Pub Date : 2016-06-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.75
A. Hełka
{"title":"Sprawozdanie z konferencji ASPE","authors":"A. Hełka","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.75","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.75","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"13 1","pages":"105-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.57
Peter Murrell
For this short essay, I have been given the brief of sharing my personal recollections of Mancur Olson. Therefore, my focus is almost entirely personal, and not intellectual. Many scholars are much more qualified than I am to exposit the latter. My comparative advantage is that I knew Mancur well as a close colleague for over 20 years. Now I am the Mancur Olson Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, a professorship supported by the many contributions of the individuals who were deeply affected by Mancur.
{"title":"MANCUR OLSON: PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS","authors":"Peter Murrell","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.57","url":null,"abstract":"For this short essay, I have been given the brief of sharing my personal recollections of Mancur Olson. Therefore, my focus is almost entirely personal, and not intellectual. Many scholars are much more qualified than I am to exposit the latter. My comparative advantage is that I knew Mancur well as a close colleague for over 20 years. Now I am the Mancur Olson Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, a professorship supported by the many contributions of the individuals who were deeply affected by Mancur.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"49-54"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.60
Piotr Swistak
Mancur was so well known that those who did not keep close tabs on such things commonly believed that he held the Nobel Prize in economics. Actually, he did not. No one, however, doubts that had he lived just a few years longer—Mancur was 66 when he died—he would have been awarded the Prize. Many of the Prize recipients have never enjoyed his fame or influence. In the social sciences Olson was unique.
{"title":"The deeds of Mancur Olson: A ride from Palmer House and a meeting in LeFrak Hall","authors":"Piotr Swistak","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.60","url":null,"abstract":"Mancur was so well known that those who did not keep close tabs on such things commonly believed that he held the Nobel Prize in economics. Actually, he did not. No one, however, doubts that had he lived just a few years longer—Mancur was 66 when he died—he would have been awarded the Prize. Many of the Prize recipients have never enjoyed his fame or influence. In the social sciences Olson was unique.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"61-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.66
C. Uhlaner
Relational goods contribute to understanding why people engage in collective action, notably including political participation, even though, as Olson showed, it would often be more rational for them to free-ride on the activity of others. Relational goods are neither public goods nor private goods but a third type of good. They must be jointly consumed with another person or persons (unlike private goods), but the identity of the other persons matters crucially (unlike the case for public goods). Relational goods can only exist by mutual agreement as part of a relationship with non-arbitrary others, in the context of an interaction. Friendship is a prototypical example. Relational goods can exist along a range of personal contact from direct, where individuals interact face to face, to indirect, where the interaction may be at a distance with a certain type of person. In the indirect case the relational good may frequently take the form of reinforcing a desired social identity. The distinction between “consumption” and “instrumental” goods applies, parallel with other usage. The consumption relational goods are produced independent of any consequences of the action or relationship, while the instrumental ones refl ect consequences, such as from an action that enhances the value of an identity. People who value relational goods may act collectively even if other net benefi ts of action are negative. Larger groups become more, not less, prone to collective activity. Relational goods provide a missing element to understand how the process of mobilization works at the individual level; leaders can infl uence people’s perceptions of what others are doing, of the value of a shared identity, and of the likelihood of success. Some limited empirical evidence is consistent with relational goods playing a role in enhancing collective action.
{"title":"Relational goods and overcoming barriers to collective action","authors":"C. Uhlaner","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.66","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.66","url":null,"abstract":"Relational goods contribute to understanding why people engage in collective action, notably including political participation, even though, as Olson showed, it would often be more rational for them to free-ride on the activity of others. Relational goods are neither public goods nor private goods but a third type of good. They must be jointly consumed with another person or persons (unlike private goods), but the identity of the other persons matters crucially (unlike the case for public goods). Relational goods can only exist by mutual agreement as part of a relationship with non-arbitrary others, in the context of an interaction. Friendship is a prototypical example. Relational goods can exist along a range of personal contact from direct, where individuals interact face to face, to indirect, where the interaction may be at a distance with a certain type of person. In the indirect case the relational good may frequently take the form of reinforcing a desired social identity. The distinction between “consumption” and “instrumental” goods applies, parallel with other usage. The consumption relational goods are produced independent of any consequences of the action or relationship, while the instrumental ones refl ect consequences, such as from an action that enhances the value of an identity. People who value relational goods may act collectively even if other net benefi ts of action are negative. Larger groups become more, not less, prone to collective activity. Relational goods provide a missing element to understand how the process of mobilization works at the individual level; leaders can infl uence people’s perceptions of what others are doing, of the value of a shared identity, and of the likelihood of success. Some limited empirical evidence is consistent with relational goods playing a role in enhancing collective action.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"171-190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.54
Keith L. Dougherty
Mancur was a happy and inquisitive person who had insights about big pictures that technicalities could never derail. The Logic of Collective Action and The Rise and Decline of Nations were certainly like that. They made bold claims that motivated researchers to go further. For example, The Logic of Collective Action provided new insights into the free-rider problem and a number of eye-catching hypotheses about group behavior that researchers tried to confirm, refute, or refine for decades, including claims about the relationship between group size and group success, the exploitation of larger actors by smaller ones, and the importance of selective incentives in group formation. The Rise and Decline of Nations argued that interest groups will eventually find rent seeking profitable, which will squeeze an economy through institutional sclerosis. Comparative political scientists and economists have since discovered cases supporting his claim, as well as cases better explained by alternative hypotheses. Both books were so well written that I still read them again and again just to think about how I might organize my own thoughts or write a good conclusion. Olson’s application of economic methodology to subjects that were traditionally in the realm of political science helped break political science out of its mid-twentieth-century rut, which spent too much time on the history of ideas and often assumed individuals would work towards their collective interests. By applying economic methodology to politics, political scientists could create valid assertions of their own and more cleanly apply them to cases that could be tested. In this way, Mancur became part of a movement that helped the social sciences proceed more scientifically. I have three memories of Mancur that stand above the rest. The first was his incredible ability to think on his feet. One year, in the mid-1990s, the Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics invited Amartya Sen to speak on campus. For
{"title":"Memories of Mancur : a Student Reminisces","authors":"Keith L. Dougherty","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.54","url":null,"abstract":"Mancur was a happy and inquisitive person who had insights about big pictures that technicalities could never derail. The Logic of Collective Action and The Rise and Decline of Nations were certainly like that. They made bold claims that motivated researchers to go further. For example, The Logic of Collective Action provided new insights into the free-rider problem and a number of eye-catching hypotheses about group behavior that researchers tried to confirm, refute, or refine for decades, including claims about the relationship between group size and group success, the exploitation of larger actors by smaller ones, and the importance of selective incentives in group formation. The Rise and Decline of Nations argued that interest groups will eventually find rent seeking profitable, which will squeeze an economy through institutional sclerosis. Comparative political scientists and economists have since discovered cases supporting his claim, as well as cases better explained by alternative hypotheses. Both books were so well written that I still read them again and again just to think about how I might organize my own thoughts or write a good conclusion. Olson’s application of economic methodology to subjects that were traditionally in the realm of political science helped break political science out of its mid-twentieth-century rut, which spent too much time on the history of ideas and often assumed individuals would work towards their collective interests. By applying economic methodology to politics, political scientists could create valid assertions of their own and more cleanly apply them to cases that could be tested. In this way, Mancur became part of a movement that helped the social sciences proceed more scientifically. I have three memories of Mancur that stand above the rest. The first was his incredible ability to think on his feet. One year, in the mid-1990s, the Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics invited Amartya Sen to speak on campus. For","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"19-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.55
Jac C. Heckelman
{"title":"My Remembrances of Mancur","authors":"Jac C. Heckelman","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.55","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"19 1","pages":"23-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.67
R. Zeckhauser
Mancur Olson offered us big thoughts on big subjects. Today, he might well attack the problem of climate change and the current failure of nations to act effectively. Olson would note the incentives of nations to ride free or cheaply. He would observe that climate change is an alliance problem, one where some nations have much more at stake than others. With climate change, the alliance problem is redoubled, since the asymmetries among nations fall along multiple dimensions, including those of vulnerability to climate change, history of greenhouse emissions, emissions per dollar of GNP, level of economic development, and cultural environmental concerns. Each nation, valuing primarily its own concerns, advances principles favoring itself in the apportionment of painful cuts. Not surprisingly, the cuts that nations have agreed upon for the heralded 2015 Paris Accords will be woefully insuffi cient to avoid exacerbating climate change. Thus, despite much international discussion and many platitudinous agreements, concerns about the distribution of painful cuts will continue to prevent the nations of the world from even approaching an effi cient agreement. Our threatened planet needs a more sophisticated approach to this and other collective action problems, a fi eld pioneered by Mancur Olson.
{"title":"Mancur Olson and the tragedy of the unbalanced commons","authors":"R. Zeckhauser","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.67","url":null,"abstract":"Mancur Olson offered us big thoughts on big subjects. Today, he might well attack the problem of climate change and the current failure of nations to act effectively. Olson would note the incentives of nations to ride free or cheaply. He would observe that climate change is an alliance problem, one where some nations have much more at stake than others. With climate change, the alliance problem is redoubled, since the asymmetries among nations fall along multiple dimensions, including those of vulnerability to climate change, history of greenhouse emissions, emissions per dollar of GNP, level of economic development, and cultural environmental concerns. Each nation, valuing primarily its own concerns, advances principles favoring itself in the apportionment of painful cuts. Not surprisingly, the cuts that nations have agreed upon for the heralded 2015 Paris Accords will be woefully insuffi cient to avoid exacerbating climate change. Thus, despite much international discussion and many platitudinous agreements, concerns about the distribution of painful cuts will continue to prevent the nations of the world from even approaching an effi cient agreement. Our threatened planet needs a more sophisticated approach to this and other collective action problems, a fi eld pioneered by Mancur Olson.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"191-202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-15DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.63
Marianna A. Klochko
This essay proposes that time preference is an essential component of analysis of collective behavior and provision of public goods. It addresses the validity of the assumption that time preference, as a parameter in individual utility functions, is exogenous and fi xed. While individual time discounting is used to predict many social phenomena, it is quite often applied in a fi xed form where the possibility of change is rarely discussed. The mechanism of change in individual time discounting is explored in different social contexts, using student, inmate and drug addict populations. This study establishes that certain parameters, such as the length of exposure to new environment and new social connections, are of extreme importance in determining the degree of change in time discounting.
{"title":"The endogeneity of time preference and analysis of collective behavior","authors":"Marianna A. Klochko","doi":"10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.63","url":null,"abstract":"This essay proposes that time preference is an essential component of analysis of collective behavior and provision of public goods. It addresses the validity of the assumption that time preference, as a parameter in individual utility functions, is exogenous and fi xed. While individual time discounting is used to predict many social phenomena, it is quite often applied in a fi xed form where the possibility of change is rarely discussed. The mechanism of change in individual time discounting is explored in different social contexts, using student, inmate and drug addict populations. This study establishes that certain parameters, such as the length of exposure to new environment and new social connections, are of extreme importance in determining the degree of change in time discounting.","PeriodicalId":37255,"journal":{"name":"Decyzje","volume":"1 1","pages":"107-122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71326383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}