics, law or medicine. In the literature there are many ambiguities and contradictory theories about, for example, its determinants in the light of the dual-systems theory. It is not entirely clear whether the phenomenon of asymmetric domination is the result of a refl ective, deliberative way of information processing or of quick and intuitive thinking. There is also no unequivocal answer to the question whether this effect is a manifestation of human irrationality or whether it is an adaptive and effective decision-making strategy in conditions of uncertainty and information noise. The article contains a broad overview of research on the effect of asymmetric dominance among people and animals. The changes in the susceptibility to this effect across the lifespan are analysed. Finally, the paper discusses using the asymmetric dominance effect to achieve socially desirable goals as described in the theory of libertarian paternalism.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.130
Alex Keena, Michael Latner, A. McGann, C. Smith
Gerrymandering is a form of voting manipulation whereby electoral district boundaries are drawn to produce a partisan or political bias in elections. In this paper, we study partisan gerrymandering in the United States to understand its undemocratic outcomes and how the design of election institutions can promote or prevent gerrymandering. We begin with a survey of the history of gerrymandering, with a particular focus on partisan gerrymandering. We then consider the normative standards of fairness in democracy that partisan gerrymandering may violate. Next, we present a typology of partisan gerrymandering based upon the district maps drawn in California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey for the 2012 elections. Using the partisan symmetry method, we estimate the seats/votes curves of the congressional maps used in 38 states during the 2012 elections. We find that partisan gerrymanders occur almost exclusively when politicians are given control over redistricting. This analysis implies that a political designer, who wants to minimize gerrymandering, should not put redistricting in the hands of politicians.
{"title":"Common Forms of Gerrymandering in the United States","authors":"Alex Keena, Michael Latner, A. McGann, C. Smith","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.130","url":null,"abstract":"Gerrymandering is a form of voting manipulation whereby electoral district boundaries are drawn to produce a partisan or political bias in elections. In this paper, we study partisan gerrymandering in the United States to understand its undemocratic outcomes and how the design of election institutions can promote or prevent gerrymandering. We begin with a survey of the history of gerrymandering, with a particular focus on partisan gerrymandering. We then consider the normative standards of fairness in democracy that partisan gerrymandering may violate. Next, we present a typology of partisan gerrymandering based upon the district maps drawn in California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey for the 2012 elections. Using the partisan symmetry method, we estimate the seats/votes curves of the congressional maps used in 38 states during the 2012 elections. We find that partisan gerrymanders occur almost exclusively when politicians are given control over redistricting. This analysis implies that a political designer, who wants to minimize gerrymandering, should not put redistricting in the hands of politicians.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"41-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.131
A. Karbowski
The aim of this paper is to investigate the fi rms’ incentives to engage in process R&D under vertical industrial setting, when the raising rivals’ cost effect is present. We show that R&D investment of the downstream duopoly fi rm raises the rival’s marginal costs of production. The downstream R&D behavior can give rise to the symmetric investment games, i.e., the prisoner’s dilemma, the deadlock game and the harmony game, between downstream competitors. If the costs of the R&D investments made by the downstream fi rms are large enough, the downstream fi rms can participate in the harmony game, which results in the investment hold-up or the creation of the R&D-avoiding cartel. For more R&D-effi cient downstream fi rms, the downstream investment game can end up in the prisoner’s dilemma or the deadlock game. In the prisoner’s dilemma, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, but such a behavior is not Pareto optimal. In the prisoner’s dilemma, greed and fear make fi rms invest in R&D. In the deadlock game, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, and such a behavior is Pareto optimal. The R&D investments are not induced by any social tension (greed or fear).
{"title":"Greed and Fear in Downstream R&D Games","authors":"A. Karbowski","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.131","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to investigate the fi rms’ incentives to engage in process R&D under vertical industrial setting, when the raising rivals’ cost effect is present. We show that R&D investment of the downstream duopoly fi rm raises the rival’s marginal costs of production. The downstream R&D behavior can give rise to the symmetric investment games, i.e., the prisoner’s dilemma, the deadlock game and the harmony game, between downstream competitors. If the costs of the R&D investments made by the downstream fi rms are large enough, the downstream fi rms can participate in the harmony game, which results in the investment hold-up or the creation of the R&D-avoiding cartel. For more R&D-effi cient downstream fi rms, the downstream investment game can end up in the prisoner’s dilemma or the deadlock game. In the prisoner’s dilemma, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, but such a behavior is not Pareto optimal. In the prisoner’s dilemma, greed and fear make fi rms invest in R&D. In the deadlock game, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, and such a behavior is Pareto optimal. The R&D investments are not induced by any social tension (greed or fear).","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"63-76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.124
B. Kaiser
Winning a championship is the highest achievement in Formula 1, and multiple titles can earn one a place in the pantheon of the sport. In this article I explore whether the scoring method for selecting a champion can be considered defi nitive, and how unstable results might be when the method’s parameters are slightly changed. I have employed case studies of paradoxes and historical recreations of seasons using alternative scoring systems. Finally, I argue that the Borda count is desirable system for scoring in Formula 1, and that building strategies by teams around particular scoring systems is a legitimate aspect of the sport.
{"title":"Strategy and Paradoxes of Borda Count in Formula 1 Racing","authors":"B. Kaiser","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.124","url":null,"abstract":"Winning a championship is the highest achievement in Formula 1, and multiple titles can earn one a place in the pantheon of the sport. In this article I explore whether the scoring method for selecting a champion can be considered defi nitive, and how unstable results might be when the method’s parameters are slightly changed. I have employed case studies of paradoxes and historical recreations of seasons using alternative scoring systems. Finally, I argue that the Borda count is desirable system for scoring in Formula 1, and that building strategies by teams around particular scoring systems is a legitimate aspect of the sport.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/dec.1733-0092.128
E. Kubińska
{"title":"Sprawozdanie z XIII Konferencji akademickiego Stowarzyszenia Psychologii Ekonomiczne","authors":"E. Kubińska","doi":"10.7206/dec.1733-0092.128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/dec.1733-0092.128","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/dec.1733-0092.134
M. Malawski
{"title":"Alvin E. Roth – Matchmaking. Kto co dostaje i dlaczego","authors":"M. Malawski","doi":"10.7206/dec.1733-0092.134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/dec.1733-0092.134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"125-130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.125
Wojciech Białaszek
{"title":"Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter Todd i ABC Research Group - \"Zagadki heurystyk decyzyjnych\"","authors":"Wojciech Białaszek","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.125","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"133-139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.121
Małgorzata Niesiobędzka, S. Kołodziej
This paper presents the results of two studies analysing the impact of procedural fairness and a sense of alienation on real tax payments in the public goods game. Study 1 showed that an unfair procedure of determining the rules of the game increases the frequency of tax evasion. In Study 2, tax evasion was associated with a sense of alienation induced in the subjects, understood as a conviction about the ineffectiveness of one’s own actions. The results of the studies presented in this paper indicate the importance of the treatment of taxpayers by the tax system as a factor infl uencing the propensity for tax fraud.
{"title":"Procedural Fairness, a Sense of Alienation and Paying Taxes","authors":"Małgorzata Niesiobędzka, S. Kołodziej","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.121","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of two studies analysing the impact of procedural fairness and a sense of alienation on real tax payments in the public goods game. Study 1 showed that an unfair procedure of determining the rules of the game increases the frequency of tax evasion. In Study 2, tax evasion was associated with a sense of alienation induced in the subjects, understood as a conviction about the ineffectiveness of one’s own actions. The results of the studies presented in this paper indicate the importance of the treatment of taxpayers by the tax system as a factor infl uencing the propensity for tax fraud.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71325965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.111
Marek M. Kamiński
W artykule dokonano analizy wyborow w okregach wielomandatowych z roznymi typami spoilerow. W wyborach jednomandatowych „klasyczny” spoiler wchodzący do wyborow zamienia zwyciezce w przegrywającego i jednocześnie jednego z pokonanych w zwyciezce. Podobne sytuacje rzadko mają miejsce w wyborach wielomandatowych. W takich wyborach istnieją bardziej subtelne efekty przypominające dzialanie klasycznego spoilera. „Krolotworca” zamienia kandydata niebedącego faktycznym zwyciezcą w zwyciezce wyborow; „Krolobojca” pozbawia zwyciestwa uprzednio wygrywającego wybory; „Szkodnik” zabiera pewnemu konkurentowi wiecej mandatow, niz sam zdobywa; „Autospoilery” tracą mandaty, startując w wyborach samodzielnie raczej niz tworząc koalicje. Mozliwe są tez rozne warianty spoilerow strategicznych, takich jak fi kcyjne partie. W artykule przeprowadzono analize ośmiu wyborow parlamentarnych, ktore mialy miejsce w Polsce po roku 1989. W dwoch przypadkach konsekwencje istnienia spoilerow byly bardzo duze. W 1993 roku rozproszenie na prawicy (Autospoilery) pomoglo SLD i PSL wrocic do wladzy, spowolnilo proces dekomunizacji i stworzylo silne przeszkody instytucjonalne na drodze do dalszej demokratyzacji. W roku 2015 maly Krolotworca, partia Razem, pomogl PiS osiągnąc wiekszośc parlamentarną i umozliwil realizacje radykalnego programu zmian. W pozostalych wyborach konsekwencje byly mniejsze, lecz rowniez godne odnotowania. Wyniki sugerują, ze wybory parlamentarne przeprowadzane przy uzyciu ordynacji proporcjonalnej z listami kandydatow są bardzo wrazliwe na dzialanie spoilerow.
{"title":"Spoilery w systemach reprezentacji proporcjonalnej: Analiza ośmiu polskich wyborów parlamentarnych, 1991-2015","authors":"Marek M. Kamiński","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.111","url":null,"abstract":"W artykule dokonano analizy wyborow w okregach wielomandatowych z roznymi typami spoilerow. W wyborach jednomandatowych „klasyczny” spoiler wchodzący do wyborow zamienia zwyciezce w przegrywającego i jednocześnie jednego z pokonanych w zwyciezce. Podobne sytuacje rzadko mają miejsce w wyborach wielomandatowych. W takich wyborach istnieją bardziej subtelne efekty przypominające dzialanie klasycznego spoilera. „Krolotworca” zamienia kandydata niebedącego faktycznym zwyciezcą w zwyciezce wyborow; „Krolobojca” pozbawia zwyciestwa uprzednio wygrywającego wybory; „Szkodnik” zabiera pewnemu konkurentowi wiecej mandatow, niz sam zdobywa; „Autospoilery” tracą mandaty, startując w wyborach samodzielnie raczej niz tworząc koalicje. Mozliwe są tez rozne warianty spoilerow strategicznych, takich jak fi kcyjne partie. W artykule przeprowadzono analize ośmiu wyborow parlamentarnych, ktore mialy miejsce w Polsce po roku 1989. W dwoch przypadkach konsekwencje istnienia spoilerow byly bardzo duze. W 1993 roku rozproszenie na prawicy (Autospoilery) pomoglo SLD i PSL wrocic do wladzy, spowolnilo proces dekomunizacji i stworzylo silne przeszkody instytucjonalne na drodze do dalszej demokratyzacji. W roku 2015 maly Krolotworca, partia Razem, pomogl PiS osiągnąc wiekszośc parlamentarną i umozliwil realizacje radykalnego programu zmian. W pozostalych wyborach konsekwencje byly mniejsze, lecz rowniez godne odnotowania. Wyniki sugerują, ze wybory parlamentarne przeprowadzane przy uzyciu ordynacji proporcjonalnej z listami kandydatow są bardzo wrazliwe na dzialanie spoilerow.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49318274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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